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PREFACE
The subject of this dissertation is the development of the 
Continental Army's organizational forms and the evolution of its 
doctrine on the employment of military force. As such it combines 
institutional and Intellectual history, rather than using the tra­
ditional orientation of military history toward battles. I believe 
that understanding of the nature of opposing forces and their innate 
capabilities is a requirement for assessing generalship and campaigns.
Military organization takes place on two levels. A superior 
command structure includes a specialized staff and subordinate 
groupings of units. The staff functions as a collection of technical 
advisors to the army's leader and relieves him of much of the burden 
of detailed planning. The lower echelons of organization permit 
independent actions by field armies and a responsive internal arrange­
ment of a large force on the battlefield. On a unit level, organization 
means the formulation of a "flexible organization, permitting full 
application of the principle of economy of force," reduction of 
"headquarters and other overhead to speed up command," and devotion 
of "strength as fully as possible to elements which can be made 
effective offensively against the enemy."1
1. Lieutenant General Leslie J. McNair's Army Ground Forces Letter, 
subject: Orientation with Reference to Revised Organization, 21 Jul
1943, quoted in Kent Roberts Greenfield, _et al.. The Organization of 
Ground Combat Troops (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947),
pp. 374-5.
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This dissertation concentrates only on the Continental Army, the 
forerunner of today's Regular Army. Two other military forces existed 
during the War of American Independence: regular state troops and the
militia. The former were directly under the control of their 
respective state governments and tended to perform garrison duties at 
important ports or local fortifications, although at times they 
cooperated with the Continentals for extended periods. The latter 
were quintessentially local forces. John Shy and a host of other 
historians have recently paid close attention to the militia, high­
lighting its local defense mission and the institution's political 
implications. I hope that my work will complement theirs by explaining 
the nature of the other major component serving in the Revolution.
The War of American Independence was not a war of national liber­
ation in the Maoist sense. It did involve a struggle for popular 
support in which the militia played a critical role, but it also in­
cluded a very conventional eighteenth century military conflict. That 
contest between a regular British army with assistance from German 
auxiliaries and a regular American force with French aid relates 
directly to this dissertation. I have examined the creation of that 
American force and its evolution into a professional fighting machine 
which was among the most modern of the era. Many compromises had to be 
made during this process as a result of various financial, logistical, 
and manpower crises. Although the army in the field seldom matched 
the plans made for it, the very existence of that planning reveals a 
great deal about the nature of the war. Unfortunately, the transfor­
mation in 1778 of a local war into a global conflict obscured some of
v
the changes. British commanders, now concerned with France's actions, 
could no longer offer battle in the same way that they had in 1776 
and 1777.
No military institution exists in a vacuum. Organizations are 
designed within a context of doctrinal assumptions on the nature of 
military force and its most effective means of expression. The types 
of weapons and equipment available, conditions of terrain in which the 
fighting will take place, and the opponent to be faced are all factors 
weighing heavily on planners. Less obvious but equally important are 
political and ideological conditions. Extensive research over the 
last two decades into the ideological nature of the American Revolution 
and the development of American political institutions now makes it 
possible to place the Continental Army in perspective. Militants in 
the political opposition to Great Britain carried certain fundamental 
assumptions about military force in their ideological baggage which 
influenced the organization of the Continentals during the early years 
of the war. As the conflict went on a more cautious political element, 
allied with army leaders, altered the nature of the army.
This dissertation traces the emergence of a new American military 
institution from a combination of European roots and New World 
influences. It traces the transformation of an extemporized force 
into a national army. I tell the story from the perspective of George 
Washington and the Continental Congress because planning took place on 
that level. As I worked on the subject I became convinced that 
Washington's role was paramount. He set the tone of the army, guided 
its development, and coordinated the contributions of many subordinates.
vi
I can only conclude that he deserves credit as the father of the 
Continental Army.
Too many Individuals assisted me during the research and writing 
of this dissertation to thank individually. I would be remiss if 1 
did not particularly commend the archivists at the New-York Historical 
Society, the National Archives, and the Library of Congress; Mrs.
Penny Crumpler of the U.S. Army Engineer Library; Mr. John Slonaker 
and Ms. Phyllys Cassler of the U.S. Army Military History Institute;
Dr. Robert Coakley and Ms. Janice McKenney of the U.S. Army Center 
of Military History; and Dr. Russell Weigley of Temple University.
Each in his own way made valuable suggestions or eased research 
problems immeasurably. Very special thanks go to Dr. John E. Selby 
and the other members of my dissertation committee for their patience 
and willingness to correspond frequently with me. The most invaluable 
aid I received, however, came from my family: parents, brother, wife,
and children. Without their support and sacrifices I would have 
abandoned this project many times over. In spite of all the individuals 
who helped in the completion of this task, the sole responsibility for 
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ABSTRACT
This dissertation traces the development o£ organizational forns 
and tactic \1 doctrine in the Continental Army, the regular United States 
armed force in the War of American Independence. It investigates poli­
tical, ideological, technological, economic, and strategic influences 
on the decisions made by the Continental Congress, George Washington, 
and other Army leaders. In the process it places the Continentals in a 
context of eighteenth century military science.
Individual colonies raised the first troops by drawing on their 
experiences in earlier wars, especially on the example of short-term 
Provincials supplementing the militia. Congress assumed national re­
sponsibility for the war on 14 June 1775 by establishing the Continental 
Army. During the next year the Army expanded to include units from every 
state (plus Canada), controlled by a network of territorial departments 
and subordinate commands. Administrative, logistical, and disciplinary 
systems and a staff were adapted from British Army usages.
Combat performance in 1776 convinced a majority in Congress that 
victory required a basic change of philosophy. It created a large army 
of infantry, artillery, and cavalry regiments raised for the duration 
of the war. The infantry regimental organization, first used in 1776, 
was a native development tailored to American conditions. In conjunc­
tion with the 1777 adoption of the excellent French military musket it 
emphasized the American advantage in Individual marksmanship and was 
superior to British and German regiments in strength, efficiency, and 
flexibility. As a result of the Trenton campaign Washington introduced 
permanent tactical brigades capable of limited independent action.
The only significant argument over military policy occurred during 
the winter of 1777-1778. One element, more militant in its ideology, 
wished to revert to the ideal of a small regular force backed by the 
militia. Most Army leaders, including an influential contingent of 
foreign volunteers, proposed to retain the large army and make it more 
professional and sophisticated. Congress actually followed a course 
which came closer to Washington's views. New staff officers and special­
ists, particularly the Inspector General, and the adoption of a uniform 
drill dramatically improved the Army's fighting ability. In 1781 the 
Continentals, with important French aid, won a decisive victory at York- 
town. Washington sustained a high level of training to the end of the 
war and then disbanded the Army without undermining the political ideals 
of the Revolution.
The Continental Army triumphed in the War of American Independence 
because it judiciously blended American experience and new military con­
cepts from Europe, particularly those advanced by French theorists, to 
create a sophisticated military machine tailored for combat in North 
America.
x
o r g a n i z a t i o n an d doct rin e i n
THE CONTINENTAL ARMY, 1774 TO 1784
CHAPTER I
THE ARMY OF OBSERVATION:
NEW ENGLAND IN ARMS
On 19 April 1775 local militiamen and regular British troops began 
the War of American Independence at Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts. 
The four New England colonies reacted by raising their own individual 
armies. Each jurisdiction formed its force according to its particular 
experience in earlier wars and its individual interpretation of 
European military developments of the previous century. Their speedy 
actions resulted from a decade of tensions within the British Empire 
and tentative preparations for possible armed conflict begun some months 
earlier. The four forces concentrated at Boston under the loose 
hegemony of Massachusetts as a cle facto regional army, paving the way 
for the establishment of a national Continental Army.
Warfare in the Eighteenth Century.
The Continental Army which fought in the War of American Indepen­
dence was the product of European military science. Like all institu­
tions developed by the American colonists, it drew from European 
roots and was modified by the particular conditions of American exper­
ience. Therefore, a proper appreciation of the place of that army in 
the context of its own times requires an understanding of both the 
general developments in the military art of western civilization during
2
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the particular martial 
traditions and experiences of the English colonists in North America.
In the seventeenth century Europeans developed a new range of 
weapons and gradually introduced them into their armies. At the same 
time a wave of dynastic wars began in western Europe which led to the 
creation of increasingly larger forces. Commanders and the leading 
military theoreticians spent the majority of the eighteenth century 
attempting to develop organizational structures and tactical doctrines 
which would exploit the potential of the new weapons and armies. These 
developments culminated in the series of conflicts known collectively 
as the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815).1
During the seventeenth century armies turned from pole arms, 
primarily the pike, to a reliance on firearms as the basic infantry 
weapon. The first firearm was a heavy matchlock musket which used a 
burning match to ignite the gunpowder charge that propelled a lead ball. 
The matchlock suffered from several serious defects as a military 
weapon: it was cumbersome; reloading was a long and complicated process;
the chance of misfire was extremely high, particularly in damp weather; 
and the lit match betrayed positions in the dark. Its defensive 
defects, particularly at close quarters, required a proportion of each 
unit to carry pikes to protect itself from cavalry attack or enemy pikes.
1. The basic sources for this section are: David Chandler, The Art of
Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1976);
Christopher Duffy, The Army of Frederick the Great (New York: Hippo­
crene Books, 1974); Robert S. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic 
Warfare: The Theory of Military Tacticn in Eighteenth Century France
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1957); and Richard Glover,
Peninsular Preparation: The Reform of the British Army 1795-1809
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963).
A technological breakthrough occurred in the second hal£ of the 
century vith the introduction of a new firing mechanism. It relied on 
the spark produced by a piece of flint striking a steel plate to touch 
off the propellant. The flintlock musket was lighter and handier than 
its predecessor (although still susceptible to moisture), had a more 
rapid rate of fire, and was easier to maintain. Late in the century it 
was complemented by the development of the socket bayonet. The bayonet, 
a foot-long triangular blade which slipped around the muzzle of the 
musket without blocking it, transformed the firearm into a pole weapon. 
The transition to the musket-and-bayonet combination gradually elimina­
ted the need for defensive pikemen, who disappeared from most western 
European armies by the end of the first decade of the eighteenth 
century.
Standardized flintlocks appeared shortly thereafter. Whether they 
were produced at government arsenals or by private contractors, the 
eighteenth century muskets of every country were inaccurate, lacking 
even a rear sight. Each weighed over ten pounds and had a barrel over 
a yard long, making it difficult to aim. Flints tended to wear out 
after only twenty rounds, and even under ideal conditions the effective 
range for the one-ounce balls (between two-thirds and three-quarters of 
an inch in diameter) fired by these smooth-bore weapons was about one 
hundred yards. An average soldier under the stress of combat was 
capable of firing three rounds a minute for short periods, but required 
considerable training to accomplish this feat. Since care in reloading 
was a major factor influencing accuracy, only the first round loaded 
before combat was fully reliable.
5Tactical formations and doctrine were evolved during the period 
between 1688 and 1745 to take advantage of these new weapons. Infantry 
gradually became the most important combat arm as firepower came to 
dominate the battlefield. Beginning with the War of the Spanish 
Succession (1702-14), generals sought literally to blast the enemy off 
the field with concentrated close-range fire. To this end they moved 
away from the massed formations characteristic of the era of the pike 
and adopted what is known technically as linear tactics or deployment 
in long lines. By mid-century in nearly every army infantrymen stood 
in three-deep lines to bring a maximum number of muskets into play.
The critical firefight took place at ranges of between fifty and one 
hundred yards.
These weapons and tactics required an adjustment in the organization 
of an army. Since the sixteenth century the regiment had formed the 
basic component of an army, providing administrative and tactical control 
over a group of companies. The need for better fire control in battle 
led to many complicated experiments. Ultimately, every army turned to 
a more manageable sub-element, the platoon, the smallest force whose 
fire could be controlled by a handful of officers and noncommissioned 
officers. A simple technique of coordinating the actions of a number 
of these basic elements of fire (normally eight) produced the battalion, 
the fundamental element of maneuver. Most regiments contained two or 
more battalions except the British Army's. Great Britain opted to form 
only eight platoons in a regiment, making their regiment and battalion 
normally synonymous. The relationship between the company (an adminis­
trative entity) and the platoon varied, although by the end of the
6century most armies moved to make them interchangeable. The battalions 
and platoons, filled with rank and file trained like robots to fire in 
unison at areas rather than individual targets, formed the heart of the 
typical European army in the Seven Years' War (1756-63).
A second area of development during the century involved improved 
handling of armies on the battlefield. At the beginning of the century 
armies marched overland in massed formations and took hours to deploy 
into line of battle. This lengthy process often allowed commanders who 
felt that they were at a disadvantage to march away and decline combat. 
Several reforms were introduced to overcome this obstacle. The cadenced 
march step and standardized drill maneuvers were developed to reduce 
the length of time needed to deploy and minimize the confusion in 
forming a line of battle. They also allowed a general to adjust his 
formations to the changing flow of a battle without risking total 
disruption of his ranks. Successful use of brigades and divisions to 
control the movements of groups of battalions produced a tendency to 
make those higher echelons permanent.
Mobile field artillery was also a development of the eighteenth 
century. While heavy cannon continued to be important in fortresses and 
sieges, lighter guns were introduced to give direct support to the in­
fantry. As a first step, standardized calibers simplified administra­
tive and logistical problems. Ballistics experts and metallurgists 
reduced the weight of the tubes, while others improved carriages. The 
French emerged with the best of the new artillery in the aftermath of 
the 1764 reforms of General Jean Baptiste de Gribeauval, an experienced 
combat officer and able theoretician. Greater mobility enabled tac­
ticians to consider artillery as a supporting arm whose function was
to fire at enemy personnel instead of opposing artillery. In nearly 
every European army, however, the artillery was a separate armed ser­
vice distinct from the infantry and cavalry. This situation complicated 
battlefield deployment to a certain extent, and more importantly retarded 
the development of effective combined arms operations.
The array which naturally exercised the greatest influence on the 
American colonies was the British. Great Britain enjoyed a unique status 
among the powers during this period because its strong navy protected it 
from hostile neighbors. With less threat of attack the British lagged 
behind the rest of Europe in adopting the reforms of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Nonetheless, it had adopted the major ones by the 
time of the Seven Years' War and, in fact, had led in the introduction 
of many techniques of infantry fire control.
The lag, however, created an incredibly inefficient and complex 
administrative and logistical superstructure. Authority and responsi­
bility were divided between two major army commands (the British and 
Irish Establishments), between the army proper and the Ordnance Depart­
ment (controlling artillery, engineers, and munitions), and between the 
civilian Secretary at War and the military Commander-in-Chief (when that 
office was filled). Strategic direction was shared by two or three Sec­
retaries of State. At times the various individuals responsible for the 
different chains of command cooperated and the system functioned accep­
tably. Breakdowns made the British Army appear to be leaderless and 
inept.2
2. Glover, Peninsular Preparation, pp. 2, 12.
England's less sophisticated military system caused It to lag 
behind other European powers particularly in the area of military 
theory. The art of war changed dramatically during the eighteenth 
century. By 1800 Napoleon's armies maneuvered in ways that exceeded 
even the Prussian army of Frederick the Great, the preeminent force of 
the Seven Years' War. Poor performance in the wars of the mid-century 
forced the French to seek better ways to handle armies in the field.
The British officers, however, learned only through trial and error, 
contributing little original thought, and by and large did not read the 
military texts written by Frenchmen and other Europeans.^
British works prior to the Revolution consisted for the most part 
of drill manuals rather than profound theoretical volumes. The first 
important manuals depicted the best practices of Marlborough's army: 
Humphrey Bland's 1727 A Treatise of Military Discipline and Richard 
Kane's Campaigns of King William and Queen Anne which appeared in 1745. 
Under the influence of the Duke of Cumberland and Field Marshal l.igonier 
the British began moving towards a drill patterned after the Prussians 
in the late 1750's. This trend began with a series of translations of 
Prussian regulations by William Fawcett in 1754 and 1757, and in the 
latter year of Malosti de Martemont's The Spirit of the Modern System 
of War, by a Prussian General Officer. An official drill regulation
3. In addition to Quimby, Background of Napoleonic Warfare, and Glover, 
Peninsular Preparation, the best sources on military theory after the 
1750's are J. F. C. Fuller, British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth 
Century (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1925) and Ira D. Gruber, "British
Strategy: The Theory and Practice of Eighteenth-Century Warfare" in
Don Higginbotham, ed., Considerations on the Revolutionary War: Selec­
ted Essays (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 14-31.
9issued in 1757 followed a line of Prussian influence which was main­
tained in amendments in 1759 and which culminated with the publication 
of Adjutant General Edward Harvey's drill book in 1764. "The '64" 
remained the official drill until 1795, although lax enforcement gave 
no assurances that all regiments followed it. Two other unofficial 
manuals offered alternative drills which appealed to some officers: 
Campbell Dalrymple's A Military Essay (1761) and William Windham's and 
George Townshend's Norfolk Discipline (1759), a simplified volume 
designed for militia use.^
Three other British authors produced works which had a reasonably 
wide readership after the Seven Years' War. Major General James Wolfe 
became a popular hero for capturing Quebec. In 1768 a collection of 
miscellaneous orders and notes that he prepared, mostly while a regi­
mental commander prior to the French and Indian War, appeared under the 
title Instructions to Young Officers. It contained no systematic theory. 
William Young became a prolific author of volumes dealing with drill, 
fortifications, and outpost duty. In 1771 his collected works along with 
Wolfe's appeared under the title Manoeuvres, or practical observations 
on the art of war. A similar two-volume compendium by Thomas Simes,
The Military guide for young officers, came out the next year. These 
pedestrian works represented an effort to furnish junior officers with 
reading material on routine military life from a regimental perspective.
4. Rex Whitworth, Field Marshal Lord Ligonier: A Story of the British
Army 1702-1770 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 32n, 34,
57n, 218. Fuller, British Light Infantry, pp. 79-86. David Chandler, 
The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (New York: Hippocrene
Books, 1976), pp. 106-7, 117.
10
The leading European theorists sought to establish a system of 
warfare which extracted the maximum worth from the weapons and soldiers 
available to the standing armies of the century. Exponents of linear 
warfare (1'ordre mince) tended to stress the firepower of infantry 
vollies. They also admired Frederick the Great and avidly read his 
Instructions for his Generals after a copy of that secret work fell 
into Austrian hands in 1760 and was published in various languages.
Most imitators of Frederick failed to realize that he achieved results 
through his personal genius and a capacity for hard work, not because 
he had developed a well-rounded theory of war.-*
A series of French authors began to propose a different system in 
the late 1720's, l'ordre profond. They suggested that infantry formed 
in dense columns could successfully attack lines of infantry by relying 
on shock effect and the bayonet. The major authors of this school were 
Chevalier Jean-Charles de Folard (1669-1752), Joly de Maizeroy (1719-80), 
and Frangois-Jean de Graindorge d'Orgeville de Mesnil-Durand (1729-99). 
Their theories remained largely paper exercises because they did not 
fit the realities of contemporary battlefields. In time a practical 
compromise emerged in 1'ordre mixte, a flexible combination of line and 
column according to the tactical needs of a particular situation. It 
also stressed training of men to perform both light and line infantry 
missions. Jacques Antoine Hippolyte Comte de Guibert (1743-90) was the
5. Peter Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform 1807-1815 (Prince­
ton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 13-15. Thomas R. Phillips,
trans., Frederick the Great: Instructions for his Generals (Harrisburg:
Stackpole Co., 1944), pp. 9-10.
11
major spokesman for this school. His 1772 Essai general de tactique 
became the seminal text. Although the French Army did not formally 
adopt Guibert's ideas until 1791, a series of war games in 1778 at 
Vassieux, Normandy, converted most French officers to the mixed order.
Colonial Military Experience.
English military institutions formed part of the cultural inheri­
tance brought to America by the first colonists. Immigrants and occa­
sional contact with the British Army kept the colonists informed about 
newer developments. The most important of these inherited military 
institutions was the militia, which dated back to Anglo-Saxon times, 
but the specific conditions of colonial settlement produced important 
modifications in it. Other variations crept in as the needs of effec­
tive defense began to outstrip the capabilities of the militia.
The Tudors had revived the English militia in the sixteenth cen­
tury as an inexpensive alternative to a large permanent army. They used 
the traditional universal obligation to serve in the defense of the 
realm as a basis for sustaining a more manageable body of voluntary 
"trained bands." Thus the general population acted as a reserve force 
through the requirement to possess arms, but became primarily a source
6. See especially Quiraby, Background of Napoleonic Warfare, pp. 233-48, 
304-20; John Albert Lynn, "The Revolution on the Battlefield: Training
and Tactics of the Armle du Nord" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
California at Los Angeles, 1974) ; and Samuel Anderson Covington, "The 
Comite Militalre and the Legislative Reform of the French Army, 1789- 
1791" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Arkansas, 1976).
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of financial support through fines in lieu of active duty for the 
trained bands. Geographical organization and central direction came 
through county lords lieutenant.?
The first settlements in Virginia, Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay, 
and Connecticut all explicitly recruited one or more professional sol­
diers to act as military advisors. The colonists recognized from the 
beginning that threats to their security could come from either hostile 
natives or rival European powers. The Jamestown trading post reacted 
to danger by organizing itself into a regimental garrison, complete with 
companies and squads. Plymouth, on the advice of Miles Standish, organ­
ized four companies of militia within two years of its founding. The 
Massachusetts Bay Colony profited from the experiences of the earlier 
settlements. In 1629 its first expedition, which founded Salem, left 
England with a militia company already organized and equipped with the 
latest weapons.
During the course of the seventeenth century the colonists adapted 
the English militia system to meet their own needs. Because conditions
7. In addition to the studies of individual militias listed in the 
bibliography, the following sources were used in preparing this section: 
Darrett B. Rutman, "A Militant New World, 1607-1640: America's First
Generation, Its Martial Spirit, Its Tradition of Arms, Its Militia 
Organization, Its Wars" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia, 
1959); Patrick Mitchell Malone, "Indian and English Military Systems 
in New England in the Seventeenth Century" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Brown 
University, 197D ; John W. Shy, "A New Look at Colonial Militia," 
William and Mary Quarterly. 3d Ser., 20 (1963), pp. 175-85; Timothy 
Breen, "English Origins and New World Development: The Case of the
Covenanted Militia in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts," Past and 
Present, 57 (1972), pp. 74-96; and Douglas Edward Leach, Arms for 
Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 
1607-1763 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1973).
varied, several regional patterns emerged. In the Chesapeake Bay area 
a plantation economy took root, leading to a dispersed type of settle­
ment. Virginia and Maryland formed their militia companies from all 
the residents of a county or other relatively large area. In New Eng­
land a different economy led to the use of towns as the basic residen­
tial system. Each town formed one or more militia companies, according 
to its size, as soon as possible after establishing its local govern­
ment. South Carolina's plantation economy was slightly different and 
prior experience in Barbados by many of its settlers gave the South 
Carolina militia a unique cast. Following the Barbadian example, it 
oriented the institution particularly towards the control of the large 
slave population. Pennsylvania, initially dominated by Quakers, did 
not pass a mandatory militia law until 1777. Differences in the 
individual militia systems in part explain the variety of approaches 
taken by the colonies when they organized units for the Continental 
Army in 1775 and 1776.
Growth introduced problems of control in each colony. Massachu­
setts, by virtue of its size, solved them first. An increase in the 
proportion of noncommissioned officers over European norms allowed for 
the formation of subordinate elements, "demi-companies", increasing 
tactical flexibility and control. In December 1636 the Bay Colony 
grouped the fifteen existing companies into three regional regiments.
That made Massachusetts the first English-speaking government to adopt 
permanent regiments. Other colonies followed suit: Maryland and
Plymouth in 1658; Virginia in 1666; and Connecticut in 1672. In contrast, 
standing regiments appeared in the English Army only in the 1640's.
14
American preferences for weapons also reflected modification of 
the European heritage. Wilderness conditions accentuated the advantages 
of the flintlock musket. By 1675 nearly every colony required its 
militiamen to own flintlocks rather than matchlocks, completing this 
transition a quarter of a century ahead of European armies. Many of the 
colonists hunted, but few ever fought in a formal line of battle. Their 
vollies stressed individual marksmanship rather than the concept of 
firing at an area employed in Europe. A specific byproduct of this 
attitude led to the refinement of the rifle by Pennsylvania gunsmiths.
A hunting weapon with German roots, the Pennsylvania rifle was longer 
than the standard musket but had a smaller bore (usually .45-caliber). 
Grooves in the barrel imparted spin to the ball and allowed a trained 
marksman to hit targets up to 400 yards away. Small units of specialists 
called jaegers (hunters) in some German armies employed a shorter, 
heavier rifle. As a military weapon either version proved effective in 
skirmishing but its slow rate of fire and lack of a bayonet placed the 
rifleman at a distinct disadvantage in open terrain.
By the eighteenth century the colonial militia, like the English 
trained bands, armed its men with muskets and based organization on 
geography. The southern colonies with one regiment per county came 
closer to the English shire system; the more densely populated northern 
colonies normally formed several regiments in each county. Most colonies 
gave each regiment's colonel both administrative and command responsibili­
ties and dispensed with the office of county lieutenant. Local elites 
in both the mother country and America dominated militia office-holding, 
whether an elective or appointive system was used, just as they control­
led all other aspects of society. Ultimate responsibility for the
15
militia lay in the Crown. In England it was exercised by the county 
lords lieutenant, in America by the governor. The financial powers 
of the lower houses of colonial legislatures did place practical 
limits on the governor's prerogatives.
The biggest difference between the English trained bands and the 
colonial militia was the latter's more comprehensive membership. Few 
free adult males were exempted by law from participation: generally
only the clergy, some conscientious objectors, and a handful of special 
groups with vital skills. This inclusiveness resulted from the early 
need for local defense, absent in England since the days of the 
Spanish Armada. During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries the danger to the more settled regions of the colonies sub­
sided. While a structure based on the total male population of an area 
was admirable for local defense, it was economically unsuited for ex­
tended crises or for offensive operations. Other institutions emerged, 
leaving the militia, in the words of one historian, "a local training 
center and replacement pool, a county selective service system and a
O
law enforcing agency, an induction camp and a primitive supply depot."
The seventeenth century Indian wars revealed the offensive limits 
of the militia. As early as the 1620's in Virginia and during New Eng­
land's Pequot War, temporary detachments were drawn from the organized 
companies for field operations against the Indians. Either volunteers 
or drafted quotas formed these units. This expedient minimized economic
8. Louis Morton, "The Origins of American Military Policy," Military 
Affairs, 22 (1958), p. 80.
16
dislocation and concentrated field leadership in the hands of the most 
experienced officers. But even that device could create too much dis­
ruption to community life, and these provisional militia detachments 
were employed primarily in garrisons.
A different type of force completely distinct from the militia 
emerged in the 1670's which was more effective for offense. Hired 
volunteers ranged the frontiers, patrolling between outposts and giving 
early warning of Indian attack. Other volunteers combined with friendly 
Indians to form units for offensive operations in the deep wilderness 
where European tactics were ineffective. The memoirs of the most 
successful leader of these mixed forces, Benjamin Church (1639-1718), 
were published by his son in 1716 and represent the first American 
military manual.^
The trend away from the militia reached a climax during the 
imperial wars against Spanish and French colonies between 1689 and 
1762. Regiments completely separated from the militia system were 
raised for specific campaigns. These units, called Provincials, were 
recruited by the governor and legislature of a colony, with appointed 
officers, and were patterned after regular British regiments. They 
relied on bounties for recruiting and conferred greater status on the 
officers. Although regiments were raised anew each year in most 
colonies a substantial percentage of the officers accumulated years of 
of service. Provincial field officers tended to come from members of
9. Thomas Church, The History of the Great Indian War of 1675 and 1676, 
Commonly Called Philip's War. Also, The Old French and Indian Wars, 
from 1689 to 1704, ed. by Samuel G. Drake (Hartford: Silas Andrus &
Son, 1854).
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the legislature who had been long-term militia officers. The company 
officers, responsible for the majority of the recruiting, were drawn 
from popular junior militia officers with demonstrated military skills.^ 
The most famous Provincial unit was formed by Major Robert Rogers of 
New Hampshire during the French and Indian War. His separate companies 
of rangers were recruited throughout the northern colonies and paid 
directly by the British Army. They performed reconnaissance for the 
regular forces invading Canada and conducted occasional long-range 
forays against the French and their Indian allies.
The American phase of the Seven Years* War, the French and Indian 
War (1754-64), was different from earlier imperial wars in one important 
way. Formerly Great Britain had been content to leave North American 
fighting to the colonists and had furnished only naval and logistical 
aid. Under William Pitt's ministry that policy was reversed and the 
regular British Army carried out the major combat operations. The 
Provincials were relegated to support and reserve functions. Americans 
resented this treatment, particularly when they saw British commanders 
like Edward Braddock and James Abercromby perform poorly in the wilder­
ness. The Britons for their part developed a negative opinion of the 
fighting qualities of the Provincials. British recruitment of servants 
and impressment of men, food, quarters, and transport created other 
tensions. Although the Anglo-American forces working together con­
quered Canada and won important victories in the Caribbean, the close
10. Ranz C. Esbenshade, "Sober, Modest Men of Confined Ideas: The
Officer Corps of Provincial New Hampshire" (Master's Thesis, University 
of New Hampshire, 1976).
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contact during the war left much residual bitterness. After the Peace 
of Paris that contributed to a growing breach between the colonies and 
the mother country.^
The Coming of the Revolution.
During the decade following the Seven Years' War, the government
in London adopted a series of policies which altered the traditional
relationship between the two portions of the empire. The colonists,
whose political institutions were rapidly maturing, resented English
interference in what they viewed as internal affairs. Over the years
many different issues contributed to an escalation of tension. By 1774
the potential for armed confrontation was real.
One important issue dividing the colonies from England was military
in nature. After the 1763 peace London decided to create an "American
Establishment" and tax the colonies to pay for it. This army, patterned
after a similar Irish garrison nearly a century old, enabled the British
to retain a larger peacetime force than British taxpayers would fund.
It also secured Canada and Florida from French or Spanish attack and
acted as a buffer between colonists and Indians. For Americans it served
none of these purposes, particularly after most of the troops moved from
12
the frontier to coastal cities to simplify logistics.
11. Alan Rogers, Empire and Liberty: American Resistance to British
Authority, 1755-1763 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).
12. John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the
Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1965). William Alfred Foote, "The American Independent Companies 
of the British Army 1664-1764" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Cali­
fornia at Los Angeles, 1966), pp. 62-71. John R. Alden, General Gage in 
America: Being Principally A History of His Role in the American Revo­
lution (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948), pp. 129-44.
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Increased political tensions, largely resulting from revenue 
measures, led the colonists to view the regular regiments as a stan­
ding army placed in their midst to enforce unpopular legislation.
They responded in two ways. American politicians raised in the ideo­
logical traditions of the radical Whigs of seventeenth century England 
saw the military establishment as an example of the corrupt and uncon­
stitutional practices of the British government, a tool of a ministry 
out to subvert colonial liberties. They followed the arguments of 
their intellectual parents and turned to the militia as the institution 
with which a virtuous citizenry should defend itself. Their calls for 
a revitalized militia hoped to prove that honest American yeomen were 
worthy of the rights of Englishment and also to obviate the need for 
stationing regulars in the c o l o n i e s . A  more militant colonial ele­
ment moved to counter force with force. The Sons of Liberty appeared 
in New York in 1765 and 1766 as a paramilitary organization in direct 
response to British troop movements, and during the early 1770's an 
increasingly larger segment of American opinion turned to the militia 
as a possible instrument to oppose the British Army.*^
With the passage of the Townshend Duties Massachusetts became the 
focal point of opposition to imperial policies. London responded by
13. John Todd White, "Standing Armies in Time of War: Republican Theory
and Military Practice During the American Revolution" (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
George Washington University, 1978), pp. 1-74. Lawrence Delbert Cress,
"The Standing Army, The Militia, and the New Republic: Changing Attitudes
Toward the Military in American Society, 1768 to 1820" (Ph.D. Disserta­
tion, University of Virginia, 1976), pp. 1-126.
14. Roger Champagne, "The Military Association of the Sons of Liberty," 
New-York Historical Society Quarterly, 41 (1955), pp. 338-50. Stewart 
Lewis Gates, "Disorder and Social Organization: The Militia in Connecti­
cut Public Life, 1660-1860" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Connecti­
cut, 1975), pp. 35-38.
20
shifting several regiments to Boston in 1768. Although most were 
withdrawn after the 1770 Boston Massacre, the damage to British credi­
bility in America had been done. The militants in the colonies convinced 
others that the British were corrupt by arguing that the ministry inten­
ded to use military force to crush opposition. More and more leaders 
accepted the need to create a force capable of opposing the troops if 
they returned in strength. Individuals who later occupied important 
positions in the Continental Army, such as Timothy Bickering, who used 
the pseudonym "A Military Citizen", and William Heath, the "Military 
Countryman", contributed articles to the Massachusetts press in the 
early 1770*s urging militia reforms. Others organized voluntary mili­
tary companies whose members agreed to devote extra time to training.
The 1773 Boston Tea Party created a final phase for these devel­
opments. British troops returned to the town in greater numbers than 
before. Punitive legislation, the Coercive Acts of 1774, furnished 
final proof to many in New England of Britain's hostility. Military 
preparations quickened throughout the area, and the First Continental 
Congress met at Philadelphia in September to concert the colonies' 
actions to obtain a redress of grievances. New Englanders began serious 
efforts to strengthen their militia. Officers whose primary loyalty lay 
with Britain were removed, the tempo of training increased, and by the 
autumn of 1774 a few individuals were even calling for the formation of 
a unified colonial army of observation which could take the field if
15. Ronald L. Boucher, "The Colonial Militia as a Social Institution: 
Salem, Massachusetts 1764-1775," Military Affairs, 37 (1973), pp. 125-6.
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hostilities erupted.1^ Similar trends, although less pronounced,
existed in the middle and southern colonies.
Interest in the militia was matched during 1774 and early 1775 by
a concern for war supplies. Adam Stephen, later a major general in
the Continental Army, spoke for many in 1774 when he warned Virginia
politicians that artillery, arms, ammunition, and other items were in
short supply in the colonies. His suggestions to encourage domestic
production and importation from Europe were also made by others who
agreed with him that if enough arms and ammunition were available,
"individuals may suffer, but the gates of hell cannot prevail against
America. Imports of arms and powder grew to such volume by October
1774 that the British government began to take steps to prohibit them.
Individual colonies also began to remove existing stores beyond the
reach of possible British siezure and took the first official steps to
encourage domestic manufactures. Massachusetts led in collecting
1ftmunitions, just as it did in reforming the militia.
16. David Ammerman, In The Common Cause: American Response to the Co­
ercive Acts of 1774 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1974).
David Richard Millar, "The Militia, The Army, and Independency in Colonial 
Massachusetts" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1967), pp. 284-8. 
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The First Continental Congress, meanwhile, rejected a proposal by 
Richard Henry Lee of Virginia to form a nationwide militia. It did 
adopt a plan for economic protest, the Continental Association, that 
had a vital importance in shaping the machinery of revolution. It 
provided for a boycott of British goods after 1 December 1774 and 
authorized the formation of enforcement committees. These committees 
quickly became i^e facto local governments at both the colony and local 
levels and secured political control over the countryside, a control 
which imperial authorities were never able to shake. With this 
political control went control over the militia, vital to the patriot 
cause throughout the war. Instead of being cowed by the Coercive Acts, 
the colonists were now moving towards armed resistance that finally 
erupted at Lexington and Concord on 19 April 1775.
Thus, in the years immediately prior to 1775 a general trend emer­
ged in Great Britain's mainland American colonies. Tensions built to 
the point that the leadership in each colony foresaw the possibility 
of violence. That leadership reacted by gathering war materials and 
restoring the militia (or volunteer forces) to a level of readiness 
not seen since the early days of settlement. The British Army's leaders 
in America were aware of the colonists' actions, but dismissed them as 
"mere b u l l y i n g . G i v e n  these attitudes, the physical presence of 
General Thomas Gage's garrison in Boston, and the more advanced state of 
preparations in Massachusetts, it is Hot surprising that war began there.
19. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 1: 991-2. Also see Charles 
Knowles Bolton, ed., Letters of Hugh Earl Percy from Boston and New York 
1774-1776 (Boston: Charles L. Goodspeed, 1902), pp. 35-37; and G. D.
Scull, ed., Memoir and Letters of Captain W. Glanville Evelyn, of the 
4th Regiment ("King's Own") from North America, 1774-1776 (Oxford:
James Parker and Co., 1879), pp. 31-37.
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Massachusetts Acts.
The Massachusetts Provincial Congress, meeting as a shadow govern­
ment, adopted a comprehensive military program on 26 October 1774 which 
was based on the militia. It created executive committees of safety 
and supplies and gave the former the power to order out the militia in 
an emergency. It also directed officers to reorganize their commands 
into more efficient units, to conduct new elections, and to drill ac­
cording to the latest British manual. The program included a plan to 
form a force of "minutemen" equal to one quarter of the strength of the 
militia, a concept derived from earlier special detachments of militia. 
The minutemen agreed to undergo additional training and hold themselves 
ready to turn out "at a minute's notice." Jedediah Preble, Artemas 
Ward, and Seth Pomeroy, three politicians who had served in the French 
and Indian War, were elected as general officers. A month later two 
younger generals were added: another veteran, John Thomas, and William
Heath, a gifted militia administrator. During periods of recess the 
Committees of Safety and Supplies collected materiel and established 
depots.
The Provincial Congress reconvened after new elections in February 
1775. It clarified the Committee of Safety's powers, reappointed the 
five generals, and added another politically active veteran, John Whit­
comb, as a sixth. More important, the Congress changed its basic policy 
by augmenting the militia with a more permanent force patterned after
20. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 1: 830-53, 993-1008, 1365-7. 
Millar, "Militia and Independency," pp. 289-90. In November Timothy 
Pickering's Easy Plan was reviewed, but was not chosen as the official 
Massachusetts drill manual.
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the earlier Provincials. Regulations for this "Constitutional Army" 
were adopted on 5 April. Three days later a committee report on the 
"State of the Province" was adopted by 96 of the 103 members present. 
That report stated that "the present dangerous and alarming situation 
of our publick affairs, renders it necessary for this Colony to make 
preparations for their security and defence by raising and establishing 
an Army." The projected force was to include more than just Massachu­
setts men, and delegates were sent to the other New England colonies to
arrange for their participation. On 14 April the Committee of Safety 
was instructed to begin selecting field officers for the Massachusetts 
contingent. Once they were chosen they were to assist the committee in 
picking captains, who would in turn appoint the subalterns. Preference 
was expressed for selecting minuteman officers. Following Provincial
precedent the new officers were expected to recruit their companies and
21regiments.
After initiating this plan for a New England army, the Provincial
Congress adjourned on 15 April. When it reassembled on the 22d, it had
a war on its hands. The first order of business was accumulating evi­
dence to prove to the English people that Gage's troops had been the 
aggressors on 19 April. The Congress then turned its attention to 
forming a volunteer army from the men who had massed around Boston fol­
lowing the battle. The Committee of Safety had already taken tentative 
steps in this direction by stretching its authority to call out the 
militia. On 21 April the committee approved an enlistment format.
Eight thousand effectives were to serve until 31 December in regiments
21. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 1: 1322-66.
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consisting of a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, a major, and nine compa­
nies. The committee planned to have each company consist of 3 officers, 
4 sergeants, a drummer, a fifer, and 70 rank and file, but it later 
reduced the rank and file to 50. This decision was preliminary since 
final authority rested with the Provincial Congress. The pre-iexington 
plan had been to form the army by apportioning quotas of men among the 
various towns, a traditional colonial device. The committee decided 
instead to have the generals survey the men at the siege lines and per­
suade them to remain. Confusion rapidly turned to chaos, and on 23 
April General Ward, the actual commander of the siege, suggested that 
the Congress use smaller-sized units in order to retain a maximum number 
of officers.^
The Provincial Congress incorporated Ward's suggestions in a com­
prehensive plan adopted that same day. It decided to try to raise a 
New England army of 30,000 men of which Massachusetts would furnish 
13,600. The regimental organization adopted for the infantry called 
for 598 men: 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant colonel, 1 major, 1 adjutant, 1
quartermaster, 1 chaplain, 1 surgeon, 2 surgeon's mates (assistants), 
and 10 companies. Each company was to have a captain, 2 lieutenants, 
an ensign, and 55 enlisted men. On 25 April, following additional dis­
cussions with the Committee of Safety, this structure was confirmed with 
23minor changes. The Congress also accepted the committee's suggestion 
that each regiment headed by a general officer have two majors, and pay 
scales were approved.
22. Ibid.. 2: 369-70, 744-7, 763-830. The collected testimony was pub­
lished as A Narrative of the Excursions and Ravages of the King's Troops
(Worcester: Isaiah Thomas, 1775).
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The Massachusetts army was to have artillerymen as well as infantry 
regiments. As early as 23 February the Committee of Safety had planned 
to train artillery companies and distributed field guns to selected 
militia regiments. The Provincial Congress directed the committee on 13 
April to form six companies for the planned volunteer army. The organi­
zation adopted on 6 May for a company called for A officers, A sergeants, 
A corporals, a drummer, a fifer, and 32 matrosses (artillery privates). 
The plan was rescinded four days later, however, and a committee was 
appointed to confer with Richard Gridley on the propriety of organizing 
a full artillery regiment. Gridley, hero of the capture of Louisbourg 
in 17A5, was acknowledged as the colony's leading artillery expert.
After these talks the Provincial Congress on 12 May authorized a ten- 
company regiment. Gridley was given command four days later.^
The regiment was formed in June, but with only nine companies. 
Neither Gridley nor his assistant William Burbeck could completely con­
centrate on raising it since they had been appointed on 26 April as the 
colony's two engineers. The Committee of Safety added a logistical 
staff and a company of artificers (skilled workmen) for maintenance 
duties in June. The important post of ordnance storekeeper went to 
Ezekiel Cheever. The company officers were drawn heavily from the 
several Boston militia artillery companies, particularly Adino Paddock's 
which had received extensive training from British artillerists in the 
1760's and was composed overwhelmingly of skilled artisans and Sons of 
Liberty. Two of its members, John Crane and Ebenezer Stevens, had moved
2A. Force, American Archives, Ath Ser., 1: 1362, 1368-9; 2: 7A2-A, 759, 
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to Providence, Rhode Island, in 1774 for economic reasons when Boston's 
port was closed. Their close ties enabled the Rhode Island artillery­
men to be merged easily into the regiment in 1776.25
In spite of careful preparations, Massachusetts entered the war 
in a state of chaos. The Provincial Congress and the Committee of 
Safety frequently found themselves working at cross purposes. Confusion 
over the size and configuration of the army created duplication of ef­
fort, and prospective officers recruited under a variety of authorities. 
The militia, especially the minutemen, thanks to their prewar organiza­
tion, responded as units to the siege of Boston after the battles of 
Lexington and Concord, but they were not prepared to remain in the field 
for an extended period of time. Later arrivals were more inclined to 
serve a full term until 31 December. Order began to emerge in May when 
formats for commissions and oaths were codified. Mustermasters were 
appointed to examine enlistment rolls at Cambridge and Roxbury so that 
the Committee of Safety could certify officers for commissioning. Regi­
ments emerged with a geographical basis and drew their precedence from 
that of the militia area which furnished the majority of their men. All 
commissions were dated 19 May 1775, leaving the touchy matter of seniority 
to be settled later. By June twenty-six infantry regiments had been
25. Ibid., 2: 768, 1349, 1354-6, 1366, 1385, 1393, 1410, 1423-4, 1433-6, 
1447-8, 1452-3, 1477-8. John Austin Stevens, "Ebenezer Stevens Lieut.- 
Col. of Artillery in the Continental Army," Magazine of American History. 
1 (1877), pp. 588-92. Asa Bird Gardner, "Henry Burbeck: Brevet Briga­
dier-General United States Army - Founder of the United States Military 
Academy," Magazine of American History, 9 (1883), p. 252.
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certified, in addition to part of a regiment whose status as either a
At
Massachusetts or a New Hampshire unit was unresolved.
On 13 June the Provincial Congress recognized that the Massachusetts 
army had achieved relatively final form. It decided to retain in service 
a force of one artillery and twenty-three infantry regiments. The limit 
was raised ten days later when troops recruited specifically for coastal 
defense released Edmund Phinney's Cumberland County regiment from that 
mission. The status of the generals was also resolved. Ward retained 
the overall command he had exercised since the outbreak of hostilities, 
while John Whitcomb, William Heath, and Ebenezer Frye were designated 
major generals.27
Formation of a New England Army.
Committees of correspondence spread the traumatic news of Lexington 
and Concord beyond the borders of Massachusetts with remarkable speed.
By 2A April New York City had the details and Philadelphia on the next
day. In fact, Savannah, the city farthest from the scene of the engage-
2Hment, received the news on 10 May. Massachusetts' call for assistance 
was answered by the other three New England colonies, its neighbors 
most concerned with the outbreak of hostilities. Within two months 
three small armies joined the Massachusetts troops at Boston and a 
council of war began strategic coordination. This regional force paved
26. Force, American Archives, Ath Ser., 2: A61, 52A, 609-10, 663, 693, 
7A6-66, 776-7, 790-5, 809-30, 13A7-1518.
27. Ibid., pp. 1395-6, 1A06-9, 1A28, 1A30, 1A33, 1A37, 1AA8-9. The coast 
defense troops remained in state service instead of becoming Continentals. 
Joseph Warren, who would have been the senior major general, was killed
at Bunker Hill before he received his commission.
28. Frank Luther Mott, "The Newspaper Coverage of Lexington and Concord," 
New England Quarterly, 17 (19AA), pp. A89-505.
the way for the creation of a national institution, the Continental 
Army.
New hampshiremen responded as individuals and in small groups to 
the news of Lexington. On 25 April, anticipating additional, more for­
mal aid from New Hampshire, the Massachusetts Committee of Safety direc­
ted Paul Dudley Sergent of Hillsborough County to organize these indi-
OQ
viduals into a regiment. 3 Four days earlier the New Hampshire Provin­
cial Congress convened in emergency session to consider Massachusetts' 
plan for a New England army and decided to send three members to confer 
with the Massachusetts Provincial Congress. The New Hampshire congress 
deferred more comprehensive action until that committee returned and
the New Hampshire leadership could mobilize public support and make
on
appropriate financial plans.
On 18 May the Provincial Congress resolved to raise men "to join in 
the common cause of defending our just rights and liberties." Initial 
legislation, loosely drawn, created a Committee of Safety and authorized
2,000 men as the colony's quota for the New England army, counting the 
individuals already in service at Boston. The plan to use the same 
regimental organization as Massachusetts was scrapped on 22 May for a 
more specific proposal. It created three regiments, one of which was
29. Force, American Archives, Ath Ser., 2: 745, 765. When New Hampshire 
did not accept responsibility for Sergent's regiment, Massachusetts did, 
although Sergent raised only four companies.
30. Ibid., pp. 377-9, 401, 429-30. Otis G. Hammond, ed., Letters and 
Papers of Major-General John Sullivan, Continental Army (3 vols., Con­
cord: New Hampshire Historical Society, 1930-39), 1: 58-60. On New
Hampshire's actions in general see Chandler Eastman Potter, Military 
History of New Hampshire, from Its Settlement, in 1623, to the Year 1861 
(Concord: Adjutant General's Office, 1866), pp. 263-272.
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formed from the volunteers at Boston. The volunteers' election of John 
Stark, a veteran of P.ogers' Rangers, as colonel was confirmed. Enoch 
Poor of Exeter began recruiting for the second regiment on 24 May. The 
remaining regiment, headed by James Reed of Fitzwilliam, began organi­
zing a week later in the eastern counties of Strafford and Rockingham. 
Nathaniel I’olsom, a member of the First Continental Congress, received 
command of the whole force.
Folsom's original appointment as a brigadier general carried duties 
similar to the Massachusetts generals', but no regimental command. On 
6 June New Hampshire placed him under General Ward's overall command and 
at the end of the month promoted him to major general. Jealousy on the 
part of the volunteers at Boston, however, limited his authority for a 
time. Minor administrative problems hampered the three regiments from 
achieving full internal cohesion until mid-June, and the last of Poor's 
companies, detained for local defense, did not reach Boston until early 
August. Although Folsom wanted an artillery company to support his 
regiments, there were no officers in New Hampshire qualified to command
one. The best that the Provincial Congress could do was to send cannon
32for the Massachusetts men to use.
Rhode Island, still able to use its chartered government, convened 
a brief emergency session of its legislature in response to the news of 
Lexington and Concord, On 25 April the Assembly resolved to raise 1,500 
men
31. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 2: 519-24, 639-40, 647-60. See 
Table 1.
32. Ibid., pp. 648, 657-9, 868, 1005-7, 1022-3, 1029, 1069-70, 1092, 
1177-80, 1529; 4: 1-20. Hammond, Sullivan Papers, 1: 64-65.
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properly armed and disciplined, to continue in this colony, 
as an army of observation, to repel any insult or violence 
that may be offered to the inhabitants. And also, if it be 
necessary for the safety and preservation of Any of the 
colonies, to march out of this colony, and join and co-oper­
ate with the forces of the neighboring colonies.
Substantive action was deferred until the regular May session. In the 
interim the commander of the Providence County militia brigade offered 
Massachusetts the services of his three battalions; other individuals 
went off to Boston as volunteers.33
At the May session, the Phode Island Assembly created its own 
Army of Observation and a Committee of Safety. The Rhode Island 
contingent formed a full brigade under Brigadier General Nathanael 
Greene, a different approach from that of the other New England colo­
nies. Greene's staff included a brigade adjutant and a brigade com­
missary responsible for logistics. Three infantry regiment (two with 
eight companies and one with seven) and an artillery company provided 
the brigade's strength. Greene, Acting Governor Nicholas Cooke, and 
the Committee of Safety arranged the officers which the Assembly had 
appointed. Seniority was determined by drawing lots, since all com­
missions were dated 8 May 1773. The regiments, which were raised ac­
cording to county boundaries, rotated posts of honor to avoid establish­
ing a system of precedence. Thomas Church commanded the regiment from 
Bristol and Newport Counties, Daniel Hitchcock the one from Providence 
County, and James Mitchell Varnum (an old associate of Greene) the one 
from King's and Kent. Captain (later major) John Crane, the displaced 
Bostonian, took charge of the artillery company which contained 4 other
33. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 2: 390, 431. Bartlett, Records 
of the Colony of Rhode Island, 7: 308-11.
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officers, a conductor, 2 sergeants, 2 bombardiers, 4 gunners, 4 cor-
3bporals, 2 drummers, 2 fifers, and 75 privates.
Companies marched to Boston as soon as possible. Two of the regi­
ments had assembled there by b June when Greene opened his headquarters. 
Varnum's regiment arrived several weeks later. The artillery company, 
armed with four field pieces, also arrived in early June. During June 
and July the Assembly resolved various logistical and disciplinary 
matters and expanded the brigade's staff by adding a secretary, a baker, 
and a chaplain. It also raised six new infantry companies, two for each 
regiment. Greene, who was given limited powers to fill vacancies, was 
placed under the "command and direction" of the commander-in-chief of 
the "combined American army" in Massachusetts.35
On 21 April representatives from Massachusetts met with the Connec­
ticut Committee of Correspondence at Lebanon, the home of Governor 
Jonathan Trumbull. Trumbull sent his son David to inform Massachusetts 
that a special session of the Assembly would meet as soon as possible 
and to establish coordination. While some militia units did march to 
Boston on receipt of news of Lexington and Concord, most were advised 
to wait until the Assembly could act. The wisdom of this course was 
confirmed by news that, although Israel Putnam was able to assert a 
loose hegemony over the volunteers, a formal command structure was needed 
before they could become effective.36
3 b . Ibid., pp. 314-29. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 2: 1143-51. 
Showman, Greene Papers, 1: 78-79. See Table 1.
35. Ibid.. pp. 81-85. Bartlett, Records of the Colony of Rhode Island,
7: 337-61. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 2: 893-4, 900, 1151-68.
The colony ultimately decided that its troops would serve to 31 December.
36. Ibid., pp. 370-3, 383-4, 423-4. Wladimir Edgar Hagelin and Ralph
A. Brown, eds., "Connecticut Farmers at Bunker Hill: The Diary of Colonel
Experience Storrs," New England Quarterly, 28 (1955), pp. 84-89.
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The special session convened at Hartford on 26 April, and the next 
day the Assembly ordered six regiments raised to serve until 10 Decem­
ber, each containing ten 100-man companies. At the time it was believed 
that these 6,000 men represented 25 percent of the colony's militia 
strength. The companies were apportioned among the several counties 
according to population. In its regimental structure Connecticut followed 
a large, somewhat older model than the other colonies. Like Massachu­
setts it placed generals in direct command of regiments, and like 
Rhode Island it also had field officers commanding companies. This 
left generals directly responsible for both a regiment and a company. 
Rather than assigning an extra lieutenant to each field officer's com­
pany, Connecticut simply designated the senior lieutenant in each 
colonel's company as a captain-lieutenant. On the other hand, the Con­
necticut organization called for each company to contain four officers 
instead of the three provided by all other New England jurisdictions.
The Assembly appointed Joseph Spencer and Israel Putnam brigadier gener­
als and David Wooster major general, and assigned supply responsibilities
to Joseph Trumbull, the Governor's son, by appointing him Commissary- 
37
General.
During May the Assembly passed legislation that resolved a number 
of administrative, disciplinary, and logistical problems. The office 
of regimental adjutant was defined as a separate post, and Samuel Mott 
was appointed colony engineer, with the rank of lieutenant colonel.
The Committee of Safety, also known as the Committee of Defense or
37. Trumbull, Records of the Colony of Connecticut, 14: 413-40. Force, 
American Archives, 4th Ser., 2: 409-22. See Table 1.
34
Committee of War, served for the rest of the war as the governor's 
executive and advisory body. The Assembly considered, but rejected, 
reorganizing the six regiments into eight to conform in size with those
OO
from the other colonies. A special session in July added two more 
regiments. These were smaller units with a third fewer privates al-
OQ
though they retained the same organization and superstructure.
Deployment of the Connecticut regiments also followed a pattern 
set during earlier wars. The colony had formerly been responsible 
primarily for reinforcing its neighbors, assisting New York to defend 
the Albany area and having primary responsibility for protecting western 
Massachusetts. In 1775 Spencer's 2d and Putnam's 3d Connecticut Regi­
ments, raised in the north-eastern and north-central portions of the 
colony, naturally marched to Boston. Samuel Parsons' 6th, from the 
southeast, followed as soon as the vital port of New London was secure. 
Benjamin Hinman's 4th from Litchfield County in the northwest went to 
Fort Ticonderoga where the county's men had served in earlier wars.
The 1st under Wooster and the 5th under David Waterbury, coming respec­
tively from Fairfield and New Haven Counties in the southwest, were 
initially reserved to secure New York City. In June Governor Trumbull 
temporarily placed the men in Massachusetts under the command of General 
Ward and the regiments in New York under the orders of the Continental 
and New York Provincial C o n g r e s s e s . T h e  7th and 8th also went to Boston.
38. Ibid., pp. 559-76. Trumbull, Records of the Colony of Connecticut, 
15: 1-83.
39. Ibid., pp. 90-109. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 2: 1579-90, 
1720-1.
40. Ibid., pp. 731, 1002, 1010. Trumbull, Records of the Colony of Con­
necticut , 15: 84-89. Richard H. Marcus, "The Connecticut Valley: A Prob­
lem in Intercolonial Defense," Military Affairs. 33 (1969), pp. 230-42.
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In this manner, the other three New England colonies responded 
favorably to Massachusetts' plan for a joint army. Although delays 
were experienced in fielding their regiments, the regiments benefitted 
from the extra time and organized in a rational manner, avoiding the 
confusion that had plagued Massachusetts' efforts. Only the 1st New 
Hampshire Regiment, which had also been organized from the volunteers 
at Boston, experienced the same organizational troubles as the Massa­
chusetts regiments.
For these New England troops raised in the wake of Lexington and 
Concord arms and ammunition were in short supply despite recent collec­
tion efforts. Weapons available to the New Englanders were mostly 
English military muskets, known colloquially as "Tower" or "Brown Bess" 
muskets, left over from earlier wars, and domestically manufactured 
hunting weapons. Gunpowder, lead for musket balls, and paper for car­
tridges were critical items. It would take years for the domestic arms 
industry throughout the colonies to become established despite the best 
efforts of local governments. In the interim, imports from France, other 
Luropean nations, and Mexico City were sought, but shortages placed 
serious limits on the New Englanders' operations.^ It would take a 
national effort to overcome them.
41. See especially: David Lewis Salay, "Arming for War: The Produc­
tion of War Material in Pennsylvania for the American Armies of the Revo­
lution" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Delaware, 1977), pp. 165-240; 
James Allen Lewis, "New Spain During the American Revolution, 1779-1783:
A Viceroyalty at War" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 1975), p. 52; 
Orlando W. Stephenson, "The Supply of Gunpowder in 1776," American His­
torical Review, 30 (1925), pp. 271-81; and Neil L. York, "Clandestine 
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Summary.
The New England army assembled around Boston reflected the modifi­
cations imposed on European military institutions by nearly two centuries 
of American colonial experience. Its leaders were drawn largely from 
the veterans of the French and Indian War and its weaponry and regimen­
tal organization strongly revealed the influences of that conflict. The 
emergence of that army, coordinated by Massachusetts, was a microcosm 
of the evolution of colonial military institutions. Its first combat 
revealed the strengths and weaknesses of American experience.
Americans first responded to the possibility of armed confrontation 
with imperial authorities by strengthening the militia. Each colony 
took steps .to replace aged or unreliable leaders and reorganize units 
for greater efficiency. Training increased. By 1775 most colonies had 
restored the militia to a degree of competence in defensive missions 
not seen for a century. This restoration was influenced by a commitment 
to an ideological ideal on the part of the militant leadership of the 
protest movement. That ideal flew in the face of colonial military 
history which had clearly demonstrated the militia's impracticality on 
major military operations.
As the crisis deepened a segment of American leadership began to 
hedge its bets by looking beyond the militia. At first leaders turned 
to provisional militia units which were designed to take the field on 
short notice and remain in action for longer periods. Whether these 
units took the form of volunteer companies or "minutemen", they were 
derived from the same need to minimize economic disruption that the 
seventeenth century colonists had faced. The New England army which
37
came into being at the instigation of Massachusetts moved a step further. 
Like the Provincials which served as a model, the army's regiments stood 
apart from the militia system, although drawing heavily on it for re­
cruits and leadership.
Ideologues could accept these new Provincials because they were 
recruited only for a single campaign. Their enlistments expired by 
31 December 1775. Militants also recognized that, like the Provincials, 
the regiments were directly under the control of local revolutionary 
governments which represented the people. This qualification restored 
the subordination to civil authority which the British Army practiced 
while in Great Britain, but which had been missing from the American 
Establishment. Because only a modest 30,000-man army was called for, 
far short of the total military manpower of the New England colonies, 
the militants could assume that a virtuous citizenry would serve in ro­
tation, obviating the need for a professional force which would be an 
anathema.
By July a substantial portion of the total projected force had as­
sembled at Boston. ^  Not counting artillery, the New England forces 
consisted of twenty-six infantry regiments from Massachusetts and three 
each from New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. On paper they 
aggregated 99 field officers, 866 company and 144 staff officers, and 
18,538 enlisted men. This total was over 2,500 men below authorized 
levels. More important, it included 1,600 sick and almost 1,500 more 
who were either on furlough or on detached duty. The regiments were
42. General Return, Main Army, 19 July 1775; Record Group 93, National 
Archives. Several more regiments had not yet reached Boston.
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still only partially organized, for only nine of those from Massachu­
setts had reached 95 percent of strength even on paper. Five that were
below 80 percent of authorized levels were of questionable combat value.
These deficiencies were due in part to the lack of centralized 
control over the army, or rather armies. Each of the New England colo­
nies raised its own force and dispatched it to Boston in response to 
Massachusetts' call for assistance. These forces arrived piecemeal and 
were assigned positions and responsibilities according to the needs of 
the moment. The only coordination was furnished by a committee form of 
leadership. A Council of War was established by the Massachusetts com­
manders on 20 April, and senior officers from the other colonies were
added as they became available. Although it worked closely with the
Massachusetts civil authorities, it did not really command, but merely 
developed consensus views. This arrangement prevented effective plan­
ning and blocked the individual regiments from making their needs known. 
Incomplete information on the regiments' status proved to be a major 
problem in the early months of the Boston siege.^
On 17 June the regional army's first engagement revealed the weak­
nesses and strengths inherent in its organization. The Council of War 
decided to apply pressure on the Boston garrison by occupying hills on 
Charlestown Peninsula that dominated the town. It did not prepare an 
adequate plan, and committed units piecemeal, with insufficient ammuni­
tion and without a clearly delineated chain of command. The British 
decided not to exploit the positional weakness of the New Englanders,
A3. William Henshaw, The orderly book of Colonel William Henshaw, of 
the American army, April 20-September 26, 1775 (Boston: A. Williams,
1881), pp. 13-39. --------- ---------- -----
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and instead launched a frontal assault In the hope that this would 
create a demoralizing show of force. From the security of hasty field­
works the defenders shattered two attacks with accurate musketry. A 
third try finally drove them from the peninsula. Sir William Howe, 
staggered by a casualty rate of 42 percent, realized that the British 
regulars could not afford to let the New Englanders fight from prepared 
positions which gave the advantage to New England marksmanship and com­
pensated for their weaknesses. Howe reported to his superiors in 
London after the battle, "when 1 look to the consequences of it, in the
loss of so many brave Officers, I do it with horror - The Success is 
44too dearly bought."
The New England army had been defeated, although they had inflic­
ted very heavy losses on the enemy. If they could find solutions to 
the problems which the battle highlighted, they could profit from the 
defeat. These solutions required a national army. The search had 
already turned to Philadelphia where the Continental Congress was in 
session.
44. John Fortescue, ed., The Correspondence of King George the Third 
from 1760 to December 1783 (6 vols., London: Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, 1887-96), 3: 220-4.
CHAPTER II
THE CONTINENTAL ARMY:
WASHINGTON AND THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
Formation of a regional army in the first several months after 
Lexington was the first phase in the war with England. Even as the New 
Englanders gathered before Boston a more significant step in the crea­
tion of a national force took place in Philadelphia. The Continental 
Congress convened there on 10 May 1775 to resume coordination of the 
thirteen colonies' efforts to secure British recognition of American 
rights. Already four of those colonies were at war. News arrived a 
week later that Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold had captured Fort Ticon- 
deroga, an event which expanded the dimensions of the conflict and ended 
hopes of a swift reconciliation with Britain. Congress reluctantly 
moved to assume direction of the military effort. Up to that point the 
organization of forces followed established colonial precedents, but as 
Congress and its agents moved towards an army representing all thirteen 
colonies they had to break new ground.
Adoption of the Army.
Military attitudes within Congress derived in part from the particu­
lar circumstances of the individual constituencies, but also from the 
political attitudes of the delegates themselves. Conflict began to under­
mine the hopes of reconciliation among the handful of members who believed 
that their first loyalty lay with Great Britain. The militants,
AO
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concentrated in the New England delegations but with support in other 
colonies, gained the initiative in deliberations by virtue of superior 
organization and because British policy played into their hands. During 
May and June the militants sought support from other delegates for Cong­
ress to assume responsibility for the existing troops at Boston. They 
successfully removed the stigma that the war was a regional issue largely 
because New Yorkers, concerned for the safety of their own colony, sup­
ported the creation of a national force.*
The first step in this direction came on 15 May when James Duane 
of New York introduced a letter from the local New York City Committee 
of One Hundred. That body, alarmed by a rumor that British troops were 
on the way to the city, requested Congressional advice. Congress recom­
mended that the British be left alone as long as they committed no overt 
action, but urged the New Yorkers to defend themselves if attacked and 
to prevent the troops from erecting any fortifications. Congress also 
used this occasion to appoint a committee to consider the general defen­
sive needs of that colony. The study group included Thomas Lynch and
George Washington, the New York delegation, and militant leader Samuel 
2
Adams.
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On the next day Congress formed itself into a committee of the whole 
to "take into consideration the state of America."^ This was an excep­
tionally important parliamentary maneuver since Congress was unsure of 
its objectives but acutely aware of the importance of presenting an ap­
pearance of unanimity to the world. As a committee of the whole the 
delegates could freely exchange opinions and arrive at a consensus with 
no hint of disagreement in the record. They could also maintain a grea- 
ter degree of secrecy. This arrangement lasted for the next month and 
served Congress' purposes admirably, although it created problems for 
historians attempting to reconstruct the flow of events.
The first business considered by the Committee of the Whole was a 
motion on 16 May by Richard Henry Lee, a Virginia ally of the Adamses, 
for Congress to raise an army. Lynch and John Dickinson supported Lee, 
but opposition came from others, notably Robert R. Livingston and John 
Rutledge."* At this point the delegates knew the Massachusetts plan for 
a regional army but assumed that the force at Boston amounted only to
9,000 to 10,000 men.*5 Although the delegates did not act on Lee's pro­
posal, it was clear that there was broad support for a defensive military 
posture in Congress.
Deliberations on 18 May revealed the impact of the news of the cap­
ture of Ticonderoga. Congress assumed that the British were planning 
to use troops stationed in Canada against the colonies, an assumption
3. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2: 53-54.
4. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 1: 465.
5. Ibid., p. 351. Dickinson, Livingston, and Rutledge all were consider­
ably less militant at this point than the New Englanders.
6. Ibid., pp. 356, 366-9.
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that placed the onus of expanding hostilities on London. Congress in­
structed the local committees in Albany and New York City to move mili­
tary supplies to safety and to call on New England for assistance in 
defending Ticonderoga.^ The next day the report of the committee 
studying Duane's motion passed to the Committee of the Whole for con­
sideration.^ These events marked a change in sentiment as British ac­
tions seemed to confirm the militants' claims of hostile intent. On 21 
May John Adams, a leading militant, reported to colleagues in Massachu­
setts "I can guess - that an Army will be posted in New York, and another 
in Massachusetts, at the Continental E x p e n s e . T h e  other delegates, 
including those who had been reluctant to endorse the use of force, ex­
pected formal actions confirming "Continental" or "American" armies 
for both Boston and New York.^
On 25 May the Committee of the Whole delivered its report on three 
specific measures to be recommended to New York. Two currently undefen­
ded strategic points needed fortification: King's Bridge, which linked
Manhattan to the mainland, and the Hudson Highlands, a zone some forty 
miles above the city where hills narrowed the Hudson River and allowed 
obstruction of the passage to Albany. The militia of the colony also 
should be brought to a state of readiness. Finally, the New York
7. Ibid., pp. 356, 358, 362-3, 369-70. Ford, Journals of Congress, 2: 
55-56.
8. Ibid., p. 57. A similar procedure on 1 June processed the report of 
a committee composed of militants Samuel Adams, Silas Deane, and Thomas 
Mifflin and more moderate George Washington, Philip Schuyler, and Lewis 
Morris appointed on 27 May to suggest ways and means to procure arms; 
Ibid., pp. 67, 74; Smith, Letters of Delegates, 1: 412, 431.
9. Ibid., p. 364.
10. Ibid., pp. 442-3, 445-6, 464-5.
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Provincial Congress should be authorized to raise up to 3,000 men to 
serve, under conditions similar to those established by New England, 
until 31 December 1775. They would garrison Ticonderoga and other posts. 
The Congress unanimously approved these recommendations on the 26th
after adding a preamble protesting that, although it hoped for recon-
11ciliation, it was forced to defend itself. Congress gave New York's 
Provincial Congress a free hand in raising and officering the troops.
The only recorded debate was over the size of that force. The original 
recommendation to raise 4,000 was supported by persons of such diverse 
views as John and Samuel Adams on the one hand and Edmund Rutledge on 
the other, and then was lowered to 3,000 at the insistence of Thomas 
McKean and Edmund Pendleton.^ This action clearly indicates the impor­
tance Congress placed on reaching a consensus.
On 31 May Congress received a report from Benedict Arnold that 
British forces were massing at St. John's at the northern end of Lake 
Champlain. It requested Connecticut to send troops to help secure 
T i c o n d e r o g a . Actually the 4th Connecticut Regiment of approximately
1,000 men had already moved into the area, and this request granted 
official approval to the movement. The delegates deliberately left the 
number vague to allow the Connecticut authorities, who were closer and 
better informed, freedom of action. This measure, moving New Englanders 
to assume a function intended for the recently authorized New Yorkers,
11. Ford, Journals of Congress, 2: 59-61, 64-66. Smith, Letters of 
Delegates, 1: 409.
12. Ibid., pp. 407, 410. The preamble appears to have been inserted at 
the insistance of the New Jersey delegates, who represented a variety of 
views.
13. Ibid., pp. 422-3, 429-30. Ford, Journals of Congress, 2: 73-74.
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resulted from the delegates' perception of the need for swift action. 
Connecticut's men were already in being; the New York Provincial Con­
gress had not yet had time to raise its troops.*^*
decisive action came on 14 June 1775 when Congress adopted "the 
American continental army." Following its usual procedure it reached 
a consensus in the Committee of the Whole.^ A desire for secrecy 
colored the proceedings.*8 The record*^ indicates only that Congress 
undertook to raise ten companies of riflemen, approved an enlistment 
form for them, and appointed a committee*8 to draft rules and regulations 
for "the government of the army." The delegates' correspondence and 
diaries and their subsequent actions make it clear that they really did 
much more. They also accepted responsibility for the existing troops, 
believed to number 10,000, and the forces allocated for the defense of 
the various points in New York, assumed to be another 5,000 men.*^
At least some men in Congress believed from the beginning that this 
20
force would grow. Better information soon arrived from Boston regar­
ding the actual numbers of New Lngland troops. Congress responded by a 
series of increases in the troop ceilings the delegates were willing to 
support. Within a week delegates began referring to 15,000 men at Boston
14. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 1: 423-4, 430-1, 449-50.
15. Ibid., pp. 488-90, 503-4, 507-8, 515-6, 526-7.
16. Ibid., pp. 488-90, 507.
17. Ford, Journals of Congress, 2: 89-90.
18. Thomas Cushing, George Washington, and Joseph Hewes constituted the 
moderate core of this committee, with Philip Schuyler and militant Silas 
Deane representing the extremes of political opinion.
19. Ibid., pp. 95, 99. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 1: 486-90, 498- 
500, 502-4, 507-8, 515-6, 519-21, 526-7, 539-40.
20. Ibid., pp. 515-6.
and by early July that total began edging towards 20,000.21 On 19 June 
the governnents of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire were 
requested to forward to Boston "such of the forces as are already em­
bodied, towards their quotas of the troops agreed to be raised by the
New England Colonies", a clear indication of the intent of Congress to
22adopt the entire extant regional army. Discussions on the next day
indicated that Congress was prepared to support a force at Boston twice
the size of the British garrison and was unwilling to order any existing 
23
units disbanded. Maximum strengths for both the forces in Massachu­
setts and New York were finally established on 21 and 22 July, when 
solid information was at hand. These were set respectively at 22,000 
and 5,000 men, a total nearly double that envisioned on 14 June.2 *^
The "expert riflemen" authorized on 14 June were the first units 
raised directly as Continentals. Congress intended to have ten com­
panies serve as a light infantry force at the Boston siege and at the 
same time symbolically extend military participation beyond the scene 
of immediate conflict. Six of the companies were allocated to Pennsyl­
vania, two to Maryland, and two to Virginia. Each would have a captain, 
3 lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, a drummer (or horn player), and 
68 privates. The enlistment period was set at one year, the norm for 
Provincials in earlier wars, a period that would expire officially on 
1 July 1776.23
21. Ibid.. pp. 516-7, 543-4, 561, 569, 585-6.
22. Ibid., pp. 518-22, 539-40. Ford, Journals of Congress, 2: 99.
23. Ibid., pp. 100-1.
24. Ibid., pp. 202, 207. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 1; 662-4.
25. Ibid., pp. 313-5. Ford, Journals of Congress, 2: 89-90; 5: 432.
On 12 June 1776 the company organization of a rifle company was amended 
to include both a drummer and a fifer.
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Responsibility for recruiting the companies was given to the three 
colonies' Congressional delegates, who then turned directly to the 
county committees of areas noted for skilled marksmen. The response in 
Pennsylvania's western and northern frontier counties was so great that 
on 22 June the colony's quota was Increased from six to eight companies, 
organized as a regiment. On 25 June the Pennsylvania delegates, on the 
recommendation of the Pennsylvania Assembly, appointed field officers 
for the regiment. Since no staff organization was provided, the neces­
sary duties were performed by company officers and volunteers. On 11 
July delegate George Read secured the adoption of a ninth company organ­
ized in Lancaster County by his wife's nephew. In Virginia Daniel 
Morgan raised one company in Frederick County and Hugh Stephenson another 
in Berkeley County; Michael Cresap's and Thomas Price's companies were 
from Frederick County, Maryland. All thirteen were organized during 
late June and early July and raced to Boston where their loose frontier 
attitudes created disciplinary problems.2**
Including troops from outside New England gave the desired contin­
ental flavor to the Army. This need to broaden the base of support for 
the war also led John Adams to work for the appointment of a southerner 
as commander of "all the continental forces, raised, or to be raised, 
for the defense of American liberty." On 15 June Congress unanimously 
chose George Washington, a Virginia delegate. Washington had been ac­
tive in the military planning committees and by late May had taken to
26. Ibid., 2: 103-4, 173. Pennsylvania Archives. 2d Ser., 10: 3-43. 
Smith, Letters of Delegates. 1: 491-2, 598-9, 621-5. Read was not a 
militant.
48
wearing his old uniform. His colleagues believed that his modesty and 
competence qualified him to adjust to the "Temper & Genius" of the New
England troops. Congress gave Washington the rank of General and
27
Commander-1n-Chief.
Congress clearly respected Washington, for it granted him exten­
sive powers combining the functions of a regular British commander with 
the latent military responsibilities of a colonial governor. Congress' 
original instructions of 20 June, drafted by Edmund Rutledge and the 
militants Richard Henry Lee and John Adams, told him to proceed to Mas­
sachusetts, "take charge of the army of the united colonies", and capture 
or destroy all armed enemies. His general instructions were to keep the 
army obedient, diligent, and disciplined; his only specific obligation 
was to send Congress the first accurate strength return of the army.
The Commander-in-Chief's right to make strategic and tactical decisions 
on purely military grounds was limited only by a reference to listening 
to the advice of a council of war. Within a maximum set by Congress, 
including volunteers, Washington had the right to determine how many 
men to retain, and Congress empowered him to temporarily fill any vacan­
cies occurring below the rank of colonel. Permanent promotions and ap- 
pointments could only be made by the colony governments.
Although sectional politics played a role in Washington's selection, 
he was in fact the best-qualified native-born American for the job on
27. Ibid., pp. 416-7, 486-99, 507-9, 515-7. Henderson, Party Politics, 
pp. 53-54. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2s 91-93, 96-97.
28. Ibid.. pp. 92-93, 96-97, 100-1. John Todd White, "Standing Armies 
in Time of War: Republican Theory and Military Practice During the
American Revolution" (Ph.D. Dissertation, George Washington University, 
1978), p .  119.
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strictly military terms. He had begun his military career in the Vir­
ginia militia in 1752 as one of four regional adjutants appointed to 
improve training. During the early phase of the French and Indian War 
he served with gallantry as Edward Braddock's volunteer aide at the 
battle of the Monongahela, and later as commander of Virginia's two 
Provincial regiments defending that colony's frontier, in 1758 he com­
manded a brigade composed of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania units 
on John Forbes' expedition against Fort Duquesne, the only American in 
that war to command so large a force. These years furnished invaluable 
experience and taught him the importance of discipline, marksmanship, 
and professional study. Exposure to Forbes' seminal ideas on adapting 
European tactics to the American wilderness contributed materially to 
Washington's military education. Above all, he came to recognize that
only unyielding commitment to hard work and attention to administrative
2 9detail could keep troops in the field.
On 16 June, the day after Washington's appointment, Congress author­
ized a variety of other senior officers for its new army. Details were 
ironed out again in Committee of the Whole. Five major staff officers 
were established: an Adjutant General, a Commissary of Musters, a Pay­
master General, a Commissary General, and a Quartermaster General. They 
were expected to assist the Commander-in-Chief with the administration
29. In addition to the standard biographies, the key items furnishing 
insight into Washington's military background are: John C. Fitzpatrick,
ed., The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript 
Sources 1745-1799 (39 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office,
1931-44), 1; 148-50, 331-6, 466-71, 490-1; 2: 6-19, 295-8; and Oliver 
L. Spaulding, Jr., "The Military Studies of George Washington," American 
Historical Review. 29 (1924), pp. 675-80.
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of the "grand army". The forces allocated to New York were already 
considered a separate department and were authorized their own Deputy 
Quartermaster General and a Deputy Paymaster General. Three aides and 
a military secretary for Washington and a secretary for the separate 
New York department, and six engineers (three for each force) completed 
the staff. The other ranks created at this time were major general and 
brigadier general. The number of generals remained uncertain for several 
days as Congress debated* Between 17 and 22 June Congress finally de­
cided on four major generals, each with two aides, and eight brigadier 
generals. It fixed these numbers to allow each colony raising troops 
a share of the patronage.30 in the succeeding days Congress also took 
steps to issue paper money to finance the army, and on 30 June adopted 
Articles of War.^*
Selection of subordinate generals and senior staff positions led 
to political maneuvering as delegates sought appointments for favorite 
sons. On 17 June Artemas Ward and Charles Lee were elected as the first 
and second major generals and Horatio Gates as the Adjutant General.
Ward received seniority because he was in command at Boston and because 
Massachusetts furnished the largest single contingent of troops. Ward 
was a Harvard graduate with long years of experience in the Massachusetts 
legislature and established whigglsh political credentials. After two 
years of active duty as a field officer in the French and Indian War he 
compiled an excellent record as a militia administrator. Lee and Gates
30. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2: 93-94, 97, 99, 102-4. Smith, Letters 
of Delegates. 1: 503, 509, 518-22, 525-6, 529-30, 533, 535-6, 539-42, 
547-8. Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 53-54.
31. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2: 103, 106, 111-22.
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were professional English officers In their forties who were living in 
Virginia on the half-pay (inactive) list. Both were associates of radi­
cals in England and America and had served in the French and Indian War. 
Lee had also seen service in Portugal and in the Polish Army. Gates 
ended the Seven Years' War as a major in the Caribbean. His appointment 
as Adjutant General with the rank of brigadier general reflected his
staff experience and was intended to provide Washington with a strong
32
administrative assistant.
Two more major generals were appointed on 19 June to satisfy the 
colonies contributing the other large contingents. Philip Schuyler, 
a conservative New York delegate with close ties to Washington, was to 
command in his native colony. A member of the New York elite, the 
forty-two year old Schuyler had been a major in the French and Indian 
War specializing in logistics. His experience, political connections, 
and extensive business Interests in Albany were particularly valuable 
in his new command. Connecticut's delegation had difficulty agreeing 
on a nominee for that colony's major general, but Israel Putnam's status 
as a folk-hero eventually outweighed considerations of strict military 
seniority, and he received the appointment. Born in 1718, Putnam was 
a relatively old man who had seen extensive service in the French and
32. Smith, Letters of Delegates. Is 503-4, 507-8, 529-30, 533, 537. 
Standard biographies are: Charles Martyn, The Life of Artemas Ward The
First Commander-in-Chief of the American Revolution (1921; reprint ed. 
Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1970); John R. Alden, General
Charles Lee. Traitor or Patriot? (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univer­
sity Press, 1951); and Paul David Nelson, General Horatio Gates: A
Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976).
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Indian War, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel. He was also an
33
early, vocal leader of the Sons of Liberty.
Selection of eight brigadier generals on 22 June was the product of 
a compromise. Congress allotted these positions in proportion to the 
relative numbers of men each colony contributed, and in making appoint- 
ments followed the recommendations of the colony's delegates. It created 
problems, however, by ignoring status and seniority.^ Massachusetts' 
Seth Pomeroy, William Heath, and John Thomas were originally elected as 
the first, fourth, and sixth brigadier generals. Washington refrained 
from handing them their commissions until Pomeroy declined because of 
his age. Congress was then able to eliminate one problem by restoring 
Thomas to seniority, although it did not fill Pomeroy's vacancy. Thomas, 
a surgeon, had been born in 1724 and had served primarily in medical 
roles. Heath, thirteen years younger, was strictly a product of the 
militia.
Richard Montgomery of New York became the second ranking brigadier 
general. Montgomery was born in Ireland in 1738, educated at Dublin's
33. Smith, Letters of Delegates. 1: 442-3, 521-2, 529-30, 535, 539-40, 
542-3, 555-6, 626-7. Standard biographies are: Martin H. Bush, Revolu­
tionary Enigma: A Re-Appraisal of General Philip Schuyler of New York
(Port Washington, N.Y.: Ira J. Friedman, 1969); Don R. Gerlach, Philip
Schuyler and the American Revolution in New York, 1733-1777 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1964); and Increase N. Tarbox, Life of 
Israel Putnam ("Old Put"), Major-General in the Continental Army (1876; 
reprint ed. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1970). Putnam's
election was the only one, other than Washington's, by unanimous vote.
34. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2: 103-4. Smith, Letters of Delegates. 
1: 525-30, 542-3, 651-3, 662-4. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3: 
465-7. Peter Force, ed., American Archives: A. Collection of Authentic
Records. State Papers, Debates, and Other Notices of Public Affairs (9 
vols., Washington: M. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1839-53), 4th
Ser., 3: H07-8. Rossle, Politics of Command, pp. 16-24.
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Trinity College, and had entered the British Army in 1756. His combat 
service had been in North America and the Caribbean, but he resigned in 
1772 when he failed to receive a promotion to major. He moved to New 
York, married into the powerful Livingston family, and in 1775 was elec­
ted to the New York Provincial Congress. His appointment was intended 
to complement Schuyler's logistical and administrative skills with 
combat leadership.
David Wooster and Joseph Spencer of Connecticut became the third 
and fifth brigadier generals. Wooster was born in 1711 and had served 
in Connecticut's navy during King George's War. A Yale graduate, he 
later commanded a regiment in the French and Indian War. Spencer, who 
was three years younger, had also served in both wars. The two men ini­
tially refused to serve under Putnam and had to be cajoled into accepting 
their commissions. Delegate John Sullivan, a thirty-five year old lawyer, 
exercised political leverage and became New Hampshire's brigadier general. 
Folsom who commanded the first troops raised to aid Boston was passed 
over. Nathanael Greene of Rhode Island became the last of the Continen­
tal generals of 1775.
In retrospect the June 1775 decision of the Continental Congress 
to create a Continental Army seems remarkably free from political strife. 
Militants as well as delegates of a more moderate persuasion supported 
each step along the way. The only arguments were of a nonpartisan nature 
and concerned technical details. That unity of sentiment resulted from 
British actions which convinced virtually every delegate of the need to 
take defensive measures and from a compromise program that appealed to 
every segment of opinion. Militants, deeply committed to the ideal of 
the citizen-soldier, saw the adoption of the short-term New England
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force as the genesis of a yeomanry army. Others, more concerned with 
the practical lessons of the colonial wars, felt that they were forming 
an army of Provincials. Militants were happy that Congress adopted the 
army; more conservative delegates could claim that the door was not yet 
closed to reconciliation with the mother country. Adherents of every 
view were accommodated in the selection of officers, particularly since 
Washington and Schuyler had blank commissions to distribute to the regi- 
mental officers. This device confirmed local selections and yet retained 
nominal national control of appointments. Senior commanders reflected 
the prevailing sentiments of each colony, and ranged from the ultra- 
militant Charles Lee to conservative Philip Schuyler. In fact, this 
desire for consensus glossed over some profound attitudinal differences 
within the Army and Congress that would later create internal t u r m o i l . 35
Washington and Schuyler left Philadelphia on 23 June to take up 
their new responsibilities. The Commander-In-Chief reached Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, late in the evening on 2 July. He formally opened his 
headquarters the next day.
Washington Takes Command.
Washington arrived at Cambridge with the mission of turning the 
armed forces assembled there into a unified army. Three major areas 
needed improvement: tactical and administrative organization above the
35. Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 53-54. White, "Standing Armies," 
pp. 95-97, 109-10, 112, 119* Lawrence Delbert Cress, "The Standing Army, 
The Militia, and the New Republic: Changing Attitudes Toward the Mili­
tary in American Society, 1768 to 1820" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University 
of Virginia, 1976), pp. 114-38.
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regimental level; a centralized special staff; and a unified system of 
discipline. Washington and the other generals appointed by Congress 
were guided in this work by Congress' general directions and by the 
model of the British Army. At the end of 1775, although the troops 
still came primarily from the five northernmost colonies, national control 
over the Continental Army was well established.
Regiments from the different New England colonies arrived at Boston
in a piecemeal fashion and occupied positions according to the dictates
of terrain and the road network. Washington brought greater rationality
and control by introducing divisions and brigades as echelons between
his own headquarters and the regiments. His pattern of organization
was adapted to the specific geographic conditions and personalities he
encountered at Boston. On 22 July, after some hesitancy because of the
problems over rank and precedence and the lack of positive guidance from
Congress, Washington assigned his available generals to command three
divisions and six brigades, each responsible for a sector of the siege 
36
lines. The British occupied two peninsulas in Boston harbor which 
were connected to the mainland by narrow necks. Ward, with brigades 
under Thomas and Spencer, guarded the southern or right wing opposite 
Boston Neck. Lee manned the left wing, shutting off Charlestown Penin­
sula with Sullivan*8 and Greene's Brigades. The third division was held 
in the central area of the lines as a reserve force under Washington's 
close supervision. Putnam, whose appointment as a major general created 
the thorniest problem, commanded Heath's Brigade and the sixth brigade.
36. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3: 349, 354-6, 396-7. The 
printed version of the 22 July 1775 general order is Incomplete.
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The latter was under the temporary command of the senior colonel because 
Pomeroy's vacancy was not filled. This arrangement was retained through­
out the siege. Each brigade, normally six regiments, defended its own 
sector, while the specialized riflemen and artillery remained directly 
under Washington's headquarters.
Congress began creating a staff structure on 16 June, but had filled 
only one post immediately, appointing Gates as Adjutant General. Over 
the succeeding weeks Congress and Washington selected the other staff 
members.^ The primacy Congress accorded the Adjutant General is evi­
dent in Gates' immediate appointment and his rank as a general officer.
In the British Army the Adjutant General, working closely with the 
civilian Secretary at War, had responsibility for discipline, compila­
tion of rolls and rosters, and supervision of drills and clothing. By 
the time of the Revolutionary War the British had also developed a tem­
porary staff adjutant general for each major expeditionary force. This 
officer handled guards, details, paperwork (including the transmission 
of orders), and the formation of the infantry into the line of battle.
A brigade-level officer, the brigade major, and a detail of sergeants 
who acted as messengers assisted him. This expeditionary officer served 
as the model for the Continental Army's Adjutant General. For his part, 
Washington left Gates to establish the Army's internal administrative
37. General background on the duties of staff officers is contained in 
the following sat af sources: George Smith, An Universal Military Dic­
tionary ... (London: J. Milan, 1779); S. G. P. Ward, Wellington's Head­
quarters: A Study of the Administrative Problems in the Peninsula 1809-
1814 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 10-31; and Clifford
Walton, History of the British Standing Army. AP 1660 to 1700 (London: 
Harrison and Sons, 1894), pp. 615-29, 637-47.
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procedures, a task he performed efficiently. In particular, difficulty
in compiling the first strength return, a major portion of Gates' job,
38led to the introduction of printed forms and regularized procedures.
On 14 September Congress confirmed, with the rank of colonel, the New
York Provincial Congress' selection of Edward Fleming as Deputy Adju-
39
tant General for the New York Department.
Army administration supervised by the Adjutant General extended to 
lower echelons. British brigade majors were captains temporarily selec­
ted by a brigade commander to serve as his liaison officer between the 
adjutant general and the regiments. Since a British Army brigade was 
a transitory formation, the office of brigade major was not permanent.
40He also supervised the daily working and guard parties of the brigade.
The adjutant paralleled the brigade major on the regimental level. A 
junior company officer customarily was assigned this duty in the British 
Army in addition to his normal tasks. He assisted the major, who retained 
nominal responsibility for the regimental staff. In the Continental 
Army both the brigade major and the adjutant were initially modeled 
after these British precedents with one important exception. They were 
normally set apart as distinct offices rather than additional duties.
38. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3: 318-9, 328, 335. George A. 
Billias, "Horatio Gates: A Professional Soldier," in George A. Billias,
ed., George Washington's Generals (New York: William Morrow and Co.,
1964), pp. 82-84. Charles H. Lesser, The Sinews of Independence: Month­
ly Strength Reports of the Continental Army (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1976), pp. xli-xxviii. Record Group 93, National Archives, 
contains weekly returns which were maintained as a separate accounting 
system to assure accuracy.
39. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2: 220-3, 249. Force, American Archives, 
4th Ser., 2: 1803; 3: 549, 564. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 1: 631; 2: 
19-20. Fleming was actually a third choice.
40. Permanent garrisons contained a town major with functions similar 
to those of a brigade major.
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Massachusetts had appointed William Henshaw as Ward's adjutant 
general and Samuel Brewer as Thomas' on 27 June to service the two 
concentrations of Massachusetts troops which had developed. When Washing­
ton informed Congress of his army's command organization on 10 July*
Congress assumed correctly that he had established three geographical 
centers. It therefore authorized three brigade majors. Washington 
accepted the existence of Massachusetts' two adjutants general and Rhode 
Island's brigade major as de facto brigade majors and requested Congress 
to authorize one for each of the army's six brigades. In August* when 
Congress failed to reply* he acted on his own authority and appointed 
David Henly* John Trumbull* and Richard Cary* and confirmed Brewer*
Daniel Box of Rhode Island* and Alexander Scammell. The pattern estab­
lished in these Initial appointments continued throughout the war. Con­
gress normally delegated authority to appoint brigade majors to either 
the Commander-in-Chief or the territorial department commanders, who in 
turn deferred selection of specific individuals to the brigade commanders.^
The remaining administrative staff also followed British precedent. 
Washington and Congress used the Paymaster General* the disburser of 
funds, to consolidate Continental control over the Army's finances. Two 
important militant politicians, James Warren of Massachusetts and Jona­
than Trumbull* Jr.* of Connecticut* were elected on 27 and 28 July as
41. Force* American Archives* 4th Ser., 2: 581, 783, 1451-2. Ford* Jour­
nals of Congress. 2: 190. Smith* Letters of Delegates. Is 662-4; 2: 42. 
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 3: 320-9, 352-3, 390-9, 425, 427,
456, 461-3. Edmund Cody Burnett* ed.* Letters of Members of the Contin­
ental Congress (8 vols., Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington*
1921-36), 3: 262-3. William Henshaw, The orderly book of Colonel Wil­
liam Henshaw. of the American army. April 20-September 26, 1775 (Boston:
A. Williams* 1881), p. 13.
the Paymaster General and Deputy Paymaster General for the New York De­
partment respectively. At the end of the siege of Boston Warren declined 
to move with the Army to New York. Congress replaced him on 27 April 
1776 with William Palfrey, a Boston merchant who had been John Hancock's
An
business manager and Charles Lee's aide. * This staff department remained 
relatively small and Animportant In the Continental Army. In the British 
Army, where regiments were the property of their colonels, the Paymaster 
General served as the channel through which funds were transmitted to 
the regiment's civilian commercial agent. Since most supplies were 
issued directly in the Continental Army, the agent system never devel­
oped and the Paymaster General concentrated narrowly on disbursing funds 
for salaries.
The British Commissary General of Musters (or Mustermaster General) 
was the official watchdog who insured that regimental commanders actually 
furnished the men and equipment they claimed payment for. Massachusetts 
had appointed two mustermasters as early as 6 May. As indicated, Congress 
included a Mustermaster General in the first set of staff officers, al­
though it delegated selection of an individual to Washington. He chose 
Stephen Moylan, a wealthy Irish Catholic merchant from Philadelphia, one
of the earliest volunteers from outside New England. On 29 July Congress
43authorized a deputy for the New York Department.
42. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3: 346-52; 4: 470-3; 5: 11-12. 
Ford, Journals of Congress, 2: 93, 209-12; 4: 42-44, 296, 314-6. Smith, 
Letters of Delegates, 1: 667-8, 682. Henderson, Party Politics, p. 54.
43. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 2: 750, 790-5. Ford, Journals 
of Congress. 2: 93, 190, 220-3. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 3: 
320-9, 414. Charles Lee, "The Lee Papers," 4 vols., New-York Historical 
Soceity Collections for 1871-74, 1: 199-200.
60
Commanders' personal staffs, the aides and secretaries authorized 
on 16 June, completed the Army's 1775 administrative apparatus. Fol­
lowing British precedent, the Commander-ln-Chlef and the major gener­
als selected these Individuals for their political connections as well 
as their abilities. The aides acted as messengers; the military secre­
taries performed most of the correspondence duties. During 1775 
Washington's "family," as these individuals were collectively known, 
contained various important young politicians or members of powerful 
families. This talented group included at different times Thomas 
Mifflin (a militant member of the Pennsylvania delegation in the First 
Continental Congress) and Joseph Reed of Pennsylvania, John Trumbull, 
a son of Connecticut's Governor, and three Virginians, Edmund Randolph, 
George Baylor, and Robert Hanson Harrison.44
British logistical practices divided supervisory responsibilities 
between a Commissary General of Stores and Provisions, a civil officer 
who was concerned with foodstuffs and the procurement and storage of 
general supplies, and the military Quartermaster General who controlled 
transportation and forage, as well as the army's marching and camping.
A separate branch handled munitions. When Washington arrived at Boston, 
he reviewed the supply measures undertaken by the several colonies. He 
was most impressed with the work of Joseph Trumbull of Connecticut, the 
colony which he expected to furnish a large share of the supplies for 
the siege. On his recommendation Congress appointed Trumbull Commissary
44. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 3: 309-11, 342, 352, 354, 
368-9, 419, 425-6, 450-4; 4: 68. Berthold Fernow, "Washington's Mill 
tary Family," Magazine of American History, 7 (1881), pp. 81-87.
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General on 19 July. Washington appointed Philadelphia merchant Thomas 
Mi££lin as the Quartermaster General on 14 August, and three days 
later, having persuaded Congress to create the office of Commissary 
of Artillery to handle that branch's special needs, he continued 
Ezekiel Cheever as a Continental officer in the role he had been per­
forming for Massachusetts. A similar organization was created for 
Schuyler's force since Congress realized the practical difficulties of 
consolidating logistics for such widely separated a r m i e s . 4 5
At this stage of the war Congress largely left the development of 
the logistical apparatus to the judgment of the local commanders, who 
relied in turn on British precedents. The most important official was 
the regimental quartermaster, a position that the Continental Army ele­
vated from an additional duty to permanent status. He was responsible 
for distributing rations, clothing, and ammunition within the regiment. 
He assigned the men their quarters and supervised pitching camp. A 
dally duty detail of about six privates, the "camp color men," assisted 
him. Supplementing the military officers were numerous civilian func­
tionaries in the commissariat. They included such specialists as con­
ductors, clerks, storekeepers, laborers, and skilled craftsmen.46
45. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2: 93, 190. Fitzpatrick, Writings of 
Washington. 3: 309, 320-9, 378-9, 419, 427-8, 514-5. Smith, Letters of 
Delegates. 1: 521-2, 529, 632, 641-3, 662-4.
46. For detailed logistical studies see: Victor Leroy Johnson, The
Administration of the American Commissariat During the Revolutionary 
War (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1941); and Erna Risch,
Supplying Washington's Army (a forthcoming publication of the U.S. Army 
Center of Military History). Special studies of British logistics in­
clude: Norman Baker, Government and Contractors: The British Treasury
and War Supplies 1775-1783 (London: University of London, 1971); R. A.
Bowler, Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America 1775- 
1783 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); and David Syrett,
Shipping and the American War 1775-83: A Study of British Transport
Organization (London: University of London, 1970).
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Medical care formed another area of special support which drew 
attention very early in the war. The regimental surgeon and his one 
or two assistants, or mates, provided basic care in the Continental 
and British Armies. Washington, drawing on his French and Indian War 
experience, bolstered their efforts by trying to convince the soldiers 
of the Importance of sanitation and diet. Congress followed the lead 
taken by Massachusetts, and on 27 July created a centralized hospital 
organization and medical supply system. The New York Department was 
later given a similar hospital corps under Dr. Samuel Stringer, an 
Albany politician and Schuyler's personal physician. Dr. Benjamin 
Church, a member of the Massachusetts political leadership, was appoin­
ted as the first Director General and Chief Physician. When he was 
revealed as a British spy in the autumn, he was replaced by the noted 
Philadelphian, Dr. John Morgan. Under Morgan a major step towards 
central control was instituted when regimental medical personnel were 
required to pass competency examinations.^
New England, a region with strong religious consciousness, 
naturally provided for spiritual as well as physical welfare. Chaplains 
had served on all major expeditions since the Pequot War of 1637, and 
the New England clergy had been politically active in the pre-war period. 
In 1775 Connecticut and New Hampshire both authorized a chaplain for
47. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2: 209-11, 249; 3: 297. Fitzpatrick, 
Writings of Washington. 3: 440-1, 449-50; 4: 2-3, 345-6; 5: 125-6. Smith, 
Letters of Delegates. 1; 558-9, 662-4. Philip Cash, Medical Men at the 
Siege of Boston April. 1775-April. 1776: Problems of the Massachusetts
and Continental Armies (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society,
1973). Richard L. Blanco, "The Development of British Military Medi­
cine 1793-1814." Military AffAArs. 38 (1974), pp. 4-10.
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each regiment, while Rhode Island allowed one for Its brigade. Diffi­
culties arose in Massachusetts. On 20 May it had scrapped a plan to 
provide one chaplain for each regiment, deciding instead to accept the 
offer of the Congregational1st Church (the colony's officially sup­
ported denomination) to provide clergymen on a rotating basis. Within 
two weeks this plan was discarded as unworkable, and the generals and 
field officers selected nine official chaplains. This concept of let­
ting the units select chaplains, rather than the authorities assigning 
them, became standard procedure in every colony except Georgia and the 
Carolines, and was recognized by Congress as well.^®
Regimental organizations contained another type of specialist 
that played an important role, although not technically considered a 
staff function. Companies included a drummer and in most cases a fifer 
as well. Unlike modern musicians, these individuals were concerned with 
signaling rather than morale and were commonly massed behind the regi­
ment in a battle. The eighteenth-century drum produced a sound that 
could be heard at distances of several miles and in groups could carry 
over the din of combat. Standard beats regulated the routine of camp 
life and transmitted orders during battle. Drummers and fifers addi­
tionally administered corporal punishment, maintained the regimental 
guard room, and assisted the surgeon and quartermaster in evacuating 
casualties. As early as 1777 they began to carry arms, and combat 
functions became more important than musical skill as the war progressed.
48. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 2: 766, 815-6, 876, 1384. 
Eugene Franklin Williams, "Soldiers of God: Chaplains of the Revolu­
tionary War" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Texas Christian University, 1972).
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In 1776 drum and fife majors were added to the regimental staff as 
performing musicians with the responsibility for instructing drummers 
and fifers. They received higher pay than their British counterparts.^
Later in the war the "field music" provided by the fifers and drum­
mers was supplemented by a few "bands of music." These were true bands 
normally containing up to eight musicians playing a variety of woodwinds 
and horns. Unlike European armies, the Continental Army did not hire 
civilians as bandsmen, but allowed soldiers to perform as an additional 
duty. The bands, which were maintained by only a handful of regiments, 
were legally the property of the officers of the regiment who pooled 
their funds to purchase instruments and pay the musicians. Even Washing­
ton had to ask their permission if he wished a band to perform at a 
formal ceremony or at an unofficial dance.
The final type of staff officer proved to be the most difficult to 
obtain. While many civilian occupations required skills which could be 
applied in the Army -- for example, merchants were able to step into 
various logistical assignments -- military engineering was a highly 
technical field. Americans knew a great deal about civil construction 
and could erect simple field works, but they were not on a par with 
formally trained European military engineers. Congress had authorized 
Washington and Schuyler each to have one chief engineer and two assis­
tants, but neither commander ever found enough suitable candidates.
49. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 8: 181-2; 9: 124-7; H :  335-6, 
366-7; 14: 293-4. Simon Vance Anderson, "American Music During the War 
of Independence, 1775-1783" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan,
1965). Raoul F. Camus, Military Music of the American Revolution 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976).
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Washington had to make do with a handful of men who were at best gifted 
amateurs: Col. Gridley and Lt. Col. Burbeck of the Artillery Regiment,
Jeduthan Baldwin, and Rufus Putnam. They created a ring of earthworks 
which the British chose not to attack, but could not press a formal 
siege of Boston. Their lack of skill turned operations into a mere 
blockade, dictating a strategy of trying to lure the British into costly
frontal attacks and strongly influencing Washington's tactical organi-
50zation.
The final requirement to turn the force at Boston into an army also 
involved the creation of special staff officers. Discipline, the mili­
tary system of obedience and Internal control, was an absolute neces­
sity for the linear warfare of the eighteenth century. Washington 
arrived at Cambridge to find that charges of misconduct in the battle 
of Bunker Hill had been levelled against a number of officers. He 
immediately informed the army that cowardice was
A Crime ... _the most infamous in a Soldier, the most 
injourlous ]_ sic_/ to an Army, and the last to be forgiven; 
inasmuch as it may, and often does happen, that the 
Cowardice of a single officer may prove the Distruction 
]_ sic_/ of the whole Army.^1
The Commander-in-Chief's attitudes had been formed during the French and 
Indian War by his experiences as a commander of Provincials and an ob­
server of the British Army. They were founded on a deep insight into
50. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3: 340-1. Force, American 
Archives, 2: 767-8, 1436. Lee, "Papers," 1: 199-200. Thomas Williams 
Baldwin, ed., The Revolutionary Journal of Col. Jeduthan Baldwin 1775- 
1778 (Bangor: De Burians, 1906), pp. 17-29. The British Army began
formal training of its engineers with the founding of the Royal Military 
Academy at Woolwich in 1741.
51. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3: 313-4.
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the nature of American society and the realities of the era. Washing­
ton's ideas on discipline dominated the Continental Army.^
New England's military and civil law both grew from English roots. 
Tradition and the Radical Whig Ideology of the region's leaders in 
1775 insured that the disciplinary system created for the New England 
armies was less draconian than Great Britain's. Massachusetts approved 
Articles of War on 5 April. In May Connecticut and Rhode Island adop­
ted similar codes, while New Hampshire accepted Massachusetts' on 29
June. Derived from British articles in force since 1765, the fifty-three 
clauses defined crimes, punishments, and legal procedures. Minor of­
fenses were punishable by summary action of the regimental commander, 
intermediary crimes were subject to a regimental court-martial, and the 
most serious were tried at a general court-martial. Most offenses were 
handled with fines or corporal punishment (up to a maximum of thirty- 
nine lashes); only desertion in combat and betraying the password to the
enemy were subject to the death penalty.
The first Continental Articles of War adopted by Congress on 30 
June added sixteen clauses to the basic Massachusetts text. The extra 
articles covered applicability, the preparation of administrative forms, 
pardons, suttlers, and the disposition of personal effects of deceased
52. The following discussion is based on: Ford, Journals of Congress,
2: 111-22, 220-3; 3: 331-4; Force. American Archives. 4th Ser., 1: 
1350-6; 2: 564-70, 1145-6, 1180; 3: 411-2, 1164; 5th Ser., 1: 576;
Smith, Letters of Delegates, lj 517, 558-9, 584-5; Fitzpatrick, Writings 
of Washington. 3: 320-9, 346-52, 378, 411; 4: 7-13, 22-25, 206-7, 220, 
224, 232-3, 527; Robert Harry Berlin, "The Administration of Military 
Justice in the Continental Army During the American Revolution, 1775- 
1783" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Santa Barbara, 
1976); and Maurer Maurer, "Military Justice Under General Washington," 
Military Affairs. 28 (1964), pp. 8-16.
soldiers. This naterial was contained in the British articles, but 
had been omitted by the New Englanders. The Continental text was 
distributed to the troops at Boston on 10 August. Concern for improve­
ment developed throughout the summer. Following a conference between 
a Congressional committee and the staff, sixteen changes were adopted 
by Congress on 7 November. They expanded the list of capital crimes.
The revision, which had been prompted by the realization that under 
existing articles treason was not a punishable offense, want into 
effect on 1 January 1776. At this time Washington began serious efforts 
to enforce the Continental Articles because lingering doubts over their 
legal applicability for men enlisted prior to 14 June were finally 
resolved.
Although Washington relied heavily on British precedents and the 
unofficial legal advice of William Tudor, he recognized the Importance 
of a permanent staff to assist him. Congress approved his plan to 
appoint a judge advocate as a legal advisor and a provost marshal to 
enforce camp discipline. Tudor, a Harvard graduate who had studied 
law under John Adams, was appointed on 30 July as the "Judge Advocate 
of the Continental Army." His principal function was supervising trials. 
The general supervision of discipline, however, remained a function of 
the Adjutant General. William Marony became the first provost marshal 
only on 10 January 1776. The provost's functions were identical in 
both the British and Continental Armies: maintaining the army jail and
supervising the daily camp guards furnished by line regiments in rota­
tion. The office suffered from a heavy personnel turnover throughout 
the war, largely because the provost was required to serve as the Army's
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executioner. Washington normally selected a sergeant and conferred on 
him the temporary rank of captain.
By mid-October 1775 Washington had made great progress in organi­
zing, staffing, and disciplining his army, although his correspondence 
indicates that he still was not satisfied. The Mail- Army actually 
exceeded the 22,000 men Congress had agreed to support.^ In addition 
to the artillery, riflemen, and a handful of separate companies, it 
included 27 Infantry regiments from Massachusetts, 5 from Connecticut, 
and 3 each from New Hampshire and Rhode Island. Although each colony's 
units had different authorized strengths, most were at least 90 percent 
full on paper. Only eight of the Massachusetts regiments were between 
80 and 90 percent complete, while three others fell below 80 percent.
The individual units averaged 474 rank and file, ranging between 364 
and 816. The total infantry rank and file strength of the Main Army 
was 19,497. There were also 690 drummers and fifers, 1,298 sergeants, 
934 company officers, i-63 regimental staff officers, and 94 field of­
ficers. Of the total rank and file strength, nearly 2,500 were sick,
750 were on furlough, and 2,400 were detached on various duties.
53. General Return, Main Army, 17 Oct 1775; Record Group 93, National 
Archives. Interpretation of Continental Army strength returns requires 
special care in understanding the categories used by the staff. Officers 
and noncommissioned officers were counted if present in camp but not if 
on detached duties. More complete information was furnished for rank and 
file (privates and corporals). Sick were classified as either "present" 
(with their unit) or "absent" (in a hospital or on convalescent leave). 
"On Command" included all men currently on detached duty, either in the 
immediate vicinity of camp or at a distance. A true picture of the com­
bat strength of a unit would include the rank and file "present fit for 
duty" plus a significant percentage of those on command or sick present: 
the former representing men who could be recalled on short notice, the 
latter those men capable of bearing arms in a defensive situation. The 
sergeants and officers in the company grades also represent a combat 
force.
Four of the six brigades contained approximately 2,400 men in 
combat strength. Sullivan's Brigade was slightly larger with 2,700 
men. The largest brigade was Spencer's (3,200) because it contained 
two of the large Connecticut regiments and several separate companies. 
The relative strengths of the divisions reflected their defensive re- 
sponsibilities. Ward's had the most men (5,600) and Lee's was only 
400 smaller. The reserve division under Putnam was the smallest, 
containing only 4,800 men, while the 700 riflemen remained outside 
the divisional alignment. This total force was substantial. It was 
equipped with a staff organization and a disciplinary system, and was 
grouped into a tactical arrangement which suited its location and mis­
sion. On the other hand the British had not tested it in battle. 
Washington finished 1775 unsure of the army's combat potential and 
eager to resolve some of the remaining issues relating to its internal 
organization.
The War Spreads to Canada.
Congressional control over a military establishment was not limited 
to Washington's Main Army in eastern Massachusetts. The 10 May 1775 
seizure of Fort Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain had played an important 
role in persuading Congress to take military action. It also expanded 
the horizons of the conflict by resurrecting fears of an invasion from 
Canada along the Champlain-Hudson River corridor which had been so 
important during the colonial wars. Unfortunately, the irregulars who 
had taken the fort under the leadership of Ethan Allen of the "Green 
Mountain Boys" and Benedict Arnold, a Connecticut volunteer acting under
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a Massachusetts commission, quickly melted away. The fort and its 
valuable cannon required more security than the Committee of Corres­
pondence of Albany County could provide from the handful of local volun­
teer companies at its disposal. Congress stepped in by assuming re­
sponsibility for the 4th Connecticut Regiment which was sent to protect 
the area from British counterattack, and by directing New York to raise 
3,000 troops.
Washington and Schuyler, commander of the New York Department
(known for most of the war as the Northern Department), discussed plans
on their trip north from Philadelphia. Washington gave his instructions 
to Schuyler on 25 June when they parted company at New York City. The 
Commander-in-Chief emphasized organization and the creation of a logis­
tical apparatus, but told his subordinate to follow any instructions 
that came directly from Congress. On 20 July Congress formalized their 
arrangements, creating the territorial department as one of the basic 
command elements of the Continental Army when it instructed Schuyler
to dispose of and employ all the troops in the New York
department in such manner as he may think best for the
protection and defense of these colonies, ... subject 
to future orders of the commander in chief.^
Schuyler's little army contained the 4th Connecticut Regiment, the 1st
and 5th Connecticut Regiments near New York City, and the 3,000 newly
authorized New Yorkers. His subordinate generals, Montgomery and
Wooster, reflected the two-colony origin of his force.
54. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2: 194.
55. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3: 302-4. Force, American 
Archives, 4th Ser., 2: 1667-8. Schuyler's first monthly report to 
Washington is dated 15 July and includes the department's first return 
dated 1 July.
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The New York Provincial Congress, for a variety of reasons, did 
not approve a plan for organizing and recruiting its quota until 27 
June. The selection of officers took another three days. The four 
regiments it decided on fell between the extremes of the New England 
regiments in size. Each contained ten companies; each company was com­
posed of 3 officers and 72 enlisted men. The companies were apportioned 
to the various counties whose committees of correspondence supervised 
recruiting. This gave the regiments a geographical basis, and their 
numerical designations reflected the militia precedence of the counties 
which furnished the bulk of the men.^®
Alexander McDougall, a leader of the Sons of Liberty, commanded 
the 1st New York Regiment which was raised in New York City. He had 
no military experience, but his radical political credentials were 
impeccable. A substantial proportion of his officers had backgrounds 
in either the French and Indian War or in the city's elite volunteer 
militia battalion. The 2d regiment was assigned to Albany, the colony's 
other urban area, and the surrounding regions in the north. Colonel 
Goose Van Schaick was the son of a former mayor, and many of the offi­
cers came from the Dutch element of the population. The 3d and 4th 
regiments divided the rest of the colony, roughly along the line of the 
Hudson River. James Clinton, a leader in Ulster County, commanded the 
3d. James Holmes and Philip Van Cortlandt, from Westchester and
56. Ibid.. 2: 1259, 1267, 1275, 1280, 1314-28, 1334-5, 1719-20, 1796;
3: 23-25, 525, 527, 532, 1268-9. James Sullivan and Alexander C. Flick, 
eds., Minutes of the Albany Committee of Correspondence 1775-1778 (2 
vols., Albany: University of the State of New York, 1923-25), 1: 120-1,
140-2. See Table 1.
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Dutchess Counties respectively, became colonel and lieutenant colonel 
of the 4th. In practice, the officers selected for each regiment 
represented the prevailing political sentiments of their portion of the 
colony. The colony's newly established Committee of Safety also de­
cided to form an artillery company as part of their contingent, and 
appointed John Lamb, another New York City Son of Liberty, as its com­
mander on 17 July. The company was raised in the city and organized 
on the same pattern as the companies of the Artillery Regiment at 
Boston.57
As a reward for Ethan Allen's role in the seizure of Ticonderoga, 
the Continental Congress authorised the formation of a special unit for 
Schuyler's army. The Green Mountain Boys were a quasi-independent 
group in the area known as the Hampshire Grants (today's Vermont). 
Congress recognized that they possessed special skills in wilderness 
fighting, but that they were fiercely independent. Therefore it in­
structed Schuyler and the New York Provincial Congress, which deferred 
to Schuyler, to allow them to organize seven companies and elect their 
own officers. They were formed into a regiment on the New York pattern, 
with the same terms of enlistment as the New Yorkers, but commanded by 
a lieutenant colonel rather than a colonel. To Allen's disgust, Seth
57. Force. American Archives. 4th Ser., 2: 1140, 1791, 1811-3; 3: 445, 
563. Historical Magazine. 1st Ser., 7 (1863), pp. 194-5. Roger J. 
Champagne, Alexander McDougall and the American Revolution in New York 
(Schenectady: New York State American Revolution Bicentennial Commis­
sion, 1975), pp. 90-95. Isaac Q. Leake, Memoir of the Life and Times of 
General John Lamb (Albany: Munsell, 1850). Rich insight into the crea­
tion of these first New York units comes from the papers of McDougall 
and Lamb. Both collections are in the New-York Historical Society.
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Warner, a veteran o£ Rogers' Rangers of the French and Indian War,
58received command of the small regiment.
Schuyler, following Congressional instructions, launched an in- 
vasion of Canada on 31 August. Montgomery was given the primary tacti­
cal responsibility for the offensive. Governor Guy Carleton unsuccess­
fully attempted to halt the Americans at St. John's (St. Jean, Quebec), 
and then was driven back toward Quebec City before winter weather re­
stricted Montgomery'8 movements. The regiments of Schuyler's army 
were supplemented during this offensive by reinforcements from the 
French-Canadian population and by Major Timothy Bedel's three companies 
of rangers. New Hampshire had raised the latter men as state troops 
during the summer to guard the Connecticut River Valley, and on Washing­
ton's advice offered them to Schuyler as soon as it became clear that 
the region was not in Immediate danger.^
Washington launched a second invasion directly from Boston. This 
maneuver not only had the military purpose of complicating Carleton's 
defensive problems, but it also enabled Washington to send reinforce­
ments to Montgomery by the most direct route. On 11 September the 
Commander-in-Chief gave Benedict Arnold, who had returned to Boston, 
command of a special force of 1,100 men drawn from the Main Army.
Three rifle companies (Morgan's from Virginia and Matthew Smith's and
58. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 2: 1339; 3: 529-30, 570-1, 1268- 
9. Ford, Journals of Congress, 2: 105. Smith, Letters of Delegates,
1: 541.
59. Ford, Journals of Congress, 2: 109-10. Force, American Archives,
4th Ser., 2- 655-7, 1183, 1767; 3: 60, 697, 779. Fitzpatrick. Writings 
of Washington, 3: 370-1, 436-9. Otis G. Hammond, ed., Letters and 
Papers of Major-General John Sullivan. Continental Army (3 vols., Concord: 
New Hampshire Historical Society, 1930-39), 1: 65-68, 71-72.
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William Hendricks' from the Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment) and two pro­
visional five-company infantry battalions of New Englanders reached 
the banks of the St. Lawrence River on 9 November after an epic trek 
through the virgin wilderness of Maine. Arnold was too weak to attack 
the city of Quebec alone and had to wait for Montgomery. The latter 
had paused at Montreal to regroup his disease-riddled ranks. The two 
forces linked outside Quebec on 1 December. Although Montgomery was 
able to persuade some of his troops to extend their enlistments beyond 
31 December 1775, many more indicated that they would leave for their 
homes at the start of the new year. Carleton could not be bluffed into 
surrendering, and Lamb's field guns were Ineffective against the city's 
walls. Montgomery had to gamble on storming the works, and he made his 
attempt on the night of 30-31 December under the cover of a snowstorm.
He was killed, the attack was repulsed, and a wounded Arnold was left 
to command the handful of men who continued to blockade the city as 
1776 began.
Summary.
By the end of 1775 control over the war effort had passed from the 
individual northern colonies to the Continental Congress. Acting as a 
national government that body had appointed general officers, initiated 
the development of staff and disciplinary systems, accepted the finan­
cial responsibility for existing units and authorized the creation of 
others, and formed two major operational commands. George Washington, 
a delegate unanimously chosen as Commander-in-Chief, took charge of the 
Main Army which penned the British into Boston. Philip Schuyler, another
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delegate, led the smaller £orce created to defend New York and later 
employed in a preemptive invasion of Canada.
Various conditions prevented Washington and Congress from imposing 
a fully rational arrangement during the first months of the war. They 
had to accept existing forces and react to the flow of events. More 
important, they operated within a very special political and ideological 
context. Any action taken needed the support of the militants who had 
been most vocal in opposing imperial policy during the previous decade 
as well as more moderate elements. The rhetoric of the period of pro­
test vigorously rejected the need for a large "standing army" of regular 
soldiers in America and made an intellectual commitment to a virtuous 
citizen-soldiery. The outbreak of hostilities in Massachusetts did not 
change this attitude. In fact Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill 
seemed to confirm the assumption that properly motivated militiamen 
were adequate for local defense.
Congress carefully stressed that it acted only out of self-defense 
in an effort to secure a broad base of support for its swasures. The 
modest size of its army, 27,000 men, and the short period of that army's 
enlistment were direct products of American opposition to the notion of 
a standing army. They were also reflections of American experiences in 
raising forces during the earlier colonial wars. The first Continental 
Army units thus resembled the Provincials of the French and Indian War 
who were raised for a specific term to counter a clearly identified 
enemy. The first units of the Revolutionary War, raised and organized 
by the governing bodies of the individual colonies, with the assistance 
of local committees of correspondence or safety, were ideologically
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viable because they were responsible to "the people." Indeed, except 
for the rifle companies, the men were technically enlisted in the ser­
vice of the various colonial governments which then turned the units 
over to Congress.
The first officers of the Continental Army, like the officers who 
had commanded the Provincials, came from the leadership of individual 
communities. They were products of the militia system, chosen for their 
experience, their ability to recruit, and especially for their political 
reliability. That these leaders mirrored the socio-political elites of 
their respective colonies is not surprising. American society in the 
eighteenth century was deferential. Leadership in every sphere of life 
was entrusted to men of merit and wealth because they had the greatest 
stake in society. In return the leaders were obligated to serve society 
to the best of their abilities. If the leaders failed to live up to 
their responsibilities they were removed. The senior officers of the 
Continental Army turned out to have a remarkable amount of practical 
military experience, largely earned as captains and field officers 
during the French and Indian War. This experience was comparable to 
that of their opponents. In 1775 few of the junior officers in the 
British regiments in America had ever heard a shot fired in combat, and 
most of the senior officers had little experience beyond the lower field 
grades. The Continental commanders had an advantage in their more flex­
ible and open approach to the art of war. Aware that they had much to 
learn, they tended as a group to approach problems with a less rigid 
attitude, and, in effect, grew into their jobs.
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Washington, in cooperation with Congress, worked during 1775 to 
impose unity and cohesion on the several armies he found at Boston.
His task was made easier by the relative homogeneity of the New England 
colonies and by their long tradition of military cooperation. Progress 
was made in creating a functional staff. Brigades, divisions, and 
separate territorial departments formed the pattern of command organi­
zation used throughout the war by the Continental Army; all three eche­
lons were introduced in 1775. Washington still had several goals for 
1776, particularly standardizing the regimental organization and foster­
ing a sense of common identity, but he had made important progress 
during his first months of command. He now turned to the task of re- 
enlisting his soldiers directly under Continental auspices and reorgan­
izing them into a genuinely Continental institution.
CHAPTER III
THE CONTINENTAL REGIMENTS OF 1776:
BOSTON AND QUEBEC
During 1775* the first year of the War of American Independence, 
British Army regulars fought hastily*formed American units in eastern 
Massachusetts and in Canada. Each of the New England colonies raised 
its own army in the aftermath of Lexington and Concord, and New York 
followed suit with the Continental Congress' encouragement. Lack of 
centralized direction allowed each colony to base its regimental or­
ganization on its own particular experience in the earlier imperial 
wars. Congress accepted responsibility for them in June when it es­
tablished the Continental Army. By December Congress, without serious 
political disagreement, had created a set of generals, a staff, and a 
disciplinary system. The enlistments of most of the soldiers composing 
the field armies besieging Boston and Quebec expired on the last day 
of that month. Congress, George Washington, and the Army's senior 
leaders used the reenlistment of those troops to transform the Army 
into a unified national force. In the process they emphasized lessons 
derived from the French and Indian War. Evaluation of the reorganization 
raised important ideological issues relating to the military, and led 
to the first important political debates later in the year.
Washington's unified Reorganization.
In his first week at Boston George Washington identified several 
problems relating to the Continental Army's organization. His earliest
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letters to Congress reported these defects and suggested solutions. 
Congress realized that enlistments would probably expire before any 
changes could produce results, and decided to conduct a thorough in­
vestigation rather than taking temporary action. During the summer 
individual delegates visited the Main Army, and in the fall a special 
committee held extensive discussions with military and civil leaders 
in New England. Based on that committee's report and Washington's 
recommendations a number of major reforms were introduced when the 
Army was reorganized for 1776.
Washington's first concern was the weakness of so many of the Mas­
sachusetts regiments. Because the generals unanimously agreed "that no 
Dependence can be put on the Militia for a continuance in Camp, or Regu­
larity and Discipline during the short time they may stay,"1' calling 
out militia units to supplement the Main Army was not a viable alter­
native. Washington attempted to fill the Massachusetts regiments al­
though he privately doubted that he would succeed, and as early as 10 
July 1775 he suggested that Congress recruit in areas outside of New 
England. In time he also decided that some incompetent officers were 
undermining the quality of the rest of the Army. Washington blamed 
this problem on Massachusetts' method of selecting officers and urged 
Congress to retain sole control over commissions. That policy would 
have the additional advantage of expanding the geographical base of the 
officer corps, a contribution towards making the Army a national
1. Washington to Congress, 10 Jul 1775, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., 
The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources 
1745-1799 (39 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931-44),
3: 327.
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institution. Washington also complained that the differences in the 
New England regimental organizations hampered efficient operations.
During an August recess several members of Congress traveled to 
Massachusetts for a personal view of their army. On their return 
Congress promised to make improvements when the Army was reorganized 
for 1776 and asked Washington to send particular proposals. On 29 
September 1775 the delegates created a special committee to confer with 
the Commander*in-Chief, his senior advisors, and officials of the New 
England governments. New England delegates initially interpreted this 
action as a criticism of their colonies1 troops, but quickly dropped 
their opposition and secured appointments to the committee for delegates 
they knew would protect New England's interests. Militant Benjamin 
Franklin of Pennsylvania and the more moderate Thomas Lynch of North 
Carolina quickly became members of the committee. A second ballot 
was needed before Benjamin Harrison of Virginia edged out the militant 
Eliphalet Dyer of Connecticut. All three delegates selected favored a 
vigorous war effort. The composition of the committee^ appointed to 
draft instructions for the investigating committee revealed the broad 
base of the Army's support in Congress.
Congress' instructions insured that final action would remain 
firmly in its own hands. The committee, essentially a fact-finding
2. Ibid.. pp. 320-31, 390-400, 433, 450-4, 456-7, 505-13. On 10 July, 
the date he submitted his first report, Washington also began a policy 
of sending personal letters to members of Congress. These letters trans­
mitted opinions which were impolitic to include in official dispatches; 
the recipients acted as hi6 agents in securing desired legislation.
3. Militants Samuel Adams of Massachusetts and Richard H. Lee of Vir­
ginia, and more conservative delegates John Rutledge of South Carolina, 
Thomas Johnson of Maryland, and Robert R. Livingston of New York.
commission, arrived at Headquarters on 15 October. Its first responsi­
bility was to persuade the Connecticut troops to remain until 31 Decem­
ber rather than leave on 10 December as their original enlistments 
specified, and to convey to Washington the hopes of Congress that an 
attack could be made on Boston before the end of the year. The com­
mittee's basic task, however, was to prepare a report for Congress on 
the specific measures needed to reorganize the Army, including Schuyler's 
troops, for an additional year's service. They were particularly in­
structed to discuss a uniform regimental organization, rates of pay and 
rations, additional regulations, and the projected costs of the Army, 
and to recommend a specific plan for raising the troops which would
A
retain as many veterans as possible.
Washington prepared for these meetings by collecting written opin­
ions from his generals and heads of the staff departments, and by holding 
a Council of War on 8 October. This meeting enabled the Army to develop 
a unified position, one which reflected the Commander-in-Chief's per­
sonal views. The officers wanted a new army of at least 20,000 men 
organized into 26 infantry regiments, plus riflemen and artillery. Each 
regiment was to be reduced from ten to eight companies. Each company 
was to have a captain, 2 lieutenants, an ensign, A sergeants, A corporals,
A. Worthington C. Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress 177A- 
i-789 (3A vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 190A-37), 3:
265-7, 270-2. Paul H. Smith, _et _al., eds., Letters of Delegates to Cong­
ress. 177A-1789 (Washington: Library of Congress, 1976- ), 2: 26-27,
6A-65, 79-86, 112-3. Edmund Cody Burnett, The Continental Congress (New 
York: Macmillan, 19A1), pp. 101-8. Donald John Proctor, "From Insur­
rection to Independence: The Continental Congress and the Military
Launching of the American Revolution" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University 
of Southern California, 1965), pp. 1A1-3, 151-83.
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a drummer, a fifer, and 76 privates, giving the regiment a total strength 
of 728 officers and men. Eight companies provided better tactical de­
ployment in linear warfare and thus represented a step forward. In 
comparison to most of the existing regiments, the new regiment would 
have stronger companies but would save money. The generals begged the 
question of how to select the officers because of its "delicacy."'*
These findings and the written staff reports formed the basis for 
frank discussions with the Congressional committee and the New England 
civilian representatives from 18 to 24 October. The committee overruled 
the generals on only one matter, setting the expiration of enlistments 
at 31 December 1776 instead of 1 December. Both the political and 
military leaders agreed that enlistments should be limited to a single 
year, so this was not a serious issue. Washington was promised that 
his Main Army would be reinforced before it was given additional re­
sponsibility for the defense of New York City. The committee, exceeding 
its authority on the grounds of expediency, allowed him to begin reen- 
listing his men. Congress began debating the committee's report on 2 
November and completed action on the reorganization within a month. It 
was clearly impressed by the unanimity within the Army and approved the 
recommendations with little change. The committee thus served as the 
vehicle for transmitting the Army's ideas to Congress, an important 
precedent.**
5. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 4: 7-13. Peter Force, ed., Amer­
ican Archives: A Collection of Authentic Records, State Papers. Debates,
and Other Notices of Public Affairs (9 vols., Washington: M. St. Clair
Clarke and Peter Force, 1639-54), 4th Ser., 3: 1039-44. Other topics dis­
cussed included pay, rations, conditions of enlistment, and regulations.
6. Ibid.. pp. 1155-67. Smith. Letters of Delegates. 2: 233-8, 243-4,
298, 337-8. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 22-23, 45-47. Ford, 
Journals of Congress. 3: 313-4, 318.
83
On A November Congress approved the reorganization o£ 26 regiments 
of Infantry with the structure recommended by the generals, as well as 
the plan for implementing the reorganization and various administrative 
nutters . 7  Brown coats with different colored facings (collar, lapels, 
cuffs, and the inside lining of the coattails) to distinguish the regi­
ments were established as the basic uniform, a system borrowed from the 
red-coated British Army. Each regiment contained 3 field officers (who 
could not also be generals or captains), a small staff, and 8 companies. 
Each company had A officers and 2 musicians, plus 8 noncommissioned 
officers and 76 privates evenly divided into A squads. At full strength 
the regiment deployed 6A0 privates and corporals. These combat soldiers 
who stood in the ranks with muskets represented a high 88 percent of its 
total. Thirty-two officers and thirty-two sergeants furnished a favorable 
ratio of one supervisor to ten rank and file for company-level control.
Although British and American regiments often operated throughout 
the war below their nominal levels, a comparison of the official regi­
mental organizations reveals some basic philosophical differences and 
sheds light on their relative advantages and disadvantages. The basic 
single-battalion British infantry regiment was a far less formidable 
organization despite an aggregate strength of 809. It also had three 
field officers on its rolls, but the colonel was a titular officer, the 
lieutenant colonel often served as a brigadier, and either he or the
7. Ibid., pp. 321-5, 399. The regimental organization superseded one 
established in October for New Jersey and Pennsylvania units by adding 
a lieutenant, drummer, fifer, and 8 privates to each company; Ibid., 
pp. 285-6, 291. See Figure 2.
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major were frequently detailed to special duties. Staff organization 
was identical to that originally adopted by the Continentals, but British 
chaplains and medical personnel were frequently absent. Each regiment 
had twelve companies. Two were actually recruiting depots (one each in 
England and Ireland), and two were elite flank companies. The grenadier 
company, composed of the largest men, was supposed to be the heavy 
striking force placed on the right or honor flank of the regiment. The 
light infantry, originally formed during the Seven Years' War and only 
restored as a permanent formation in 1771, were selected for their 
agility and were supposed to be either skirmishers or to take post on 
the left flank. By the Revolution, however, the British normally con­
solidated the grenadier and light infantry companies into special pro­
visional flank battalions. Commanders tended to use them in normal 
combat roles, and since they drew replacements from the line companies,
they drained the best men from the eight companies remaining at the
9
disposal of the regimental commander.
Each British company had the same basic organization: 3 officers,
3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 2 drummers (actually a drummer and a fifer),
9. See Figure 3. Edward E. Curtis, Organization of the British Army in 
the American Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926), pp.
1-4, 23-24. Eric Robson, "British Light Infantry in the Mid-Eighteenth 
Century: The Effect of American Conditions." Army Quarterly. 63 (1952),
pp. 209-22; and "The Raising of a Regiment in the War of American Inde­
pendence," Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 27 (1949), 
pp. 107-15^. Secretary at War Barrington to Gen. Gage, 31 Aug 1775; £  Bar­
rington's_/ Circular to the Colonels, 26 Aug 1775; to Gen. Howe, 10 Jun 
and 18 Oct 1776; Sec. of State Germain to Howe, 3 Sep 1777; Sec. at War 
Jenklnson to Gen. Clinton, 5 Dec 1780; Clinton's General Orders for 26 
Oct 1780; Headquarters Papers of the British Army in America, #27-29, 206, 
288, 660, 3181-2, 3343. These documents are photostatic copies in the 
collections of the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, Williamsburg, Vir­
ginia; the originals were presented in 1957 to the Queen and are currently 
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and 56 privates. Both o£ the £lank companies had two lieutenants 
rather than the normal lieutenant and ensign. Three of the line, or 
battalion, companies lacked a captain since the field officers also 
held positions as captains. The granadier company had two fifers, but 
the slots were used for the regimental drum and fife majors. Three 
privates in every company were "contingent men," fictitious names car­
ried on the regiment's rolls. Their pay was used as a special fund to 
care for the regiment'b widows and orphans. All of these exceptions, 
plus normal detachments and details, drastically reduced the fighting 
strength of the regiment. At best, an ideal rarely approximated, a 
British lieutenant colonel could deploy only 514 men, 63 percent of the 
theoretical strength. Only 448 (87 percent of the deployable strength) 
were musketmen. The British also had roughly one supervisor for every 
ten fighters: 21 company officers and 24 sergeants.
Although a common heritage produced many apparent similarities in 
the eight-company battle formations of the Continental and British 
battalions, Washington planned to make his much more powerful. The 
American battalion contained nearly 50 percent more musketmen (640 rather 
than 448) without sacrificing control. In fact, Washington normally 
enjoyed a higher ratio of officers to men than his opponents because so 
many British officers were absent.1® Shortages in enlisted men plagued 
both armies, but the additional problems of transatlantic communications 
made procuring replacements particularly troublesome for the British.11
10. Germain to Howe, 14 Jan 1777; Barrington to Howe, 24 Feb 1777; Howe 
to Barrington, 1 Jun 1777; British Headquarters Papers, #371, 411, 552.
11. Germain to Howe, 19 Apr, 18 May, and 3 Sep 1777; to Clinton, 21 Mar 
1778; Jenkinson to Clinton, 5 Sep 1780 and 5 Dec 1781; Ibid., #496, 530, 
660, 1031, 2993, 3181.
86
The differences in regimental organization reflected deliberate
doctrinal choices. Britain, Influenced by Frederick the Great and its
own experience in the Seven Years' War, produced a regiment tailored to
formal European battle. It deployed its battalion companies in three
12ranks to achieve the density needed for a bayonet charge. The Con­
tinentals turned instead to their colonial tradition of aimed fire and 
the lessons of the French and Indian War for inspiration. They adopted 
a formation using only two ranks to bring all 640 muskets into effec­
tive play. The Continental unit had a frontage twice the size (320 
men to 150) of a British battalion and a volley in which all 640 shots 
counted. The fire of the British third rank was so ineffective that in 
a volley a battalion could only hope for 300 shots.
The American regimental staff expanded during 1776 as it became more 
refined and the Continental Army's administration became more sophisti­
cated. In the original planning the staff consisted of a chaplain, a 
surgeon, and a surgeon's mate, with the functions of adjutant and quar­
termaster being carried out by subalterns as additional duties. The 
hospital staff screened all medical candidates since Washington con­
sidered it "a matter of too much importance, to intrust the Wounds and
12. Clinton to Germain, 14 May 1779; Ibid., #1999. Richard Glover, 
Peninsular Preparation: The Reform of the British Army 1795-1809 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, i-9(>3), pp. 112-22. J. F. C. Fuller,
British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century (London: Hutchinson 6
Co., 1925), pp. 79-92, 124-57, 193. Benjamin Franklin Stevens, ed., 
General Sir William Howe's Orderly Book ... (1890; reprint ed. Port Wash­
ington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1970), pp. 132, 145-6, 294. By 1778 the
British shifted to two ranks to compensate for personnel shortages and 
lack of firepower: William B. Willcox, ed., The American Rebellion: Sir
Henry Clinton's Narrative of His Campaigns, 1775-1782 ... (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1954), p. 95n.
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1 o
Lives of officers, and Soldiers, to unskilled Surgeons.11 At Washing­
ton's request five additional specialists were added on 16 July. A 
paymaster relieved the combat officers of the burden of financial book­
keeping. The drum and fife majors supervised the musicians, the sergeant 
major assumed administrative responsibilities as the adjutant's enlisted 
assistant, and the quartermaster sergeant became the quartermaster's 
helper. The adjutant and quartermaster also became full-time specialists. 
This staff expansion in fact formalized ad hoc usage.^
The only real problem came in establishing the role of the chaplain. 
Washington wished to attract more capable men by improving the job's 
status. He recommended that Congress raise their salaries and assign 
each to minister to two regiments. This was approved, but the events 
of the coming campaign proved that it was impractical and Congress 
authorized each regiment to have its own. Implementation was limited 
by deteriorating battlefield conditions. The chaplain's duties remained 
the same throughout the war: moral and spiritual guidance; assisting
the surgeon; and, like the civilian ministers who were so important in 
American local life, political indoctrination. One major accomplishment 
of the Continental Army's chaplain corps was its freedom from denomina­
tional friction. A Roman Catholic priest became an Army chaplain, an 
event unthinkable in 1774.^5
13. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 345.
14. Ibid., 5: 238, 337, 410, 441. Ford, Journals of Congress, 3: 416;
4: 242-3; 5: 418, 479, 563; 6: 862; 8: 426-7.
15. Ibid., 4: 61; 5: 522. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 197-8,
205, 307-8; 5: 192-3, 244-5. Eugene Franklin Williams, "Soldiers of God:
Chaplains of the Revolutionary War" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Texas Christian 
University, 1972), pp. 69, 95-101, 111-33.
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Even as Congress was acting on the new regimental organization and 
related matters Washington set the reorganization of the Main Army in 
train. On the basis of the committee's preliminary instructions he con­
ducted a survey of the officer corps to find out how many planned to 
remain in service. By 1 November Adjutant General Gates compiled pre­
liminary statistics.1** The overall response was encouraging: 751 of the
authorized 1,465 officers intended to stay. Among combat officers 641 
of 1,286 were favorable: 78 field grade and 563 company grade. Twenty-
six regiments required 78 field officers and 832 company officers, so 
only minor adjustments were necessary to account for a full complement 
of the former. The creation of a second lieutenant position caused 
some problems since most colonies had not had this rank in 1775, while 
a surplus of captains existed. Massachusetts had an excess of candidates 
in the higher grades, the other colonies somewhat of a shortage.
Washington and his generals selected the field officers on 2 Novem­
ber. Because a more detailed evaluation was required, choice of the 
remaining officers was delegated to groups composed of the brigadier 
generals and field officers of each brigade. Washington retained the 
right to review all arrangements. Consideration in the selection of 
company officers was extended to those who had been absent from camp at 
the time of the survey or who had changed their minds and decided to 
continue in service, and to qualified sergeants. Washington reluctantly 
abandoned his desire to mingle officers from all colonies in each regiment
16. See Table 2. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 36-37, 43-45, 
58-59, 145-7. The returns are in Record Group 93, National Archives.
The riflemen were not included in the statistics since their service did 
not expire until 1 July 1776.
TABLE 2






























Total Willing to Serve 24 26 28 195 188 45 135
Total Unwilling to Serve 4 5 5 112 107 63 92
Total Absent 4 5 4 53 60 16 37
Total Vacant 5 1 1 13 21 6 31
1775 Brand Total of Officers 37 37 38 373 376 130 295
Authorized for 1776 26 26 26 208 208 208 208
Rhode Island
Willing to Serve 2 2 3 12 12 0 11
Authorized 1776 2 2 2 16 16 16 16
New Hampshire
Willing to Serve 3 2 2 14 14 0 17
Authorized 1776 3 3 3 24 24 24 24
Connecticut
Willing to Serve 4 2 3 24 22 15 10
Authorized 1776 5 5 5 40 40 40 40
Massachusetts
Willing to Serve 15 20 20 145 140 30 97
Authorized 1776 16 16 16 128 128 128 128
This table is compiled from the 1 November 1775 series of four returns 
entitled "Return of The Commissioned Officers in The Army of The 
United Colonies ..." in Record Group 93, National Archives.
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when it proved to be extremely unpopular. The arrangements were gradu­
ally completed, and reenlistment began on 13 November 1775. Recruiting 
parties, liberal furloughs, and elimination of arrears in pay were all 
employed in an effort to fill the regiments before 1 January.^ The 
new enlistments were expressly in the Continental Army, not in the 
individual colonies' armed forces as in 1775.
Washington implemented the reorganization of the Main Army on 1 
January 1776:
This day giving commencement to the new army, which, in 
every point of view is entirely Continental, ... His 
Excellency hopes that the Importance of the great Cause 
we are engaged in, will be deeply impressed upon every 
Man's mind, and wishes it to be considered, that an Army 
without Order, Regularity and Discipline, is no better 
than a Commission'd Mob.
Each Infantry regiment was assigned a numerical designation as a "Con­
tinental Regiment" based on its colonel's relative seniority.^8 New 
Hampshire's three regiments of 1775 under Colonels James Reed, John 
Stark, and Enoch Poor became the 2d, 5th, and 8th Continental Regiments. 
The officer ranks were filled through promotions and some new appoint­
ments. 19
Rhode Island retained a quota of 1,500 men, organized into two in­
stead of three regiments. General Greene, working closely with his 
brother Jacob (a member of the colony's Committee of Safety) and Governor 
Cooke, used the reduction to purge the officer ranks. Varnum's and
17. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, A: 73, 77, 81-88, 94-96, 99- 
103, 108-11, 116, 120-3, 145-9, 153-4. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 2: 
96. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 3: 1333-4.
18. Ibid., 4th Ser., 4: 633-46. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 
4: 202-7. The quotation comes from General Orders for 1 Jan on p. 202.
19. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 4: 8; 5th Ser., 3: 1035-8.
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Hitchcock's regiments were retained as the 9th and 11th Continental
Regiments. Church's was disbanded because Greene judged its officers
to be poor disciplinarians. A handful of its officers, such as Major
Henry Sherburne, were used to fill the two regiments or were placed in
20units from other colonies.
Connecticut sent five regiments to Boston in 1775 and three to 
Canada. Since the colony's quota for 1776 consisted of five regiments, 
the cadres at Boston were used to form the 10th, 17th, 19th, 20th, and 
22d Continental Regiments. All modified their geographical bases slight­
ly. Some sergeants were promoted to ensigns, and a few random individu­
als, particularly veterans of the four companies that had been sent to
Boston when their regiments went to Canada, rounded out the officer 
21complement. *•
Massachusetts faced different problems in making the transition. 
Washington assigned it a quota of 11,648 men, about 2,000 fewer than 
the colony had set for itself in 1775, but only 16 regiments instead of 
the existing 27. According to their competence, officers were selected 
in proportion to the number of men the 1775 regiments furnished. The 
number of companies determined the allocation of field officers. Where 
a regiment could be reorganized from an existing one, it was held to­
gether. In most cases, however, a single regiment could not furnish
20. Rhode Island Historical Society Collections, 7 (1867), pp. 117-8. 
Richard K. Showman, _et al., eds., The Papers of General Nathanael Greene 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Rhode Island
Historical Society, 1976- ), 1: 124, 134-7, 147-8, 154-65.
21. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 3: 1110-1, J. H. Trumbull and 
Charles C. Hoadley, eds., The Public Papers of the Colony of Connecticut 
(15 vols., Hartford: Various publishers, 1850-90), 15: 183-4, 202.
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eight full companies; therefore companies from several were merged, with 
the assignment of field officers reflecting the proportions from each.
The reorganization involved New England's artillerymen as well as 
its infantry, combining Gridley's Massachusetts regiment and John Crane's 
Rhode Island company into a single regiment. On 17 November Congress 
named Henry Knox, a Boston bookseller whose volunteer service had im­
pressed Washington, to replace Gridley as the artillery commander. After 
debate William Burbeck and John Mason were confirmed as lieutenant 
colonels and Crane and New York's John Lamb as majors. The former were 
Gridley's field officers in 1775; the latter two had commanded the 
separate companies with distinction. Congress ruled on 2 December that 
the regiment should consist of these five officers and twelve companies, 
but left further organizational details to the Army. The regiment's 
staff was similar to that of an infantry regiment but included provision 
for cadets undergoing on-the-job training. Each company contained 5 
officers and 58 enlisted men. Eight noncommissioned officers, 8 bombar­
diers, and 8 gunners were allowed, but Knox followed a policy of actual­
ly filling those positions in proportion to the real strength of the 
company. Bombardiers, gunners, and matrosses were all privates, but the 
gunners and bombardiers were specialists who received higher pay.^2
In Great Britain the Royal Artillery was technically a separate 
armmd service, a precedent which the Continentals deliberately avoided.
22. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. A: 74, 120, 140-1, 158, 161, 
460; 5: 34-35. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 4; 633-4. Artillery 
Returns for 1776; Record Group 93, National Archives. Ford, Journals of 
Congress, 3: 309, 359, 399. The separate company in the Hudson Highlands 
had the same organization, but 60 matrosses in deference to the added 
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It consisted of a single regiment organized as four eight-company (in­
creased in 1779 to ten) battalions. In peacetime each company contained 
5 officers and about 50 men, but expanded in wartime to 6 officers, 4 
sergeants, 4 corporals, 9 bombardiers, 18 gunners, 2 drummers, and 73 
matrosses. Both the battalion and the company were administrative
units. Tactical flexibility was preserved by organizing provisional
23
artillery "brigades" with crews for eight to ten guns.
Knox's companies were smaller than British ones on a war footing, 
but were organized more symmetrically. The regiment remained an admin­
istrative rather than a tactical entity. Although he did not adopt the 
"brigade" style, Knox distributed his companies in 1776 to man specific 
fortifications or batteries and had them camp with nearby infantry units. 
Later in the year detachments consisting of one or two officers and the 
crews of several guns were assigned to infantry brigades to furnish 
direct field artillery support.^ By the summer of 1776 the shortage 
of adequately trained artillerists became a serious problem. Knox pre­
pared a plan to form a second regiment which received Congressional 
approval on 24 July, but events of the campaign prevented action being 
taken to fill it.^
The Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment and the four associated Virginia 
and Maryland companies were not reorganized because their original terms
23. Curtis, British Army in the Revolution, pp. 6, 33-50. Horatio 
Rogers, ed.. Hadden's Journal and Orderly Books ... (Albany: Joel Mun- 
sell's Sons, 1884), pp. 110, 154-9, 179-82, 216-20, 250-4. Capt. John 
Stewart, "Disposition of Three Heavy Brigades of Field Brass Artillery," 
13 Sep 1782; British Headquarters Papers, #5597.
24. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5: 38, 406-7. Force, American 
Archives. 4th Ser., 6: 920-1; 5th Ser., 2: 1096-7; 3: 873.
25. Ibid.. 4th Ser., 6: 921; 5th Ser., 1; 502. Ford, Journals of Cong­
ress. 5: 606-7. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5: 134-5, 322-4.
93
did not expire until 1 July 1776. The regiment did assume a new desig­
nation to conform with the infantry regiments: its continuity and
original enlistment as Continentals gave it primacy and the designation 
1st Continental Regiment. Washington continued to use it as a special 
reserve force, although two of its nine companies had been sent to 
Quebec. The operational attachment of the one remaining Virginia and
two Maryland companies allowed it to carry out its unique role. In the
spring Washington and Congress planned its reorganization for a two-year
term of service. Reenlistment was ordered on 17 June 1776, but the
reorganization was hampered by combat requirements.
The reorganization's planning phase was short and smooth. Congress 
and the Army both agreed on the general policy and the specifics of the 
reorganization, and the new arrangement of officers was swiftly drawn up.
A real crisis came when Washington implemented the reenlistment phase on 
13 November. Indeed, he became so upset by the slow progress that on 4 
January 1776 he complained to Congress that:
It is not in the pages of History perhaps to furnish a case
like ours. To maintain a post within musket shot of the Enemy
... and at the same time disband one Army and recruit another 
within that distance of twenty odd British regiments, is more 
than probably ever was attempted: But if we succeed as well
in the latter, as we have hitherto in the former, I shall
think it the most fortunate event of my whole life.^
New England civil and military leaders had been very confident during
the October planning that the troop6 would reenlist rapidly. A large
26. Ibid., 4: 501-2; 5: 109, 501. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 188, 
284; 5: 452. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 4: 633-4; 5: 1433. 
Showman, Greene Papers, 1: 336-8. On 31 August it was provisionally 
grouped with elements of the Pennsylvania Flying Camp to offset losses.
27. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 4: 208. In a private letter 
to Joseph Reed he mused "How it will end, God in his great goodness will 
direct. I am thankful for his protection to this time;" Ibid.. pp. 211-2.
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segment of that group believed fervently in the doctrines of Radical 
Whig ideology as it related to the military. They believed that the 
virtue of America's militia-trained citizenry would create widespread 
willingness to serve in the Army, and felt that the response to Lexing­
ton confirmed the validity of this assumption.^ Despite a wide range 
of measures adopted to encourage the men, reality was quite different.
By 30 December only 9,649 men had signed up, an average of fewer than 
1,400 a week. Another 2,808 enlisted by 3 February, dropping the weekly 
average for the first part of the new year below 600. The Commander-in- 
Chief began to urge the New England governments to fill their regiments 
by instituting a form of a draft . ^ 9  Congress recognized the manpower 
problem and on 16 January removed the restrictions on reenlisting free 
Negroes. Depending on their personal attitudes, unit commanders opened 
their ranks to this new source of recruits.^®
During the transition period Washington filled the gaps in his 
lines with militiamen called up for limited periods. The first of these 
were about 4,000 New Hampshire and Massachusetts men furnished during 
late December when Washington anticipated that Connecticut's Continentals 
might depart. The recruiting problem led him to issue a new call on 16 
January. He asked for provisional regiments on the Continental pattern
28. John Todd White, "Standing Armies in Time of War: Republican Theory 
and Military Practice During the American Revolution" (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
George Washington University, 1978), pp. 95-97, 109-10, 128-35.
29. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 172-4, 210-1, 227, 240-51. 
General Return of the Troops of The Continental Army Inlisted upon the New 
Establishment, n.d.; Record Group 93, National Archives.
30. Ford, Journals of Congress, 4: 60. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washing-, 
ton, 4: 193-5. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 2: 67. David 0. White, Con­
necticut's Black Soldiers 1775-1783 (Chester, Ct.: Pequot Press, 1973).
Although the generals had been opposed to Negroes in the Army, the more 
telling objections had come from Edward Rutledge and other southern dele­
gates.
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to serve for a longer period, until 1 April. New Hampshire had General 
Sullivan organize its regiment from the companies already at Boston. 
Connecticut furnished four regiments and Massachusetts six by calling 
on quotas from the towns closest to Boston.
A second aspect of the crisis was the December discovery that many 
of the Army*8 firearms were not suited for sustained military use. Under 
the guise of an inspection Washington paraded the Connecticut units on 
9 December, a day before their original enlistments expired, so that he 
could confiscate sound weapons from owners he feared would depart. The 
New England governments were bombarded with requests for any available 
arms, particularly British "Brown Besses," and letters were sent to 
Schuyler and Montgomery begging them for material captured in Canada.
This shortage and related ammunition problems persisted during early 
1776, but by the summer the crisis had passed.^
In early March the troops at Boston emerged from the period of 
greatest danger. Excluding artillery, Washington had twenty-seven 
Continental Regiments. They contained 828 officers, 694 sergeants, 365 
drummers and fifers, and 12,510 rank and file. Militia reinforcements 
added 400 more officers and 6,500 enlisted men. The Main Army was back
31. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 4: 189-91, 227-8, 246-51, 257-8. 
Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 4: 7, 221, 932-3, 1233-4, 1272-1312, 
1410-68; 5: 14-17. Otis G. Hammond, ed., Letters and Papers of Major- 
General John Sullivan. Continental Army (3 vols., Concord: New Hampshire
Historical Society, 1930-39), 1: 129-34, 165-87.
32. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 4: 150-3, 231, 235-9, 242, 
246-51, 264, 325-7, 345-7. A 24 Jun 1776 return for 17 regiments at New 
York City (about 9,100 men) showed that 76 percent had arms rated good 
and only 9 percent lacked them. Shortages were concentrated in the 1st 
and 3d New York Regiments not yet fully reorganized and the 20th Conti* 
nental Regiment whose colonel (Arnold) had never been present. Force, 
American Archives. 4th Ser., 6: 1121-2.
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roughly to its 1775 strength In raw numbers. Just under 3,000 of the 
Continentals were sick at that time, although only 10 percent of them 
were hospitalized. Thirteen hundred more, including the entire 14th 
Continental Regiment, were on detached duties. All of the twenty-five 
reorganized infantry regiments on the siege lines were over half-strength.
One had recruited over 90 percent of its rank and file goal, ten others
were at least three-quarters full, and only five were below 60 percent.
In terms of real combat force half of the regiments were over the 400-man 
level and only one below 300. The regiments were not yet full, but they 
had turned the corner.^ Washington was profoundly shaken by the crisis. 
On 9 February he summarized the lessons of the reorganization for Con­
gress:
To go into an enumeration of all the Evils we have experienced
in this late great change of the Army ... would greatly exceed
the bounds of a letter. ... I shall with all due deference, 
take the freedom to give it as my opinion, that if the Congress 
have any reason to believe, there will be occasion for Troops 
another year ... they would jave money, and_have Infinitely 
better Troops if they were J  to enlist men_/ for and during 
the war. ... The trouble and perplexity of disbanding one 
Army and raising another at the same Instant, and in such a 
critical situation as the last was, is ... such as no man, who 
has experienced it once, will ever undergo again.^
The Canadian Department.
The Congressional committee sent to Cambridge to discuss the reor­
ganization of the Army was instructed to deal with the troops in the 
Northern Department as well as those in eastern Massachusetts. With
33. General Return, Main Army, 2 Mar 1776; Record Group 93, National 
Archives.
34. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 317-8.
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Washington's approbation they limited their talks to the Main Army, 
realizing that the two field forces faced unique problems. In fact, 
Philip Schuyler's reorganization difficulties dwarfed Washington's. His 
troops were not concentrated in a single small area, and the various 
parts of his command were in different situations. A special committee 
went to Schuyler's headquarters to begin the reorganization, but events 
left the northern area in a state of flux until July.
On 11 October 1775 Congress told Schuyler to encourage the Cana­
dians to join the Revolution. It particularly stressed a guarantee of 
religious freedom for Roman Catholics, a major concession for American 
Protestants to make. Congress even authorized Schuyler to organize a 
Continental regiment from Canadians who were willing to join his army.
It also told him to confer with his senior officers and develop a plan 
for raising the troops needed to defend Canada and the forts on Lake 
Champlain during the coming winter.35 on 2 November Congress selected 
delegates to visit Schuyler and aid him in the reorganization. Three 
New Englanders initially composed this committee's membership; mili­
tants Eliphalet Dyer of Connecticut and John Langdon of New Hampshire, 
and the more conservative Robert Treat Paine of Massachusetts. Dyer 
fell ill and on 8 November Congress replaced him with New York's 
Robert R. Livingston, a moderate on the issue of independence who was 
General Montgomery's brother-in-law.36
35. Ford, Journals of Congress. 3: 284-5, 298. Smith, Letters of
Delegates, 2: 161-2. Schuyler's instructions were drafted by a commit­
tee which included three militants, John Adams, Samuel Chase, and Silas 
Deane, and two more cautious delegates, John Rutledge and Robert R. 
Livingston.
36. Ford, Journals of Congress. 3: 312, 317-8, 339. Smith, Letters of
Delegates. 2; 281. Burnett, Continental Congress, pp. 108-12.
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Because the need for action was more immediate, this committee's 
instructions Included somewhat broader powers. It was able to take 
specific steps to encourage the Canadians and to solve logistical prob­
lems. Primarily, however, it was formed to collect data about the 
garrison needed for Canada and the forts in northern New York. It 
carried information to Schuyler about the newly-approved regimental 
organization and rates of pay, as well as blank commissions for the 
Canadian regiment. Schuyler was instructed to reenllst as many of the
department's men as possible and to raise any others he needed to com-
37plete the conquest of Canada in New England and New York. The com­
mittee set out on 12 November and reached Tlconderoga on the 28th 
after conducting an inspection of the forts in the Hudson Highlands.
It discovered to its pleasure that Schuyler and Montgomery (who had 
been promoted to major general on 9 December) had already begun the 
reorganization. The committee blessed their actions, gathered the li­
mited information that was available, and on 23 December submitted its 
report to Congress.
Congress acted on the report on 8 January 1776, before it learned 
of Montgomery's defeat at Quebec. It displayed the same unanimity in 
its actions that it had in deciding to send the two committees. The 
report accepted Schuyler's opinion that 3,000 men were needed for the 
winter and recommended raising three regiments, Including the Canadians.
37. Ford, Journals of Congress. 3: 339-41, 350. Smith, Letters of 
Delegates. 2: 326. The instructions were drafted by a committee com­
posed of militants John Adams, Silas Deane, and Richard H. Lee, and two 
more cautious delegates: Thomas Lynch and John Jay of New York.
38. Ibid.. pp. 327n, 368, 377-9, 397-8, 407-8, 411-3. Ford. Journals 
of Congress. 3: 418, 446-52.
Congress took note of some of the negative aspects of the report, in* 
eluding the news that Warner's and Bedel's men had gone home and that 
other units had suffered heavy attrition, and approved a garrison of 
nine regiments (about 6,500 men). Three were units set in train by 
the committee: the Canadian regiment being recruited by James Living­
ston and two regiments formed from the veterans of 1775. These were 
reinforced by six new organizations. New York, New Hampshire, and 
Connecticut were each told to raise a regiment for Canadian service.
The remainder of the garrison came from regiments currently being formed 
in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. All nine had the same structure as 
Washington's reorganized infantry regiments.
The generals did not form the two veteran regiments until 15 April 
1776. In November Montgomery had regrouped his forces for the drive on 
Montreal by persuading part of his men to extend their enlistments from 
December until mid-April and releasing the rest to ease his logistical 
burdens. The New York regiments remained nominally intact, and the 1st 
Connecticut Regiment gained additional personnel. The men for the 
latter came from disbanding the 4th and 5th Connecticut Regiments and 
transferring the men who extended. When the prolonged enlistments ex­
pired the two new regiments were formed. Like Washington, Schuyler 
hoped to mix officers from several colonies in each regiment. He wanted 
one regiment to consist of five companies from New York and three from 
Massachusetts, and the other of four companies from New Hampshire, three 
from Connecticut, and one from New York. Wooster found this scheme
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Impractical, just as Washington had. Instead he formed one from New 
York veterans under Major John Nicholson of the old 3d New York Regi­
ment. Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Elmore, who had transferred from the 
4th to the reorganized 1st Connecticut Regiment, commanded the other.
It used a Connecticut cadre with a leavening of other New Englanders.
Both regiments finished the 1776 campaign in the Mohawk Valley after
40suffering heavy losses in Canada.
The new regiments organized in the north followed a course slightly 
different from what Congress planned. Schuyler had begun reorganizing 
the old Albany-area 2d New York Regiment as soon as he learned of Mont­
gomery's death, and he and Colonel Van Schaick swiftly assembled it as
41
the regiment from New York. Washington received Schuyler's report of 
the defeat at Quebec on 18 January, before he learned of Congress' 
actions on 8 January. Washington immediately convened a Council of War 
with delegate John Adams attending as an observer. This Council recom­
mended diverting three of the militia regiments requested for service 
at Boston: one each from Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts.
Washington wrote to those colonies on the next day, but recommended that 
the regiments be raised as Continentals for a full year's service
40. Ibid.. 5: 472, 615. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5: 362-3, 
386-7. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 4: 1216-9; 5: 549-50; 5th 
Ser., 1; 1083, 1153; 2: 857-8. Julian P. Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950- ), 1: 436-47.
Lt. Col. Rudolphus Ritzema to Col. Alexander McDougall, 19 Nov 1775; 
McDougall Papers, New-York Historical Society. Brig. Gen. Wooster to 
Congress, 10 Apr 1776; Papers of the Continental Congress, Record Group 
360, National Archives. Berthold Fernow, ed., New York in the Revolu­
tion (2 vols., Albany: Weed, Parsons and Co., 1887), 1: 52, 74.
41. Schuyler to McDougall, 25 Jan 1776; McDougall Papers, New-York 
Historical Society. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 4: 1094; 5:
294, 301, 312, 330-1, 1467-9. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 3: 300-1.
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Instead o£ as militia for a shorter period. The first two regiments 
were considered the ones authorized by Congress, and that body subse-
ix 2
quently accepted the Massachusetts unit as well.
All three of the New England regiments were recruited, as Washing­
ton recommended, in the areas closest to Canada and were filled fairly 
rapidly. Connecticut had anticipated the need for additional troops 
and formed its regiment in Litchfield County which had a tradition from 
earlier wars of sending men to serve at Lake Champlain. A handful of 
officers were veterans of the old Ath Connecticut Regiment, but most, 
including Colonel Charles Burrall, entered Continental service for the 
first time. Captain Timothy Bigelow's company from Hartford County was 
equipped as artillery rather than as infantry.^
New Hampshire assembled its regiment at Coos (Haverhill) and marched 
it overland before the spring thaw opened Lake Champlain for water trans­
port. Timothy Bedel was made its commander in recognition of his ranger 
service the previous year. In May Major Isaac Butterfield ignominiously 
surrendered most of the regiment to an inferior force at The Cedars. He 
and Bedel were courtmartialled for cowardice and banned from ever ser­
ving again. Bedel, who was not present at the battle, successfully 
appealed and later served on the northern frontier.
A2. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, A: 25A-61. Ford, Journals of 
Congress. A: 99-100.
A3. Trumbull, Connecticut Colony Papers, 15: 225-7, A06-7. Force, 
American Archives, 5th Ser., 3: 117A-5.
AA. Ibid.. Ath Ser., A: 1A-18, 810-1; 5th Ser., 1: 167-9, 7A7-8. Fitz­
patrick, Writings of Washington, A: 302-3. Hammond, Sullivan Papers.
1: 169-72, 271-7. Gen. Gates to Bedel, A Mar 1778; Gates Papers, New- 
York Historical Society.
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Colonel Elisha Porter, a popular western Massachusetts leader, 
raised that colony's regiment with five companies from Hampshire County 
and three from Berkshire. Quotas were assigned to each town. The se­
lection of staff and company officers was left to local leaders and the 
field officers, who were themselves major politicians from the two
counties. This expedient hastened organization, but it created admin-
45istrative headaches.
Montgomery had received significant Canadian assistance during 
1775. On 19 November he directed his wife's kinsman, James Livingston, 
to begin raising the regiment of Canadians authorized by Congress. 
Livingston, a New Yorker who had married a woman from Montreal and set­
tled at Chambly, formed his unit at nearby Pointe Olivier and moved it 
up to Quebec in December . ^  Other Canadians who had been expelled from 
the city by Governor Carleton also began to recruit men, although only 
one group ultimately had success . ^
45. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 4: 1270-5, 1298-9, 1404-8. 
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 324-5. Gen. Ward to Congress,
3 Feb 1776; Record Group 360, National Archives. Appleton Morgan, ed., 
"The Diary of Colonel Elisha Porter of Hadley, Massachusetts. ...", 
Magazine of American History, 30 (1893), pp. 185-206.
46. Montgomery to Schuyler, 19 Nov and 5 Dec 1775; Arnold to Congress,
11 Jan 1776; Record Group 360, National Archives. Invaluable sources 
for the Canadian regiments' formation are: George Francis Gilman Stan­
ley, CanadaJLmj«JedJLJL77^^ (Toronto: Hakkert, 1973); Gustave Lanc-
tot, Canada & the American Revolution 1774-1783. trans. by Margaret M. 
Cameron (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967); and Allen
S. Everest, Moses Hazen and the Canadian Refugees in the American Revo­
lution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1976).
47. Arnold to Congress, 12 Jan 1776; Record Group 360, National Archives. 
Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 5: 550. Ford, Journals of Congress,
4: 223, 238-9. Smith, Letters of Delegates. 3: 459. The Chevalier de 
St. Aulaire and Quebec barber Jeremy Duggan, who had Arnold's support, 
were authorized on 21 and 28 Mar 1776 to raise separate Canadian ranger 
companies (one and three respectively), but neither was successful.
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Edward Antil, son of a former Chief Justice of New Jersey, was one 
of those exiles. He carried the news of Montgomery's death from Quebec 
to Congress and used the opportunity to recommend Moses Hazen as a 
popular local leader. Hazen was a native of New Hampshire who had served 
as a captain in Rogers' Rangers during the French and Indian War. Al­
though he had been allowed to purchase a lieutenancy in the 44th Foot, 
he had been forced Into retirement in 1763 and settled in Canada. After 
marrying a French-Canadian woman he became an economic and social leader 
in the Richelieu Valley. Hazen arrived in Philadelphia shortly after 
Antil, and on 20 January 1776 they secured authorization to raise a 
second Canadian regiment. Unlike Livingston's, the new unit was pat­
terned after the French regiments of the Seven Years' War. Its 1,000 
rank and file were organized in four battalions, each with five fifty- 
man companies.^
Colonel Hazen and Lieutenant Colonel Antil returned to Canada and 
on 10 February organized the 2d Canadian Regiment. Only half of the 
men were recruited, primarily in the Richelieu and St. Lawrence Valleys, 
before the pro-American sympathies of the Canadian populace subsided.
Many French veterans of the French and Indian War who had remained as 
settlers in Canada in 1763 joined the unit. Hazen's personal financial 
backing of the regiment during this period gave it a special status for 
the remainder of the war. Congress allowed him to retain a proprietary 
interest in the regiment until he was reimbursed, and since he never
48. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 75, 78. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 
3: 112-3, 154, 161, 169.
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was, it remained under his control and retained its unique four-bat-
4Qtalion organization.
Both regiments drew heavily from the French-Canadian population for 
their enlisted strength. The majority of the officers, however, came 
from the English-speaking minority in Canada. Most of this latter group 
were native-born Americans like the two colonels and were active in the 
small Canadian Revolutionary movement. The French segment of the popu­
lation tended to be neutral, although the influential clergy supported 
the Crown. Bishop Briand of Quebec excommunicated Catholic Canadians 
who supported the Americans, including Frangois-Louis Chartier de Lot- 
biniere, a Recollet priest who served as Livingston's chaplain. In 
addition to this spiritual hardship, the summer evacuation of Canada 
forced the regiments and their families into exile. Both regiments had
to be withdrawn from the front lines to reorganize: Livingston's in
50the Mohawk Valley and Hazen's at Albany.
Congress reacted swiftly to the news of the disaster at Quebec.
In addition to officially adding the 2d Canadian Regiment and Porter's 
Regiment to the Canadian garrison, it asked Washington to transfer one 
of his regiments and a general officer from Boston. On 17 January 1776 
Congress finally clarified the command situation by completing the trans­
formation of the invasion force into a separate territorial department.
49. Ford, Journals of Congress. 5: 811-2; 6: 900; 8: 589; 19: 427-9. 
Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 5: 751-3. Pennsylvania Archives.
1st Ser., 8: 17-20. Board of War Report, 28 Jun 1781; Record Group 360, 
National Archives. Gates to (7 Congress), (? Oct 1778); Hazen to Gates, 
28 Jan 1779 and 12 Dec 1782; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
50. Ford, Journals of Congress. 5: 645. Force, American Archives. 5th 
Ser., 1: 797-800, 977, 1143-4. Gates' General Orders, 21 Jul 1776 (After 
Orders); Gates' Orderly Book, New-York Historical Society. Hazen to Maj. 
Gen. Steuben, 11 and 24 Feb 1780; Steuben Papers, New-York Historical 
Society.
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Since it believed that Schuyler did not desire the Quebec assignment, 
Congress ordered him to shift his headquarters to New York City and 
Charles Lee to go to Canada and organize a department staff. Wooster 
was considered to be "too infirm" to be permanently assigned to the 
duty that he was exercising on a temporary basis. But before Lee could 
set out he was reassigned. On 6 March Congress promoted John Thomas, 
the senior brigadier general, to major general and assigned him as Lee's 
replacement. Thomas formally assumed command from Wooster at Quebec on 
2 May. In the interim Congress reconsidered its previous instructions 
to Schuyler and ordered him to remain at Albany where he could super­
vise the logistical support for Canada in addition to performing his 
other duties.^1
During January Congress also considered the needs of the non-Cana­
dian portion of the old New York Department. On the 19th of that month 
New York was again authorized to raise four Continental regiments for 
its defense. The colony'6 Provincial Congress allocated company quotas 
to the Individual counties on 15 February and submitted nominations for 
field officers to the Continental Congress for commissioning in March. 
Three of the regiments were assembled from 1775 veterans. McDougall's 
1st New York Regiment continued to be principally a New York City unit. 
Since the 2d had already been reorganized by Van Schaick, the old 3d 
and 4th were redesignated as the 2d and 3d respectively. James Clinton
51. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 70-71, 73, 99-100, 157-8, 186-7, 
240-1. Smith, Letters of Delegates. 3: 108-9, 116-7, 121-4, 355-6, 377- 
8, 381-3. Charles Lee, "The Lee Papers," New-York Historical Society 
Collections for 1871-74, 1: 251-3, 271-2, 303-8, 343-4.
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continued to command the former, drawn primarily from Ulster County and 
Long Island. Dutchess and Westchester Counties furnished the bulk of 
the 3d, while a new Ath was raised in Albany and the other northern 
areas. Schuyler gradually released the remaining cadres from Canada, 
a practice which retarded recruiting but which was a compromise with 
tactical considerations. The 1st assembled at New York, the Ath at 
Albany, and the 2d and 3d in the Hudson Highlands. Schuyler retained 
the Ath in northern New York, while the 2d assumed garrison responsi­
bilities in the Highlands and the 1st and 3d served at New York C i t y . 52 
Canada, however, continued to attract more of Congress' attention. 
Knowing that the spring thaw that cleared Lake Champlain would also 
open the St. Lawrence River to the British, Congress and Washington 
ordered additional reinforcements to the north. Brigadier General Wil­
liam Thompson arrived in mid-May with the 8th, 15th, 24th, and 25th 
Continental Regiments, but those New Englanders were immediately dis­
abled by an outbreak of smallpox. Brigadier General John Sullivan 
reached St. John's with a second force on 31 May. It consisted of New 
Hampshire's 2d and 5th Continental Regiments, the 2d New Jersey Regiment, 
and the 4th (less many of its companies) and 6th Pennsylvania Battalions. 
Sullivan found that Thomas had been stricken with smallpox on 21 May and
52. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 69, 190, 238. Smith, Letters of 
Delegates. 3: 77-80, 102-3, 300-1, 381-3, 459. Fitzpatrick, Writings 
of Washington. 5: 7-11. James Sullivan and Alexander C. Flick, eds., 
Minutes of the Albany Committee of Correspondence 1775-1778 (2 vols., 
Albany: University of the State of New York, 1923-25), 1: 343-8. Force,
American Archives, 4th Ser., 4: 1081-2; 5: 251-3, 267-80, 301, 314-8, 
946-7, 968, 1439-40, 1467-9, 1498-9. Historical Magazine. 1st Ser., Sup­
plement IV (1866), pp. 110-1. The reorganization of the 1st can be 
traced in intimate detail in the Alexander McDougall Papers, New-York 
Historical Society.
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had turned temporary command over to Thompson. When Thomas died on 2 
June, Sullivan by virtue of his seniority inherited command of the de­
partment.^
The arrival of a British relief force from Europe under Major Gen­
eral John Burgoyne forced the Continentals to abandon the siege of 
Quebec in early May 1776. The British, Brunswick, and Hesse-Hanau 
regulars slowly pushed Sullivan's men back. The Continentals' main 
body reached Crown Point on 1 July, ending American hopes of making 
Canada the fourteenth colony. The effort had probably been beyond the 
Continental Army's logistical capability and ruined many regiments. A 
dispirited Sullivan complained that "I am Sufficiently mortified & Sin­
cerely wish I had never seen this fatal country."^
Congress had reacted to the deteriorating situation in Canada on 
17 June before Sullivan's withdrawal. A special diplomatic mission 
sent to the Canadians in the spring had held extensive discussions with 
the military leaders in Canada. Delegates Benjamin Franklin and Samuel 
Chase were accompanied on that inspection by Charles and John Carroll, 
two brothers who were leaders in the Maryland Catholic community. Their 
June report led to major command changes and revealed for the first time 
a partisan split in Congress with respect to the military situation. 
Congress appointed Horatio Gates as the new commanding general of "the
53. Ford, Journals of Congress, 4: 236, 302. Fitzpatrick, Writings of 
Washington. 4: 495-7, 500, 519-21, 526, 531; 5: 15, 132-3. Hammond, 
Sullivan Papers, 1: 212-4.
54. Ibid., pp. 242-3, 250-4, 271-7. Also see Martin Bush. Revolution­
ary Enigma: A Re-appraisal of General Philip Schuyler of New York (Port
Washington, N.Y.: Ira J. Friedman, 1969), pp. 56-62.
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Troops of the United Colonies in Canada" and endowed him with extensive 
emergency powers to reorganize the department staff and suspend incom­
petent officers. Gates' selection was based on his reputation as an 
organizer and administrator. Political considerations also came into 
play, and became more pronounced after Gates arrived at Crown Point on 
5 July and relieved Sullivan.^
The change in command, which nearly precipitated Sullivan's resig­
nation, reflected a growing concern among New England delegates over 
the lack of.success in the north. Since most of those delegates es­
poused the Radical Whig Ideological view of the military, they believed 
that the failure resulted from a lack of virtue. It was only natural 
for them to reject the current generals and turn to Gates, who held 
similar attitudes, to lead a moral regeneration of the northern army. 
Interwoven with ideological considerations were factors of regionalism 
and family connection. The shift in preponderance after 1775 from New 
York units to New Englanders gave the delegates from that region a 
greater interest and voice in the department's affairs. Friction be­
tween key officers within the department who were related to leading 
politicians magnified these problems.
55. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 151-2, 215-9, 233; 5: 436, 448-53. 
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Gates commanded a territorial department that no longer existed, 
however, and on 8 July Congress ruled that he came under Schuyler's 
command. As a practical matter Schuyler allowed Gates a large measure 
of autonomy at Ticonderoga by staying at Albany and concentrating on 
logistics and affairs in the Mohawk Valley. Gates' "Northern Army" 
contained the majority of the department's combat troops and was charged 
with developing a fortress complex in the Ticonderoga area. Benedict 
Arnold and David Waterbury, both of whom had commanded ships as civili­
ans, were placed in command of the Lake Champlain naval squadron. On 
20 July Gates created a brigade organization for the units at Ticondero­
ga. Following the advice of his senior officers and his own experience 
at Boston he assigned units from the same or adjacent colonies to homo­
geneous brigades to minimize friction, Arnold, the only brigadier 
general, commanded one of the four brigades. The others were given to 
three senior colonels.^
Reorganization also involved the formation of two new units from 
veteran 1775 cadres. On 21 June Congress ordered New York to raise 
another regiment. Unlike earlier units, this regiment wa6 enlisted for 
three years. Command was given to Major Lewis Dubois of Nicholson's 
Regiment as a reward for his excellent service during the winter. Dis­
putes over the appointment of the other officers and their relative 
seniority prevented it from becoming fully operational. Congress
56. Ford, Journals of Congress. 5: 526. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washing­
ton, 5: 222-4, 257. Gates' General Orders for 20 Jul and 11 Aug 1776; 
Gates' Orderly Book, New-York Historical Society. Gates to Hancock, 16 
and 29 Jul and 6 Aug 1776; Lieut. Col. Hartley to Gates, 10 Jul 1776;
Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
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authorized a second regiment, also for three years, on 5 July. Its 
cadre, Seth Warner's Green Mountain Boys, had begun reorganizing in 
February, but a shortage of cash limited recruiting until November. ^  
Since Knox's Artillery Regiment was designed to support the Main 
Army, Schuyler relied primarily on separate artillery companies. The 
remnants of John Lamb's 1775 company voluntarily reenlisted under Lieu­
tenant Isaiah Wool. They were reinforced in the spring by Stevens' and 
Eustis' companies of Knox's regiment, Bigelow's company in Burrall's 
Regiment, and a Pennsylvania company. That colony had misinterpreted 
a Congressional resolution and directed engineer Bernard Romans to re­
cruit an artillery company for service in Canada. Congress accepted it, 
and it marched north under the actual command of Captaln-Lieutenant 
Gibbs Jones. New York also raised two new artillery companies in New 
York City, although neither wound up supporting Schuyler as the colony 
had originally intended. Sebastian Bauman's was a Continental unit cre­
ated to garrison fortifications in the Hudson Highlands. Alexander 
Hamilton's company of state troops spent most of 1776 under Knox's opera­
tional control and on 17 March 1777 was formally transferred to the
C O
Continental Army.
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The Northern Department finally stabilized during the pause in
operations caused by the contest for naval control of Lake Champlain.
In January Congress planned for a forward Canadian Department of nine
regiments (6,500 men) supported by the Northern Department's four
regiments defending the area from New York City to Lake George with
2,900 men. By August the Canadian Department no longer existed and the
Northern Department's responsibilities stopped just south of Albany.
Its troops remained divided into two major groups: Gates' field army
garrisoning the Ticonderoga complex and Schuyler's rear echelon sustain-
59ing communications and controlling the Mohawk Valley.
Gates commanded a force consisting, exclusive of artillery, of 
fifteen Continental infantry regiments and one separate rifle company, 
plus six regiments of militia. It contained 386 officers, 333 sergeants, 
143 drummers and fifers, and 6,262 rank and file, a total roughly equi­
valent to the number originally intended for Canada. True combat strength 
was about 4,000 Continentals, including the detachment manning the 
fleet, because nearly 2,200 were sick, another 1,000 on detached duties, 
and 185 on furlough. Only three of the Continental regiments were over 
three-quarters full, even on paper, and ten were between half and two- 
thirds complete. This deficiency significantly reduced the units' ef­
fectiveness in open battle, but was less of a problem in garrison. The 
militia added about 200 more officers and over 3,500 enlisted men, most 
of whom were still fit.
Gates had the six strongest regiments originally assigned to the 
Canadian garrison or added during January by Congress. He also had the
59. General Return, Northern Department, 24 Aug 1776; Gates Papers, New- 
York Historical Society. The return contains complete data only for the 
units directly under Gates.
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four regiments sent north under Thompson and five of the six that ac­
companied Sul l i v a n . S c h u y l e r  retained direct command of the four 
regiments which had served the longest in Canada and consequently were 
in the worst shape. He also had the two regiments raised by New York 
in the Albany region (Van Schaick's and the 4th New York Regiment), the 
3d New Jersey Regiment from Sullivan's force, and the two new regiments 
just beginning their organization. Three militia regiments supplemented 
his troops. Schuyler had only three Continental regiments which were 
even reasonably effective and certainly controlled fewer than the 3,000 
effectives he had originally been promised. This force was sufficient, 
however, for his reduced defensive responsibilities.
Summary.
Congress and the Army's leaders worked closely together during the 
autumn of 1775 to prepare for the coming year. They intended to elimi­
nate organizational problems revealed during the preceding months and 
hoped to make the transition smooth. The cornerstone of their work 
came from Congress' approval of a standard infantry regiment designed 
by Washington and his generals. Unlike the British Army which was 
heavily influenced by the European phase of the Seven Years' War, the 
Continentals took advantage of more pertinant Anglo-American experiences 
in the imperial wars, particularly the French and Indian War. The new 
standard regiment represented a very powerful force with a simplified 
organization. It dispensed with the various special companies of a
60. In May Schuyler had diverted the 3d New Jersey Regiment to the Mo­
hawk Valley when Sullivan passed through Albany.
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British regiment, which wasted manpower from an American perspective.
The Continental regiment's high ratio of officers to enlisted men recog­
nized the greater need for control under American conditions. Its or­
ganization and use of a two-rank battle formation emphasized American 
faith in musketry rather than shock action.
Adopting a standard regiment solved one problem revealed during 
1775. Implementing the reorganization raised new difficulties. Both 
Washington and Schuyler hoped to emphasize national identification by 
mingling personnel from several colonies in each regiment. Opposition 
from the officers and men alike ended that concept, although Washington 
at least retained the word "Continental" in the designation of his regi­
ments. A greater source of trouble was the recurrence in 1776 of the 
problem of regiments falling short of their authorized strength. Few of 
the new units ever reached maximum legal size, and many took excessive 
time to achieve minimum levels of efficiency. In the future the nation's 
leaders would have to adjust policies to deal with this condition.
Washington's Main Army at Boston was able to survive the crisis 
caused by slow enlistments by calling on a sizeable contingent of militia 
reinforcements. Slow but steady recruiting raised that army by March 
1776 to a level where it could begin to apply pressure on General Howe 
in Boston. British evacuation of the town on 17 March gave the Commander- 
in-Chief his first victory. On the other hand, defeat marked the American 
military effort in Canada. Despite several major attempts to reinforce 
the field army in that theater, it was still driven all the way to Ti­
conderoga, and many units ended up in shambles from attrition and dis­
ease. Schuyler and Gates survived the immediate crisis, but their bi­
ckering for hegemony carried ominous overtones for the future.
CHAPTER IV
AN ARMY TRULY CONTINENTAL:
EXPANDING PARTICIPATION
Improvisation marked the military situation in 1775; expansion 
typified 1776. In the first year the five northern colonies each cre­
ated an army by drawing on their individual experiences. The Continen­
tal Congress and the military leaders also improvised when they formed 
the Continental Army from those forces. The next year the Army expanded 
to involve more than the forces engaged in Canada, northern New York, 
and at Boston. Although combat elsewhere was limited, the remaining 
colonies all raised regiments. The increase in participation necessi­
tated a major change in the Army's command arrangement. That change and 
the movement of the Main Army from Boston to New York City led in turn 
to a staff expansion.
The Southern Colonies.
Virginia, the Carolines, and Georgia began 1775 free from British 
occupation. They had defiant royal governors to contend with, however, 
and Florida's regular garrison posed a continued threat. Like their 
northern neighbors the southern colonies formed new governments which 
raised troops whenever the deposed governors gathered military or naval 
forces. Because these early efforts were undertaken with minimal super­
vision from the Continental Congress, the southern regiments followed 
various models of organization. Since the south lacked New England's
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homogeneity and similarity of experience in the colonial wars, its units 
experienced greater structural diversity until Congress provided direction.
The aggressiveness of Governor John Murray, the Earl of Dunmore, 
pushed Virginia to act first. In March 1775 the extra-legal Virginia 
Convention decided not to raise regular troops as the militant Patrick 
Henry proposed, but instead encouraged the formation of local volunteer 
units. News from Massachusetts produced a change in attitude by July 
when the Convention reconvened. Although general agreement existed on 
the need for military action, debates over precise measures lasted until 
21 August. The original proposal called for each county to organize a 
fifty-man company for a total force of 3,000 to A,000 men. Less militant 
opinion produced a modification which scaled down the regular force and 
supplemented it with less expensive minuteroen. The compromise adopted 
by the Convention divided the colony into sixteen military districts, 
each under a district committee responsible for organizing the troops.
The mainland districts raised a total of fifteen companies of regulars 
and fifteen ten-company minuteman battalions. The Eastern Shore did 
not form a regular company, but it was authorized a somewhat larger 
minuteman regiment. The minutemen represented a local defense force 
within the militia system, and replaced the earlier volunteer companies.
The Convention also created a Committee of Safety, adopted Articles of 
War, and endorsed the current British drill manual.1
1. William J. Van Screevan, _et al., eds., Revolutionary Virginia: The
Road to Independence (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,
1973- ), 3: 319-43, 392-409, 427-9, 450-9, 471-2, 497-504. William
Waller Henning, ed., The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of all the 
Laws of Virginia ... (14 vols., Richmond: J.&G. Cochran, 1821), 9: 9-48.
Robert A. Rutland, ed., The Papers of George Mason 1725-1792 (3 vols., 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), 1; 245-57.
Virginia Gazette (Purdie), 25 Aug 1775.
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The fifteen regular companies (about 1,020 men) reported to Williams­
burg and on 21 October 1775 formed two regiments. The 1st Virginia Regi­
ment under Patrick Henry, the colony's new commander-in-chief, contained 
two rifle companies and six musket companies. William Woodford's 2d also 
had two rifle companies but only five with muskets. The rifle companies 
came from the frontier and served as light infantry while the musketmen 
represented the older areas of the colony. Each company contained a 
captain, 2 lieutenants, an ensign, 3 sergeants, a drummer, a fifer, and 
68 rank and file. District committees selected the company officers while 
the Convention appointed three field officers for each regiment. Staffs 
consisted of a chaplain, a surgeon with two mates, an adjutant, a paymas­
ter who doubled as mustermaster, a quartermaster, and a sergeant major.
The leaders of Virginia's first two regiments carried impressive political 
credentials although only four field officers had significant combat ex­
perience. Most of the captains were too young to have served in the French 
and Indian War but came from the colony's leading families.
The compromise which created the regiments also included five separate 
companies to garrison strategic frontier posts. Captain John Neville ex­
ercised overall command from Fort Pitt (Pittsburgh). Four were rather 
large: a captain, 3 lieutenants, an ensign, 4 sergeants, 2 drummers, 2
fifers, and 100 rank and file. The fifth had only a single lieutenant and 
25 enlisted men. Two companies manned Fort Pitt while the smallest held 
the outpost at the mouth of the Wheeling River (Fort Fincastle). All three
2. Brent Tarter, ed., "The Orderly Book of the Second Virginia Regiment, 
September 27, 1775-April 15, 1776." Virginia Magazine of History and Bi­
ography, 85 (1977), pp. 170-1.
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came from the West Augusta District, the north-western frontier. Another
company from Botetourt County defended Point Pleasant on the Kanawha
River. The remaining company secured its home county of Fincastle in
the south-west. These companies drew on the precedent of the British
3
Army's use of independent companies for remote colonial garrisons.
Skirmishing between the Virginians and Dunmore's forces erupted in 
Hampton Roads during the fall. The Convention reacted by passing new 
legislation on 11 January 1776 which essentially bypassed the minutemen 
as a major combat force. It added seventy-two more companies of regulars, 
expanding the two existing regiments to ten companies apiece, forming 
six more of the same size, and establishing the 9th Virginia Regiment as 
a special seven-company regiment for the Eastern Shore. This legislation 
added a sergeant to the basic company and created some minor staff posi­
tions. It envisioned a large regiment with seven companies armed with 
muskets and three with rifles. The new companies enlisted their men for 
a longer period, until 10 April 1778. Individual counties appointed the 
company officers and raised the men.^
The Committee of Safety assigned the expanded military force to 
specific defensive sectors. Pairs of regiments occupied coastal areas 
divided by the James, York, and Rappahannock Rivers. It also assigned 
the companies to regiments on a regional basis, although the rifle compa­
nies still came from the frontier counties. The Convention made the 8th
3. Van Screevan, Revolutionary Virginia, 3: 343, 404. Reuben Gold 
Thwaites and Louis Phelps Kellogg, eds., The Revolution on the Upper Ohio. 
1775-1777 (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1912), pp. 12-17.
4. Henning, Statutes at Large. 9: 75-92. Van Screevan, Revolutionary 
Virginia, 4: 467-9, 497-9. Peter Force, ed., American Archives: A Col­
lection of Authentic Records. State Papers, Debates, and Other Notices of 
Public Affairs (9 vols., Washington: M. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force,
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Virginia Regiment unique by directing that it be raised by the German- 
American community in the Shenandoah Valley. Field officers for the 
new regiments had a great deal of experience, six of the seven colonels 
having served with Washington in the French and Indian War. Company 
officers and many of the enlisted men came from the minuteman battalions.'* 
All nine regiments, an artillery company, and the frontier companies 
were raised as state troops for the defense of Virginia and its neighbors. 
That condition, the ten-company organization, and the short one- or two- 
year enlistments made them similar to earlier Provincials. The colony 
could not sustain the financial burden of such a large force, however, 
and asked Congress to transfer the regiments to the Continental Army.
On 28 December 1775 Congress, which wanted to broaden the Army's geo­
graphical base, authorized six regiments from Virginia. Prolonged nego­
tiations between the two governments followed and eventually all nine 
regiments were accepted. Virginia did not alter its regimental organi­
zation to conform to Continental standards, nor did it alter the men's 
terms of enlistment. It did require the officers to exchange colony for 
Continental commissions, leading to a few resignations. When Virginia 
also asked Congress to appoint general officers to command these troops, 
Henry's lack of military experience became a sensitive political issue. 
Washington blocked Henry's promotion, leading to Henry's resignation and 
return to politics. In his place Congress elected two men who had served
5. William P. Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other 
Manuscripts ... ( H  vols., Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1875-93),
8: 75-149. The 9th expanded to ten companies on 18 May; see Henning, 
Statutes at Large, 9: 135-8; and Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 6: 
1528, 1556.
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under Washington as brigadier generals: Andrew Lewis on 1 March and
Hugh Mercer on 5 June.**
The artillery company authorized on 1 December 1775 consisted of 
a captain, 3 lieutenants, a sergeant, 4 bombardiers, 8 gunners, and 48 
matrosses. On 13 February the Committee of Safety selected James Innis 
as captain and Charles Harrison, Edward Carrington, and Samuel Denney 
as lieutenants. Congress adopted the company on 19 March and soon after 
told Captain Dohicky Arundel, a French volunteer, to raise another in 
Virginia. Innis transferred to the infantry because he lacked the tech­
nical background for artillery service. Arundel then attempted to merge 
the two companies, but before he could do so, was killed on 12 July 
while experimenting with a mortar. Although the two companies worked 
closely together, they remained separate.^
In May Virginia reorganized the frontier defense companies, re­
taining them as state troops. Two large companies were filled by re- 
enlisting men at Fort Pitt and Point Pleasant. A third was organized
6. Worthington C. Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress 1774- 
1789 (34 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904-37), 3:
463; 4: 132, 181, 235; 5: 420, 466, 649. Edmund Cody Burnett, ed.. Let­
ters of Members of the Continental Congress (8 vols., Washington: Car­
negie Institution of Washington, 1921-36), 1: 346-8, 369, 407-8; 2: 31-32. 
Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 4: 116-7; 5th Ser., 1; 719-22. John 
C. Fitzpatrick, ed.. The Writings of George Washington from the Original 
Manuscript Sources 1745-1799 (39 vols.. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1931-44), 4: 379-84. Van Screevan, Revolutionary Virginia. 4: 
421-2, 470-1. Julian P. Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Prince­
ton: Princeton University Press, 1950- ), 1; 482-4.
7. Henning, Statutes at Large. 9: 75-92. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 
212, 364. Virginia Gazette (Purdie), 16 Feb and 12 Jul 1776. Charles 
Campbell, ed., The Orderly Book of that Portion of the American Army Sta­
tioned at or Near Williamsburg ... (Richmond: Privately printed, i860),
pp. 26-27, 36-37. Charles Lee, "The Lee Papers," New-York Historical 
Society Collections for 1871-74, 1: 367-8, 416-7, 440-3, 477-80.
120
in Botetourt to reinforce Point Pleasant. Hampshire and Augusta Counties 
raised new, smaller companies (3 officers, 3 sergeants, a drummer, a 
fifer, and 50 rank and file) to garrison Wheeling and a post on the 
Little Kanawha River. Neville, promoted to major, retained overall com­
mand. The same legislation reorganized the 1st and 2d Virginia Regiments 
for three year enlistments.® Virginia's regular forces were more than a 
match for Lord Dunmore, who by August withdrew to New York.
North Carolina's revolutionary leadership lacked the Virginians' 
confidence in its base of popular support and turned to outside assis­
tance much sooner. The colony contained a large body of recent Scottish 
immigrants who were still loyal to the Crown. Old political grievances 
left Tidewater planters unsure of backcountry cooperation. On 26 June 
1775 the North Carolina delegates secured a Congressional promise to fund
9
a force of 1,000 men. This gesture of support gave the colony's leaders 
the confidence to act.
The North Carolina Provincial Congress also organized military dis­
tricts similar to Virginia's. To supplement the Continentals, each of 
the six districts raised a ten-company battalion of minutemen. On 1 
September the Provincial Congress arranged the Continentals into two 
regiments, each consisting of three field officers, an adjutant, and ten 
companies. The company organization for both the Continentals and the
8. Henning, Statutes at Large. 9: 135-8. Force, American Archives. 4th 
Ser., 6: 1532, 1556, 1568. Henry Read Mcllwaine, et al., eds., Journals 
of the Council of the State of Virginia (4 vols., Richmond: Virginia 
State Library, 1931-67), 1: 97, 108, 148, 173.
9. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2: 107; 3: 330. Paul H. Smith, et al.» 
eds., Letters of Delegates to Congress. 1774-1789 (Washington: Library
of Congress, 1976- ), 1: 545.
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minutemen was similar to that of the Virginia minutemen: 3 officers, 3
sergeants, and 50 rank and file. To expedite recruiting, North Caro­
lina disbanded its volunteer companies formed earlier. The Continental 
companies assembled at Salisbury beginning in October.*® The Provincial 
Congress developed the plan as a compromise between sectional interests. 
The east received two regular regiments to defend the coastline from 
naval attack. Less threatened areas relied on less expensive minutemen.
On 28 November 1775 the Continental Congress ordered both regiments 
reorganized on the new Continental structure. A third was added on 16 
January and two more on 26 March. The Provincial Congress accepted the 
increased quota and on 9 April ordered the three new regiments raised 
for a term of two-and-a-half years. It soon added a sixth. Each mili­
tary district recruited five,companies, and the colony at large assumed 
responsibility for the other two companies needed. North Carolina de­
viated from the Continental structure by omitting the fife major from 
the regimental staff and adding a commissary of stores, an armorer, and 
a wagonmaster. Congress rewarded the colony for its promptness in 1775 
by promoting Colonels James Moore and Robert Howe to brigadier general 
on 1 March 1776.**
Members concerned for the security of the coast pressed the Provin­
cial Congress to add another regular regiment with six companies, but 
General Moore was able to have the plan modified on 29 April. Instead
10. Force. American Archives. 4th Ser., 2: 255-70; 3: 181-210, 679, 1087- 
94.
11. Ford, Journals of Congress, 3: 387-8; 4: 59, 181, 237. Smith, Let­
ters of Delegates. 3: 102-3, 310-1, 315-8, 440. Force, American Archives. 
4th Ser., 4: 299-308; 5: 68, 859-60, 1315-68; 6: 1443-58.
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of a single regiment it created five independent companies of state 
troops to defend specific points. Two were the same size as the Con­
tinental companies, but the other three contained only sixty privates.
On 3 May a 24-man company was added to garrison a frontier fort. The 
Continental Congress accepted the 6th North Carolina Regiment on 7 May 
and subsequently adopted three troops of light horse and an artillery
company raised by the colony during the summer, but not the independent
, *2 companies.
South Carolina's situation contained factors similar to North Caro­
lina's and Virginia's. It also faced Tidewater-versus-backcountry ten­
sions, but its leadership was more secure politically than North Caro­
lina's. Its Provincial Congress decided to raise regular state troops 
rather than turning immediately to the Continental Congress. As a 
regional compromise on 4 June 1775 it created two 750-man infantry 
regiments for Tidewater defense and a third regiment of 450 mounted 
rangers to protect the frontier. Since there was no immediate threat of 
invasion the companies were limited to cadre strength. The nine ranger 
companies recruited only thirty men apiece. The limit left the two in­
fantry regiments each with ten fifty-man companies, making them similar 
in practice to the minutemen in North Carolina and Virginia. Competition 
for commissions became intense. Several ranger companies even mutinied 
when a Tidewater officer was assigned as their regimental c o m m a n d e r . *3
12. Ford, Journals of Congress, 4: 331-3; 5: 623-4; 8: 567. Burnett, 
Letters of Congress, 1: 448.
13. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 2: 897, 953-4. William Moultrie, 
Memoirs of the American Revolution ... (2 vols., New York: David Long-
worth, 1802), 1; 64-65. R. W. Gibbes, ed.. Documentary History of the 
American Revolution (3 vols., Columbia: Banner Steam-Power Press, 1853-
57), Vol. A, pp. 104-5.
During the winter the Provincial Congress expanded its forces. An 
artillery regiment, small but highly specialized, was established to 
man the fortifications at Charleston, and the 4th South Carolina Regi­
ment was quickly filled by drawing key personnel from the city's elite 
militia artillerymen. On 22 February 1776 the three original regiments 
were finally allowed to recruit to full strength and shortly thereafter 
two new rifle regiments were added. The 5th South Carolina Regiment, 
recruited in the Tidewater, had seven companies; the 6th only five. It 
was raised along the northwestern frontier where many of the inhabitants, 
including its commander, Thomas Sumter, were former Virginians. Each 
rifle company was unusually large, containing four officers and one hun­
dred men. Artillery companies were allocated for Fort Lyttleton (Port 
Royal) and Georgetown with strengths individually tailored to the de­
fensive needs of each locale.*^
Congress directed South Carolina to raise three Continental regi­
ments under the standard infantry structure on 4 November 1775. A 
second act on 25 March 1776 increased the quota to five regiments. The 
colony did not immediately transfer its units to the Continental Army and 
tried instead simply to delegate operational control over them. Congress 
rejected that alternative. On 18 June it finally decreed that all of the 
regiments except the rangers had been adopted by the earlier acts. As a 
major concession, however, it promised the colony not to send more than 
one-third of the troops outside South Carolina without prior notice. The 
rangers and a similar Georgia unit were adopted on 24 July with a special
14. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 4: 27-76; 5: 561-615. Moultrie, 
Memoirs, 1: 93, 126-7. Gibbes, Documentary History. Vol. A, pp. 246-8. 














































organization and the requirement that the men serve on foot as well as 
on horseback. Additional legislation was required to restore the six 
regiments to proper s e n i o r i t y .
Georgia, like North Carolina, required Congressional support before 
it risked military action. It had only 3,000 males of military age and 
was the colony most exposed to outside attack. When Congress authorized 
South Carolina's three regiments on 4 November 1775 it also directed 
Georgia to raise a standard infantry regiment. Because communication 
with the colony took so long, its Provincial Congress was allowed to 
appoint all officers, not just company*grades. Political factions within 
the colony fought for control of the regiment until a compromise gave 
command to Lachlan McIntosh, leader of the Scottish element. Savannah 
mercantile interests gained the other two field officer positions, while 
most of the company-level appointments went to sons of planters known as 
the "Country Party." The latter group controlled the local government 
and subsequently caused senior Continental officers trouble by asserting 
a right to meddle in the regiment's affairs.
McIntosh began raising the regiment in February 1776, arming one 
of the companies with rifles. He correctly anticipated that limited
15. Ford, Journals of Congress. 3: 325-7; 4: 235; 5: 461-6, 606-7, 760. 
Smith, Letters of Delegates, 3: 440. Moultrie, Memoirs, 1: 141. Force, 
American Archives. 5th Ser., 1; 631-2. Lee, "Papers," 2: 10-12, 37-39, 
57, 173, 199-202, 251, 254. Jack D. Cross, ed., "Letters of Thomas 
Pinckney, 1775-1780," South Carolina Historical Magazine, 58 (1957),
pp. 29-30.
16. Ford, Journals of Congress. 3: 325-7. Allen D. Candler, ed., The 
Revolutionary Records of the State of Georgia (3 vols., Atlanta: Frank­
lin- Turner Co., 1908), 1: 77-78, 273. tee, "Papers," 2: 216-29, 254. 
Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 2: 1553; 6: 1159-60. Lilia M. Hawes, 
ed., "The Papers of Lachlan McIntosh, 1774-1799." Georgia Historical 
Quarterly. 39 (1955), p. 53.
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resources would hamper his efforts. General Lee and the colony's leaders 
asked Congress to offset Georgia's lack of manpower by raising six regi­
ments elsewhere and assigning them to defend the colony. Before their 
recommendations reached Congress, it voted to have Georgia raise two 
additional regiments and two artillery companies. On 24 July it also 
adopted the colony's four troops of horse and expanded them into a ran­
ger regiment. Recruiting was slow, despite permission to canvass North 
Carolina and Virginia. Low bounties, long enlistments, and a fear that 
Georgia's climate was fatal caused problems for the infantry. The ranger 
regiment did better and was on duty by October 1776.^
In many respects the first year of southern military effort paral­
leled New England's in 1775. Each colony raised its own force either 
independently or with Congressional encouragement. Individual differen­
ces appeared in regimental structure although a ten-company, 500-man 
formation had general appeal. The units gradually were adopted as part
of the Continental Army. Two key differences set the south apart. The
<
region, with less manpower to spare from a plantation economy, turned 
quickly to enlistments longer than a single year. Many of the colonies 
also resisted surrendering full control over their units to a distant 
government in Philadelphia, and all refused to conform completely to 
the standard infantry regimental organization.
17. Ford, Journals of Congress. 5: 521-2, 606-7. Lee, "Papers," 2: 48' 
49, 107-17, 241-5, 249. Candler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia. 1: 
124, 194-9, 213. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 4: 1159-61; 5: 
1106-9; 5th Ser., 1: 6-8. Hawes, "McIntosh Papers," 38 (1954), pp. 16L
6, 253-7. "Letters Colonial and Revolutionary," Pennsylvania Magazine 
of History and Biography. 42 (1918), pp. 77-78.
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By July 1776 Georgia had one regiment nearing full strength and a 
ranger regiment partially organized. North Carolina was held by three 
regiments, two troops of horse, and an artillery company, while eight 
regiments and two artillery companies defended Virginia's Tidewater and 
five companies its frontier. The major troop concentration in the south 
was at Charleston, threatened by a British force under General Clinton. 
All six South Carolina regiments were there along with the 8th Virginia, 
the 1st, 2d, and 3d North Carolina Regiments, and a troop of North Caro­
lina horse. Excluding the artillery the nine Continental regiments ag­
gregated 269 officers and 3,453 enlisted men. About 500 men were sick 
and nearly 100 others were on furlough, leaving the force well below 
authorized levels. The three North Carolina regiments were about half 
strength, the 8th Virginia about three-quarters full. The three senior
South Carolina regiments averaged about 350 men apiece, but the newer
185th and 6th were still under 300. Recruiting problems clearly posed 
a greater problem in the south than in Washington's Main Army.
Fortunately for the revolutionaries the southern troops did not 
face as serious a threat during 1776 as they had feared. Virginia bested 
Governor Dunmore, and North Carolina crushed a Loyalist uprising at 
Moore's Creek Bridge. Joint forces of Virginia and the Carolinas, mostly 
militia, defeated the Cherokee Indians, and the Charleston garrison re­
pulsed Clinton's amphibious force. The ease of these successes actually 
hurt the Continental Army. Southern leaders, steeped in Whig ideological 
commitment to militia saw these victories as proof that local forces were
18. Force, American Archives. 5th Ser., 1: 631-2.
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sufficient for their defense and did not give their full support to sus­
taining their Continental regiments. When Major General Lee, who was in
overall command in the south, left in the autumn of 1776 he recognized 
that "It is not impossible that the late repulse of the Enemy _/ Clinton_/
may be fatal to us. We seem now all sunk into a most secure and comfor-
, , , 19table sleep."
The Middle Colonies.
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, the central colo­
nies, also joined the Continental Army during 1776 as part of Congress' 
expansion of the military effort. Like the south, this area had a more 
diverse ethnic composition than New England. On the other hand, it lay 
puch closer to the seat of national authority in Philadelphia. Proximity 
simplified communication and enabled the governments of these colonies 
to cooperate better with Congress. They largely avoided the variety of 
unit structures which plagued the initial efforts of the other colonies, 
for example. Easy communication also kept them from raising troops until 
they received instructions from Congress. While this control saved the 
colonies unnecessary expense, it raised for the first time an Important 
question of who should make initial appointments of officers.
The first troops requested from the Middle Colonies, other than the 
riflemen called forth in June of 1775, were two regiments from New Jersey.
19. Lee, "Papers," 2: 105-6. Also see John Todd White, "Standing Armies 
in Time of War: Republican Theory and Military Practice During the AmerL
can Revolution" (Ph.D. Dissertation, George Washington University, 1978), 
pp. 109-10; and Robert Loyal Ganyard, "North Carolina During the American 
Revolution: The First Phase, 1774-1777" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke Uni­
versity, 1963), p. 340.
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Congress, anticipating a British attack on New York City, on 9 October 
1775 asked the New Jersey Provincial Congress for troops to replace the 
New York regiments which had marched into Canada. New Jersey asserted 
the right of each colony to name all the officers in a unit because, 
knowing its own citizens, it could select men who would be most effective. 
Delegates in Congress who were committed to safeguarding local govern­
ment supported New Jersey's position, but the debate was won by those 
who hoped to strengthen Congress' role as a national government. In 
practice Congress followed a compromise. Company officers were selected 
by the colonial governments who also nominated candidates for the field 
officers. Congress elected the candidates endorsed by the colonies and 
issued commissions to all officers.^
Congress subsequently clarified other aspects of the commissioning 
process. Officers elected on the same day took seniority according to 
the order in which their names appeared in the minutes of Congress. A 
promotion made to fill a vacancy carried an effective date retroactive 
to the time the vacancy occurred. Congress also steadfastly maintained 
its right to promote officers without regard to seniority in cases of ex­
ceptional merit. Delegates from the middle and southern colonies willing­
ly agreed because they knew that strict adherence to seniority would allow
21New England to dominate Army leadership.
20. Ford, Journals of Congress. 3: 285-9, 305, 335, 429. Smith, Letters 
of Delegates. 2: 147-8, 155-6, 171, 253, 489-90. Force, American Archives, 
4th Ser., 3: 1051, 1224-5, 1240. William Livingston to Stirling, 8 Nov 
1775; William Alexander Papers (hereafter referred to as the Stirling Pa­
pers), New-York Historical Society. Jonathan Gregory Rossle, The Politics 
of Command in the American Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1975), pp. 26-30, 61-74.
21. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 29, 342; 6: 864. Burnett, Letters of 
Congress. 2: 14.
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With policy established, Congress appointed distinguished men as 
New Jersey's field officers. Lord Stirling, commanding the 1st New 
Jersey Regiment, and William Maxwell, colonel of the 2d, were veterans 
of the French and Indian War, militia colonels, and Important politicians. 
The sixteen companies to be raised by the Provincial Congress were ap­
portioned among the counties according to militia strength. Organiza­
tion of the regiments reflected the longstanding subdivisions of the
colony. East Jersey, the northeastern portion, filled the 1st, while
22
West Jersey, the southwest, furnished the 2d.
William Livingston, a New Jersey delegate soon to be the governor, 
secured authorization for a third regiment when Congress ordered the 2d 
to Canada. The new commander, Ellas Dayton, had the same military and 
political credentials as the two earlier colonels. This regiment organi­
zed during the early spring on a colony-wide basis. At the same time the 
Provincial Congress disbanded its minutemen and created two companies of 
artillery. These companies, one for East Jersey and one for West, were 
regular state troops designed to support the militia. Congress rejected
New Jersey's efforts to have them adopted as Continentals. It also
23
turned down a request for two more infantry regiments.
Congress soon promoted Stirling to brigadier general and Lieutenant 
Colonel William Winds succeeded him as commander of the 1st New Jersey 
Regiment. In an unusual step, Matthias Ogden (who went to Boston as a
22. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 3: 1234-44; 4: 164-6, 288, 294-5. 
American-born William Alexander's claim to the Earldom of Stirling had 
been recognized in Scotland, but rejected by the British House of Lords.
23. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 47, 123, 181n. Smith, Letters of 
Delegates. 3: 77-80, 306, 310-1, 318-9. Force, American Archives, 4th 
Ser., 4: 664, 1391, 1580-1624.
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volunteer) was inserted as the new lieutenant colonel. The 1st and 3d
went to New York, although two companies of the latter were briefly
diverted to protect Cape May. Washington later sent both regiments
north, where the 1st joined the 2d in Canada while the 3d nerved in the 
24
Mohawk Valley.
Pennsylvania, like New Jersey, had been relatively untouched by 
operations in 1775. Because it lacked a mandatory militia, the Quaker- 
dominated colony relied on volunteers, known as Associators. The colo­
nial Assembly, still the legal governing body, assumed responsibility 
for supervising the Associators on 30 June 1775. Under the leadership 
of Benjamin Franklin, the colony's Committee of Safety worked vigorously 
to accumulate supplies and by the end of September published a set of 
rules and regulations. Since the colony had a large German-speaking 
minority, the regulations were printed in that language as well as in 
English.2^
Congress pushed the colony to further activity on 12 October 1775 
by authorizing it to raise a regiment. The Assembly appointed company 
officers who began recruiting almost immediately. Field officers were 
not selected until November. The companies were enlisted across the 
colony and assembled in the capital on 11 January 1776. At that time 
the officers forced the aging Colonel John Bull to resign. John DeHaas,
24. Stirling to Samuel Tucker, 3 Mar 1776; Tucker to Stirling, 7 Mar 1776; 
Stirling Papers, New-York Historical Society. Stirling to Congress, 5 and 
19 Feb 1776; Papers of the Continental Congress, Record Group 360, National 
Archives. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 188, 204, 291. Fitzpatrick, 
Writings of Washington. 4: 526.
25. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 2: 1771-7; 3: 496, .501-11, 870-1. 
Pennsylvania Archives. 8th Ser., 8: 7245-7, 7351-2, 7369-80, 7384.
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another veteran of the French and Indian War, replaced him and marched 
the regiment to Quebec.^
On 9 December 1775 Congress authorized four more regiments. Field 
officers recommended by the Committee of Safety were appointed in early 
January. Counties raised the companies which were grouped into regiments 
on a geographical basis. For unknown reasons, Congress allowed the colo­
ny to designate its regiments anachronistically as the 1st through 5th 
Pennsylvania Battalions. Cumberland County's local committee of safety 
petitioned the colony's committee to allocate it a full regiment, and 
Congress rewarded this enthusiasm on 4 January 1776 by directing Penn­
sylvania to raise another regiment there. Officers for it received com­
missions according to the county's recommendations.^ one company of 
each regiment, except the 1st, had rifles instead of muskets. Captain 
John Nelson's independent rifle company was attached during 1776 to the 
1st Pennsylvania Battalion as compensation. That company had been or­
ganized by the Berks County committee and accepted by Congress on 30 
28
January.
Pennsylvania hoped to have a voice in the use of its regiments by
2Q
having them serve as a unified brigade.* That course would allow time 
to train the junior officers, who were inexperienced but considered
26. Ford, Journals of Congress, 3: 291, 370. Pennsylvania Archives, 8th 
Ser., 8: 7306-8, 7314, 7324-5, 7345, 7456.
27. Ibid.. 1st Ser., 4: 693-4, 711. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 
4 : 501, 507-H. Smith, Letters of Delegates. 3: 13-14, 20-21, 27-28. 
Ford, Journals of Congress. 3s 418; 4: 23-24, 29-31, 47-48.
28. Ibid., 4: 29, 101-2, 207. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 3: 167. In 
1777 Nelson's company was absorbed by the 5th Pennsylvania Regiment.
29. William Thompson to unknown, 25 Jan 1776, in Pennsylvania Magazine 
of History and Biography, 35 (1911), pp. 304-6.
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"pretty generally men of some Education, capable of becoming good offi­
cers, _/ and_/ willing to do their duty."3® The Canadian crisis preven­
ted systematic deployment. Congress quickly ordered the 1st, 2d, and 
4th (under Franklin's protege Anthony Wayne) to the north. A shortage 
of arms delayed the movement of the others and led Congress to toy with 
the idea of arming Robert Magaw's 5th with pikes instead of muskets. The 
6th later reached Canada, but the 3d and 5th went only as far as New York 
City.31
During the summer Congress authorized Pennsylvania to raise two more 
regiments for special missions. Westmoreland County on its own authority 
had formed an Independent company to protect its frontier. On 16 June 
1776 this unit, one hundred men under Captain Van Swearingen, was accep­
ted by the Assembly as state troops and stationed at Kittaning. Congress 
also became concerned with preserving the neutrality of Indians in the 
area. On 11 July it ordered Schuyler to raise a regiment to garrison 
several key points in New York and Pennsylvania, including Kittaning. 
Seven of the companies were raised in Westmoreland County and the eighth 
in adjacent Bedford. Swearingen's company became part of the regiment. 
Aneas Mackay, a former commander of a British independent company living 
in Westmoreland, was appointed colonel on 20 July. Mackay was successful
in recruiting men, but a food shortage prevented concentration of the
32regiment until mid-December.
30. Lee, "Papers," lj 303-8.
31. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 163, 204, 2l5; 5: 431. Force, Ameri­
can Archives, 4th Ser., 5: 435-6; 6: 664. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 
3: 376, 381-5, 420.
32. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 6: 1284; 5th Ser., 2: 7-9. Penn­
sylvania Archives. 1st Ser., 5: 92-93, 135; 8th Ser., 8: 7535-6. Ford,
Journals of Congress. 5: 542, 562, 596, 759-60.
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Mackay's regiment was not responsible for the defense of the colo­
ny's northern border in Northumberland and Northampton Counties.
Congress authorized a second regiment to secure that region on 23 August 
1776. It contained only six companies under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel William Cook and did not complete organization in time to parti-
33
cipate in operations in 1776. Congress actually provided the equivalent 
of a full regiment for that stretch of Pennsylvania's frontier by author­
izing two separate companies at the same time for the Wyoming Valley.
The Valley, today part of Pennsylvania, was claimed by both Connecticut 
and Pennsylvania, with the former colony exercising effective control.
It organized the companies under Captains Robert Durkee and Samuel 
34Ransom of Wyoming.
Delaware also responded promptly when Congress assigned it a single 
regiment of Continentals on 9 December 1775. Company officers were 
appointed on 13 January, and six days later Congress approved the field 
officers. The regiment assembled at Dover in March and began training 
under the tutelage of Adjutant Thomas Holland, a former British captain. 
Several companies skirmished with landing parties from the frigate Roe­
buck while protecting Delaware's coastline, but the bulk of the regiment
lacked weapons until July. It picked up muskets in Philadelphia and in
35
August set out for the Main Army.
33. Ibid., p. 699. Pennsylvania Archives, 1st Ser., 5: 84-85. Force, 
American Archives, 5th Ser., 2: 16, 28, 35, 60.
34. Ford, Journals of Congress, 5: 699, 70l; 6: 1024. Charles J. Hoadley, 
et al., eds., The Public Records of the State of Connecticut (11 vols., 
Hartford: Various publishers, 1894-1967), 1: 7.
35. Force. American Archives. 4th Ser., 5: 745-6, 814-5, 1173; 5th Ser.,
1: 739-41; 2: 881-2. Ford, Journals of Congress, 3: 418; 4: 68-69, 251;
5: 520, 596, 631. Henry Hobart Bellas, ed., Personal Recollections of 
Captain Enoch Anderson ... (Wilmington: Historical Society of Delaware,
1896), p. 7.
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Maryland patterned its defense bill of 14 August 1775 on Virginia's. 
The colony was not in any immediate danger, however, and merely reor­
ganized its militia and established minutemen. Lord Dunmore's activity 
in the Chesapeake Bay caused the Maryland Convention to reconsider that 
decision. On 1 January 1776 the concept of raising regular troops re­
ceived approval. Two weeks later the Convention replaced the minutemen 
with Btate troops. One regiment contained the nine companies from the 
northern and western parts of the colony. It was organized along lines 
similar to Continental regiments except for the addition of a second 
major and a light infantry company. The light company had rifles instead 
of muskets and a third lieutenant instead of an ensign. It contained 64 
privates, somewhat more than the line companies, but the total number in 
the regiment was the same as in a regiment of eight 68-man companies.
Seven of the remaining separate companies were infantry with a larger
number of privates; two others were artillery (with the same organization)
36
to defend Annapolis and Baltimore.
The officers came from the political leadership of the colony.
Colonel William Smallwood, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Ware, and four 
captains sat in the Convention. Both majors had prior service: Thomas
Price commanded one of the Continental rifle companies of 1775 and Mor- 
decai Gist organized the colony's first volunteer company in 1774. The 
regiment and three of the Infantry companies reached New York on 9 August 
and joined Washington. The remaining four companies under Major Price
36. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 3: 108-12; 4: 728-35, 744-53; 5: 
1528. Archives of Maryland. 18: 4-20. See Table 3.
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did not join them until 19 September when they could be spared from
coastal defense. Congress formally assigned Maryland a quota of two
Continental regiments on 17 August 1776. The colony decided instead
to transfer the regiment and independent infantry companies without
37providing a second regimental staff.
Two other regiments were raised during the summer of 1776, primarily
in the middle colonies, as cooperative ventures. The British introduced
the use of German auxiliaries in that year. Propagandists denounced the
"Hessian mercenaries" and cited them as proof of the corruption of the
British political system. They also prompted Congress to begin enlisting
troops for longer periods, and to make specific efforts to mobilize the
38
German-American population. On 25 May Congress created the German
Battalion. Native-born and immigrant Germans were enlisted in Maryland 
and Pennsylvania for three year terms. Each colony furnished four 
companies. The three field officers came from the revolutionary leader­
ship in the German communities in those colonies. Congress added a ninth 
company from Pennsylvania on 17 July as a direct result of Washington's 
recommendation of John David Woelper, then a lieutenant in the 3d Penn-
QQ
sylvania Battalion, who had served in the French and Indian War.
The other joint unit was authorized on 17 June as the Maryland and 
Virginia Rifle Regiment. Like the 1st Continental Regiment, on which it
37. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 6: 1474, 1507; 5th Ser., 3: 87. 
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5: 416; 6: 72. Ford, Journals of 
Congress, 5: 665-6.
38. White, "Standing Armies," pp. 143-4.
39. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 392; 5: 487-8, 526, 571, 590, 825-6. 
Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 6: 1508; 5th Ser., 1: 124, 186-7, 
1284, 1293, 1334-6.
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was modelled, Its cadre came from the rifle companies of 1775. Daniel
Morgan'8 Virginia company had been captured at Quebec, but the other
Virginia company and both Maryland ones were in service at New York and
were reenlisted. Four additional companies were raised in Virginia and
three in Maryland, all in the northwestern parts of their respective
colonies. Captains Hugh Stephenson, Moses Rawlings, and Otho Holland
Williams became the regimental field officers, retaining their relative
seniority. The regiment was captured in November at Fort Washington,
40
however, before all of the companies had a chance to join it.
During late 1775 and 1776 the four central colonies accepted the 
obligation to raise over 11,000 men for the common military effort. New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware formed ten regiments for Congress. 
Maryland organized the equivalent of two more regiments as state troops, 
but at Congress' request transferred them to the Continental Army. Four 
others were added during the summer of 1776, two of which were jointly 
recruited by adjacent colonies. Like the initial units recruited else­
where, these regiments attracted men of talent, influence, and experience 
as officers. Except for Maryland, which behaved more like Virginia than 
the other middle colonies, each concentrated on improving its militia at 
first and turned to regular troops only at the request of Congress. That 
fact eliminated the variation in organizational models that was a problem 
in the other regions. Once the issue of appointing officers was resolved,
40. Ibid.. 5th Ser., I; 31-32, 183, 251, 1335-7, 1343. Ford, Journals of 
Congress. 5: 452, 486, 529, 540, 741. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 
5: 202, 216; 6: 128. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 1: 518.
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the middle colonies' regiments blended easily into the regular Army.
Seven of them went north. The equivalent of six others joined Washing­
ton's Main Army at New York City.
The Departments and the Main Army.
Adding new regiments from the southern and middle colonies greatly 
expanded the size of the Continental Army during 1776. At the same time 
military operations spread beyond eastern Massachusetts and Canada. 
Congress and Washington reacted to these new conditions by improving on 
the basic command and staff organizations created during 1775. The New 
York and Canadian Departments served as a model for dividing the nation 
into a system of territorial commands. New departments and the transfer 
of the Main Army to New York City led in turn to a larger staff. Although 
the size of the Army was greatly increased during early 1776, additional 
demands during the summer forced Congress to raise still more men. It 
chose to tap other resources to meet that need.
The south, particularly Virginia, initiated the expansion of the 
command structure by requesting general officers for its new regiments. 
Congress appointed a committee "to consider into what departments the 
middle and southern colonies ought to be formed, in order that military 
operations ... may be carried on in a regular and systematic manner. 
Following the committee's recommendations, Congress created two new ter­
ritorial departments on 27 February 1776. Virginia, the Carollnas, and
41. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 132-3. The committee represented every 
shade of opinion in Congress, including the militant John Penn, the more 
conservative James Wilson, and three members (Thomas Lynch, Benjamin Har­
rison, and Robert Alexander) who generally followed a middle course on 
questions of resistance.
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Georgia became the Southern Department. New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela­
ware, and Maryland, added to New York, formed the Middle Department, 
which remained under Schuyler. Three days later Congress placed Charles 
Lee in command of the Southern Department and elected six brigadier 
generals for the new departments. Appropriate staff assistants were 
subsequently appointed for each.^
Washington remained the Commander-in-Chief with personal command of 
the "Military District" of New England. Canada represented a fourth de­
partment. Congress intended to assign each department a major general 
and two brigadier generals, but the attempt at symmetry was unsuccessful. 
Lee's Southern Department immediately received two additional brigadier 
generals because it covered so large an area, and Washington's Main Army 
retained three major and six brigadier generals.^ Transfers, promotions, 
and resignations followed. New appointments to fill vacancies included 
Frederick de Woedtke who claimed to be a Prussian general. His election 
on 16 March 1776 as brigadier general for the Canadian Department was the 
first appointment as a general officer of a foreign volunteer.^*
When Henry Knox accumulated enough heavy artillery, Washington occu­
pied dominant positions on Dorchester Heights, rendering Boston untenable
42. Ibid., pp. 174, 181, 187, 236, 241, 243, 331-2, 364-5. Smith. Letters 
of Delegates, 3: 252, 346-7, 459. The brigadier gaaerals for the Southern 
Department were John Armstrong of Pennsylvania, Andrew Lewis of Virginia, 
and James Moore and Robert Howe of North Carolina. William Thompson of 
Pennsylvania and Lord Stirling of New Jersey were assigned to Schuyler in 
the new Middle Department.
43. Ford, Journals of Congress, 4: 47. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washing­
ton, 4: 374, 381-2.
44. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 186, 209-20. Smith, Letters of Dele­
gates , 3: 384-5. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 4: 221-3.
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for the British, who evacuated it on 17 March 1776. Washington correctly 
guessed that General Howe would attack New York City next, as soon as the 
British could regroup their forces. The Main Army moved by brigades to 
that city over a period of weeks. The regiments marched overland to Nor­
wich, Connecticut, embarked in coastal shipping, and sailed down Long 
Island Sound. Washington opened his headquarters at New York on 14 
April, and three days later the last units arrived from Boston.
With this move Washington became commander of the Middle Department. 
Schuyler reverted to command of the reorganized Northern Department in 
northern New York. Major General Artemas Ward wished to resign, but was 
persuaded to accept command of the new Eastern Department encompassing 
New England for the time being. His forces consisted of a company of 
Knox's artillery regiment and five Massachusetts infantry regiments.
Four, the 8th, 16th, 18th, and 27th Continental Regiments, protected 
Boston. The 14th remained at the Marblehead naval base.^
Washington continued the Main Army's organization of three divisions 
and six brigades in January 1776. The average size of a brigade remained 
the same, although each now contained only four or five of the larger 
regiments. When the army moved to New York it gained some regiments from 
the middle colonies, but left five behind in Massachusetts. Shortly 
thereafter it sent the equivalent of two brigades to the north. In April 
Washington regrouped the remaining regiments under the one major and four
45. Ward to Congress, 22 Mar 1776; Record Group 360, National Archives. 
Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 300; 5: 694; 6: 931. Fitzpatrick, Wri­
tings of Washington. 4: 467-70; 5: 1-4. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 1: 
450-2, 505-6. C. Harvey Gardiner, ed., A Study in Dissent; The Warren- 
Gerry Correspondence 1776-1792 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
Ere88, 1968), pp. 16-19.
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brigadier generals left with the Main Army. Each of the four brigades
contained four or five regiments and defended a specific area or terrain
feature. That arrangement, and the exemption of the artillery from the
brigades, were characteristics of the 1775 brigade system, although
Washington did alter the arrangement employed at Boston in one respect.
At New York he placed the riflemen in the brigade responsible for the
most advanced positions where their special skills had greater value.
Key personnel changes as well as the expansion to service the new
territorial departments highlighted the history of the Army staff in
1776. Adjutant General Gates and Muster Master General Stephen Moylan,
for example, were promoted to larger assignments during the year. Joseph
Reed accepted the Adjutant General's office with the rank of colonel, and
his former law student, Gunning Bedford, moved up from Deputy Muster
Master General. Their close relationship Insured that the two main ad-
47ministrative sections continued to cooperate. Washington also worked 
to improve the quality of staff work. He instituted a comprehensive re­
porting system that kept headquarters informed about the day-to-day
48
status of the Army. That data gave the Continentals an edge in accurate
planning over the British, who lacked a cohesive, functioning adminlstra- 
49tive network.
46. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 275, 512-3, 535-6; 5: 36-37.
47. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 177, 187, 236, 311, 315; 5: 419, 460; 
6: 933.
48. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 4: 202-7, 223. Ford, Journals 
of Congress. 10: 124. Richard K. Showman, et al., eds.. The Papers of 
General Nathanael Greene (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press
for the Rhode Island Historical Society, 1976- ), 1: 264-5. In 1776
reports required a ream of paper a month for each regiment.
49. Charles Jenkinson to Henry Clinton, 5 Apr and 23 Nov 1779 and 5 Feb 
1781; British Headquarters Papers, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 4  
1894, 2443, and 3320.
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Washington18 aides and secretaries served as another element in the 
Army's administrative chain. During 1776 they also experienced expansion 
and personnel changes. Increased pay and a Congressional decision to give 
the Commander-in-Chief's aides the rank of lieutenant colonel (major gener­
als' aides were majors) eased some of the problems caused by career aspir­
ations. The addition of a fourth aide in August compensated for the 
growth in Washington's correspondence after the move to New York.^® A 
new special unit formed on 12 March supplemented the aides. The Commander- 
in-Chief's Guard, a company-sized element, protected Washington's person 
and the Army's cash and official papers. Adjutant Caleb Gibbs of the 14th 
Continental Regiment became its captain and took on the burdens of super­
vising the headquarters' household. Washington's nephew, Lieutenant 
George Lewis, became the other officer of the guard.
Comparable expansion took place in the logistical and medical spheres. 
Two developments in 1776 improved support for the troops. Congress re­
placed the individual colonies as the procurer of clothing and, under the 
general supervision of the Quartermaster General, issued it to the troops 
at cost. The system followed American exoerlence in the colonial wars 
rather than the British policy of allowing colonels to deal directly with 
civilian contractors. Designed for the small army of January 1776, the
plan suffered a partial collapse when the Army expanded. Eventually
52
Washington had to abandon his hope for standardized uniforms.
50. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 3 H ;  5: 418, 613. Fitzpatrick, Writings 
of Washington. 4: 287, 369, 381; 5: 50, 165, 337-8, 481.
51. Ibid.. 4: 387-8; 5: 50, 125. Carlos E. Godfrey, The Commander-in- 
Chief's Guard Revolutionary War (Washington: Stevenson-Smith, 1904), pp.
19, 35-38.
52. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 4: 57, 85, 87, 96, 155, 195, 341, 
385; 5: 21, 130, 336. The plan included regimental flags keyed to the color 
of each unit's coat facings.
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The second innovation came on 29 June 1776. Washington organized a 
provisional regiment from the labor troops under the command of Barrack- 
master Jonathan Brewer, a former colonel, and Deputy Quartermaster General 
John Parke. The hired or enlisted craftsmen continued to perform main­
tenance and construction duties, but now were organized into twelve com­
panies for possible emergency combat service. Each fifty-man company 
had a temporary captain and two lieutenants, mostly either former enlis­
ted men or civilians. The artisans formed companies according to trades:
seven of carpenters, three of smiths, one of naval carpenters, and a
53general maintenance company. The regiment dissolved in November.
Competent military engineers were too rare to allow each department 
to have several. Washington brought only Rufus Putnam and Jeduthan Bald­
win to New York. Putnam served as the Main Army's chief engineer with a 
catch-as-catch-can collection of assistants detailed from the line regi­
ments. Baldwin moved to Ticonderoga to supervise similar arrangements in 
the Northern Department. Both men received commissions as engineer 
colonels during the year, although the lack of true training as military 
engineers created weaknesses in overly ambitious fortifications at New
York and Ticonderoga. Fort Washington, the major work on Manhattan, later
54was stormed in a single day.
Congress capped the expansion of the Army by creating a special 
standing committee to assume the burden of routine military supervision.
53. Ibid., 5: 197, 270. Force. American Archives, 5th Ser., 1; 765-6.
54. Ford, Journals of Congress. 5: 630, 732. Fitzpatrick, Writings of 
Washington, 5: 5, 11, 108, 412. Thomas Williams Baldwin, ed., The Revo­
lutionary Journal of Col. Jeduthan Baldwin 1775-1778 (Bangor: De Bur-
ians, 1906), pp. 17-34, 62-63.
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Edward Rutledge, echoing Washington's concerns, suggested on 24 January 
1776 that Congress establish a War Office similar to Britain's. Congress 
appointed a committee to study the matter^** and finally formed a "Board 
of War and Ordnance" on 12 June. Five delegates,*’*’ assisted by Richard 
Peters as a permanent secretary, began functioning on 21 June. In ad­
dition to performing various administrative functions, the Board prepared 
recommendations on matters of military policy which were submitted to the 
full Congress. The major tasks of the Board included supervision of 
prisoners of war, the compilation of a master roster of commissioned of­
ficers, monitoring returns of men and materiel, and developing reference 
files of military correspondence.^ Washington greeted this development
with joy, calling it "an Event of great importance ... J  which_/ will be
58
recorded as such in the Historic Page."
The military expansion in early 1776 and the improvements in the 
Continental Army's command and staff organization that it prompted none­
theless fell short of the defensive needs of the nation by the summer. 
Britain vastly Increased the military and naval strength committed to sup­
pressing the Revolution, massing forces at St. John's in Canada and es­
pecially at New York. The first pressure to add still more men to the
55. Interest in and support for the Board was widespread in Congress. The 
original committee to investigate the concept Included militants Franklin, 
Samuel Ward, and Samuel Adams, plus more moderate delegates Thomas Lynch, 
Benjamin Harrison, Edward Rutledge, and Robert Morris. The resolution was 
drafted by a committee appointed on 20 March which Included James Duane 
and Thomas Johnson plus militant Richard H. Lee.
56. Militants John Adams and Roger Sherman; Rutledge and JameB Wilson who 
generally adopted more conservative positions; and Harrison.
57. Ford, Journals of Congress, 4: 85, 215; 5: 434, 438. Smith, Letters of 
Delegates. 3: 148. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 5: 128-9, 200-1.
58. Ibid.. p. 159.
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Continental Army's rolls came from New England. A Congressional study
in May indicated that the Eastern Department needed a garrison of 6,000
men. On H  May Congress ordered Ward's five regiments to recruit to full
strength, adopted two regiments of Rhode Island state troops, and three
days later directed the other three New England governments to raise one 
59
regiment apiece.
Washington's basic policy throughout the war called for keeping the 
Continentals concentrated and leaving local defense to "the Militia, or 
other Internal Strength of each Province."**® The New England governments 
initially used short-term independent companies to protect key harbors, 
but on 31 October 1775 Rhode Island took a different course by raising a 
500-man regiment of state troops as its source of "Internal Strength."
In January the force expanded to two 750-man, 12-company regiments, which 
freed Ward from responsibility for defending Newport and Providence. New 
Hampshire's new Continental regiment was intended to garrison Portsmouth, 
but chaos resulted from attempting to use state troops as a cadre, and 
Colonel Nicholas Long made no recruiting progress until August. Connec­
ticut raised its regiment under Colonel Andrew Ward in the Hartford area 
and northeastern portions of the state, and then added two regiments of 
state troops to take over the burden of local defense when it marched 
out of the state. Massachusetts did not raise its regiment, but instead 
placed three regiments of recently formed state troops (two of infantry
59. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 311, 344-7, 355, 357, 360. Burnett, 
Letters of Congress. 2: 78-79. Harry Alonzo Cushing, ed., The Writings 
of Samuel Adams (4 vols., New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1907), 3: 288-
90.
60. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 3: 379-80. Also see pp. 486-7.
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and one of artillery) under General Ward's command with the restriction 
that they could not be sent outside Massachusetts.**^
Congress' plans for a 6,000-man Eastern Department became a dead 
letter by summer as operations elsewhere became more important. Three of 
the new regiments and all five regiments of the original New England gar­
rison soon shifted to either Ticonderoga or New York. During conferences 
in May Washington and Congress concluded that the Army needed a two-to-one 
numerical advantage to defend both places successfully. Between 1 and 3 
June Congress called for the additional men needed to achieve that ratio. 
Ticonderoga received an allocation of 6,000 militia and New York another 
13,800. A third force, the 10,000-man Flying Camp, was set aside as a 
mobile reserve stationed in New Jersey. In deciding on militia rather 
than still more Continental regiments, Congress acted on practical and 
ideological reasons. Militia could take to the field quicker, and many 
delegates also believed that America faced a crisis which demanded full 
participation by the society. To individuals of this point of view the 
militia, not the regular army, was the military institution of the peo-
61. John Russell Bartlett, ed., Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantations in New England (9 vols., Providence: Various pub­
lishers, 1856-65), 7: 376, 384-6, 403-4, 410, 415, 432-8, 492-3, 537-8, 
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1974), p. 104. White, "Standing Armies," pp. 95-110.
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All of the colonies from Maryland northward responded to this call,
although few furnished their full quotas of militia. Pennsylvania's
contribution to the Flying Camp Included two special units of state
troops, totalling ly500 men. They had been created in March to replace
departing Continentals. The colony planned to use the two-battalion
Pennsylvania State Rifle Regiment either on the frontier or in defense
of eastern Pennsylvania, and the Pennsylvania State Musketry Battalion to
64
defend Philadelphia from British regulars. The state troops also in­
cluded an artillery contingent which was not sent to the Flying Camp, but 
retained near Philadelphia to guard the fortifications on the Delaware 
River. A small company under Thomas Proctor established in October 1775 
expanded in May to one hundred men. As a result of its men's distinguished 
service as volunteers on the Continental Navy's Hornet in an engagement 
with the frigate Roebuck. Pennsylvania further expanded its artillery
force to two large companies. In October those men were ordered to be
65reenlisted for the duration of the war.
The reinforcements of militia, and of several new Continental regi­
ments which arrived in New York during the summer, increased the size of 
the Main Army. Although the militia had their own "Provincial" brigadier 
generals, Washington had a pressing need for extra senior officers to 
which Congress responded on 9 August by promoting Heath, Spencer, Sullivan, 
and Greene to major general, and adding six new brigadier generals. Of 
the original 1775 brigadier generals only Wooster was not promoted; Congress
64. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 4: 1573-5; 6: 961. Pennsylvania 
Archives, 1st Ser., 4: 780; 8th Ser., 8: 7429-46, 7461-5. See Table 3.
65. Ibid.. 1st Ser., 4: 751-2; 5: 33. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 
3: 1819-20, 1828; 4: 524; 5th Ser., 1; 1317; 2: 69, 80, 97.
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punished him for quarrelsome conduct in Canada. The new brigadier gener­
als replaced men promoted, killed, or captured. In almost every case the 
senior colonel from the same state was promoted. Other brigadier gener­
als were added in September.66 The additional generals enabled Washington 
to reorganized his brigades. In August the eight brigades of militia and 
four of Continentals were formed into three "Grand Divisions," each tai­
lored to a specific defensive mission and containing both militiamen and
Continentals. Although other brigades were added, that basic pattern
67prevailed for the remainder of the campaign.
In mid-September the Main Army's fourteen infantry brigades contained
68
31,000 officers and men. Over 7,000 were sick, although most of those 
were not so ill as to be hospitalized. Another 3,500 were on detached 
duties. Of the total strength, 57 percent came from 36 regiments of 
militia and 4 of state troops. The remainder, 25 Continental regiments, 
accounted for 674 officers, 103 regimental staff officers, 602 sergeants, 
314 drummers and fifers, and 11,590 rank and file. Only slightly more 
than half of the Continental rank and file were carried as present and 
fit for duty: 3,153 were sick and 2,356 "on command." Of those on
special duties nearly two-thirds were Continentals rather than militia 
because they had better training. All regiments were reasonably complete. 
Half were over three-quarters full, including the sick and detailed
66. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 5: 379-81. Burnett, Letters of 
Congress, 2: 45-57. Ford, Journals of Congress. 5: 597, 641; 6: 898.
67. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5: 422-3, 501-3; 6: 3-4, 207-8.
68. General Return, Main Army, 14 Sep 1776; Record Group 93, National 
Archives. This return does not include the Flying Camp or various regi­
ments, such as the Delaware Regiment, not physically with their brigades 
on that day.
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personnel. The eight which fell below two-thirds had special reasons 
for their status. The 1st Continental Regiment was in the process of 
reorganizing, and the others all had suffered heavy casualties in the 
battle of Long Island a few weeks earlier. Overall these figures indi­
cate that Washington had a large army under his command, although only 
a fraction of it could be considered trained, reliable troops. On the 
other hand, his regular regiments were reasonably close to their designed 
strength and had an organizational potential for efficient battlefield 
duty.
Summary.
The original plans worked out by Congress, Washington, and Schuyler 
projected a small Continental Army for 1776. Twenty-six infantry, one 
rifle, and one artillery regiment were allocated to the Main Army and 
another nine infantry regiments to the army in Canada and northern New 
York. Standard tables of organization insured that the regiments would 
have a uniformity lacking in 1775. Events during 1776 and Congress' 
willingness to include every colony in the military effort soon outran 
the original modest plan. Great Britain committed major forces from 
Europe which expanded the scope and intensity of the conflict. Congress 
and the individual colonies reacted by adding additional units to the 
Army.
The haphazard growth in the number of regiments, conditioned by a 
changing military situation and political questions, eventually produced 
a national military institution in a geographical sense. Congress es­
tablished a network of territorial departments and added general officers
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and staff personnel to provide a national command organization. Although 
many of the newer regiments also adopted the standard regimental struc­
ture, differences prevailed in some units due to special circumstances 
involved in their creation. Bringing them into conformity was the major 
remaining task required to make the Army a national institution in every 
sense.
Units concentrated in the north, at Charleston, and especially at 
New York City during 1776 represented more colonies than those assembled 
at Boston and in Canada in 1775. Despite the loss of homogeneity, the 
major field armies worked well together. The troops in the far north 
suffered a humiliating repulse in Canada, but stabilized after withdrawing 
to Ticonderoga. The Southern Department easily defeated tentative efforts 
to restore royal authority in that region. Washington's Main Army drove 
the enemy from Boston, but was less successful in its defense of New York. 
The latter campaign Included a series of battlefield defeats and the loss 
of the vital port city. Howe outgeneralled Washington, and his British 
and German regulars for the most part performed more efficiently in combat 
than the mixed force of militia and Continentals. Howe's 15 September 
landing at Kip's Bay, scattering two militia brigades in a rout, marked 
the low point of the campaign for the Americans.
On the next day, however, a relatively minor skirmish at Harlem 
Heights began the restoration of Continental morale. Lieutenant Colonel 
Thomas Knowlton's recently formed provisional ranger unit, supported by 
the rifle companies of the 3d Virginia Regiment, and later by other units, 
defeated a British force which included the elite 42d Foot (Black Watch). 
Other skirmishes at Pelham and Mamaroneck, and individual performances by
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units even in battles which ended in defeat, contributed to a restoration 
of confidence. Washington planned to Incorporate the lessons he learned 
in this campaign when the Army was reorganized for the coming year. Chan­
ges in arms and the development of better teamwork in larger units, ra­
ther than major change in the regimental structure, figured prominently 
in his plans. The other key concept which emerged from the campaign was 
a realization that militiamen were not prepared for extensive service 
with the field armies. As Washington told Congress,
1 am persuaded and as fully convinced, as I am of any one 
fact that has happened, that our Liberties must of necessity 
be greatly hazarded, If not entirely lost, If their defence
is left to any but a permanent standing Army, I mean one to
exist during the War. ^
69. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6; 5.
CHAPTER V 
AN ARMY FOR THE WAR: 1777
Enlistments for most of the Continentals expired on 31 December 
1776. Congress and Washington, remembering the problems of the previous 
winter's reorganization, began preparations during the early fall. They 
profited from experience by starting sooner and by retaining the idea of 
planning through military-Congressional conferences. The new reorganiza­
tion applied to troops from every state, producing comprehensive legis­
lation to rationalize the ad hoc growth of the previous year. The nearly 
unanimous decision to recruit men for the duration of the war, rather 
than the single-year term typical earlier, formed the central premise of 
the new plan. It was approved in September and modified somewhat during 
the winter to adjust to changes necessitated by the final phase of the 
1776 campaign. Other modifications came in 1777 as the Main Army gained 
its first experience with mobile rather than static operations. In 1777 
the Continental Army reached its maximum size in terms of units. Other 
than a handful of special-type organizations, problems thereafter related 
to sustaining strength rather than growth.
The Eighty-Eight Battalion Resolve.
Congress made the basic decisions about the size and nature of the 
Continental Army of 1777 during September and early October of 1776. 
Delegates of different political backgrounds agreed on the general
151
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outlines of a new policy. Extensive discussions in committee took place 
before consensus on precise details appeared. The original proposal 
adopted by Congress settled on the size of the Army and apportioned it 
among the several states, establishing conditions of enlistment and com­
pensation for the officers and men. Congress also approved amendments 
to the Articles of War to improve discipline.
Americans had adamantly opposed long enlistments during the first 
year and a half of the Revolution. In addition to the precedent of short 
enlistments for the Provincials, most politicians believed in the ideal 
of a militia of citizen-soldiers rather than a "standing army." That 
attitude began to change during the summer of 1776, and even Whiggish 
John Adams conceded that the newly independent nation needed "A regular 
Army, and the most masterly Discipline, because ... without these We 
cannot reasonably hope to be a powerful, a prosperous, or a free People." 
The 1776 campaign proved that the Revolutionary militia system, like its 
colonial predecessor, could not furnish large bodies of men for extended 
periods. The change in Congress' attitude began during the summer when 
the newly authorized units were recruited for three years' service. By 
the fall delegates universally agreed to rely on a large body of trained
and disciplined Continentals to compete with the British and German
2
regulars on the battlefield.
1. Edmund Cody Burnett, ed., Letters of Members of the Continental Congress 
(8 vols., Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1921-36), 2: 61.
2. Ibid.. 1: 319, 360-1, 505-6; 2: 44-45, 57, 78-79, 98-100, 106-7. H.
James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental Congress (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974), pp. 102-5. John Todd White, "Standing Armies 
in Time of War: Republican Theory and Military Practice During the American
Revolution" (Ph.D. Dissertation, George Washington University, 1978), pp. 
128-35, 143-4. Lawrence Delbert Cress, "The Standing Army, The Militia, and 
the New Republic: Changing Attitudes Toward the Military in American Society,
1768 to 1820" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1976), pp. 138-43.
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Once Congress decided in favor of a long-term army it directed the 
Board of War to draft a comprehensive plan. The Board submitted that 
document on 9 September 1776. Congress devoted the next week to deba­
ting and amending it in committee of the whole. Discussion of specific 
details relating to enlistments, bounties, and the allocation of quotas 
consumed the time. The final legislation, known as the "eighty-eight 
battalion resolve," called for eighty-eight regiments of Infantry under 
the structure approved for use in 1776. Congress' estimates of the 
military population of each state governed the quotas of regiments.^ The 
delegates Intended to have most existing regiments reenlist their men.
They approved cash bonuses and liberal poBt-war land grants as incentives 
in the face of the much longer terms of service. As in the past, Congress 
retained commissioning powers but allowed the states to select all regi­
mental officers. The states also had to arm, clothe, and equip the regi­
ments, and could withhold part of the men's pay to cover the cost of
A
uniforms.
Longer enlistments allowed the Army to improve training and discipline. 
Modification of the Articles of War also contributed to better discipline. 
Washington decided during the summer that the existing Articles lacked 
deterrent effect, and he sent Judge Advocate William Tudor to Philadel­
phia to present his case. Tudor and a Congressional committee which in­
cluded some of the finest legal minds in America^ produced the revision
3. See Table 4.
4. Worthington C. Ford, ed.. Journals of the Continental Congress 1774- 
1789 (34 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904-37), 5: 729,
747, 749, 751, 756-7, 762-3. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 2: 82-83, 88- 
89, 95-100, 102, 105-7.
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adopted on 20 September. It expanded the number of articles by more 
closely copying the British articles and restoring material deleted in 
former versions. The central changes added to the list of capital crimes 
and increased the maximum corporal punishment from thirty-nine lashes to 
one hundred. This version remained in effect for the rest of the war. 
Accompanying legislation commissioned Tudor as a lieutenant colonel and 
authorized deputy judge advocates to assist with mounting casework.*’ 
Washington wrote a letter to Congress on 24 September, before he 
learned of these resolutions, requesting immediate action to reorganize 
the Army for the new year and to Improve discipline. It was an eloquent 
appeal which overcame the last lingering objections in Congress, but it 
also raised some new Issues. In particular Washington asked the delegates 
to increase the pay scales of officers and to furnish free uniforms to the 
men. Congress increased officers' salaries on 7 October and approved an 
annual uniform allowance on the next day.^
The Commander-in-Chief'8 concern was to complete the reorganization 
before winter fragmented the Army. He wanted Congress to have the states 
send legislative committees to headquarters and to Ticonderoga to Insure 
that the most qualified officers were retained. Congress agreed, and when 
some committees did not appear promptly, allowed Washington and Schuyler 
to act in place of them. When November brought news that Massachusetts
6. Ibid., 2: 54-57. Ford. Journals of Congress. 5: 788-807; 7; 265-6.
Peter Force, ed., American Archives: A Collection of Authentic Records.
State Papers. Debates, and Other Notices of Public Affairs (9 vols., Washing­
ton: M. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1839-53), 5th Ser., 1: 576.
John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington from the Origi­
nal Manuscript Sources 1745-1799 (39 vols., Washington: Government Prin­
ting Office, 1931-44), 5: 194-5; 6: 91-92, 125, 147, 151.
7. Ibid., 6: 106-16. Ford. Journals of Congress. 5: 853-6.
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had promised to supplement the pay of Its enlisted men and that other 
states were considering similar action, Washington warned that such a 
course was unwise over the long term, and Congress agreed. On 12 Novem­
ber the practice was forbidden, but the option of shorter three-year 
enlistments received approval as another incentive to recruiting.**
Operations around New York did not halt after the battle of White 
Plains. Instead, they interrupted the reorganization and eventually 
caused major changes in the master plan. On 12 November Washington di­
vided the Main A m y  to guard against several possible courses of British 
action. General Lee, recently returned from the south, remained east of 
the Hudson River to protect approaches to New England. Washington crossed 
over to New Jersey to reinforce the Flying Camp. General Heath's division 
marched into the Hudson Highlands, a mountainous zone some forty miles 
above New York City, to preserve communications between the two larger 
forces. As early as 8 November 1775 Congress recognized that the High­
lands deserved to be fortified because it was the only place along the 
river between Albany and the sea where warships could be stopped. A com- 
mondant of the fortifications, at first a colonel but later a brigadier 
general, had been the senior Continental officer in the region during most 
of 1776. Heath's assignment transformed the region into a de-facto ter­
ritorial department, a status which its strategic importance preserved for
9
the rest of the war.
8. Ibid., 5: 854-6; 6: 920-1, 944-5. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 2: 115- 
6, 139-41, 143-4, 154-9. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 6: 152-6, 
186-90 , 200-1, 271-3 , 289-90.
9. Ibid.. 5: 10-11, 123, 138-9, 317-9, 340-1, 435-6; 6: 242-5, 257-8, 284- 
7; 16: 150-4. Ford, Journals of Congress, 3: 337-8. Robert K. Wright, Jr., 
"Too Little, Too Late: The Campaign of 1777 in the Hudson Highlands" (Mas­
ter's Thesis, College of William and Mary, 1971), pp. 30-40.
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Howe captured Fort Washington on 16 November, depriving Washington 
of its large garrison and upsetting the balance of forces. He continued 
with an Invasion of New Jersey which chased Washington across the Dela­
ware River on 8 December. A second British force from New York captured 
Newport, Rhode Island, the same day. As soon as Howe decided that 
Washington was safe on the Pennsylvania side of the river, he halted the 
campaign and ordered his troops into winter quarters.
Trenton, one of the most advanced outposts, was garrisoned by a re­
inforced Hessian Brigade under Colonel Johann Rail. Rail's regiments were 
among the best in the German auxiliary forces serving the British, but they 
were worn out, seriously short of officers, and handicapped by a cumbersome 
structure. Hesse-Cassel modeled its army on Prussia's, giving each infan­
try regiment two five-company battalions plus a grenadier company. The 
British had altered that formation before the regiments left Europe, de­
taching the grenadier companies to form four four-company grenadier bat­
talions and dividing each regiment into two single-battalion regiments.
In comparison with British and American units, the revised Hessian regi­
ment lacked enough officers for its large enlisted strength. It contained 
five companies for administrative purposes, but fought in eight platoons. 
Before it could engage, it needed time to regroup into platoons. At 
Trenton the Hessians were billeted by company.*®
10. Bernard A. Uhlendorf, ed., Revolution in America: Confidential Let­
ters and Journals, 1776-1784 of Adjutant General Major Baurmeister of the 
Hessian Forces (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957), pp. 6-17,
72-79. Ernst Kipping, Die Truppen von Hessian-Kassel ... 1776-1783 
(Darmstadt: Wehr und Wissen Verlagsgesellchaft M. B. H., 1965), pp. 27-
28. Treaty between Great Britain and Hesse-Cassel, 15 Jan 1776 (copy); 
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The invasion of New Jersey threatened Philadelphia and the exis­
tence of the Main Army. Washington ordered Lee to come to his aid, but 
the latter followed an independent strategy until he was captured. Major 
General John Sullivan assumed command of Lee's three brigades and marched 
them to headquarters without further i nc i d e n t . S c h u y l e r  and Gates in 
the Northern Department responded much more quickly. On 18 November most 
of the regiments in that department had already started south to reorgan­
ize, leaving Colonel Anthony Wayne in command of a winter garrison at 
Ticonderoga. On 26 November Schuyler diverted them to Washington. Four 
arrived at headquarters on 20 December, the same day as Sullivan, while
three others established a camp at Morristown, New Jersey, to threaten
12British rear areas.
Washington, reinforced by these Continentals and by Pennsylvania and 
New Jersey militia, moved quickly to restore morale and public confidence. 
He sent Generals Spencer and Arnold, but no troops, to rally New England 
militia near Newport. Patrols probing the banks of the Delaware uncovered 
weakness at Trenton. On the night of 25-26 December a partially regrouped 
and resupplied Main Army crossed back into New Jersey. Part of the coun­
terattack had to be cancelled because of bad weather, but the main body 
virtually destroyed Rail's brigade. On 3 January a second enemy brigade 
was mauled near Princeton. Washington then proceeded to Morristown,
11. Otis G. Hammond, ed., Letters and Papers of Major-General John Sulli­
van. Continental Army (4 vols., Concord: New Hampshire Historical Society,
1930-39), Is 302.
12. Force, American Archives. 5th Ser., 3: 1125, 1260. Gates' General 
Orders for 5-18 Nov 1776; Gates' Orderly Book, New-York Historical Society. 
Gates to Schuyler, 30 Sep; to Ward, 9 Nov; to Hancock, 27 Nov; to Col. Jo­
seph Vose, 8 Dec; to Washington, 12 Dec; Robert Harrison to Gates, 26 Nov; 
Schuyler to Gates, 26 Nov; St. Clair to Gates, 27 Nov; Heath to Gates, 14 
Dec 1776; Horatio Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society. Fitzpatrick, 
Writings of Washington, 6: 414-6, 419.
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having completely outmaneuvered his opponents and forced them to with­
draw into a small bridgehead around New Brunswick.
In a period of little more than a week Washington's small, veteran 
cadre shattered two British brigades, restored morale, and recovered most 
of New Jersey. The Germans lost their aura of invincibility and for the 
rest of the war were underused by the British. Individual officers who 
performed well during the crisis became Washington's trusted subordinates. 
This brief campaign introduced the Continental Army to mobile warfare 
after nearly two years of static operations at Boston and New York. 
Washington spent the next several months digesting its lessons. The most 
important of those lessons was the value of a brigade composed of several 
infantry regiments supported by an artillery company. Hereafter it became 
the basic element of the Main Army.
Rounding Out the Army.
The retreat through New Jersey made Washington acutely aware of Howe's 
numerical strength and his advantage in artillery and cavalry. In a series 
of letters to Congress during December the Commander-in-Chief pressed for 
more men. Additional infantry regiments, more artillery, and a force of 
cavalry headed the list of needs which he outlined. Congress, shaken by 
the crisis and near defeat, acted on these requests by the end of the month. 
As a result, the Continental Army became a more balanced force which 
Washington could organize into elements capable of competing in open battle.
The requests which Washington sent to Congress represented the views 
of his generals as well as his own opinions. Increasing the number of in­
fantry regiments from the 88 authorized on 16 September to a minimum of
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110 lay at the heart of Washington's proposals. Because the invasion of 
New Jersey probably would prevent that state from recruiting its quota, 
he accepted New York's offer to raise a fifth regiment and instructed all 
recruiting parties to enlist as many men as possible without regard for 
quotas. Henry Knox, whom Washington recommended for promotion to briga­
dier general, submitted a plan to expand the artillery to five regiments 
to support the larger number of Infantry regiments. Washington thought 
five excessive, but when he asked Congress for more Infantry he included 
a request for three regiments of artillery. He also desired a force of 
cavalry, several new staff officers, and enough generals to make one
brigadier general available for every three regiments and one major
1*1general for every three brigades.
Congress did not act immediately because it was moving to Baltimore
for greater security. On 27 December, however, it complied exactly with
Washington'8 suggestions. Knox was promoted and Washington empowered to
add the necessary staff officers. Congress ordered the Commander-in-Chief
to develop a comprehensive system for promotions, specifying that officers
should rise by seniority: regimentally to the rank of captain and within
a state's "line" through the field grades. A state's line consisted of
its quota of infantry regiments established in September. Most Important,
Congress, having maturely considered the present crisis; and 
having perfect reliance on the wisdom, vigour, and uprightness 
of General Washington, do, hereby, Resolve. That General 
Washington shall be, and he is hereby, vested with full, ample, 
and complete powers to raise and collect together, in the most 
speedy and effectual manner, from any or all of these United 
State6, 16 battalions of Infantry, in addition to those already
13. Ibid.. 6: 332-3, 350-1, 379-84, 400-9. Force, American Archives. 5th 
Ser., 3: 1310—4.
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voted by Congress; to appoint officers for the said bat­
talions; to raise, officer, and equip three thousand 
light horse; three regiments of artillery, and a corps 
of engineers, and to establish their pay ... .
The "Sixteen Additional Regiments," artillery, and light horse 
represented a new type of force different from the September regiments. 
Unlike previous Continental units, these were not organized by the indi­
vidual state governments but were directly under the Commander-in-Chief's 
control. The sixteen infantry regiments, added to the eighty-eight of 
the September resolve and six approved the previous summer without re­
spect to a single state, produced a total of one hundred and ten. The 
six regiments became known as "extra" regiments to distinguish them from 
the state lines and the sixteen "addltionals." Warner's (largely from 
the Vermont area) and the 1st and 2d Canadian Regiments remained as extras 
for the remainder of their existence. The other three were basically 
absorbed into state lines. Dubois' Regiment, primarily recruited in New 
York, became part of the expanded line of that state. The German Battalion 
and the remnants of the Maryland and Virginia Rifle Regiment contained the 
equivalent of a regiment of men from Maryland, which never raised an eighth 
regiment, contending that those two units should count towards its Sep­
tember quota.^
Washington had expected favorable Congressional action and began 
recruiting even before he learned of the new resolve. On 21 December he
14. Ford, Journals of Congress. 6: 1040, 1043-6. A companion piece of 
legislation authorized establishment of a magazine and ammunition labora­
tory at Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
15. Harry Alonzo Cushing, ed., The Writings of Samuel Adams (4 vols., New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1907), 3: 342-6. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington. 7: 138.
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told General William Maxwell to offer competent officers omitted from 
New Jersey's reorganization commissions as company commanders if they 
would recruit at least fifty men apiece. The same offer was made on 24 
December to Samuel Griffin, a staff officer from the Flying Camp. When 
Congress eventually authorized the additional regiments and Washington 
began to organize them after settling into quarters at Morristown, he 
followed a pattern outlined in these December experiments. In particular, 
he used the regiments to provide for officers who he felt had been passed 
over by state legislatures for reasons other than military merit. Top 
positions were given to officers who performed distinguished staff duty 
during 1776. Washington also believed that Congress intended to have 
the regiments apportioned according to geography and acted accordingly.^^ 
Because New England had a lower line quota in 1777 than in 1776, 
potentially forcing out many good officers, Washington assigned it seven 
of the additional regiments, the largest group given to any region.
Since Boston did not furnish a regiment in 1775 or 1776, Washington se­
lected Henry Jackson, a citizen with a strong military reputation, to com­
mand a regiment allocated to the town. Jackson's key officers came from 
Boston's Independent Company of Cadets. A second Massachusetts regiment 
went to Lieutenant Colonel William Lee of the 14th Continental Regiment. 
The 14th declined to reenlist as a regiment in the 1777 reorganization, 
but enough officers and men remained to justify using it as a cadre. The 
third regiment for Massachusetts went to Deputy Adjutant General David 
Henley, whose broad base of contacts promised recruiting success. All
16. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 6: 415-6, 429-30; 7: 417-9. See 
Table 4.
three regiments remained at Boston during 1777 because they received a
low priority in the competition for recruits with the line and artillery
_ 17
regiments.
Two other Deputy Adjutants General, Ezekiel Cornell of Rhode Island 
and Alexander Scammell of New Hampshire, turned down offers of New Eng­
land additional regiments. Cornell chose to command his state's brigade 
of state troops, Scammell the 3d New Hampshire Regiment. Greater success 
came with the Connecticut portion of the program. Samuel Blatchley Webb, 
one of Washington's aides, raised a regiment there with support from the 
state government. Connecticut also combined with Rhode Island to raise 
the last of the New England regiments. Henry Sherburne of Rhode Island 
received that command as a reward for gallantry at The Cedars. Although 
the regiment took the field in 1777, it never organized all its companies.
State affiliation was less clear in the case of the five regiments 
Washington allocated to the middle states. In contrast to New England, 
where there was a large body of former Continentals to draw on, Washington 
selected officers in the middle states from among veterans of the Bummer's 
militia forces. Colonel William Malcolm of New York City received one 
regiment. General George Clinton and his brigade major Albert Pawling 
(who became the new regiment's major) raised four of its companies in 
the city. General Armstrong organized the other four in Pennsylvania.
The regiment did not assemble as a unit until October. Two veteran New 
Jersey militia leaders, David Forman and Oliver Spencer, raised regiments
17. Ibid.. 6: 433, 499-500; 7: 86-87, 136-40, 165-6. John Hancock was a 
former commander of the elite militia Cadets.
18. Ibid.. 6: 499, 505-6; 7: 11, 132-3.
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with New Jersey cadres. Forman's built on the preliminary work of Griffin, 
who declined command; Spencer's on Maxwell's efforts.
The other two regiments recruited primarily in Pennsylvania, but drew 
from neighboring areas as well. On the recommendation of Richard Henry 
Lee, Washington gave command of one to Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Hartley 
of the 6th Pennsylvania Battalion. Acting Adjutant General Morgan Connor 
(the major of the 1st Continental Regiment) became lieutenant colonel 
when James Wilkinson, a Northern Department staff officer, declined. Like 
most of the commanders of the additional regiments, Hartley was allowed 
wide latitude in selecting his junior officers. Lieutenant Colonel John 
Patton of the Pennsylvania State Rifle Regiment, who had served with dis­
tinction at New York in 1776, was rewarded with the other regiment. Assis­
tant Quartermaster General John Parke and Brigade Major Peter Scull be-
20
came his field officers.
Washington avoided criticism that he favored his native south by com­
missioning few officers in the additional regiments from that region.
Since Georgia and the Carolinas were outside the sphere of his immediate 
command, he omitted them altogether, and Maryland's contribution to the 
extra regiments exempted it from the addltionals. Initially Washington 
allotted only two regiments to Virginia, both to close associates: his
aide William Grayson and the noted frontiersman Nathaniel Gist. Grayson 
recruited in northern Virginia and nearby Maryland. Washington planned 
to use Gist's unit as a special light infantry regiment with four
19. Ibid.. 6: 476, 494; 7: 33-34, 93, 191, 389; 9: 364, 461.
20. Ibid., 6: 490, 493, 498-9; 7: 60n, 374-5. Ford, Journals of Conxress. 
12: 1225-6.
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companies of rangers from the southern frontier and up to 500 attached 
southern Indian scouts. The Indians also would serve as hostages for 
their tribes' good behavior. The Commander-In-Chief reluctantly added a 
third Virginia additional regiment two months later. Lord Stirling had 
grouped three volunteer Virginia companies into a provisional battalion 
under Captain Charles Mynn Thruston, a powerful political leader from the 
Shenandoah Valley. When they performed well in northern New Jersey,
91
Washington told Thruston to recruit a regiment in north-western Virginia.
Washington never attempted to raise all sixteen additional regiments. 
He stopped short of the maximum Congress allowed because of serious re­
cruiting problems. Although some of the additional regiments enjoyed more
success than others, none could compete on an equal footing with regiments
22
of the state lines. Congress itself secured the final additional regi­
ment on 17 June 1777 when it approved North Carolina's offer to raise 
another regiment under Colonel Abraham Sheppard. Because at least 300 
men had to report to Washington within a reasonable period under the terms 
of the authorization, the regiment soon disappeared through absorption.^ 
The three artillery regiments authorized on 27 December, like the 
additionals, represented an expansion rather than the addition of a com­
pletely new element to the Army. Since the September quotas made no men­
tion of artillery, Washington presumably was free to use one or two of the 
eighty-eight regiments for that purpose. During December, however,
21. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 6: 491-2, 494-6; 7: 6-7, 11-12, 
102 , 201-2 , 229 , 295-7 , 307-8.
22. Scammell to Frederick Steuben, 25 Sep 1779; Steuben Papers, New-York 
Historical Society.
23. Ford, Journals of Congress. 8: 475.
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Colonel Knox prepared a plan for as many as five artillery regiments to 
support every geographical region, not just the Main Army. On his own 
authority Washington ordered Knox to begin recruiting three regiments 
while he submitted a request for the additional number to Congress.
The 1777 artillery regiment, like the infantry, followed the same 
general organization that prevailed in 1776. Congress did not change the 
allocation of staff or company officers and left the regiment divided into 
a dozen companies. It did make two changes. The number of field officers 
in a regiment dropped from five to three because the net increase allowed 
for flexibility to handle major detachments from the Main Army. The 
second change regrouped the enlisted men. A company now contained 6 
sergeants, 6 corporals, 6 bombardiers, 6 gunners, and 28 matrosses. This 
arrangement provided balanced crews for up to six guns, plus a company 
ammunition section.
Knox began recruiting after the Trenton campaign. He left Major 
Thomas Proctor to support the Main Army with the Pennsylvania and New 
York state artillery companies plus Captain Sebastian Bauman's Continental 
company. This plan freed the officers of the 1776 regiment to begin re­
cruiting two regiments around cadres of veterans. John Lamb, recently 
released from captivity, recruited in the area between Connecticut and 
Philadelphia. Nine of his companies organized in the spring: four in
Connecticut, 3 in New York, and 2 in Pennsylvania. Three existing units 
rounded out the regiment: Captains Bauman's and Alexander Hamilton's
companies (the latter now under John Doughty of New Jersey), plus the
24. Force, American Archives. 5th Ser., 3: 1314. Fitzpatrick, Writings 
of Washington. 6: 401.
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original 1775 company reorganized under Isaiah Wool. John Cranet a native 
Bostonian, raised nine companies for his regiment in Massachusetts, where 
Ebenezer Stevens assembled three other companies for the Northern Depart­
ment. Stevens never understood that technically he was part of Crane's 
regiment and believed throughout 1777 that he commanded a separate corps,
including a company of artificers whom he recruited at Albany to perform
2 5
maintenance.
Washington and Knox intended to organize their third regiment around 
Proctor's Pennsylvanians, supplemented by companies from New Jersey and 
Maryland, making it in effect a Middle Department regiment. Pennsylvania 
undermined them by expanding its state artillery into a ten-company regi­
ment under Proctor on 6 February 1777. The state did transfer the regi­
ment to the Continental Army in the summer. The net effect of this se­
quence of events left Proctor's regiment with only ten companies instead
2(%of the twelve Knox intended. Two other regiments in the Southern De­
partment provided the total of five Knox envisioned. One was the 4th 
South Carolina Regiment. The other Congress created on 26 November 1776 
by expanding the two existing Virginia companies into a ten-company regi­
ment under Colonel Charles Harrison.^
25. Ibid.. 7: 82, 138-9, 263, 467; 8: 276, 460; 12: 71-72; 18: 303-4.
John Lamb to Washington, 12 Mar 1779; to a Board of General Officers, 6 
Aug 1779; Knox to Lamb, 22 Jan, 13 and 20 Apr, 24 May 1777 and 17 Jan 1778;
Eleazer Oswald to Lamb, 16 Feb, 7 Apr, 17 Jun, 23 Jul 1777; Crane to Wa­
shington, 16 Mar 1779 (copy); Report of Board of General Officers, t Aug 
1779; John Lamb Papers, New-York Historical Society.
26. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 8: 386, 415; 15: 80-81. Pennsyl­
vania Archives. 1st Ser., 5: 234-5, 357, 451, 455; 6: 676-7; 7: 121; 2d 
Ser., 1: 713. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 2: 427. Ford, Journals of 
Congress. 8: 482-3, 551, 564; 12: 865.
27. Ibid., 6: 981, 995; 8: 396, 514, 655. Fitzpatrick. Writings of Wa­
shington. 8: 117; 9: 332; 10: 520. Virginia Gazette (Dixon and Hunter),
28 Feb 1777. Each company had 4 officers, 1 sergeant, 4 corporals, 4 
bombardiers, 8 gunners, and 48 matrosses.
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Knox's proposal also encompassed the special logistical requirements 
of his branch. He wanted Congress to create a supporting company of ar­
tificers, regroup the staff of the Commissary of Military Stores, and 
establish laboratories and a foundry so that the Army could produce its 
own cannon, ammunition, and related items. Until those facilities came 
into service, he and Washington recommended that Congress Import weapons 
from Europe. Their goal was a mobile train of brass field pieces in pro­
portions which corresponded to European concepts: 100 3-pounders, 50 6-
pounders, and 50 12-pounders, plus a number of heavier 18- and 24-pounders 
for general support and siege needs.
Congress located the foundry at Philadelphia and the laboratories at 
Springfield, Massachusetts, and Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Both laboratories 
served throughout the war as ordnance depots for army operations in the 
northern half of the country. Knox personally supervised setting up the 
former. The somewhat larger Carlisle establishment came under Lieutenant 
Colonel Banjamin Flower, formerly the commissary of military stores for 
the Flying Camp. Flower recruited two companies of ordnance technicians 
and repairmen who, unlike the hired artisans of earlier years, were sol­
diers. Captain Isaac Coren commanded a standard artillery company at 
Carlisle. The second company, led by a master carpenter, kept the Main 
Army's artillery park in working order.^
During the winter Knox and Washington addressed the problem of im­
proving the mobility of the field artillery so that it could accompany
28. Ford, Journals of Congress. 6: 963. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washing­
ton. 6: 280-2; 7: 83.
29. Ibid.. 6: 474; 7: 18-23; 8: 38. Pennsylvania Archives. 1st Ser., 5: 
209-10.
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the Infantry, in the Trenton campaign each Infantry brigade drew support 
from a company of artillery with two to four guns. This successful con­
cept remained a fixture of the Continental Army for the rest of the war. 
The brigade's company, preferably from the same state as the infantry, 
selected armament to fit its particular mission. The normal allocation 
in 1777 was two 6-pounders, although this weapon required the largest 
crew of any field piece. Other companies served in the artillery park, 
or general reserve, or manned heavy garrison artillery in fortifications. 
Doctrine specified that the artillerists concentrate their fire on enemy
infantry. This placed a premium on rate of fire and maneuverability 
30rather than range.
Up until this time the Continental Army relied on three sources for
its cannon: old guns already in the colonies, captured British weapons,
and iron guns produced domestically. American craftsmen produced 30,000
tons of iron a year by 1775 and quickly turned to military production.
Unfortunately, few available weapons from these sources met battlefield
needs. Iron cannon and old British pieces in particular weighed so much
that they could only be used in permanent fortifications. Washington
counted on foreign imports and the new Philadelphia foundry to provide
31the lighter brass guns for direct support of the field armies.
30. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6: 364, 454; 8: 100-1, 175, 235, 
318-21, 396-9, 457-8; 9: 290. Oswald to Lamb, 17 and 25 Jun, 23 and 25 Jul, 
and 14 Aug 1777; Robert Walker to Lamb, 21 Jul 1777; Andrew Moodle to Lamb,
9 May 1777; Knox to Lamb, 2 Dec 1777; Lamb Papers, New-York Historical Society.
31. Keach Johnson, "The Genesis of the Baltimore Ironworks," Journal of 
Southern History, 19 (1953), pp. 151-79. Irene D. Neu, "The Iron Planta­
tions of Colonial New York." New York History, 33 (1952), pp. 3-24. Spen­
cer C. Tucker, "Cannon Founders of the American Revolution," National De­
fense, 60 (Jul-Aug 1975), pp. 33-37. David Lewis Salay, "Arming for War:
The Production of War Material in Pennsylvania for the American Armies of the 
Revolution" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Delaware, 1977), pp. 202,
241-75. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7: 69; 8: 37*
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The imports came mostly from France. That nation, with some Spanish 
help, used the firm of Hortalez and Company as a channel for transmitting 
clandestine aid to the Americans. During the war the French government 
furnished over 200 artillery pieces, over 100,000 1763-model Charleville 
muskets, and other vital military supplies to the United States. The 
first significant shipment, one of several by Hortalez and Company, ar­
rived at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in April, 1777. Knox judged the 23 
French 4-pounders too cumbersome for American conditions and sent them
to Springfield to be melted down and recast. The other cannon went di-
32rectly to the Main Army.
Continental Army artillerymen turned to a British tactical handbook 
when they cast their own guns, or when they remounted imports on improved 
carriages. John Muller's Treatise of Artillery first appeared in 1757 as 
a textbook for the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. The Americans 
published an edition at Philadelphia in 1779 specifically for the Contin­
ental Artillery. Actually, Muller's proposals proved more important to 
the Americans than to the British, who never gave them formal approval. 
Part of Muller's appeal came from his innovative ideas for mobile iron 
guns and part from his detailed instructions for casting and for con- 
struct!ng light carriages. J
32. Ibid., 8: 2-3, 37, 254, 318-9. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 2: 218- 
9, 591. Force, American Archives, 5th Ser., 1: 1011-23. Neil L. York, 
"Clandestine Aid and The American Revolutionary War Effort: A Re-Examina­
tion," MiUtarjr_Affairs, 43 (1979), pp. 26-30.
33. John Muller, A Treatise of Artillery ... (3d ed., London: John 
Millan, 1780; reprinted with introduction by Harold L. Peterson, Ottawa: 
Museum Restoration Service, 1965), pp. v-xxv. Bauman to Lamb, 25 Jun 1779; 
Samuel Shaw to Bauman, 17 Feb 1777; Sebastian Bauman Papers, New-York 
Historical Society.
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The emphasis on mobility seen in the reorganization of the artil­
lery extended as well in a third element added by the legislation adop­
ted on 27 December. Unlike the additional infantry regiments and expan­
ded artillery, 3,000 light dragoons represented a novel element in the 
Continental Army. While in Europe cavalry remained an offensive force 
which could win battles with a thundering charge, the nature of the ter­
rain in America eliminated the need for such a heavy force during the 
colonial period, although troopers served as scouts or messengers. By 
the start of the Revolution a few colonies had regiments of mounted men, 
but they acted as mobile infantry rather than as true cavalry. The costs 
associated with maintaining a horse insured that such units included only 
the social elite.
During the middle of the century renewed European interest in recon­
naissance and skirmishing led to a limited return of the light horseman.
The British sent two regiments, the 16th and 17th Light Dragoons, to 
America. Each consisted of six troops, a titular colonel, a lieutenant 
colonel, a major, an adjutant, a chaplain, and a surgeon. A troop initial­
ly contained a captain, a lieutenant, a cornet, a quartermaster, 2 ser­
geants, 2 corporals, 1 hautboy (drummer), and 38 privates. In the spring 
of 1776 each troop added another cornet, 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, and 30 
privates. General Howe had the option of mounting the augmentation with 
local horses or using them as light infantry. One German cavalry regiment, 
the Brunswick Dragoon Regiment von Rledesel, served in Canada as infantry.^
34. Barrington to Gage, 31 Aug 1775; to Howe, 29 Jan 1776 and 16 Apr 1777; 
British Headquarters Papers, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, #27, 114, 491. 
Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 6: 271-3. Rledesel's regiment had 4 
troops, each with 3 officers and 75 men, plus a staff of 8 officers and 16 
men.
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The Continental Army's static operations in 1775 and early 1776 did 
not require a cavalry force, although Congress toyed with the idea sever­
al times. Even the Southern Department's ranger regiments served as 
mounted infantry rather than true cavalry. It was during the later phase 
of the New York campaign that Washington decided he needed horsemen for 
reconnaissance duty. The effectiveness of Major Elisha Sheldon's detach­
ment of Connecticut mounted militia and the Intimidation of some of the 
American infantry by the British dragoons prompted Washington to request
O C
permission to recruit Continental light horsemen.
Congress' initial response came on 25 November 1776 when it called 
upon Virginia for the use of its six troops of light horse. Major The- 
odorlc Bland had raised them as state troops during the summer. Each 
troop contained 3 officers, 3 corporals, a drummer, a trumpeter, and 29 
privates. The state transferred them to the Continental Army, and in 
March 1777 Bland reenlisted them as a Continental regiment . ^  At Washing­
ton's suggestion Congress on 12 December 1776 also directed Sheldon to 
raise a Continental regiment of light dragoons. Washington gave Sheldon, 
and the other two regimental commanders, the same free hand in selecting 
junior officers that he accorded to the commanders of the additional in­
fantry regiments. He interpreted the resolve of 27 December as including
35. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5: 163-4, 236-7, 242, 324; 6: 39, 
230-1. Smith, Letters of Delegates. 1: 587, 590-1. Ford, Journals of 
Congress, 2: 173, 238; 5: 606-7.
36. Ibid., 6: 980; 7: 34. Burnett. Letters of Congress, 2: 269. Fitz­
patrick, Writings of Washington. 6: 456-7; 7: 103, 338-9. William Waller 
Henning, ed., The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of all the Laws 
of Virginia ... (14 vols., Richmond: J. & G. Cochran, 1821), 9: 135-8, 
141-3. H. R. Mcllwaine et al., eds.. Journals of the Council of the State 
of Virginia (4 vols., Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1931-67), 1; 153, 
254-5, 269, 288. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 6: 1531, 1556; 5th 
Ser., 3: 1270.
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Bland's and Sheldon's men, and decided to try and raise from scratch
only two regiments rather than the full quota of 3,000 men. One of the
new regiments went at Congress' request to Washington's aide George
Baylor who carried the news of Trenton to Baltimore. The other went to 
37
Stephen Moylan.
On 14 March 1777 Congress approved a regimental organization for the 
light dragoons developed by Washington. It provided 3 field officers, a 
staff, and 6 troops for each regiment. Every troop contained 3 officers,
6 noncommissioned officers, a trumpeter, and 34 privates. One of the 
sergeants specialized in logistics while two of the privates drew higher 
pay for serving as armorer and farrier. The regimental staff, similar to 
an infantry regiment's, also contained a riding instructor and a saddler 
to keep leather gear in repair. Four supernumaries were cadets undergoing 
training and served the colonel as messengers. The Continental light dra­
goon regiment specialized even more than the British regiment in reconnais­
sance missions. Its organization strengthened the ability of each troop
to conduct independent operations, anticipating the need for dispersion
38
during actual service.
Washington believed that the light dragoons' mission was reconnais­
sance, not combat. Because of this he waited only reliable, native-born 
recruits and inconspicuous horses. These high standards, special
37. Ford, Journals of Congress. 6: 1025; 7: 7. Burnett, Letters of 
Congress, 2: 176. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6: 350-1, 384-8, 
483-4; 7: 51, 193-4, 304-5.
38. Ibid.. 12: 290. Hammond, Sullivan Papers. 1; 403. Ford, Journals 
of Congress, 7: 178-9; 9: 869. See Figure 7. Sheldon's regiment had a 
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equipment, and long training periods all contributed to the lengthy 
period needed to complete the regiments. Moylan's regiment organized 
at Philadelphia specifically to have access to the Army's main supply 
center. The fact that three of the four regiments came from Virginia 
and Connecticut, the two colonies noted for raising horses in the eigh- 
teenth century, indicated the importance of supply factors in Washington's 
allocation of the regiments . ^
Congress created the additional infantry, artillery, and light dra­
goon regiments on 27 December 1776 at Washington's request. Tactical 
operations in late 1776 demonstrated the need for these units as the Main 
Army faced European-style open warfare for the first time. Unlike the 
regiments of the state lines, the new units organized directly under 
Continental authority. Washington carefully allocated them to recruiting 
areas where they complemented the state lines and used officers left out 
of the state lines as cadres. During the spring the line regiments and 
the newer units assembled at various rendezvous. Moulding them into a 
coordinated military machine which Incorporated the lessons of the Trenton 
campaign became the major task of Washington and his generals.
Fielding the New Army.
While Washington formed the new regiments, the Individual state 
governments reorganized their lines. Congress intended to have them con­
form for the first time to a single pattern. It also wanted them to make
39. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7: 123, 214-5, 219-20, 324, 368, 
421; 8: 53-54, 136, 264-5.
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maximum use of veterans. Particular attitudes and problems in some 
states, however, blocked compliance in every detail. In the spring 
the troops reported to various strategic locations to begin the 1777 
campaign. There Washington and the department commanders marshalled 
them into brigades and divisions. During this period Congress and the 
military leaders also modified the Army's staff and support organiza­
tions to meet the needs of the larger force.
The deep south had the easiest time adjusting to the new quotas
because regiments from that area remained at home as the Southern De­
partment's combat force. Georgia did not reduce to the single regiment 
of the 16 September quota, but retained the one ranger and four infantry 
units authorized in 1776. Despite some losses as original enlistments 
expired, aggressive recruiting as far away as Pennsylvania brought all 
five regiments into the field.^ South Carolina kept its six regiments,
converting the two rifle regiments to normal infantry and exchanging
half of the 3d regiment's rifles for muskets. The 4th remained an ar­
tillery regiment, and absorbed the separate artillery companies.^
North Carolina and Virginia transferred their regiments to the Main 
Army, following a trend started in 1776. Since the current enlistments 
of the six North Carolina and nine Virginia regiments lasted until 1778
40. Lilia M. Hawes, ed., "The Papers of Lachlan McIntosh, 1774-1799," 
Georgia Historical Quarterly. 38 (1954), pp. 256-7, 266-7, 357-9, 363-7. 
Margaret Godley, ed., "Minutes of the Executive Council, May 7 Through 
October 14, 1777," Ibid., 34 (1950), pp. 110-3. Ford, Journals of 
Congress, 9: 782-3.
41. Force, American Archives. 5th Ser., 3: 49-54, 66, 68, 72-76. Burnett, 
Letters of Congress. 2: 452. Jack L. Cross, ed., "Letters of Thomas 
Pinckney, 1775-1780," South Carolina Historical Magazine. 58 (1957), pp. 
77-79.
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they only had to recall detachments serving In South Carolina before 
departing. Although North Carolina thought its new quota was unreal- 
istically high, it went ahead and raised three new regiments. The re­
sult was that when the nine arrived in Philadelphia in early July, they
contained only 131 officers and 963 enlisted men instead of the 7,000
42called for on paper. Virginia added six new regiments, two of which 
had veteran cadres. Daniel Morgan built his H t h  Virginia Regiment 
around the survivors of his 1775 rifle company plus the five Vitginia 
companies of the Maryland and Virginia Rifle Regiment. The state fron­
tier companies reenlisted as Continentals as part of the 12th. Virginia 
retained its ten-company regimental formation for all fifteen regiments 
and also recruited men only for a three-year term, not for the duration 
as Congress preferred. The effort to recruit these regiments, two separ­
ate Continental companies for the frontier, and three regiments of state
43
troops exhausted Virginia's manpower resources.
The middle states faced different problems, for existing units were 
on duty outside their home states and under enlistments which expired at 
the start of the year or shortly thereafter. The states turned to legis­
lative liaison committees to prepare new arrangements which retained the 
1776 regiments and added new ones as necessary. The new regiments de­
pended on veterans from the militia or state troops, particularly the
42. Ford, Journals of Congress. 5: 733-4; 6: 1043-4; 7: 21, 52, 90-91, 
133. Force, American Archives. 5th Ser., 1: 1384. Burnett, Letters of 
Congress, 2: 95-97. Returns of Troops at Philadelphia, 7 and 8 Jul 1777; 
Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
43. Henning, Statutes at Large, 9s 179-84, 192-8, 210-1, 213-4. Mcll-t 
waine, Journals of the Council of State, 1: 250, 270-1, 310, 321, 325, 
337-40, 368. "Correspondence of Colonel James Wood," Tyler's Quarterly 
Historical and Genealogical Magazine. 3 (1921), pp. 38-40.
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Flying Camp, for their cadres. This expedient caused some turmoil be­
cause of arguments over rank, but it allowed all of the 1777 regiments 
to start with experienced nuclei.
Delaware's reorganization consisted of filling vacancies in its
44single regiment and reenllsting the men. Maryland's problems were
more complex. The state argued that its quota was unrealistically high
and made an effort to raise just seven regiments. The original 1776
regiment and attached companies regrouped respectively as the 1st and 2d
Maryland Regiments. The four Flying Camp regiments furnished cadres for
the 4th through 7th. The 3d assembled its officers from a variety of 
45sources.
Officers from New Jersey and Pennsylvania readily remained in ser­
vice, but the problems caused by regiments remaining in the Ticonderoga 
winter garrison slowed reorganization for both states. New Jersey re­
filled its three regiments and added a fourth from militia veterans. To 
relieve the Continental officers from combat duties while the reorgani­
zation took place it formed four temporary state battalions during the 
winter.^ The 1st Continental Regiment, six Pennsylvania Battalions, 
and Mackey's frontier regiment became the 1st through 8th Pennsylvania 
Regiments. Three new regiments joined them, with the 9th and 10th drawing
44. Joseph Brown Turner, ed., The Journal and Order Book of Captain Ro­
bert Kirkwood ... (Wilmington: Historical Society of Delaware, 1910),
pp. 4-6. Henry Hobart Bellas, ed., Personal Recollections of Captain 
Enoch Anderson ... (Wilmington: Historical Society of Delaware, 1896),
pp. 7, 26-29. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 6: 485.
45. Ibid.. 7: 397. Archives of Maryland. 18: 76-292. Force, American
Archives. 5th Ser., 3: 120-1, 125, 132, 163-4, 182.
46. Ibid., 5th Ser., 2: 1258-9; 3: 1316, 1449, 1474-5. Fitzpatrick, 
Writings of Washington. 6: 81-82; 7: 27, 200-1. Schuyler to Gates, 13 
Nov 1776; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
177
experienced officers from the two state troops regiments organized in
1776. The U t h  was completely new. Cook's frontier regiment, which was 
just starting to recruit, expanded to eight companies as the l2th.^
The two state regiments consolidated into a single ten-company regiment 
since the men's enlistments did not expire until 1778. On 10 June 1777
Aft
it transferred to the Continental Army as the 13th Pennsylvania Regiment.
New York and New England units had already served for two full cam­
paigns, more than the units from the southern or middle states. Casual­
ties, normal attrition, and lower quotas made their reorganization more 
comprehensive. New York reduced its line from seven to five regiments.
The loss of Manhattan and Long Island led the state to disband the old 
1st New York Regiment, consolidate the two regiments from the Albany 
area, and renumber the line regiments to reflect their commanders' rela­
tive seniority. Nicholson's Regiment disbanded, but Dubois' became the 
nucleus for the new 3d under Peter Gansevoort. Colonel Dubois himself
raised a new 5th New York Regiment when Congress authorized a higher
49quota for the state on 30 November 1776.
47. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 9: 90. Force, American Archives, 
5th Ser., 2: 92, 94; 3: 195-200. Pennsylvania Archives. 1st Ser., 5s 40- 
41, 51, 176-7, 522-3, 545; 7: 583-5; 2d Ser., 1; 41-42, 51-52, 717-8; 10:
7, 106; 4th Ser., 3: 656-7. Charles J. Stille, Major-General Anthony 
Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line in the Continental Army (Philadelphia: J.
B. Lippincott, 1893), pp. 39-40, 43-48, 54. Francis Johnston to Gates,
20 Feb 1777; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
48. Force, American Archives. 5th Ser., 2: 80-81, 92-94. Pennsylvania 
Archives. 1st Ser., 5: 103-4, 107, 112, 318, 357. Ford. Journals of 
Congress. 8: 482-3. Pennsylvania Council of Safety to Gates, 4 Mar 1777; 
Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
49. Ford, Journals of Congress. 6: 994; 8: 710-1. Force, American Ar­
chives, 5th Ser., 3: 206-11, 247-9, 312-20, 366-7. New York State, Calen­
dar of Historical Manuscripts, Relating to the War of the Revolution ...
(2 vols., Albany: Weed, Parsons, and Co., 1863-68), 2: 31-53.
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Connecticut's quota remained eight regiments, but the legislature
sought the best possible officers regardless of the nature of their
prior service and broke up all existing units. The officers retained
then recruited according to a new geographical arrangement. Although
the state offered extra land grants to stimulate enlistments, it could
SO
not obtain substantial numbers of men until April. Rhode Island drop­
ped from four regiments to two by employing the same device used during 
the previous year's reduction. The 9th and 11th Continental Regiments 
became, through reenlistment, the 1st and 2d Rhode Island Regiments with 
the best officers from the disbanded regiments filling vacancies. A 
brigade of state troops competed for recruits, but compensated by helping 
to contain the British forces in Newport.^1 New Hampshire used its three 
Continental Regiments as cadres in the same manner as Rhode Island.^
Massachusetts' quota of fifteen regiments reduced by two the number 
in service during 1776. One legislative committee directed the formation 
of seven regiments from men on duty at New York, trying to preserve unit 
continuity, while a second went to Ticonderoga to arrange five more in
50. Charles J. Hoadley, jet al., comps., The Public Records of the State 
of Connecticut (11 vols., Hartford: Various publishers, 1894-1967), 1:
12-16, 26, 65-70, 165-8. Charles S. Hall, Life and Letters of Samuel 
Holden Parsons ... (Binghamton, N.Y.: Otseningo Publishing Co., 1905),
pp. 92-93. Worthington C. Ford, ed., Correspondence and Journals of Sam­
uel Blachley Webb (3 vols., New York: Privately printed, 1893-94), 1:
189-2H. Force, American Archives. 5th Ser., 2: 957-61; 3: 799, 899, 1433.
51. Richard K. Showman, _et al., eds., The Papers of General Nathanael 
Greene (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976- ), 1;
307-8, 317, 360-4. John Russell Bartlett, ed.. Records of the Colony of 
Rhode Island ... (9 vols., Providence: Various Publishers, 1854-65), 8:
10-ll, 20, 30-33, 103-4, 126-7, 140-1, 172-3, 192-3. Rhode Island His­
torical Society Collections. 6: 175, 183-5. Fitzpatrick, Writings of 
Washington. 6: 200-2, 274; 7: 42-44, 349-51.
52. Hammond, Sullivan Papers. 1: 317-22. Force, American Archives. 5th 
Ser., 2: 1175-7; 3: 624-5, 646-7, 796-8, 1125.
the same manner. Three others were organized within the state. Generals
Heath, Ward, and Gates provided advice to the committees. When recruiting
tapered off the legislature firBt proposed offering additional pay, but
the idea was rejected by Congress. The legislature then turned to a
limited draft in April. The state's efforts raised 7,816 men, mostly
for the line regiments, by early July. The average number of recruits
for each regiment was 470, with four surpassing the 600-man level and
53
only four falling below 400.
The reorganized regiments assembled in three primary locations in 
the spring of 1777. Ticonderoga and Peekskill (in the Hudson Highlands) 
had obvious strategic importance. Troops at those points protected im­
portant fortifications and denied the Hudson River to the British. Mor­
ristown, Washington's headquarters, served as the other rendezvous be­
cause it protected Philadelphia from an overland advance from New York 
City. Once the regiments reached these objectives Washington and the 
commanders of the Northern and Highlands Departments assembled them into 
brigades and divisions, the primary formations used in 1777 to maneuver 
the Continental Army.
Washington in January planned for a brigade to have three full in­
fantry regiments (over 2,200 men) and a company of artillery, and for a 
division to have three brigades. When he asked Congress to appoint ad­
ditional general officers to command these formations, he also requested 
three lieutenant generals to act as senior commanders. Many delegates
53. Ibid., 5th Ser., 3: 399-400, 414-5, 494-6, 507-8, 711-3, 1030, 1083- 
4, 1170. C. Harvey Gardiner, ed., A Study in Dissent: The Warren-Gerry
Correspondence 1776-1792 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,
1968), pp. 59-60. Joseph Avery's Return of Men Enlisted by Massachusetts,
10 Jul 1777; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
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considered the new rank a threat to republican virtue, and Congress re­
jected the Idea. It did appoint 6 new major and 14 brigadier generals,
but only alter considerable political maneuvering on the part of dele-
54gates advancing the careers of Individuals.
The Main Army drew most of its resources from the middle states, 
plus the regiments transferred from the Southern Department. Although 
many of the regiments reported to headquarters in company-sized detach­
ments over a period of months and others still had not appeared, enough 
men were on hand by mid-May to allow the Commander-in-Chief to proceed 
with revised plans. Thirty-eight infantry regiments from Virginia, 
Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey plus various detachments 
accounted by that time for 673 officers, 708 sergeants, 241 drummers and 
fifers, and 8,378 rank and file. Only about a third of the regiments 
were over half strength. Washington adjusted to this problem, as well 
as a shortage of generals, by establishing ten permanent brigades between 
11 and 22 May. Each contained 4 or 5 regiments, from the same state 
where possible, and an artillery company. The arrangement established 
four Virginia, three Pennsylvania, one New Jersey, and two Maryland 
Brigades. Two brigades formed a division.^ The brigade staff consisted 
of an aide, a brigade major, a brigade quartermaster, and a chaplain (who 
replaced the regimental chaplains). The division staff included the
54. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 7: 49-51. Ford, Journals of 
Congress, 7: 90, 133, 141-2, 203, 213, 256, 323; 8: 624; 9: 823. Burnett, 
Letters of Congress. 2: 261-3, 269-75, 287-8, 291-2, 299-301, 311-2.
55. Weekly Return, Main Army, 21 May 1777; Record Group 93, National 
Archives. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 7: 236, 278-9, 396-7, 
447-8, 451-2; 8: 40-41, 49-50, 88-89, 97-101, 170-2; 9: 103-4, 149.
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major general's aides, a quartermaster officer, and a conductor of mili­
tary stores who repaired small arms and prepared ammunition.^
Although reflecting an acute shortage of troops, this formation 
allowed Washington great flexibility. During the summer divisions shif­
ted along the main roads between Morristown and Philadelphia as the 
British appeared to threaten either the Hudson Highlands or the Delaware 
Bay. In a detached role Washington expected a division to harass the 
enemy advance and buy time for the rest of the army to concentrate.*^
In battle he deployed the Main Army in a double line. The First Line 
consisted of two or more divisions abreast. The Second Line deployed 
to the rear and provided depth to absorb shock. The Left Wing and the 
Right Wing each contained portions of both lines and were used to allow 
an intermediate level of command between Washington and the divisions.
By December 1777 the Order of Battle approached European complexity. Ten 
brigades deployed in the First Line and six in the Second. One additional 
brigade was held in general reserve. Each wing also used two light dra­
goon regiments and supporting separate infantry formations, both militia
58
and Continentals, for flank security or skirmishing.
Improved arms and training reinforced the advantages inherent in the 
new tactical organization. The 1763 model French Army musket, known col­
loquially as the "Charleville," became the Continental Army's standard
56. Ibid.. 8: 203-4, 337. Ford, Journals of Congress, 8: 390, 609. Ham­
mond, Sullivan Papers, 1: 352.
57. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 8: 62-64. Note the similarity 
between Washington's use of the division as a force capable of limited in­
dependent action and Napoleon's use of the corps as described in Stephen 
T. Ross, "The Development of the Combat Division in Eighteenth-Century 
French Armies," French Historical Studies, 4 (1965), pp. 84-94.
58. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 8: 296-7; 10: 94-95, 138-9.
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Infantry weapon. This .69 caliber smoothbore, firing a 1-ounce ball,
had greater range and was more durable, reliable, and accurate than the
English "Brown Bess." It was an ideal weapon for the Continentals since
their infantry organization placed a premium on musketry rather than 
59shock action. Training stressed battlefield maneuvers rather than the
manual of arms. New standing regulations introduced during the summer
improved marching, the baggage train, and guard duty, all vital to ma- 
60neuverabllity.
Under Washington's guidance the Highlands and Northern Departments 
instituted divisions and brigades to take advantage of the Improved 
musket and training. These organizations also facilitated the movement 
of reserves from one area to another. At first Washington intended to 
send the Massachusetts and New Hampshire regiments to the Northern De­
partment and use New York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island units to garri­
son the Highlands. Since New England was in no immediate danger, the 
Eastern Department needed only three Massachusetts additional regiments 
to stiffen available militia and state troops. But recruiting and vari­
ous emergency problems gradually altered that neat plan.***
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By mid-May, with units still arriving, the Highlands Department had
3 New York, 8 Connecticut, and 6 Massachusetts infantry regiments plus
Webb's Additional Regiment and the leading detachments of Rhode Islanders.
The Continentals included 156 officers, 197 sergeants, 94 drummers and
fifers, and 2,502 rank and file. Strength continued to mount, allowing
Israel Putnam to institute brigades shortly after he assumed command of
the department in early June. By 5 August, despite numerous transfers
of units to the Main Army and Northern Department, he had two divisions,
each with two brigades. Schuyler's Northern Department finally wound up
with four brigades from Massachusetts and one from New Hampshire. It did
not need a divisional organization as long as the troops were tied to the
6  7defense of Ticonderoga.
The new tactical organization of the field armies required more ad­
ministrative and support organization to gain full value. It made the 
Adjutant General more important as the chief administrative officer, but 
Joseph Reed resigned the post at the start of the year. Washington 
limped along with temporary appointments until he persuaded Colonel Timo­
thy Pickering of the Massachusetts militia to accept the assignment. His 
hard work restored order to the strength reporting system by the fall.
An expansion of the mustering department made Pickering's job easier.
It provided a deputy mustermaster for each territorial department and
62. Weekly Returns, Highlands Department, 17 and 24 May 1777; Alexander 
McDougall Papers, New-York Historical Society. Worthington C. Ford, ed., 
General Orders Issued by Major-General Israel Putnam. When In Command of 
the Highlands ... (Brooklyn: Historical Printing Club, 1893), pp. 1, H -
12, 23-25, 46-47. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 7: 354-5, 485-6; 
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63
enough subordinate officials to muster every unit once a month. The 
cross-checks established by this system and the program of preparing 
weekly and monthly returns separately eventually gave Washington and 
Congress reliable and timely data for strategic planning.
Washington also had to reorganize his personal staff to handle the 
increased correspondence and messenger requirements. He conducted a 
search for influential young men with secretarial skills and a willing­
ness to work to replace the aides who took positions in the additional 
regiments and dragoons. The search was successful, adding such talented
individuals as Alexander Hamilton, Richard Kidder Meade, and John Laurens
64to the household during 1777. Washington also used the new office of 
Commissary General of Prisoners, created on 27 December 1776, to relieve 
part of the headquarters burden. Its nominal function related to the care 
of enemy prisoners and of Americans held captive by the British. Under 
Elias Boudinot it coordinated intelligence activities as well.**^
Logistical and medical staff departments all reorganized during 1777 
for greater efficiency and better support of the field armies. The Com­
missary Department split into specialized purchasing and issuing depart­
ments. The Quartermaster Department regrouped its personnel into sections 
to handle transportation, quarters, forage, and baking. A new section, 
the Clothier General's Department and associated Commissary of Hides,
63. Ford, Journals of Congress. 7: 204, 221-2, 253, 322. Hammond, Sul­
livan Papers, 1: 418, 433. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7: 5, 
67-68, 218, 336-7, 381-2, 447-8; 8: 114-6, 264.
64. Ibid., 6: 487; 7: 41, 161, 2l8, 280. Douglas S. Freeman, George 
Washington: A Biography (7 vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1947-57), 4: 391-2.
65. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7: 383, 417-8. Ford, Journals 
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handled the responsibilities arising from Congress' decision to directly 
clothe the troops. The hides department converted raw hides left over 
from the cattle consumed by the Army into needed leather products.****
Resumption of British offensive operations in the summer tested 
the new arrangement of departments, divisions, and brigades, and the 
enlarged staff. As expected, the first blow fell on the Northern De­
partment. General John Burgoyne's British and German regulars quickly 
reduced Ticonderoga, although General Arthur St. Clair was able to evacu­
ate the garrison. Schuyler's systematic destruction of the roads leading 
south from the lakes broke down Burgoyne's already insufficient transport 
organization and bought the Northern Department time to regroup and draw 
reinforcements from the south. Schuyler set plans in motion which led 
to later defeats of British detachments in the Mohawk Valley and at 
Bennington.
The fall of Ticonderoga had a more important political impact than 
a military one. The more radical delegates in Congress distrusted Schuy­
ler and had made one effort to unseat him in 1776, and a second in May
1777. Both failed because Schuyler's military reputation was strong 
enough to win support from most of the more conservative southern and 
central states' delegates. But when Ticonderoga was lost, Schuyler's 
reputation went with it. Congress recalled him on 3l July, and appointed 
Gates as his replacement four days later. Although there were personal 
and sectional factors at play in this Incident, there was a compelling 
undercurrent of ideology at work, too. The Army's requests had been met
66. Ibid.. 5: 839-40; 6: 880-1, 1051-2; 7: 231-7, 244-5, 323, 355-9; 8: 
434-43, 452, 469-70, 610. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7: 247-9, 
420-2; 8: 16, 25; 10: 45-46, 80-81, 183-8, 243-6.
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during the winter by Congress without significant opposition. The dele­
gates who had formerly favored a military reliance on militia or short­
term troops conceded to advocates of a standing army only because re­
sults were promised. When disaster struck they counterattacked. Gates' 
supporters were finally able to topple Schuyler by arguing that the only 
significant reinforcements the Northern Department could receive would 
be New England militiamen, who would serve under Gates but not under
e v , 67Schuyler.
In fact, however, several brigades of Continentals moved north from 
the Highlands Department and one vital unit hurried up from the Main 
Army. This unit was a provisional rifle corps which Washington organized 
under Colonel Morgan on 13 June. The men, primarily Virginians and Penn­
sylvanians, were selected for their marksmanship and their skirmishing 
skills. Like Knowlton's 1776 rangers, the corps acted with the Main Army 
as a picked body of light infantry. In the north Morgan worked with a 
provisional light infantry detachment under Major Henry Dearborn which 
Schuyler had organized before his relief. Together they quickly intimi­
dated Burgoyne's Indians and left the British without reconnaissance 
forces.**®
Gates went on to inflict two defeats on Burgoyne, cut him off from 
Ticonderoga, and force him to surrender on 17 October. Saratoga was
67. Ibid., 9: 8-9. Ford, Journals of Congress, 7: 202-3, 362-4; 8: 375, 
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78. Lloyd A. Brown and Howard H. Peckham, eds., Revolutionary War Jour­
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unquestionably a smashing victory, bagging nearly 6,000 enemy soldiers 
and massive quantities of stores and arms. Militia had turned out to 
serve under Gates, swelling the Northern Department forces to 1,698 of­
ficers and 20,652 men by the time of the surrender, not including various 
artificers, batteauxmen, and the 700-odd riflemen. That total is mis­
leading since most of the actual combat was carried out by the much smal­
ler contingent of Continentals. Less than a third of the department's 
forces were regulars: 15 Massachusetts, 1 Canadian, 3 New Hampshire, and
2 New York regiments plus detachments of cavalry, artillery, and rifle­
men. Only five of the thirteen brigades were Continental, and three of 
them had militia regiments attached. The total Continental infantry con­
tingent amounted to 52 field, 457 company, and 72 staff officers, 526 
sergeants, 262 drummers and fifers, and 7,644 rank and file. Only some 
5,000 were combat effectives.®^
Part of Gates' strength had come from the Hudson Highlands, which 
also sent three brigades to the Main Army. By October Putnam had only 
General Parsons' 1st Connecticut Brigade as a field force and the 5th New 
York Regiment and part of Lamb's artillery as fort garrisons. General 
Sir Henry Clinton took advantage of this weakness and captured the main 
forts on 6 October, after a hard fight. The defeat did not have a
69. Various returns located in the Gates Papers, New-York Historical 
Society, must be consulted to determine the exact breakdown of his 
strength by component. These include: General Return, Northern Depart­
ment, 16 Oct 1777; State of the Army at Saratoga, 17 Oct 1777; Return 
of Continental Troops at Van Schaick's Island, 7_Sep l777;_and Brigade 
Returns for Paterson's, Nixon's, and Shepard's J  Glover's_/ Brigades, 
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returns is Deputy Mustermaster General Richard Varlck's 10 Sep 1777 
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permanent effect on the Continental Army because Clinton returned to 
New York City when he learned of Burgoyne's surrender.^
Washington's Main Army also suffered defeat during the 1777 cam­
paign. Howe decided to attack Philadelphia from the rear and landed 
after a long sea voyage at Head of Elk, Maryland. A provisional light 
infantry force organized by Washington to replace the rifle corps haras­
sed Howe's advance, but could not stop it.^ Washington stood and fought 
at Brandywine on 11 September but was outflanked by Howe. Washington 
prevented a catastrophe by shifting units from his unengaged flank and 
withdrew under the cover of an aggressive rear-guard action. Execution 
of this difficult maneuver impressed the professional German officers 
serving with Howe, but it did not prevent the loss of Philadelphia on 
26 September.^
On the night of 3-4 October the Continentals counterattacked. Be­
cause Howe had gradually fragmented his army in an effort to hold open 
communications to the fleet in the lower Delaware River, Washington 
devised an intricate plan similar to the one he used at Trenton to strike 
an encampment at Germantown. Excellent march discipline and intelligence 
allowed the leading brigades to overrun the 2d Battalion of Light Infan­
try and drive back other units. One astonished German officer saw
70. Wright, "Too Little, Too Late," pp. 73-88. Transcript of the Court 
of Inquiry into Putnam's Conduct, 5 Apr 1778; McDougall Papers, New-York 
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"something I had never seen before, namely the English in full flight." 
When confusion and the staunch British defense of the stone Chew House 
robbed the attack of some of its momentum, Washington withdrew. Howe 
spent the next month and a half clearing the defenders out of the forti­
fications along the Delaware below Philadelphia.
By early November the Main Army contained a dozen Continental bri­
gades plus a smattering of militia. Its combined Infantry strength came 
to 1,167 officers and 15,927 men, about half of the Continental Army's 
total force. Officers included 82 of field grade, 865 of company grade, 
and 220 on regimental staffs. Sergeants accounted for 1,009 of the 
enlisted men and fifers and drummers another 523, leaving 14,395 rank 
and file. About 4,500 were sick and another 2,100 on command, mostly in
the river forts or related duties. Washington's actual combat strength
74was probably about 10,000 men, too few to continue an active campaign. 
After calling for reinforcements from Gates, he went into winter quarters 
at Valley Forge on 20 December.
Summary.
The Continentals camped at Valley Forge in December 1777 superfi­
cially resembled the men who retreated through New Jersey a year earlier. 
Both armies looked back on months of defeats and hardships. The differ­
ences held greater significance. As permanent bodies, the regiments of
73. Kipping and Smith, At Howe's Side, pp. 38-39. Also see Uhlendorf, 
Revolution in America, pp. 5-27 and Justin Winsor, ed., "Col. John Eager 
Howard's Account of the Battle of Germantown," Maryland Historical Maga­
zine. 4 (1909), pp. 314-20.
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1777 did not have to undergo another dangerous reorganization. Accumu­
lated experience enabled the Army to incorporate lessons from the Trenton 
campaign, and Washington could anticipate further improvement following 
l777's actions.
The army of 1777 began to move away from a traditional colonial 
force and resemble the balanced combined arms organization of many Euro­
pean armies, although it still lacked sophistication. It clearly was 
more mobile in 1777 than in 1776. The permanent brigades represented 
the single most important innovation, enabling Washington partially to 
offset British control of the sea by shifting reserves from one depart­
ment to another. Lack of resources or errors in generalship caused most 
of the defeats in 1777, not a lack of fighting ability on the part of in­
dividual regiments. Basic organization appeared to be sound, although 
training and doctrine continued to lag.
Washington anticipated a rosier future on Christmas Day 1777 than 
he had a year earlier. He knew that his army could fight, and even beat, 
the British under favorable conditions. One of his remaining problems 
was to insure that it won consistently. The other was more complicated. 
Congress voted a large standing army with some 119 regiments. It should 
have contained over 90,000 men, but fell far short. Yet Congress expec­
ted him to produce results with that force. Beginning in 1778 Washing­
ton's problems related to preserving and filling the army rather than 
expanding it. The arena for that struggle was in Congress.
CHAPTER VI
PROFESSIONALISM: NEW INFLUENCES FROM EUROPE
The winter encampment at Valley Forge played an extremely important 
role in the history o£ the Continental Army. Congress and the Army's 
leaders used their first winter without problems of rebuilding to review 
the campaign of 1777. Two very different points of view emerged. One 
group believed that the Army should improve its battlefield performance 
by returning to the earlier model drawn from two centuries of Anglo-Ameri­
can experience. The other sought inspiration from European, particularly 
French, professional soldiers and military writers. The struggle between 
the groups for political domination reached a brief but intense peak 
during the first months of 1778. Neither side won clear predominance, 
but over the next year and a half Washington secured adoption of many 
reforms based on new European ideas. This period witnessed the gradual 
transformation of the Continental Army into a professional eighteenth- 
century fighting force.
Valley Forge.
Congress approved an army to serve for the duration of the war in 
September 1776. It accepted a major departure from American tradition 
without serious opposition because military commanders insisted that 
victory could be won only if they had such a force. Three months later 
the delegates increased the size of the Army for the same reason. They
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expected the permanent army to produce results. During 1777 the Main 
Army lost most of its battles, but Gates won a smashing victory with the 
assistance of large militia forces. Policy debates during the winter 
involved two basic interpretations of the lessons of the 1777 campaign.
One group of delegates, supported by some army leaders, remained 
committed to the militant republican attitudes of 1775. They remained 
suspicious of a standing army and believed that victory could only come 
from a total commitment on the part of the population. Saratoga appeared 
to be a proof of their assumption. During the 1777-1778 winter they 
argued for a program which marked a return to the concepts of the 1776 
campaign: a small Continental Army resembling the colonial Provincials,
supplemented for major battles by a large militia force. Washington, 
most of the senior officers, and another group of delegates followed a 
more cautious and pragmatic course. They believed that the transformation 
begun during 1777 was correct, that the Continentals had fought well at 
Brandywine, Germantown, and Saratoga. Their program called for further 
improvements. Neither faction won a complete endorsement for its posi­
tion.^ The central issues of the winter debate related to the overall 
direction of military affairs, professionalization of the officer corps, 
and the size of the Army.
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The policy debate began with the Board of War. The original Board, 
a standing committee of Congress, simply could not cope with the volume 
of business and as early as April 1777 recommended redefinition of the 
Board as a permanent administrative body. The delegates approved a 
version of that concept on 17 October 1777 which called for three perma­
nent members and a clerical staff. In addition to the administrative 
functions of the Congressional committee the Board became responsible 
for supervising recruiting, prisoners, and weapons production. It also 
became the sole official channel for Congress' dealings with the Army and 
the states on military matters. On 7 November Congress named Quartermas­
ter General Thomas Mifflin, Adjutant General Timothy Pickering, and 
Robert H. Harrison, Washington's Military Secretary, as the members. 
Harrison promptly declined.2
Mifflin reported first and immediately took an active role. His 
early influence derived in part from the fact that one of the Board's 
first tasks involved reorganizing the Quartermaster Department. He per­
suaded Congress to expand the Board to five members on 24 November and 
recommended Horatio Gates and Richard Peters (the secretary of the old 
Board) for the new vacancies. Congress appointed both and replaced Har­
rison with former Commissary General Joseph Trumbull. At Mifflin's sug­
gestion it also named Gates as President of the Board and allowed him to 
retain his rank and right to field command. In a sense the appointments
2. Worthington C. Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress 1774- 
1789 (34 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904-37), 7:
241-2; 8: 474n, 563; 9: 809-11, 818-20, 874, 936, 971. Edmund Cody Bur­
nett, ed., Letters of Members of the Continental Congress (8 vols., 
Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1921-36), 2: 52.
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reflected a desire to select individuals with expertise in specific staff 
areas. On the other hand, all five members came out of the militant po­
litical tradition of the early 1770's.^
Gates took up his new duties in January 1778. He arrived in York, 
Pennsylvania, with glowing praise for his Saratoga triumph still flowing 
from various delegates and army officers. He also knew that Congress 
had initiated investigations into the losses of the forts in the High­
lands and along the Delaware River and had openly criticized Washington 
for not confiscating supplies from Pennsylvania civilians to keep them 
out of enemy hands.^ Pushed by Mifflin, some of the delegates, and a 
handful of other disgruntled officers, Gates attempted to convert the 
Board of War into an agency to control military operations.
Colonel Moses Hazen suggested to Gates in October 1777 a method for 
capitalizing on the Saratoga victory. A small force could attack Mon­
treal in the winter when ice neutralized British warships on Lake Cham­
plain and complete the conquest of Canada in the spring with reinforce­
ments. Brigadier General John Stark independently convinced Congress to 
approve a small raid by militia volunteers on the St. John's naval base. 
Gates, working through the Board, convinced Congress in January to ex­
pand the raid into an "irruption" into Canada along Hazen's lines. The 
Board assumed complete control over the operation. At Gates' suggestion
3. Ibid., 2: 574-6. Ford, Journals of Congress, 9: 941, 959-63, 971-2. 
Pennsylvania Archives, 1st Ser., 6: 35.
4. James Lovell to Gates, 5 Oct and 27 Nov; Joseph Reed to Gates, 30 Oct;
James Wilkinson to Gates, 4 Nov; Gliphalet Dyer to Gates, 5 Nov; Thomas
Conway to Gates, H  Nov; Thomas Mifflin to Gates, 17 and 27 Nov 1777;
Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society. Ford, Journals of Congress,
9: 972, 975-6, 1013-5.
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Congress named Major General the Marquis de Lafayette as the expedition's 
commander, assisted by Major General Thomas Conway, Stark, and Hazen.'* 
Conway, an Irish veteran of the French Army, became openly critical 
of Washington during the late fall. On 13 December 1777 Congress pro­
moted him, over a number of senior brigadier generals, to the rank of 
major general and named him inspector general. Conway planned to make 
that new office a field agent of the Board, but Washington effectively 
froze him out of any role within the Main Army.^ Gates then selected 
him for the Canadian expedition, assuming that he would be the real com­
mander. Lafayette was expected to be a figurehead. Lafayette had a 
limited military background but was definitely not a political novice.
He refused to participate in an activity which undermined Washington's 
authority as Commander-in-chief. He objected to Conway and insisted 
that orders for the expedition pass through Washington rather than 
through the Board. He even threatened to return to the French court if 
these demands were not met. This strong support for Washington brought 
the project to an end and Congress cancelled the invasion on 2 March.^
5. Ibid., 9: 999-1001; 10: 84-85, 87. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 3: 
124-30. Hazen to Gates, 26 Oct; James Duane to Gates, 16 Dec; Gates to 
Col. John Greaton, 28 Dec 1777; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society. 
Stanley J. Idzerda, et al., eds., Lafayette in the Age of the American 
Revolution ... (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977- ), 1: xxiv-
xxvi, 169-72, 204-7, 2l3-8, 245-385.
6. John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington from the 
Original Manuscript Sources 1745-1799 (39 vols., Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1931-44), 9: 387-90; 10: 39, 226-8, 236-7. Conway to 
Gates, 11 Nov 1777 and 4 Jan 1778; Gates Papers, New-York Historical 
Society. Ford, Journals of Congress, 9: 1026.
7. Ibid., 10: 107, 216-7, 253-4. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 3: 63-65. 
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, H :  113-4. Greene to McDougall, 5 
Feb 1778; Alexander McDougall Papers, New-York Historical Society.
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The demise of the "Irruption" and Congressional airing of Conway's 
criticism of Washington ended the challenge to Washington's leadership 
of the Army. Conway was ostracised, and when he submitted his resigna­
tion in a ploy to regain stature Congress quickly accepted it. Gates, 
realizing that a majority in Congress would not reduce the Commander-in- 
Chief's role, abandoned the Presidency of the Board to return to a field 
command in the north. Mifflin, in turn, was pressured into resigning on 
17 August 1778, and the Board of War reverted to a purely administrative 
role. These decisions solidified Washington's authority as the single
O
voice of the Army on matters of military policy. Apart from political 
considerations, if Gates' Board had developed in the manner he and Mifflin 
intended, it would have served as a vehicle for returning the Continental 
Army to the relatively small cadre of 1776 and would have effectively in­
creased the role of the militia in combat situations. Washington, on the 
other hand, continued to work for a Continental Army which carried out 
the basic combat function of the Revolution with limited outside help, a 
policy implicit in the resolve of 16 September 1776.
Washington'8 first effort to advance his ideas centered on profes­
sionalizing the officer corps. In the British Army, and most of its 
European counterparts, an officer who wished to leave the army could sell
8. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 10: 236-7, 410-1; 11: 493-4; 14: 
383-6. Ford, Journals of Congress, 10: 399; 11: 520, 802. Burnett, Let­
ters of Congress. 3: 20-25, 28-31, 39-40, 42, 48, 141-2, 209-11, 487-9. 
Mifflin to Gates, 28 Nov 1777; Gates to Washington, 8 Dec 1777 and 23 Jan 
and 17 Feb 1778; Pickering to Gates, 26 Aug 1778; Gate6 to Congress, 11 
Dec 1777; Walter Stewart to Gates, 12 Feb 1778; Gates Papers, New-York 
Historical Society. Greene to McDougall, 25 Jan and 16 Apr 1778; Varnum 
to McDougall, 7 Feb 1778; McDougall to Greene, 14 Feb 1778; McDougall 
Papers, New-York Historical Society. S. Weir Mitchell, "Historical Notes 
of Dr. Benjamin Rush, 1777," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biogra­
phy, 27 (1903), p. 147. John Laurens, The Army Correspondence of Colonel 
John Laurens ... (New York: Bradford Club, 1867), pp. 80-88, 98-101.
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his commission (under government supervision) and use the proceeds as 
retirement income. Officers involuntarily separated in peacetime re­
ductions remained in a form of reserve status and drew half of their 
normal pay. Washington and his senior advisors believed that the Con­
tinental Army needed a similar program to attract able officers and ade­
quately compensate them for inflation and economic loss. During the 
1777-1778 winter financial problems forced many officers to leave the 
service. Unfortunately, politicians with ideological objections to 
standing armies distrusted any measures such as half-pay which would
create, as James Lovell put it, "a set of haughty idle imperious Scan-
q
dalizers of industrious Citizens and Farmers."
On 10 January 1778 Congress decided to send a "Committee of Con­
ference" to Valley Forge to discuss this issue and other matters rela­
ting to efficiency and economy in the Army. The committee's proponents 
wanted it to consist of members of the Board of War as well as delegates. 
But when the tide of Congressional opinion turned against the Board, 
participation in the committee was limited to delegates, led by Francis 
Dana and Gouveneur Morris. Although the members nominally represented 
a cross-section of opinion, they were in reality pragmatists open to 
Washington's ideas.^ During the extensive discussions with Washington
9. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 3: 31-33. Also see: Ibid., 2: 585-6;
3: 34, 153-6; Greene to McDougall, 25 Jan 1778; McDougall Papers, New- 
York Historical Society; Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 102-4, 120-4; 
and White, "Standing Armies," pp. 277-8.
10. Ford, Journals of Congress, 10: 39-41, 67. Henderson, Party Poli­
tics, pp. 120-1. Dana and Nathaniel Folsom were New Englanders but not 
from the militant core of that region's delegations; Joseph Reed was a 
pragmatist whose military service with Washington had weakened his ties 
to the militants; and Morris and Charles Carroll were established sup­
porters of Washington. The Board representatives were to have been Gates, 
Mifflin, and Pickering.
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and his advisors from 28 January to 12 March, the committee gradually 
turned to formulating policy by preparing recommendations for numerous 
reforms. It filled the role Mifflin and Gates Intended for the Board of 
War, but with one major difference: it echoed Washington's positions. 
Congress rejected some of its suggestions, including the peacetime sale 
of commissions and half-pay. Intense lobbying by Washington and the 
committee did secure a compromise on the latter point. On 15 May 1778 
Congress promised that officers serving to the end of the war would re­
ceive seven years of half pay to ease the transition to civilian life 
while enlisted men would receive a lump sum of eighty dollars.
The committee's second major objective was to reconcile the exten­
sive army approved in the 1776 resolves with the reality of the 1777 cam­
paign. Most regiments started 1777 below full strength. Subsequent 
rank and file losses forced Washington to issue muskets to sergeants and 
junior officers to compensate. In spite of shortcomings in the number 
of enlisted men, most regiments contained nearly full complements of of­
ficers, and Washington hoped to procure enough replacements to fill every 
unit. Since Congress lacked the legal power to enact a draft, which was 
the only practical way to obtain as many men as Washington needed, the
committee received instructions to look for ways to consolidate units,
12
trim surplus officers, and reduce quotas to realistic levels.
11. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 3: 61-115, 123-4, 131, 160-3, 212-3, 
219-21, 244-5, 255-6. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, H :  285-6, 
290-2, 415. Max M. Mintz, Gouveneur Morris and the American Revolution 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), pp. 9I-I0I. Ford, Jour­
nals of Congress, 10: 285-6, 300-1; 11; 502-3.
12. Ibid., 8: 593-5, 670; 9: 930; 10: 39-40. Fitzpatrick, Writings of 
Washington, 8: 440; 9: 365-7, 406-7; 10: 125-6, 153, 195, 197-8, 205, 
221-5; 11: 236-40. "Plan for a Re-Organization of the Continental Army," 
Historical Magazine, 2d Ser., 3 (1868), pp. 270-3.
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By the start of February 1778 the committee found that the Main 
Army contained the majority of the Continentals. Georgia and South 
Carolina units and Harrison's Artillery Regiment served in the south, 
and the equivalent of three brigades remained in the Highlands and 
Northern Departments. All of the other regiments, a force which should 
have exceeded 60,000 men, were either at Valley Forge or its outposts.
The infantrymen in the fifteen brigades at Valley Forge accounted for 
990 officers, 931 sergeants, 642 drummers and fifers, and 17,491 rank 
and file. Only 7,600 rank and file remained completely fit for duty, 
and a third of them were on detachments. Almost 5,000 were sick, 1,100 
on furlough, and 3,700 who were healthy lacked either shoes or clothes 
and could not be used in combat. The portions of three artillery regi­
ments at Valley Forge contained 117 officers and 810 men; the four regi-
13ments of light dragoons at Trenton another 70 officers and 438 men.
The committee faced a situation in which the Main Army had only about 
a third of its authorized strength.
The press of other business prevented Congress from implementing 
substantive reforms before the start of the 1778 campaign. On 26 Febru­
ary, on the advice of the committee, it did recommend that the states in­
stitute a comprehensive recruiting organization and a system of nine-month 
drafts to fill quotas. It also reduced Rhode Island's quota for the cam­
paign to a single full regiment and Pennsylvania's to ten regiments.^
More lasting legislation came in May and involved basic revisions of the 
organization for the various types of regiments. The economy-directed
13. General Return, Main Army, 9 Feb 1778; Record Group 93, National Ar­
chives. It does not include two brigades wintering at Wilmington.
14. Ford, Journals of Congress. 10: 199-203.
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resolve of 27 May 1778 reduced the maximum size of most regiments to 
levels easier to fill and particularly cut the number of officers in 
each. Washington, satisfied with the old structure, had hoped to avoid 
these changes. On the other hand, the resolve created two new types of 
units specifically requested by the Commander-in-chief
The basic change came in the infantry regiment. After first rejec­
ting a radically different organizational model suggested by Major Gener­
al Charles Lee,1** Congress adopted a structure which moved back towards 
the British regiment. Each regiment gained a ninth company as a perma­
nent light infantry company, but reduced the total number of officers 
from 40 to 29 and enlisted strength from 692 to 553.^ Through attri­
tion each regiment would eliminate its colonel leaving only two field 
officers. This structure also simplified prisoner of war exchanges since 
a British colonel was not a combat officer. The other major reduction 
came in the staff where the adjutant, quartermaster, and paymaster 
ceased to be separate positions. Subalterns from line companies assumed 
the duties of the former two offices as additional tasks, while one of 
the captains, elected by the unit officers, doubled as paymaster. All 
three received extra compensation.
Within each company one lieutenant was eliminated, and several cap­
tains in the regiment lost their positions as the field officers, like
15. Ibid., 11: 538-43, 570, 633-4; 12: 1154-60. Burnett, Letters of 
Congress. 3: 263-6, 407, 431-2. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 11: 
475-6; 12: 30-35, 60-62, 274-5. Idzerda, Lafayette, 1; 284-5.
16. Charles Lee, "The Lee Papers," New-York Historical Society Collec­
tions for 1871-74, 2: 382-9. Ford, Journals of Congress, 11: 514-5.
Lee's plan was derived from the "legion" of Marshal Maurice de Saxe; an 
earlier version is in Worthington C. Ford, ed., Correspondence and Jour­
nals of Samuel Blachley Webb (3 vols., New York: Privately printed, 1893-
94), 1: 84-87.
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their British counterparts, assumed command of companies. If the regi­
ment still had a colonel, the senior lieutenant, as captain-lieutenant, 
exercised practical control over his company. Each company also lost a 
sergeant and a corporal from the organization approved in 1776, paral­
leling the reduction in officers. The number of privates was cut by a 
third, from 76 to 53. Rank and file strength, the true power of the 
company, fell from 80 to 56. A regiment now deployed for combat, if it 
retained its light company, with a bayonet strength of 504 out of a total 
of 582. If, as was normally the case, the light company was detached, 
the strength dropped to 448, roughly on a par with a British regiment.
Congress created a regiment which cost $270 per month less than 
the 1776 regiment in salaries alone, but which was only 70 percent as 
strong. Its combat efficiency was even lower since two or three companies 
had only two officers and the reduced staff no longer furnished a pool of 
spare officers to replace casualties in combat. Except for the creation 
of the permanent light infantry company the new regiment was inferior to 
the old one on paper as a battlefield force. Congress viewed the changes 
as important from a financial point of view, and also as an acceptable 
compromise with the reality of the recruiting levels experienced during
1777. Washington knew the theoretical advantages, particularly in the 
area of tactical control, of the old structure, but he also recognized 
the importance of reaching an agreement with Congress on the nature of 
the army which the nation would support. He accepted Congress' decisions 
on regimental structure although he remained opposed to that body's in- 
sistance on using line officers for staff duties outside the regiment, 
another new departure in the May resolve.
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The artillery regiment underwent less change. It gained a third 
second lieutenant for each company, but lost the spare staff officers 
in a change which paralleled the transformation of the Infantry regi­
ment's staff. Similar staff reductions took place in the light dragoon
1-8regiment. Unlike the infantry, however, the cavalry structure was 
expanded. Each troop added a second lieutenant, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, 
and 22 privates. The fouT regimental supernumaries and the troop ar­
morer were eliminated. A new troop called for 4 officers and 64 enlisted 
men, nearly double the 1777 size. The new regiment required 29 officers 
and 386 men. This increase brought the ratio iof officers to enlisted 
men in the mounted arm into a more economical arrangement in Congress' 
eyes.
Although implementation of the new organization was a gradual pro­
cess, the 27 May 1778 resolve completed Congress' direct role at Valley 
Forge. The delegates began the winter with the contrast between Saratoga 
and Washington's loss of Philadelphia fresh in their minds. One group 
believed that Gates' success was due to a combination of Continentals 
and militia. Their program, which initially won majority support, amoun­
ted to a return to the policies of 1776. They expanded the role of the 
Board of War and filled it with military men who supported their position, 
planning to use the Board as an instrument of change. Washington stood 
off that challenge to his leadership, but lost his own battle for perma­
nent half-pay and the sale of commissions. A majority in Congress also 
overruled Washington's mild objections to a reduction in the size of the 
authorized Army. The 27 May 1778 resolve reflected the delegates' return
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to a British model for infantry regiments. On the other hand, Washing­
ton's influence with the committee at Valley Forge limited the change 
in the artillery and actually strengthened the cavalry. The resolve 
also added two new types of units which Washington requested as part of 
his effort to recast the Army on a French model.
Foreign Advisers.
Washington, too, spent the winter at Valley Forge considering the 
lessons of the 1777 campaign. He decided that the Continentals needed 
to adopt many characteristics of European military organization to im­
prove on their past performance. Personal experience and his reading 
of military textbooks played a role in this decision, but expert advice 
from a number of foreign volunteers was almost as influential. The 
first impact of this new concept came in the form of a dramatic improve­
ment in the Army's engineering efforts. It was also reflected in its 
mounted arm and in the creation of a variety of special units.
Established tradition in Europe allowed officers to serve in the 
armies of other nations to win glory, gain promotions, and taste adven­
ture. In 1776 a number of Individuals came to America for these reasons. 
Many claimed to have technical expertise and made exorbitant demands for 
high rank, but turned out to be frauds. Congress' hopes that Germans 
could recruit in the German-American community and that Frenchmen could 
attract Canadians proved groundless. Since most of the early officer 
volunteers were not fluent in English they could not be assigned to line 
units. Particularly incompetent performances came from two men who ser­
ved as brigadier generals in the Northern Department in 1776: Frederick
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William de Woedtke, a former Prussian officer, and a Frenchman, Matthias-
19Alexis, the Chevalier de La Rochefermoy.
Congress brought about a subtle change in the quality of the volun­
teers when it dispatched Silas Deane to France in the summer of 1776. 
Deane and his fellow diplomats secured the services of three groups of 
professional soldiers. On the advice of Caron de Beaumarchais of Hor- 
talez and Company and General Jean Baptiste de Gribeauval (the century's 
leading artillery expert) Deane contracted with Philip Charles Jean 
Baptiste Tronson du Coudray to organize and lead the first of these 
groups. Coudray, despite extravagant claims, was a minor military 
theorist and protege of Gribeauval whose French rank was equivalent to 
an artillery major. Deane granted him a contract which promised virtu­
ally a free hand in artillery and engineering operations, the rank of 
major general, and the title of General of Artillery and Ordnance. 
Coudray's group arrived in America in the late spring of 1777 and proved 
to be rather undistinguished. Congress commissioned two members, Conway 
and Philippe-Hubert, the Chevalier de Preudhomme de Borre, brigadier 
generals. It finessed the storm of protest which arose when the Army 
thought that Coudray might replace Knox by commissioning the Frenchman 
as Inspector General of Ordnance and Military Manufactories rather than 
General of Artillery and Ordnance. Coudray's death in the fall in an
19. Idzerda, Lafayette. 1; 68-87. Chevalier Dubuisson des Hayes later 
commented that the first volunteers were "officers who are deeply in 
debt, and some of them have been discharged from their units." He criti­
cized the governors of the French West Indies for deliberately sending 
them to America with inflated credentials as a way to rid themselves of 
troublesome individuals.
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accident ended any chance that he might have made a contribution to the 
Revolution, and both brigadier generals resigned within a year.^0
A second group of technical experts came to America through the 
efforts of the French Minister of War, the Comte de Saint-Germain. He 
formally "loaned" four military engineers to the Continental Army. In 
contrast to the previous volunteers, the contracts given to these men 
promised commissions only one grade higher than their French rank, and 
the men were carefully selected for real skills. Their leader, Louis le 
Begue de Presle Duportail, recently revised the engineer regulations 
for the French Army, and on 8 July 1777 Congress commissioned him as a 
colonel, giving him command over all engineers shortly thereafter. His 
obvious skill and cooperative attitude led to his promotion on 17 Novem­
ber to brigadier general, giving him status equivalent to General Knox's. 
Duportail's group quickly unmasked Coudray's false claims to technical 
training as an engineer.
The third contingent consisted of proteges of the Comte de Broglie, 
one of France's top commanders. Deane offered a major general's com­
mission to the group's leader, Gilbert du Motier, the Marquis de Lafayette, 
because of his powerful connections in the French court. A similar
20. Peter Force, ed., American Archives: A Collection of Authentic Re­
cords. State Papers, Debates, and Other Notices of Public Affairs (9 vols., 
Washington: M. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1839-53), 5th Ser., 1:
1011-23; 2: 283-5. Jonathan R. Dull, The French Navy and American Inde­
pendence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774-1789 (Princeton: Prince­
ton University Press, 1975), pp. 30-49. Idzerda, Lafayette, 1; 11. 
Lafayette described Coudray as "a clever but imprudent man, a good of­
ficer but vain to the point of folly."
21. Elizabeth S. Kite, Brigadier-General Louis Leb^gue Duportail: Com-
mondant of Engineers in the Continental Army 1777-1783 (Washington:
Instltut Fran^ais de Washington, 1933), pp. 2-34.
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offer went to Bavarian-born Johannes de Kalb, a grizzled veteran of the
French army. Deane promised this group assignments in the infantry
rather than the technical services. Unfortunately, by the time they
reached Philadelphia the temper of Congress and the Army had turned and
they were coldly received at first. Lafayette's personal enthusiasm,
the group's offer to serve as unpaid volunteers, and demonstrations of
22competence eventually earned most of them commissions.
The immediate impact of these foreign volunteers came in the field 
of military engineering. Americans could not match the training of 
British engineers at the Woolwich school, let alone that of the French 
who perfected the science of military engineering. Because of this, 
most of the early European volunteers received engineer commissions in 
the Continental Army although few had formal training or could perform 
useful service. The single exception, a young Polish captain named 
Andrew Thaddeus Bonaventure Kosciuszko, had received formal training in 
France. Congress commissioned him as a colonel of engineers on 18 Octo­
ber 1776.23
Although Washington included a request for a coherently organized 
corps of engineers in his plans for the 1777 army, and Congress author­
ized him to form such a body in its resolve of 27 December 1776, the 
shortage of proficient engineers prevented him from taking any action. 
Colonel Rufus Putnam, the best American engineer, returned to infantry
22. Idzerda, Lafayette, xxiv-xxvi, 7-12, 17-18, 33-36, 53-56, 68-87, 145- 
50. Lafayette actually was a cavalry captain in a reserve status without 
combat experience, but as de Kalb later commented was a gifted natural 
soldier.
23. Ford, Journals of Congress. 5: 565, 614-5, 656; 6: 888. Miecislaus 
Haiman, Kosciuszko in the American Revolution (New York: Polish Insti­
tute of Arts and Sciences in America* 1943), pp. 1-11.
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duty and a more cautious Congress halted the commissioning of untested
volunteers. Until Duportail*s group reached Philadelphia, the Army had
only Colonel Jeduthan Baldwin, Kosciuszko, and a number of infantry or
24artillery officers detailed to engineering duty. Duportail's emer­
gence as a trusted expert gave the Army a standard on which to judge 
Europeans for professional merit for the first time. He secured the
services of men such as Jean de Murnan, who had talent but whose career
25
in the French Army was blocked by court intrigue.
One of the first improvements the engineers made was the formation
of a bridging train to improve the Army's mobility. On the night of 11-
12 December 1777 they constructed two bridges over the Schuylkill
River at Swede's Ford. One consisted of a roadbed laid across floating
rafts. The other was constructed by placing 36 wagons in the shallows
and stringing rails across them. Later more sophisticated flat-bottomed
pontons with special wheeled carriages were constructed at Albany, which
26
in 1781 accompanied the Army to Yorktown. The second technical con­
tribution involved permanent fortifications. After the defeats of 1777 
Washington concentrated his resources on the field army. He only re­
fortified the Hudson Highlands to serve as the Main Army's strategic
24. Force, American Archives, 5th Ser., 2: 549-50, 892-3. Fitzpatrick, 
Writings of Washington. 6: 160-1; 7: 102-6; 8: 380-2. Thomas Williams 
Baldwin, ed., The Revolutionary Journal of Col. Jeduthan Baldwin 1775- 
1778 (Bangor: De Burians, 1906), pp. 102-3. Ford, Journals of Congress,
8: 380. Fran^ois-Louis Teisseidre, the Marquis de Fleury's 2 May 1777 
commission as captain was the only new appointment in early 1777.
25. Ibid., 8: 571; 9: 932; 13: 57-58. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 2: 
417-21. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 10: 35. Kite, Duportail, 
pp. 50-52.
26. Amos Perry, ed., "Dr. Albigence Waldo, Surgeon in the Continental 
Army," Historical Magazine. 5 (1861), p. 131. John B. Reeves, ed., "Ex­
tracts from the Letter-Books of Lieutenant Enos Reeves, of the Pennsylvania 
Line, " Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 20 (1896), pp.
458-9.
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pivot. From the winter of 1777-1778 until the end of the war a major 
part of the engineer corps worked on the fortress complex at West Point. 
Duportail's engineers avoided the single large fort which could be lost 
in one stroke and erected a complex of small, mutually-supporting works 
for defense in depth.^
At Valley Forge Duportail proposed to supplement the officer en­
gineers with companies of trained combat engineers. Following European 
custom he called them companies of sappers and miners. Sappers received 
special pay for digging the entrenchments (saps) of a formal siege; 
miners constructed underground tunnels. The companies could execute 
small projects or supervise infantry details in more extensive under­
takings. Washington particularly liked Duportail's plan to train the 
officers as apprentice engineers, insuring a steady supply of native- 
born engineers for the first time. Congress approved forming three com­
panies on 27 May 1778, but implementation took longer. Washington ap­
pointed the officers on 2 August 1779, after Duportail had personally 
interviewed the candidates, and transferred literate, intelligent enlis­
ted men from infantry regiments a year later. Each company was authorized
9ft
1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, and 60 privates.
Congress took the final step to regularize the engineers on 11 March 
1779. In response to Washington's continued pressure it resolved "that
27. Kite, Duportail, pp. 47-50, 60-72. Haiman, Kosciuszko, pp. 43-47. 
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, H :  297-8.
28. Ibid., 10: 433; 11: 239; 12: 40, 241, 311-2; 14: 235; 15: 103, 491- 
2; 16: 36; 17: 443-5; 19: 224. Ford, Journals of Congress, H :  541-2;
16: 133. Joseph Plumb Martin, Private Yankee Doodle ..., ed. by George 
F. Scheer (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1962), pp. 194-6. By compari­
son the British did not start to form their Royal Military Artificers 
until 1787.
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the engineers in the service of the United States shall 
be formed into a corps, styled the 'corps of engineers,' 
and shall take rank and enjoy the same rights, honours, 
and privileges, with the other troops on the continental 
establishment.
This legislation gave the engineers the status of a branch of the Con­
tinental Army. They received the same pay and prerogatives as the ar­
tillery. As commandant Duportail supervised the engineer officers and 
companies of sappers and miners, functioned as a special advisor to the
Commander-in-Chief, and made the assignment of individual officers to
30
specific posts prior to the start of each year's campaign.
Indirect French influence effected a separate section of topogra­
phical engineers. Following the Seven Years' War France had begun 
rigorous training of a small topographical corps, the Ingenieurs Geo- 
graphes (distinct from the Corps Royal du Genie). They were responsible
for preparing a systematic library of maps for reference in planning 
31operations. As a former surveyor Washington understood the value of 
accurate maps. On 19 July 1777 he asked for a topographical staff; six 
days later Congress told him to appoint a "geographer and surveyor of 
the roads, to take sketches of the country, the seat of war" and neces­
sary subordinates. Robert Erskine accepted the job but did not report 
to headquarters until June 1778. Erskine, a Scot who came to New Jersey 
in 1771, was a famous civil engineer and inventor. Until he died of
29. Ford, Journals of Congress, 13: 305-6.
30. Ibid., 14: 570-1. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 12: 376-7; 
14: 160-1; 16: 21-23, 37, 46-48. Kite, Duportail, pp. 125-31.
31. J. B. Hawley, jit _al., Mapping the American Revolutionary War (Chi­
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 32-36, 68-75. Howard C.
Rice, Jr. and Anne S. K. Brown, eds., The American Campaigns of Rocham- 
beau's Army ... (2 vols., Princeton and Providence: Princeton and Brown
University Presses, 1972), 1; 191-219; 2: 3-5, 111-20.
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pneumonia on 2 October 1780 Erskine coordinated up to six survey teams 
from his home at Ringwood Forge. He and his successors transformed the 
raw data into a comprehensive survey of the Main Army's area of opera­
tions. The resulting maps matched French standards of accuracy and
were vastly superior as a planning resource to anything available to
32
British commanders.
Washington intended to have another foreign volunteer upgrade the 
effectiveness of the mounted arm in the way Duportail improved the en­
gineers. Congress answered his long-standing request for a cavalry 
commander on a par with Knox on 15 September 1777. Casimir Pulaski, a 
fiery Pole, became the Commander of Horse with the rank of brigadier 
general. Louis de Fleury soon became his brigade major, and the four 
light dragoon regiments went into winter quarters at Trenton in 1777- 
1778. Washington and Pulaski used the winter to begin transforming the 
troopers from a reconnaissance force into an offensive weapon. Pulaski 
established a riding school to train horses and men in European-style 
shock action including cut-and-thrust saber tactics. The dragoon regi­
ment reorganization authorized on 27 May 1778 suited a battle mission 
better than patrolling. Unfortunately, Pulaski had clashed with his 
American officers and resigned as Commander of Horse a month earlier. 
Washington never found a replacement, and the strategic changes after
32. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7: 65; 8: 372, 443, 495-6; 11; 
246; 12: 21; 14: 182-3; 23: 68-69. Ford, Journals of Congress. 8: 580; 
18: 1118; 20: 475-6, 738. The maps are in the Erskine-De Witt Collec­
tion, New-York Historical Society. British Headquarters Maps are in the 
Henry Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library, University of Michi­
gan (copies in the New-York Historical Society). Simeon De Witt suc­
ceeded Erskine in the north and Thomas Hutchings in the south.
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Monmouth returned the light dragoons to a reconnaissance role when the
33
British declined to fight open battles as they had in 1776 and 1777.
While the dragoons did not complete their transformation into a 
true European cavalry force, the Continental Army introduced a number 
of light units patterned after the partisan cojirs which had emerged in 
the Seven Years' War. Major Nicholas Dietrich, Baron de Ottendorf, a 
Saxon veteran of the Prussian Army, commanded the first of these units. 
On 5 December 1776 Congress ordered him to recruit a company of chas­
seurs (light infantry) and two of jaegers (riflemen). A large propor­
tion of the officers for Ottendorf's four companies (the extra company 
was added in April) were foreign volunteers but the enlisted men came 
from the German-American community. Ottendorf, however, deserted in 
the spring of 1777, and Congress placed Charles Armand Tuffin, the Mar­
quis de la Rouerie, in command. It also told Armand on 19 May to raise 
a partisan corps of 200 Frenchmen, but Armand did not fill that unit 
until 1778.3A
When Pulaski resigned command of the cavalry Congress allowed him 
to raise an "independent corps." It consisted of a troop of 68 lancers 
and 200 light infantry organized into a "legion." The cadre of the 
troop came from the light dragoons he trained at Trenton in special
33. Ford, Journals of Congress. 8: 745; 12: 897, 941. Burnett, Letters 
of Congress, 3: 408. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 7: 51, 190-1; 
9: 143-4, 305; 10: 234-6; 11; 446; 12: 228, 276, 490; 13: 14-15. Samuel 
Hay to William Irvine, 14 Nov 1777; Historical Magazine. 3 (1859), p.
283. Gates to Washington, 23 May 1778; Benjamin Tallmadge to Gates, 1 
Jun 1778; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
34. Ford, Journals of Congress. 6: 1007; 7: 186, 346. Fitzpatrick, Wri­
tings of Washington. 6: 324; 8: 91-92, 224-6; 9: 162. New-York Histori­
cal Society Collections for 1915, pp. 566-9. W. T. R. Saffell, Records 
of the Revolutionary War ... (3d ed., Baltimore: Charles E. Saffell, 
1894), pp. 219-21.
212
lance tactics. On 7 April 1778 Congress rewarded Captain Henry Lee for 
excellent service on the outpost lines around Philadelphia by allowing 
him to organize a similar unit. Lee's troop of the 1st Continental 
Light Dragoons was withdrawn from the regiment and expanded into two 
troops; a third was added on 28 May. Lee, now a major, used the small 
light dragoon troop organization of 1777 which was appropriate for the 
reconnaissance and raiding missions that the partisans performed. Armand 
finally recruited his Free and Independent Chasseurs after Congress ap­
proved an organization for it on 25 June 1778. It consisted of three 
large companies based on Marshal Saxe's legionary concept. Each con­
tained 4 officers, 8 noncommissioned officers, 2 drummers (or horn play-
35ers), and 128 privates.
By the end of the 1778 campaign the Main Army had three partisan 
corps. Lee's was entirely mounted and composed of native Americans. 
Pulaski's, usually operating in conjunction with Ottendorf's remnants, 
was a combined arms unit mixing Americans and foreigners. Armand's was 
completely infantry and heavily foreign. Washington reviewed their per­
formance and concluded that the most efficient partisan organization 
contained equal numbers of mounted and dismounted men. At his request 
Congress annexed Captain Allen McLane's company (formerly of Patton's 
Additional Regiment) to Lee's unit on 13 July 1779 and on 14 February 
1780 increased Lee's corps by another 70 men to form three mounted and
35. Ford, Journals of Congress. 10: 29l, 294, 314-5, 364; 11; 545, 642-
5. Gates to Washington, 24 Jun and 13 Jul 1778; Gates Papers, New-York 
Historical Society. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. H :  80-82, 
205-6 , 230; 12: 152-3 , 470; 13: 41-43.
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three dismounted troops. The success of this expedient led Congress to
rescind an earlier directive and on 23 February 1780 to consolidate
36
Pulaski's and Armand's corps.
A special mounted police unit, the Marechaussie Corps, authorized 
on 27 May 1778, represented another European concept without Anglo-Ameri­
can precedent. It consisted of 5 officers, a clerk, 8 noncommissioned 
officers, 2 trumpeters, and 47 privates (4 of whom served as execution­
ers). The corps assisted the Provost Marshal in maintaining order in 
camp and on the march. In combat it took station behind the Second 
Line to provide rear security and prevent desertion. Captain Bartholomew 
Von Heer, a Prussian veteran, recruited Pennsylvania-Germans from Berks
and Lancaster Counties. The unit contributed to the general Improvement
37in the Army's internal order and discipline.
The Army's other police unit arose from expediency rather than Euro­
pean inspiration. It merely guarded prisoners of war, a function normally 
performed by militia. Burgoyne's army did not surrender unconditionally: 
the "Saratoga Convention" only stipulated that the regiments had to leave 
North America and not return unless exchanged. When the British failed 
to honor some of the minor provisions, Congress suspected that Howe would 
renounce the agreement. It detained the regiments and in the fall of
36. Ibid., 14: 65, 74-79; 15: 233, 242, 345; 17: 450-2, 496-7. Ford, 
Journals of Congress. 13: 132, 143, 181; 14: 822-3; 15: 1418; 16: 159,
187. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 4: 45, 55, 58-59, 67. Armand to 
Gates, 25 Jul 1780; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
37. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 11: 443; 12: 26-27, 241; 13: 
61-63, 68-70; 19: 41. Ford, Journals of Congress, 11: 541, 729. Von 




1778 transferred them to Charlottesville, Virginia, for better security. 
Instead of using militia guards, Virginia decided to raise a 600-man 
regiment under surplus Continental officers. Congress adopted the Regi­
ment of Guards on 9 January 1779. The unit remained under the governor's 
control, rather than under the operational command of the commander of
the Southern Department, until it disbanded in stages between 10 April
39and 9 June 1781 as the "Convention Army" moved to Maryland.
The Corps of Invalids, a specialized unit established in 1777, also 
reflected a desire to professionalize the Continental Army. Great Bri­
tain used separate companies of men not fit for field duty to garrison 
fortifications in the home islands. The Invalids performed a similar 
mission in the Continental Army, freeing combat units from defending 
depots. On 20 June 1777 Congress authorized Colonel Lewis Nicola, a 
strong proponent of the concept, to organize the corps. Congress went 
beyond British precedent by directing Nicola to set up a "Military 
School for Young Gentlemen" to train ensigns for assignment to line 
regiments and to conduct recruiting and training of replacements. 
Detachments were organized at Philadelphia and Boston during 1777 and
38. Ford, Journals of Congress. 9: 1058-64; 10: 13-17; 12: 902, 1016-8. 
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 10: 10, 56-58; 13: 131-2, 218-20, 
274-5, 289-91, 308, 3H-3. Paul H. Smith, ^t al., eds., Letters of Dele­
gates to Congress, 1774-1789 (Washington: Library of Congress, 1976- ),
2: 436. The British violated a similar agreement, the Convention of 
Kloster Kampen, in the Seven Years' War.
39. Ford, Journals of Congress, 13: 42-43. Julian P. Boyd, ed., The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1951- ), 3: 155-6, 191-2; 4: 252-3, 565, 603-5; 5: 147, 333-4, 408-9,
426-8, 661-2; 6: 66-67. William P. Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia 
State Papers and other Manuscripts (11 vols., Richmond: Commonwealth of
Virginia, 1875-93), 2: 574. Henry Read Mcllwalne, ed.. Official Letters 
of the Governors of the State of Virginia (3 vols., Richmond: Virginia
State Library, 1926-29), 1; 347-9, 355.
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1778. The regiment never fulfilled its training function, but it per­
formed valuable garrison duty until the end of the war, especially at
40
West Point.
The growing sophistication of the Continental Army, inspired in 
part by foreign volunteers, also showed in improved organization of sup­
port troops. Following Coudray's detah in the fall of 1777, Washington, 
Knox, and the Commissary General of Military Stores, Benjamin Flower, 
moved to upgrade the Army's ordnance staff. On 11 November 1777 Congress 
added two more artillery artificer companies. Knox and Washington hoped 
to group the companies into a regiment for better administration and 
assign detachments to each division at the start of the 1778 campaign 
to maintain small arms. On 11 February 1778 Congress consolidated re­
sponsibility for ordnance, munitions, military equipment, and repair of 
weapons under Flower who also became commander of the Artillery Artificer 
Regiment. The two old companies, the two new ones, a fifth company ad­
ded in the spring, and veterans of Lieutenant Colonel Ebenezer Stevens' 
maintenance company formed the regiment. Its officers held special com­
missions which restricted their authority to the regiment, a wise pre-
41
caution since they actually were technicians.
40. Pennsylvania Archives. 1st Ser., 7: 255. Fitzpatrick, Writings of 
Washington. 9: 28-29, 283-4; 10: 11, 152; 12: 69, 280; 22: 121, 236-42. 
Ford, Journals of Congress. 7: 288-9; 8: 485-6, 554-6. Nicola to Congress,
2 Oct 1777; Record Group 360, National Archives. Howard R. Carraso, ed., 
"Unpublished Letters of Colonel Lewis Nicola, Revolutionary Soldier," 
Pennsylvania History, 13 (1946), p. 274. Nicola's reputation was based on 
a translation of the Chevalier de Clairac's L'Ingenieur de campagne; or. 
field engineer ... (Philadelphia: R. Aitken, 1776) and his own A Treatise
of military exercise, calculated for the use of Americans ... (Philadel­
phia: Styner and Ci6t, 1776).
41. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 8: 8; 10: 277-80. Ford, Jour­
nals of Congress. 7: 179; 9: 891-2; 10: 119, 144-50; 15: 1398-9. Artil­
lery Brigade Orders, 25 Aug 1778; Artillery Brigade Orderly Books, New- 
York Historical Society. The detachments operated mobile repair shops.
Congress did not make the Military Stores Department subordinate 
to Knox as Washington wished. It remained under the supervision of the 
Board of War. Repeated pressure from Washington and Knox did lead to 
the creation of the Field Commissary, a new officer directly supporting 
the Main Army. Other improvements in cooperation between ordnance of­
ficials and the artillery served to increase technical skills. Artillery 
officers received practical training at ordnance depots on a rotating 
basis. Another new office, the Surveyor of Ordnance, put an artillery 
colonel officially within the ordnance staff which made the technical 
service more responsive to the needs of the troops in the field. John
Lamb, the colonel with the greatest technical proficiency, served as
_ „ 42
the Surveyor.
During the summer of 1778 Washington returned to a concept used in 
1776 but discarded in 1777. The skilled workmen serving in the Quarter­
master General's Department were assembled in provisional "companies,1 
or work crews, under the supervision of Colonel Jeduthan Baldwin. Since 
Baldwin demonstrated an aptitude for supervising construction parties, 
the assignment conveniently removed him from a position where he might 
quarrel with the French engineers. The artificers carried out construc­
tion at West Point, maintained the Army's wheeled vehicles, and served 
as pioneers to mend roads during marches. When the Artillery Artificer 
Regiment proved successful, Congress directed Washington on 11 November 
1779 to permanently arrange for a Quartermaster Artificer Regiment. The
42. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 12: 273-4; 13: 489; 14: 68; 15: 
79-80; 17: 170; 20: 445. Ford, Journals of Congress, 13: 201-6; 17: 
724-5, 793; 18: 1093; 25: 540-1. Lamb to Knox, 19 Jun 1779; John Lamb 
Letterbook, New-York Historical Society.
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new unit observed most of the same restrictions as Flower's, and ulti-
43
mately contained nine companies.
The foreign volunteers who arrived in America after 1776 contribu­
ted to the broadening and sophistication of the Continental Army. Their 
technical skills enabled Washington and Congress to implement improve­
ments planned, in some cases, as early as the 1776-1777 winter. The 
most immediate contribution was a professional engineer service, both 
combat and topographical. Foreigners staffed the former almost exclu­
sively; the latter combined French inspiration with practical American 
surveying. European concepts of cavalry combat lapsed because they did 
not fit American conditions after Monmouth, but foreign volunteers and 
partisan theory added several contingents of light troops to the Army. 
Among the special supporting units which Washington and Congress formed, 
foreign inspiration and example had direct Impact on the Marechauss^e 
and Invalids and indirectly justified the others. The greatest foreign 
contribution, however, came in training and administration.
The Introduction of European Theories.
The foreign volunteers expanded the professional horizons of the 
Continental Army by bringing ideas recently developed by European 
theorists to the attention of American officers. In large part, how­
ever, they merely reinforced an intellectual growth already begun by 
Washington and other concerned military leaders.
43. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 12: 246-7; 13: 73; 14: 2l2; 18:
1-2. Ford, Journals of Congress. 15: 1261-2, 1276; 16: 2l2. Baldwin to 
Captain _/ Peter_7 Mills, 10 Sep 1778; Gates Papers, New-York Historical 
Society.
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During the eighteenth century armies developed the ability to
maneuver in new ways, particularly after the Seven Years War. This
battlefield transformation was preceeded by a significant theoretical
debate. Experiences in the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven
Years' War impelled officers, especially the French, to seek better ways
to handle armies in the field. The British Army, the major institutional
Influence on the Americans prior to Valley Forge, lagged behind most
other nations in the development of new doctrine. British officers
learned on the job, contributed few books containing original thought,
AAand by and large even failed to read available European works.
Most British authors p»ior to the Revolution produced mere drill 
manuals rather than profound theoretical volumes. The two most important 
manuals early in the century repeated the best aspects of the Duke of 
Marlborough's army: Humphrey Bland's A Treatise of Military Discipline
in 1727 and Richard Kane's Campaigns of King William and Queen Anne in 
1745. Under the Duke of Cumberland and Field Marshal Ligonier the Bri­
tish came under the influence of Prussia. This trend appeared first in 
a series of translations of Prussian regulations by William Fawcett in 
1754 and 1757, and Fawcett's 1757 translation of Malosti de Martemont's 
The Spirit of the Modern System of War, by a Prussian General Officer.
44. The basic sources for understanding eighteenth century military 
theory are: Robert S. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare: The
Theory of Military Tactics in Eighteenth Century France (New York: Co­
lumbia University Press, 1957); Richard Glover, Peninsular Preparation: 
The Reform of the British Army 1795-1809 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer­
sity Press, 1963); and J. F. C. Fuller, British Light Infantry in the 
Eighteenth Century (London: Hutchinson £> Co., 1925). Also see Ira D.
Gruber, "British Strategy: The Theory and Practice of Eighteenth-Cen­
tury Warfare" in Don Higginbotham, ed., Considerations on the Revolution­
ary War: Selected Essays (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp.
14-31.
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A Prussian-inspired drill regulation was issued in 1757 and expanded by
amendments adopted in 1759. That regulation led to the publication of
Adjutant General Edward Harvey's The Manual exercise, as ordered by his
majesty in 1764. "The '64" remained the official British drill until
1795, although laxly enforced. British writers produced two other drill
manuals with some appeal: Campbell Dalrymple's A Military Essay in
1761; and William Windham's and George Townshend's Norfolk Discipline,
45
a simplified volume published in 1759 for militia use.
Three other Englishmen authored widely-read volumes in the 1760's 
and early 1770's. In 1768 a collection of miscellaneous orders and 
notes Major General James Wolfe prepared, mostly while a regimental com­
mander, appeared posthumously under the title Instructions to Young Of­
ficers. It contained no systematic theory. William Young was a proli­
fic author of volumes dealing with drill, fortifications, and outpost 
duty. Wolfe's material reappeared in 1771 in conjunction with Young's 
collected works as Manoeuvres, or practical observations on the art of 
war. A similar two-volume compendium by Thomas Simes, The Military 
guide for young officers, followed a year later. These books served 
only to Introduce junior officers to routine regimental life.
True European theorists wanted to find a system of warfare which 
extracted the maximum value from the weapons and soldiers available to 
the standing armies of the century. Proponents of linear warfare (1'ordre 
mince) dominated the early part of the century and considered Frederick
45. Rex Whitworth, Field Marshal Lord Llgonier: A Story of the British
Army 1702-1770 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 32n, 34, 57n,
218. Fuller, British Light Infantry, pp. 79-86. David Chandler, The Art 
of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (New York: Hippocrene Press, 1976),
pp. 106-7, H7.
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the Great as the foremost practitioner of their school. After 1760 
translations of his Instructions for his Generals became quite popular. 
Frederick's battlefield success came from his personal genius and ca­
pacity for hard work, and the Instructions remained essentially sterile
46because it did not contain a well-rounded theory of war.
The first alternative, 1'ordre profond, argued that infantry formed 
in dense columns could successfully attack lines of infantry by ignoring 
musketry and relying on shock effect and the bayonet. The major expo­
nents of this rather Impractical school were Chevalier Jean-Charles de 
Folard (1669-1752), Joly de Maizeroy (1719-80), and Francois-Jean de 
Graindorge d'Orgeville de Mesnil-Durand (1729-99). Eventually the French 
worked out a practical solution in the form of 1'ordre mixte. That 
school combined the line and column to meet the tactical requirements 
of a variety of circumstances in a flexible manner. It also stressed 
training men to perform both line and light infantry missions. Jacques 
Antoine Hippolyte Comte de Guibert's 1772 Essai general de tactique be­
came the most important military book of the century. Most French offi­
cers became disciples of the mixed order by the end of 1778 even though 
it was not formally espoused by the French Army until 1791.**^
46. Peter Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform 1807-1815 (Prince­
ton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 13-15. Thomas R. Phillips,
trans., Frederick the Great: Instructions for his Generals (Harrisburg:
Stackpole Co., 1944), pp. 9-10.
47. See especially Quimby, Background of Napoleonic Warfare, pp. 233-48, 
304-20; John Albert Lynn, "The Revolution on the Battlefield: Training 
and Tactics of the Arm^e du Nord" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Cali­
fornia at Los Angeles, 1974); and Samuel Anderson Covington, "The Comite 
Militaire and the Legislative Reform of the French Army, 1789-1791"
(Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Arkansas, 1976).
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North America had little Impact on European writers prior to the
Revolution because its terrain and Indian adversaries were not relevant
to European conditions. Americans, however, imported or reprinted many
48British, French, and German works and avidly read them. One major
group of volumes covered technical artillery and engineering subjects.
John Muller, the Woolwich instructor, wrote many volumes which enjoyed
a wide popularity, particularly his Treatise of Artillery (1757) and A
Treatise Containing the Elementary Part of Fortification (1756). Both
Muller and Lewis Nicola, later the commander of the Invalids, produced
translations of Louis Andrl de la Maime, the Chevalier de Clalrac's
Field Engineer (in 1758 and 1776 respectively) which were frequently
read. Other key books included: Benjamin Robin's New Principles of
Gunnery (1742); Guillaume Le Blonde's Treatise of Artillery (1746) and
Military Engineer (1759); Charles Vallancey's translation of M. de Bon-
neauville's An Essay on Fortifications (1757); J. C. Pleydell's Essay
on Field Fortification (1768); and a 1776 Philadelphia compendium, The
Art of War, which included writings of Jean-Florent de Valli^re (1667-
1759). Muller, Pleydell, and Robins remained basic texts for Woolwich
into the 1790's, and the technical writings available to Americans gener-
49
ally conformed to British preferences.
48. The following survey is based particularly on Charles Evans, et al., 
eds., American Bibliography (14 vols., Chicago and Worcester: Various
publishers, 1903-59); Appleton P. C. Griffin, comp.. A Catalogue of the 
Washington Collection in the Boston Athenaeum (Boston: Boston Athenaeum,
1897); and Henry Knox, A Catalogue of books imported and to be sold by 
Henry Knox (Boston: For Henry Knox, 1772). See the bibliography for a
list of military works prior to 1784 of American imprint.
49. Glover, Peninsular Preparation, pp. 211-3. Force, American Archives, 
4th Ser., 5: 7l7.
Drill manuals constituted the largest category of imports and re­
prints. The popularity of Bland's Treatise through the opening phase of 
the French and Indian War extended to America, where a dozen editions 
appeared between 1743 and 1759. Connecticut officially adopted Bland 
for militia use in 1743 and only discarded it in 1769 when officers
50complained that it was "prolix and encumbered with many useless motions." 
American publishers printed two editions of Fawcett's translation of the 
Prussian infantry drill and four of Cumberland's regulation during 1757 
and 1758. In 1776 they also produced single editions of Simes' Military 
guide, Dalrymple's Military Essay, and the Earl of Cavan's minor work,
A New system of military Discipline. Washington himself owned copies of 
Bland, Cavan, Simes, Windham's Norfolk Discipline, and Young's Manoeuvres. 
Simes received semi-official endorsement from Pennsylvania and North Caro­
lina officials during the Revolution.^1 Windham became popular in New 
England where five editions appeared between 1768 and 1775. Both Massa­
chusetts and Connecticut adopted it for official militia use. Although 
it simplified regular drills somewhat, Windham's manual of arms still in­
cluded 50 commands and 155 separate motions, 24 of which related to firing. 
A large part of the book's value to Americans came from the numerous
50. J. H. Trumbull and Charles C. Hoadley, comps., The Public Papers of 
the Colony of Connecticut (15 vols., Hartford: The Case, Lockwood &
Brainard Co., 1850-90), 8: 568; 13: 190. John Lamb Letterbook, New-York 
Historical Society, passim. Edward Braddock, Major General Edward Brad- 
dock's Orderly Books ... 1755 ... (Cumberland, Md.: Will H. Lowdermilk,
1878), pp. 5-10, 54-55. King Lawrence Parker, "Anglo-American Wilderness 
Campaigning 1754-1764: Logistical and Tactical Developments" (Ph.D. Dis­
sertation, Columbia University, 1970), p. I38n.
51. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 5: 717; 5th Ser., 1: 1386. Pal­
mer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 1: 394.
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52references to various classical and contemporary European authors.
Wolfe's Instructions appeared in three editions in America during the 
Revolution, two of which were joint bindings with either Young or 
Harvey. Americans did not reprint Frederick the Great's Instructions, 
but most of the Continental Army's key generals had read an imported 
edition.53
Harvey's 1764 Regulations became the paramount manual for American 
officers from 1766 until 1777. Nineteen imprints appeared in cities 
stretching from Boston to Williamsburg, most in 1774, 1775, and 1776.
The volunteer companies prior to Lexington rated it highly, and Massa­
chusetts and Rhode Island officially adopted it for militia use in 1774. 
Virginia, North Carolina, and Connecticut followed suit the next year 
for militia and Continentals. Harvey became the most popular work for 
Continental officers serving in the Main Army in 1776 and on 18 July
1777 Brigadier Generals McDougall and Parsons, with Washington's blessing,
54made its use mandatory for their brigades.
52. Trumbull, Colonial Records of Connecticut, 13: 190; 15: 195. Wind- 
ham, A Plan of Discipline, Composed for the Use of the Militia of the 
County of Norfolk (London: J. Shuckburgh, 1759), pp. x-xxiii.
53. Worthington C. Ford, ed., Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 (Brooklyn: 
Historical Printing Club, 1897), pp. 229-31, 248-56. Graham Philip Dolan, 
"Major General William Heath and the First Years of the American Revolu­
tion" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 1966), p. 153.
54. Boyd, Jefferson Papers. 1: 160-2. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 
1*. 843-5, 848-9, 1145; 5th Ser., 1: 1386. Ford, Webb Journal, 1: 247. 
Smith, Letters of Delegates. 1: 298-301. Trumbull, Colonial Records of 
Connecticut, 15: 195. William L. Saunders, ed., The Colonial Records of 
North Carolina (10 vols., Raleigh: Various publishers, 1886-90), 10: 198.
Richard K. Showman, et al., eds., The Papers of General Nathanael Greene 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976- ), 1; 70-71.
John Russell Bartlett, ed., Records of the Colony of Rhode Island ... (9 
vols., Providence: Various publishers, 1854-65), 7: 269-71. William Wal­
ler Henning, ed., The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the
Laws of Virginia ... (14 vols., Richmond: J. & G. Cochran, 1821), 9: 9-35.
Worthington C. Ford, ed., General Orders Issued by Major General Putnam 
1777 (Brooklyn: Historical Printing Club, 1893), p. 31.
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In 1775 and 1776 a number of American officers also produced drill 
manuals which modified various British and Prussian systems. Timothy 
Pickering, at the time a Massachusetts militia colonel but later the 
Continental Army's Adjutant General and Quartermaster General, published 
the most widely known manual in 1775. His An Easy plan of discipline for 
a militia modified Windham's Norfolk Discipline and gained some currency 
among units besieging Boston, although Massachusetts rejected it as an 
official manual.55 Thomas Hanson of the Philadelphia Associators and 
briefly of the 12th Pennsylvania Regiment published a two-volume work,
The Prussian evolutions in actual engagements .... Washington obtained 
copies of both of these works as soon as they appeared. The next year, 
1776, Lewis Nicola published his A Treatise of military exercise, calcu­
lated for the use of the Americans, and Adjutant Thomas Davis of the 1st 
Virginia Regiment brought out a brief handbook, A Treatise on the military 
duty. Neither work enjoyed the readership of Pickering's or Hanson's.
One significant exception to the lack of innovation among the Bri­
tish appeared in North America during the French and Indian War. Gener­
als John Forbes and Henri Bouquet (a Swiss serving the British) turned 
to several European thinkers to solve the problem of operating with regu­
lar troops in the American wilderness. Forbes based his successful cam­
paign against Fort Duquesne on the Commentaires sur les Memoires de Mon- 
tecuculi of Lancelot, Comte Turpin de Crisse. Bouquet refined Forbes' 
techniques during Pontiac's rebellion by also consulting Maurice, Comte
55. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 1; 1003-4, 1008. Edward Field, 
Revolutionary Defences in Rhode Island (Providence: Preston and Rounds,
1896), pp. 37-38. John Womack Wright, "Pickering's Letter on Washington," 
Tyler's Quarterly, 7 (1925), p. 16.
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de Saxe's Mes reveries, a posthumous work published in French and Eng­
lish in 1757. Bouquet's "Reflections on War with the Savages of North 
America" appeared in 1765 as an appendix to William Smith's A Historical 
Account of the Expedition against the Ohio Indians in the Year HDCCLX1V. 
Raimond di Montecuculi (1609-81), Crissl, and Saxe all saw the Roman 
conquest of Celtic and Germanic barbarians as proof that regular troops 
adequately trained in line and light infantry missions could defeat 
masses of loosely disciplined irregulars in wilderness conditions. Out­
side of Saxe these authors did not enjoy wide influence in European 
circles, and even Saxe tended to be eclectic rather than systematic in 
his writings.5**
Americans, particularly Washington who served as one of Forbes' 
brigade commanders in the 1758 campaign, paid a great deal of attention 
to the application of the Criss^-Saxe-Forbes-Bouquet line of thought.
One of Washington's friends from the Fort Duquesne campaign, Captain Jo­
seph Otway, published a translation of Crisse in 1761 which Washington 
quickly obtained, along with the William Fawcett 1757 translation of 
Saxe. Knox, Greene, Wayne, and a host of other officers down to the 
lowest ranks in the Continental Army also paid attention to Saxe because 
they recognized that his arguments were particularly applicable to the 
American situation. They took special interest in Saxe's references to
56. Quimby, Napoleonic Warfare, pp. 41-62. Fuller, British Light In­
fantry, pp. 97-98. Parker, "Wilderness Campaigning," pp. 252-342. Thomas 
R. Phillips, trans.. Reveries on the Art of War (Harrisburg: Military
Service Publishing Co., 1944), passim.
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aimed musketry in skirmishing action, and to his emphasis on joint 
training by infantry, artillery, and cavalry.^
Americans displayed an intense interest in another group of rela­
tively minor European theoretical works. Austrian introduction of light 
troops during the middle of the century forced all other armies to de­
velop similar bodies to counter them, and a school of theory on the pro­
per organization and handling of partisans in "petite guerre" grew up. 
Central works from the partisan school imported or reprinted in America 
included Roger Stevenson's Military instructions for ... carrying on the 
petite guerre, M. de Jenny's The Partisan; or the Art of Making War in 
Detachments, and especially M. de Grandmaison's La petite guerre, the 
text which Frederick the Great preferred. Americans such as Henry 
Jackson believed that partisan operations suited the "natural genius" 
displayed by American rangers during the French and Indian War. They 
also had one significant native American text, Thomas Church's 1716 
account of his father's campaigns against the Indians during King Philip's 
War and King William's War. Benjamin Church (1639-1718) was a master of
using Indian-European teams to counter hostile Indians in the wilderness,
58and the account served as a tactical case book.
57. John K. Mahon, "Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare, 1676-1794," 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review. 45 (i-958), p. 268. Oliver L. Spaul­
ding, "The Military Studies of George Washington," American Historical Re­
view, 29 (1924), pp. 675-80. Showman, Greene Papers, 1: 89-90. Charles J. 
Stilie, Major-General Anthony Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line in the Con­
tinental Army (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincot Co., 1893), pp. 23, 75-76.
Almon W. Lauber, ed., Orderly Books of the Fourth New York Regiment ... 
(Albany: University of the State of New York, 1932), p. 816.
58. Peter E. Russell, "Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and
Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760," William and Mary 
Quarterly. 3d Ser., 35 (1978), pp. 629-52. Force, American Archives. 4th 
Ser., 2: 385-6; 5: 717. Paret. Yorck. pp. 22-23. Palmer. Calendar of Vir­
ginia State Papers. 1; 394. Fuller, British Light Infantry, pp. I28n, 152- 
3. Church, The History of the Great Indian War .... ed. by Samuel G. Drake 
(Hartford: Silas Andrus 6 Son, 1854).
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Few native-born Americans secured commissions in the British Army 
during or after the French and Indian War. Individuals, like Washington, 
who were interested in a military career had to turn to reading to re­
place regular service. This fact probably explains the extensive array 
of imported or reprinted military volumes that appeared in America in the 
1760's and 1770's. Most of the individuals who remained in important 
leadership positions in the Continental Army by 1777 knew the general 
issues behind European theoretical debates and read many of the important 
authors whose works existed in translation. The accumulated American ex­
perience in colonial wars colored their preferences to a very high degree. 
Problems with a terrain that covered wider areas and contained more obsta­
cles than Europe's and the particular differences which arose from fighting 
Indians made Saxe and exponents of partisan operations more important to 
American generals than to their English counterparts. American traditions 
demanded emphasis on flexibility, marksmanship, and simplicity.
In November 1775, Washington wrote to William Woodford, then colonel 
of the 2d Virginia Regiment but soon to become a brigadier general, out­
lining the essentials of successful military leadership. He also men­
tioned the five works which he felt constituted the basic texts: Harvey, 
Crisse, Stevenson, Jenny, and Young. The list reflected availability, 
but it also indicated the importance of flexibility. On 8 May 1777
59. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 4: 80-81. Also see John Adams to 
William Tudor, 12 Oct 1775; Adams Papers, Publication forthcoming (copy fur­
nished to author by Robert J. Taylor, editor-in-chief, 30 Nov 1976); Spaul­
ding, "Military Studies," pp. 675-80; Ford, Defences of Philadelphia, pp. 
179-88, 193-7, 229-31, 272-6; and Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 2: 
385-6. Greene supparized American attitudes in Dec 1777 when he wrote Wa­
shington "Experience is the best of schools and the safest guide in human 
affairs - yet I am no advocate for blindly following all the maxims of Euro­
pean policy, but where reason corresponds with what custom has long sancti­
fied, we may safely copy their example"; Ford, Defences of Philadelphia, pp. 
248-56.
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Washington expressly ordered all Continental officers to read "Military 
Authors" in their spare time. French and Hessian professional soldiers 
noted that they obeyed. Captain Johann Ewald, who became a leading theor­
ist of light infantry after the Revolution, commented that this fact ser­
ved as "a true indication that the officers of this army studied the art
of war while in camp, which was not the case with the opponents of the 
60
Americans."
At about the same time that he directed the officers to expand their 
professional horizons, Washington moved to establish a standard system of 
"discipline, maneuvers, evolutions, £  and__/ regulations for guards" which 
every unit would follow, an important development to improve battlefield 
performance. The advent of the 1777 campaign prevented Washington from 
doing more than preliminary work on the regulations, although subordinate 
commanders worked hard on practicing rudimentary battlefield maneuvers. 
Foreign volunteers noted the lack of uniformity, and at Valley Forge a 
number worked on the problem. Thomas-Antoine, the Chevalier de Mauduit 
du Plessis, a graduate of the rigorous French artillery school at Grenoble 
who proved his valor at Germantown and Fort Mifflin, introduced the Army's 
leaders to Guibert's writings.^ Frederick Steuben played an even more 
Important role.
60. Quoted in Fuller, British Light Infantry, pp. 152-3. Also see C.
Fiske Harris, ed., "Diary of a French Officer 1781 ...." Magazine of Ameri­
can History. 7 (1881), p. 295; and Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington.
8: 29.
61. Ibid., 8: 40-41, 108, 255, 268-9; 9: 362-4; 11; 163. Ford. Putnam Or­
ders. pp. 28-29. Idzerda, Lafayette, 1: 73-87, 91-103. Laurens, Army Cor­
respondence. pp. 109-12, 134-41. Capt. George Fleming to Maj. Sebastian 
Bauman, 6 Feb 1778; Sebastian Bauman Papers, New-York Historical Society.
As early as 18 Aug 1775 the 1st New York Regiment trained by "rejecting 
for the present, every motion & movement that will not be conductive or 
necessary in action"; McDougall to Maj. Herman Zedwitz, 18 Aug 1775; Mc- 
Dougall Papers, New-York Historical Society.
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The Contributions of Steuben.
"The Baron," as Frederick Wilhelm Augustus "von" Steuben became
known, synthesized official doctrine, trained the Main Army, and created
a new element in the administrative staff which melded Americans and
Europeans to produce uniformity and competence on the battlefield. He
began his military career as a junior Prussian infantry officer and for
ten years learned how to train troops. In 1757 he became the principal
staff officer of Johann von Mayr's frei korps, a special partisan unit
organized to counter Austrian light troops. This duty exposed him to a
less rigid form of military organization and gave valuable administrative
experience. Steuben continued to rise through staff assignments until
1762 when he became a member of Frederick the Great's special corps of
aides and received the best staff training available in the eighteenth
century. Army politics forced his retirement in 1764 as a captain, and
6 2
he spent the next decade out of the military.
During 1777 Steuben, using the Comte de Saint-Germain as an inter­
mediary, offered his services to Benjamin Franklin. The three men pre­
pared credentials falsely identifying Steuben as a lieutenant general. 
Congress accepted his offer to serve as a volunteer without rank, and on 
23 February 1778 he arrived at Valley Forge. Washington asked him to in­
spect the troops and talk to the senior officers. When Steuben reported 
that they were the finest raw material for an army that he had ever seen, 
Washington told him to prepare the drill regulations planned in 1777.
62. Steuben's claim to be a baron appears to be groundless; his family's 
use of the ennobling preposition "von" clearly was. In America Steuben 
habitually used the French form "de" rather than the Germanic "von."
230
Steuben analyzed the existing practices, primarily based on Harvey, and
compared them to various European systems. As he later told Franklin:
circumstances ... obliged me to deviate from the Principles 
adopted in the European Armies, ... Young as We are, We 
have already our Prejudices as the most ancient Nations,
£  and_ / the prepossession in favor of the British service, 
has obliged me to comply with many Things, which are 
against my Principles.^3
Steuben's genius created an entirely new system in which he borrowed 
elements from British, Prussian, and American practices. The drill em­
phasized a simple manual of arms, improved execution, new techniques of 
marching, and use of the bayonet. A column of fours replaced single-file 
marching to produce more compact formations and better deployment on bat­
tlefields. The standard pace became the Prussian norm of 75 two-foot
steps per minute, not the English standard of 60. Officers, not noncom-
64missioned officers, now had the responsibility for drilling the men.
On 19 March 1778 Steuben began instructing a special "Model Company" 
in the new system. His colorful curses, delivered in a variety of langua­
ges, amused the large crowds that assembled each day at Valley Forge to 
witness the spectacle. The cursing actually was a calculated psycho­
logical device designed to smooth adoption of the drill. Members of the 
model company and selected officers extended the instruction to all units 
at Valley Forge within six weeks, and later to the rest of the Army. 
Steuben drew on many sources in compiling his drill, which impressed 
foreign observers with its efficiency and originality.^
63. Steuben to Franklin, 28 Sep 1779; Steuben Papers, New-York Historical 
Society. Also see Laurens, Army Correspondence, pp. 131-3, 145-9.
64. Idzerda, Lafayette, 1; 73-87, 91-103. Fitzpatrick, Writings of 
Washington. 11: 233, 335-6, 399-401; 12: 4-7.
65. Ibid., 11: 163-4; 13: 342. Jean Baptiste Ternant to Steuben, 20 Jan 
and 9 Mar 1779; William Davies to Steuben, 17 Oct 1778; Steuben Papers, 
New-York Historical Society. Harris, "Diary," pp. 294-5.
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Steuben did not limit himself to the manual of arms, but also pro­
duced a simple, efficient method for maneuvering on the battlefield.
Like Guibert and other French theoreticians of the ordre mixte school 
he used both the column and the line for tactical flexibility. Divisions 
and brigades practiced marching in closed columns for speed and control, 
and rapidly deployed into line for musket fire or bayonet work. Skir­
mishers, either light infantry companies or details from line companies, 
covered the columns during advance or withdrawal. They specifically 
kept one hundred yards (the effective range of musket fire) from the col­
umn to prevent enemy harassment of the main body. As soon as the columns 
deployed into line the skirmishers withdrew through gaps between regiments 
to reform. The men maintained silence when marching, a practice which 
particularly impressed French officers. ^  ,
In the fall of 1778, after the battle of Monmouth, a board of general 
officers reviewed the drill. Washington agreed to their single suggested 
Improvement and replaced the traditional command "Present!" with "Take 
Sight!" as the order immediately preceeding "Fire!" The change emphasized 
the Continental Army's continued reliance on marksmanship.^ After polish­
ing by Steuben, the drill received Congress' approval on 29 March 1779 
and was published by the Board of War. Virtually every army officer re­
ceived a copy. Although Steuben hoped to have it classified as a state 
secret, as Frederick's Instructions had been, Washington overruled him. 
Copies of the drill went to every state government in the hope that the
66. Pennsylvania Archives. 2d Ser., 11: 290-1, 304, 320-2, 410-1. Harris, 
"Diary," p. 295.
67. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 8: 268; 12: 360. Gates' notes 
of the 26 Aug 1778 board meeting are in the Gates Papers, New-York His­
torical Society.
232
various state militias would also adopt it and allow men to receive 
basic training before they became Continentals.®®
The Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the 
United States Part 1 (better known as The Blue Book) covered all aspects 
of infantry service. It specified that a regiment deploy tactically in 
eight companies, each under its own officers to prevent the type of con­
fusion that crippled the Hessians at Trenton. A regiment with more than 
160 files (i.e. 320 corporals and privates) formed two four-company bat­
talions; those with fewer than 80 files (160 men) either temporarily com­
bined with p  second small regiment or did not take a place in the line 
of battle. A special twelve-man color guard gave each regimental comman­
der an emergency reserve force. The light infantry company deployed as 
skirmishers or went into a provisional light infantry battalion. The
column became the standard maneuver formation; training emphasized
69
movement through broken terrain and rapid deployment into line.
Other chapters of the Regulations improved the efficiency of the 
trains to let the Army move without encumbrance but still be able to fight 
a sustained engagement immediately. Routine of army life emphasized 
health and morale. Administration insured sustained concern for regimen­
tal business. An appendix clearly explained the functions of every
68. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 14: 151-2, 227-31, 369, 444-6, 
488-9; 15: 46-49; 16: 432-3, 447, 449, 468, Ford, Journals of Congress, 
13: 384-5. Charles Thomson to Steuben, 5 Apr; John Jay to Steuben, 6 Apr; 
Pickering to Steuben, 26 May, 19 Jun and 12 Jul; Peter Scull to Steuben,
26 Jun and 27 Jul; Ternant to Steuben, 29 Sep 1779 and 7 Jan 1780;
Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society.
69. Steuben, Regulations (Philadelphia: Styner and Cist, 1779). At 
least seven other editions appeared by 1785. Figure 10 shows the regi­
ment's disposition.
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individual in a regiment from its commander to the lowest private.
Senior noncommissioned officers received training to replace staff of­
ficers in an emergency or to supervise the four squads that formed each 
company. The progressive attitude of the regulations culminated in the 
dramatic direction that a captain's
first object should be, to gain the love of his men, by 
treating them with every possible kindness and humanity, 
enquiring into their complaints, and when well founded, 
seeing them redressed. He should know every man of his 
company by name and character.7°
Steuben's contribution to the professionalism of the Continental 
Army did not stop with the Blue Book. He also gave substance to a new 
staff office: the Inspector General. Between 1778 and 1780 this office 
grew, and Steuben emerged as Washington's J^e facto chief of staff. The 
office originated in a proposal by Baron d'Arendt, commander of the Ger­
man Battalion, and the Main Army's Council of War endorsed it as a way 
to effectively employ foreign volunteers. Congress' authorization on 
13 December 1777 for two inspectors general, one of whom was to be Con­
way, radically altered the concept. Legislation required the inspectors, 
presumably one each for the Main Army and the Northern-Highlands area, 
to "see that every officer and soldier be instructed in the exercise and 
manoeuvres which may be established by the Board of War." Their other 
duties, "agreeable to the practice of the best disciplined European 
Armies," related to discipline, paperwork, and investigation of fraud.
70. A second volume, "Baron von Steuben Regulations for the Cavalry or 
Corps Legionaire" was completed in manuscript by Steuben on 22 Dec 1780, 
but not published. It minutely parallels the infantry regulations, and 
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They reported to Congress directly, not to the Commander-In-Chief.7*1
Washington ignored Conway and used Steuben's superior credentials as a
European expert to regain control over this office. On 28 March 1778
he appointed Steuben as temporary Inspector General pending Congressional
approval. Four sub-inspectors acted as division-level assistants. One
major from each brigade extended the inspector system to that echelon.
72Their first duty involved implementing Steuben's drill. The arrange­
ment worked so well that on 5 May 1778 Congress approved it and commis­
sioned Steuben as a major general, the rank Washington lobbied privately 
for.73
When the Main Army marched out of Valley Forge Washington used the 
sub-inspectors as divisional adjutants general. He also reaffirmed that 
tactical command remained with the unit commanders. Inspectors simply 
insured that drills followed official Army doctrine. New legislation on 
18 February 1779 stated that there would only be one Inspector General 
who ranked as a major general and remained responsible for drafting 
regulations. He now conducted inspections on the authority of the Comman­
der- in-Chief or commanding officer of a territorial department, and re­
ported through those commanders to the Board of War. Brigade inspectors 
(majors) absorbed the functions of the brigade majors and became the
71. Ford, Journals of Congress. 9: 1023-6. Fitzpatrick, Writings of 
Washington, 10: 249-50. Laurens, Army Correspondence, pp. 98-101. Bur­
nett, Letters of Congress, 3: 20-25.
72. Conway to Gates, 11 Nov 1777; Gates Papers, New-York Historical So­
ciety. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 10: 226-7; H :  108, 132, 163, 
173-4, 313, 335-6; 12: 66-68. Laurens. Army Correspondence, pp. 109-12, 
131-49. A fifth sub-inspector, Fleury, was added on 27 April 1778 and 
subsequently sent to Wilmington to instruct the Maryland division.
73. Ford, Journals of Congress, 11: 465-6, 498-500, 728-9; 12: 1010. 
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 11: 329-31, 366. The Chevalier de 
la Neuville briefly served in the north as the second inspector.
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senior staff officers In each brigade. Sub-inspectors (lieutenant 
colonels) continued to perform similarly at the division level. They 
also acted as adjutants general for wings of the Main Army and for ter­
ritorial departments. In the temporary absence of the Adjutant General 
the senior sub-inspector replaced him.^1
Colonel Alexander Scammell replaced Timothy Pickering as Adjutant 
General on 5 January 1778. He worked closely with Steuben to standardize 
the Army's paperwork. They developed printed forms for most of the rou­
tine regimental and brigade bookkeeping chores and even issued individual 
"blank books" to each soldier for personal records. Their partnership 
paved the way for the gradual merger of the two major staff agencies. 
Steuben developed policy while Scammel concentrated on routine adminis­
tration. Congress agreed that consolidation made sense, and on 17 May 
1779 reduced the Adjutant General's department to the Adjutant General, 
two assistants, and a clerk. They operated the Headquarters orderly 
o f f i c e . T h e  Inspector General gradually rendered the mustering depart­
ment redundant as well. On 12 January 1780 Congress abolished it.^
Consolidation of Steuben's staff hegemony came on 25 September 1780. 
New legislation officially designated the Adjutant General as the
74. Ibid., 12: 16, 66-68, 438-44; 14: 444-6; 15: 129-31, 288-90, 293, 
475-6. Peters to Steuben, 2 Jun 1778; William Davies to Steuben, 18 Jun 
and 21 and 26 Jul 1779; Sub-Inspectors to Steuben, 20 Jun 1779; Steuben 
Papers, New-York Historical Society. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 4: 41. 
Ford, Journals of Congress. 11: 819-23; 13: HI, 196-200.
75. Ibid., 14: 600-1. Davies to Steuben, 26 Jul 1779; Scammell to Steu­
ben, 22 Sep 1779; Benjamin Walker to Steuben, 2 Feb and 10 Mar 1780; 
Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society. Fitzpatrick, Writings of 
Washington. 10: 80-82, 245, 297, 332-3; 14: 224-7, 486; 15: 356-8; 16:
11-13; 17: 99-100, 495-6.
76. Ibid., 14: 120-1; 16: 134-6; 18: 64. Ford, Journals of Congress,
13: 403-4; 16: 47.
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Assistant Inspector General for the Main Array. It also authorized in­
spectors for artillery, cavalry, and militia on active duty with the 
Continental Army.^ Under Steuben the inspectors assumed duties similar 
to modern chiefs of staff. The emergence, surprisingly, lacked signifi­
cant opposition. Changes in personnel and the growth of Washington's 
immediate staff weakened the Adjutant General, the one official in a 
position to challenge the new hegemony. Steuben's close relationships 
with the two final Adjutants General, Scammell and Brigadier General 
Edward Hand, cemented the arrangement. The rise of the Inspector Gener­
al stands in contrast to Europe where either the Adjutant General or 
Quartermaster General became paramount. It shows the flexibility that
the Continentals exercised in their use of European precedents. They
78
borrowed where appropriate, but were not afraid to experiment.
The Reorganization of 1778-1779 in Practice.
The 1778 campaign opened before Washington could implement the or­
ganizational changes mandated on 27 May 1778, but after Steuben, Duportail, 
and the other foreign volunteers began contributing to the maturity of 
the Continental Army. France's declaration of war on Great Britain pushed 
the War of American Independence into a global struggle in which North 
America faded in importance. The first impact of the strategic change 
came in the British decision to evacuate Philadelphia rather than risk
77. Ibid., 17: 764-70; 18: 855-61.
78. S. G. P. Ward, Wellington's Headquarters: A Study of the Administra­
tive Problems in the Peninsula 1809-1814 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1957), pp. 130-1. David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon 
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1966), pp. 56, 144-61. "Instructions relatives
au Department des Inspecteurs de l'armee"; Steuben Papers, New-York His­
torical Society.
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losing New York City. Washington set out from Valley Forge and on 28 
June caught up with Sir Henry Clinton's troops at Monmouth, New Jersey. 
General Charles Lee, recently exchanged, failed to grasp the change In 
the effectiveness of the Continental Army since his capture In December 
1776. As a result he mishandled the start of the battle and Washington 
had to settle for a hard-fought draw. Clinton reached New York City 
without further Incident and Washington moved on to White Plains where 
the Main Army joined forces with the troops from the Highlands and 
prepared for further action.
During the year that followed Monmouth Washington and Congress gra­
dually Implemented the 27 May 1778 organizational changes. Action came 
on a state-by-state basis. Various factors Influenced the timing of each 
reorganization and Its specific arrangement. Recruiting success, the 
strength of the regiments, and location all played a role. On 9 March 
1779, after a careful review, Congress reduced the state lines to a paper 
total of 80 infantry regiments by lowering New Jersey's quota to 3, Penn­
sylvania's to 11, Virginia's to 11, North Carolina's to 6, and Georgia's 
to one.^
New Hampshire's regiments adopted the new structure on 23 December 
1778, Connecticut's on 11 July 1779, and most of Massachusetts' on 22 
July 1779. The three strongest regiments of the remaining Massachusetts 
brigade reorganized on 1 August 1779 when they rejoined the Main Army 
after detached duty In Rhode Island; Bigelow's and Alden's Regiments 
somewhat later. The Massachusetts regiments received numerical designations
79. Ford, Journals of Congress. 3: 108-9, 143, 298-9. Burnett, Letters 
of Congress. 4: 377-9. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 13: 485-91; 
14: 3-12, 26-32, 71-72, 86-87.
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on 1 August for the first time since 1776. Washington numbered them
OA
according to the relative seniority of their colonels.
The Commander-in-Chlef established the New York Brigade on 22 July 
1778 but continued to use it primarily to defend New York's frontier.
All five New York regiments reorganized later, on 30 May 1779. Congress 
allowed New Jersey to reduce its quota to three regiments in 1778 but 
the 4th New Jersey Regiment did not disband until 7 February 1779. Its
81personnel went to the remaining regiments which reorganized on that date. 
Although Congress decided to reduce Pennsylvania's quota to ten regiments 
on 26 February 1778, it did transfer Hartley's Additional Regiment on 27 
March as a new 11th Pennsylvania Regiment since Hartley was a popular 
recruiter. The reduction actually came on 22 July 1778, allowing the
Pennsylvania units to adopt the new structure well in advance of the
82other states' regiments. Maryland and Delaware regiments enjoyed 
successful recruiting during the winter they spent at Wilmington and did
go
not reorganize until 12 May 1779.
Virginia loaned the 1st and 2d Virginia State Regiments to the 
Continental Army to replace 1777 losses. Washington's main problem
80. Ibid.. 15: 342, 406, 461-2; 16: 33-34, 51-53; 17: 15-16. Inspection 
Report, Glover's Brigade, 18 Aug 1779; Gates Papers, New-York Historical 
Society. Ford, Journals of Congress. 15: 1033.
81. Ibid., 10: 361. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 3: 109. Undated 1778 
return of recruiting officers; William Alexander (hereafter Stirling) 
Papers, New-York Historical Society. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 
12: 216; 13: 264-5; 14: 73-74, 414-6; 20: 295-6.
82. Ibid., 12: 215-8. Pennsylvania Archives. 2d Ser., 11: 307-8, 336-7. 
Burnett, Letters of Congress. 3: 123-4. Stille, Wayne, pp. 125-6, 158-9, 
175-7. Ford, Journals of Congress. 10: 288; 13: 298-9.
83. Ibid., 12: 1225-6; 13: 58. Henry Hobart Bellas, ed.. Personal Recol­
lections of Captain Enoch Anderson ... (Wilmington: Historical Society 
of Delaware, 1896), pp. 53-55. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 10: 
360; 15: 46-47, 265-7.
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Involved reenllsting the veterans of the senior nine Virginia regiments 
whose terms of service expired at Valley Forge. He experimented with a 
series of provisional reorganisations, Including reducing the Virginia 
line to three brigades on 22 July 1778. Permanent reorganisation came 
on 12 May 1779 when the eight weakest Virginia regiments with the Main 
Army consolidated to form four and Washington renumbered the line. On 
5 May 1779 he ordered General Scott, who was in charge of recruiting in 
the state, to organize all available officers, convalescents, and re­
cruits into three new provisional regiments as reinforcements for the 
Southern Department. The first marched from Petersburg under Colonel 
Richard Parker in October and reached Charleston on 5 December. Colonel 
William Heth's unit arrived there on 7 April 1780. The last, under Colonel 
Abraham Buford, failed to reach that city before it fell, but suffered 
defeat at The Waxhaws shortly afterwards.
North Carolina's nine regiments joined the Main Army in 1777 so 
weak that their field officers recommended transferring all enlisted men 
to the three most senior units. On 29 May 1778 Congress ordered the 
transfer and in addition directed the state to use the surplus officers 
to form four new regiments for a total of seven. Late in 1778 the cadres 
of the newer units went to South Carolina as provisional reinforcements.
The 3d North Carolina Regiment returned home in the spring of 1779 to
84. Ibid.. 9: 329, 367, 481-2; 10; 54-56, 153, 254-5; 12; 79-81, 139, 
215-7, 279; 14: 72, 498-9; 15: 17-19, 46. "Revolutionary Orders For the 
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recruit, leaving only the 1st and 2d with the Main Array. The latter 
reorganized under the new structure on 22 July 1779.®^
Although they did not serve in the north, the Georgia and South 
Carolina forces also declined in strength. Idleness, climate, and the 
expiration of enlistments all took their toll. A full company of the 
1st South Carolina Regiment, serving as marines, died on 8 March 1778 
when the frigate Randolph blew up during an engagement with the British 
battleship Yarmouth off Barbados. The remnants of Georgia's troops 
suffered virtual annihilation during the winter of 1778-1779 when the 
British overran that state in a new offensive. Congress finally empow­
ered Major General Benjamin Lincoln, who assumed command of the Southern 
Department on 4 December 1778, to consolidate the two lines and reform 
the regiments under the new structure. Local political jealousies 
blocked action until 20 January 1780. Lincoln reorganized the Georgia 
units, which existed only on paper, as one infantry regiment and one of
mounted rangers. South Carolina's formed one artillery regiment and 
86
three of Infantry.
Congress concentrated reductions and economies on the separate com­
panies and Additional Regiments. These generally started out understrength
85. Ibid.. 11: 550-1; 13: 14-15, 132, 385; 14: 560-1. Fitzpatrick. Wri­
tings of Washington. 10: 268-9; 12: 8; 15: 462. Burnett, Letters of Con­
gress, 3: 382-4, 426.
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and lacked the political support of the state lines. Congress normally 
consolidated units drawn from the same or adjacent areas, retired ex­
cess officers, and transferred the consolidated unit to a state line if 
possible. Patton's and Hartley's Additional Regiments plus the four 
Pennsylvania companies of Malcolm's became the H t h  Pennsylvania Regi­
ment of 1779. Spencer's Additional Regiment absorbed the other four 
companies of Malcolm's. Virginia's three Additional Regiments consoli­
dated on 22 April 1779 under Colonel Nathaniel Gist. Massachusetts' 
three combined under Colonel Henry Jackson on 24 July 1779 as the 16th 
Massachusetts Regiment. Webb's became the 9th Connecticut Regiment on 
the same day. On the other hand Sherburne's had to disband on 1 May 1780. 
Its personnel transferred to Webb's, Jackson's, and the 2d Rhode Island 
Regiment depending on native state. When the 1st Canadian Regiment could 
not join the New York line it reduced to five small companies. The 2d 
Canadian Regiment, however, continued under its special four-battalion 
configuration.®^
Rhode Island's infantry reorganization represented a unique solution 
to its manpower problems. Most states turned to their Negro inhabitants, 
slave or free, when recruiting lagged among Caucasians. Most of the time 
the blacks served in integrated units performing the same duties as other 
Continentals, but Rhode Island tried a different approach. In January
87. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 11: 126; 13: 55; 14: 176, 180-1, 
263, 354, 401-3, 426, 464; 16: 3-4, 112-3; 18: 319, 455, 462-3; l9:_241-3._ 
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Historical Society. Scammell to Steuben, 25 Sep 1779; Hazen to Steuben,
11 Feb 1780; Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society.
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1778 the 1st Rhode Island Regiment transferred Its privates to the 2d, 
and the officers and noncommissioned officers returned home to refill 
the 1st primarily with Negroes. The state government purchased slaves 
who wished to enlist from their owners, promising them emancipation at 
the end of the war. Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens, Washington's aide, 
persuaded Congress to approve a similar plan for South Carolina on 29
OO
March 1779, but the state refused to implement it.
The formation of permanent light Infantry companies during the 
reorganization simplified Washington's task of organizing special strike 
forces. In 1779 four provisional light Infantry regiments under General 
Wayne achieved a smashing success in a night attack on Stony Point. The 
following year six light battalions operated as a division under Lafay­
ette. The use of special light infantry forces seemed to run counter to 
the European influence that permeated the Army at Valley Forge. Gulbert 
and Saxe, for example, stressed the value of training Infantrymen for 
both line and light infantry roles. In fact, the Continentals did train 
every individual in a regiment to perform both missions, while the light 
corps used standard linear formations as well as skirmishing.*^
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Washington and Knox implemented the artillery portion of the re­
organization with less difficulty than the Infantry part. The only 
major organizational impact came when Maryland's separate companies 
joined Harrison's Virginia regiment, provisionally in 1778 and perma­
nently on 9 May 1780. Maryland raised three large artillery companies
(4 officers and 102 enlisted men each) as state troops, but formally
90
transferred them to the Continental Army in late 1777. Assigning 
numerical designations to the artillery regiments created more diffi­
culty than any other phase of the reorganization. Washington needed 
two boards of general officers to resolve seniority disputes. In August 
1779 the generals decided that neither Lamb nor Crane could claim con­
tinuity from Knox's regiment. Harrison's therefore became the 1st Con­
tinental Artillery Regiment and Proctor's the 4th based on the dates of
their Continental authorization. The others drew lots to settle senior-
91
lty, with Lamb's becoming the 2d and Carne's the 3d.
Knox stabilized the weapons of the artillery arm at Valley Forge.
He planned to have four brass 3- or 6-pounders for each brigade. An ar­
tillery park for general support Included two 24-pounders, four 12-poun­
ders, four 8-lnch and eight 5-inch howitzers, and ten smaller fieldpleces. 
The unmanned reserve of 24-, 12-, 6-, and 3-pounders moved with the Main 
Army's trains while a siege battery of heavy iron guns and mortars stayed
90. Archives of Maryland, 18: 315-6, 571-8, 596-7. Ford, Journals of 
Congress. 9: 822; 10: 253. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 10: 360, 
520; 18: 31-32, 277-9.
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at Carlisle and Springfield. French imports, captured British guns, and 
pieces produced in America, all mounted on Muller-style carriages, exis­
ted in surplus numbers by 1778. Knox even had to abandon a plan in 1780 
to standardize fieldpleces with French 4-pounders (the most efficient 
combination of mobility and firepower) because he could not waste the 
massive stockpile of stores on hand for 6- and 3-pounders.Companies 
were rotated among the brigades, large garrisons, and the artillery park 
to maintain proper cross-training. Knox established a program of in­
struction and endorsed the theory that field artillery should fire at
Infantry targets. During the battle of Monmouth this tactic proved ex- 
93tremely effective.
Forage problems and changed strategic considerations led Washington 
to scatter the light dragoon regiments in late 1778, and they never 
again assembled as a brigade. Serious shortages of men and horses also 
began to appear. Washington considered, but abandoned, the idea of arm­
ing the troopers with blunderbusses in 1779 to Increase their firepower. 
A more practical suggestion originated with Major Benjamin Tallmadge of 
the 2d Continental Light Dragoons. Since new recruits could be found
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more easily than mounts, he suggested that they be equipped temporarily 
as light infantry. Washington ordered the 2d to implement this plan on 
14 August 1779, and on 24 September told Colonel Stephen Moylan's 4th 
to do the same. The 1st and 3d Continental Light Dragoons transferred 
to the Southern Department in 1776. They did not use the Infantry ex­
pedient but rather served throughout the rest of the southern campaigns
QA
as a composite mounted unit under Lieutenant Colonel William Washington.
Implementing the 27 May 1778 resolve took a year. It produced major 
changes only in the infantry regiments. Steuben's Blue Book and the 
other Improvements in training and support increased the effectiveness 
of officers and men, partially compensating for the weaknesses Inherent 
in the new regimental structure. The artillery merely improved extant 
forms and practices, while the mounted army and partisans reverted to 
reconnaissance duty. The permanent brigade consisting of several infan­
try regiments and an artillery company remained the basic tactical element 
of the Army. Washington improved it by adding to the specialized staff 
serving the brigade commander. The brigade Inspector, functioning as 
chief of staff, controlled a maintenance section under a conductor of 
military stores, a logistical section under a brigade quartermaster and
a brigade commissary, and an administrative section. The division, though
95a less permanent unit of organization, had a comparable staff.
94. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 13: 207-8, 219-20, 284, 339-40; 
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During that same period the Army's territorial department structure 
96
stabilized. Washington exercised effective control over all operations 
outside the south. The Main Army continued to function as the principal 
force, eliminating the need for a distinct Middle Department command.
The Northern and Highlands Departments remained separate commands but 
operated in close conjunction with the Main Army. The former normally 
contained the equivalent of a reinforced brigade; the latter a reinforced 
division. The Eastern Department's field army kept watch over the British 
in Newport with New England militia and state troops, reinforced by one 
or more Continental brigades. The newest territorial department, esta­
blished in 1777, was the Western Department. It protected the western 
frontiers of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania but received only two
Q7
regiments in 1778 and remained a minor command. Through 1778 the 
Southern Department contained essentially only Georgia and South Carolina 
units.
Summary.
By July 1779 the Continental Army achieved the status of a competent,
well-trained force. Excluding the two thousand or so effectives in the
98
Southern Department and a handful of regiments in Isolated frontier 
garrisons in the Northern and Western Departments, Washington had about 
25,000 officers and raen.^ The Main Army and Highlands Department contained
96. Knox to Lamb, 22 Aug 1780; Lamb Papers, New-York Historical Society. 
Lovell to Gates, 23 May 1777; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
97. Ford, Journals of Congress. 7: 247-9. Fitzpatrick, Writings of 
Washington. H :  439-41; 12: 200-1.
98. Lincoln to Congress, 1 Sep 1779; Record Group 360, National Archives.
99. Monthly Return, Main Army, Jul 1779; Record Group 93, National Ar­
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thirteen brigades stationed in the vicinity of New York City and four 
more under Sullivan attacking Indian villages in the Mohawk Valley.
Those 17 brigades' infantry contingents averaged about 65 officers, 80 
sergeants, 50 drummers and flfers, and 1,000 rank and file apiece, all 
of whom were available for combat. Their aggregate strength in July 
included 107 field, 737 company, and 260 staff officers, 1,409 sergeants, 
and 871 drummers and fifers fit and present with their regiments. Another 
78 field, 629 company, and 51 staff officers and 492 sergeants, drummers, 
and fifers were sick, prisoners, or detached. Nearly 14,000 rank and file 
were on duty with the line companies; most of the 2,600 others "on command" 
served with the light infantry corps. Fewer than 2,000 rank and file were 
sick. The force in Rhode Island contained 142 Infantry officers and 2,255 
enlisted men. Artillery with the Main Army and in the Highlands and Eas­
tern Departments accounted for another 200 or so officers and almost 2,000 
men. Together, these troops represented a sizeable combat force, although 
they probably amounted to only half of the strength called for on paper. 
Congress' decision to cut costs by using line officers to perform staff 
duties at echelons above the regiment employed 13 field and 209 company 
officers, a significant diversion of Washington's battlefield resources. 
Doctrine and training extracted the maximum value from the troops, but 
full quotas would have materially expanded the force at Washington's dis­
posal .
After Monmouth, units in the northern half of the country saw limited 
combat. The variety of conditions under which portions of the Main Army 
successfully engaged the enemy demonstrated the value of the professional 
skills nurtured by Washington and Steuben. In 1779 highly successful
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operations against the Iroquois Indians by General Sullivan and Wayne's 
nighttime bayonet assault on Stony Point demonstrated the Army's flexi­
bility. l780's battles at Springfield, New Jersey, showed conclusively 
that a single brigade under its self-contained organization could suc­
cessfully stand off a superior force until the rest of the Main Army 
100
could arrive.
Britain'8 decision to shift offensive operations to the southern 
states in part reflected the difficulty in successfully engaging the 
Main Army. The shift did force Congress to transfer units from the north. 
Both remaining North Carolina regiments arrived at Charleston on 3 March 
1780 where they rejoined the 3d which had been filled again. The Vir­
ginia line (minus one regiment stationed at Fort Pitt) followed. Briga­
dier General William Woodford reached Charleston on 6 April 1780 with 
the 1st, 2d, and 3d Virginia Regiments at full strength and the others 
with officer cadres only.*®1 These units and the Georgia and South Caro­
lina remnants surrendered on 12 May 1780 when Charleston fell, the worst 
defeat the Continental Army suffered during the entire Revolution. Still, 
the sustained 42-day defense of an Inferior position demonstrated the Army's 
ability to fight. Sophisticated use of artillery crossfire and ricochet 
techniques held the British at bay until jaeger sniper fire silenced the
100. Washington's use of the brigade is identical to the role of the di­
vision in Guibert's writings and the corps in Napoleon's campaigns.
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On 5 April 1780 General de Kalb received orders to inarch the Mary­
land division and the 1st Continental Artillery Regiment to reinforce 
the south. De Kalb provisionally reorganized the division on 15 July 
for greater efficiency since it now represented the only Continental 
force in the department. He formed his infantry into four full eight-
company regiments and sent the surplus officers home to recruit. On 24
103July General Gates arrived as the new Southern Department commander.
Gates led the division and reinforcing militia to crushing defeat at 
Camden. De Kalb's Continentals fought very well until they were over­
whelmed when the militia broke and uncovered their flank. After the bat­
tle, the division's superior training enabled General Smallwood to reas­
semble it quickly as a provisional regiment with two four-company battal-
104
ions and two light Infantry companies.
On 18 January 1778 Captain Johann Heinrichs of the Hesse-Cassel 
jaegers commented in a letter to the Hessian Minister of State "Nor is 
their standing army to be dispised ... J  it only_/ requires Time and good 
leadership to make them formidable." The accuracy of this observation 
was clear. The Continental Army came of age between 1778 and 1780. Regi­
ments trained by Washington and Steuben continued to suffer from shortages 
of personnel but fought well under a wide range of conditions. The Army's
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organization achieved sophistication; its leadership down to the con* 
pany level emerged as an experienced, tough, and competent group with 
few exceptions. The "Europeanization" of the Continental Army evolved 
from foreign volunteers and the wisdom of Washington and other American 
leaders in selecting only those concepts which they realized would 
work in the American situation.
CHAPTER VII 
PERSEVERANCE TO VICTORY
The first years of the War of American Independence witnessed the 
growth of the Continental Army from a small nucleus patterned after the 
Provincials of earlier wars into a long-term force which included men 
from every state as well as foreign volunteers. The latter, particularly 
Steuben and Duportail, contributed European military theory and training 
skills to go with practical American experience. Beginning at Valley 
Forge that blend produced a complex and relatively sophisticated organi­
zation which solved the purely military problems that faced the Continen­
tal Army. During the final years of the Revolution a recurring problem 
with recruiting and the general collapse of the American economy forced 
retrenchment. The Continental Army eventually disappeared as a standing 
military force, but first it triumphed at Yorktown and then it disbanded 
without undermining the government.
Economy and the 1781 Reorganization.
Congress' plan for reorganization in 1778 emphasized reduction of 
expenses and adjustment of quotas to more realistic levels. Those goals 
continued to be an important consideration in succeeding years despite 
the weakening of the Main Army as units transferred to the Southern De­
partment to counter a growing British danger. By October 1780, as the 
original three-year enlistments threatened to expire, the Army was
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clearly under great pressure. New efforts to conform to realistic 
limitations and still extract a maximum advantage from available re­
sources produced a major realignment of military force.
In January 1780 Robert R. Livingston, a delegate with a strong con­
cern for the Army, suggested increasing efficiency by reducing the infan­
try to sixty full regiments. Surplus officers would retire on full pay, 
subject to recall to fill vacancies, eliminating the cost of allowances. 
Washington and Steuben persuaded Congress to avoid a major reorganiza­
tion at that time. Washington argued that it was not necessary until 
enough French naval and economic aid became available to make a major 
offensive possible. He did take the opportunity to point out deficien­
cies in the existing regimental structure. Congress decided on 9 Febru­
ary not to disband any regiments and established quotas to place 35,211 
men in the field for the coming campaign. Congress based that figure on 
Steuben's report that anticipated operations required a minimum of 36 
rank and file per company, or a total of 324 for each infantry regiment. 
That plan produced 21,000 infantry, 2,000 artillery, and 1,000 cavalry 
for field armies plus sufficient supporting troops and garrisons.1
At the time of these discussions the Continental Army actually con­
tained approximately that number of officers and men. The Southern
1. Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress 
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Department held all the troops from Georgia and the Carolines, the three 
provisional Virginia regiments, two regiments of dragoons, and Pulaski's 
corps. The equivalent of a brigade of Continentals served in the Eastern 
Department while the Northern and Western Departments each had about two 
regiments. Sixteen brigades plus supporting troops, the heart of the 
Army's fighting strength, manned the Main Army and the Highlands Depart­
ment. Excluding the New Hampshire Brigade at Danbury, Connecticut, 
Washington's infantry included 168 field, 1,209 company, and 273 staff 
officers; 1,650 sergeants; 1,579 drummers and fifers; and 14,673 rank and 
file. Artillery added 180 officers and 1,190 enlisted men, cavalry ano­
ther 64 officers and 672 men. More significant, those brigades lacked 
331 officers, 3l5 sergeants, 242 drummers and fifers, and 13,353 rank 
and file.^
In the spring Washington began to hope that the Continentals and an 
expected French force under the Comte de Rochambeau could attack New York 
City. He redoubled recruiting efforts and prepared to call for militia. 
Rochambeau'8 troops reached Newport, Rhode Island, too debilitated from 
the sea voyage to participate in action in 1780. Washington reluctantly 
cancelled his plans. By September, despite transfers of the Virginia, 
Maryland, and Delaware regiments to the south, Washington still controlled 
a dozen Continental brigades, supporting units, and a number of separate 
garrisons. His infantry now included 169 field, 1,091 company, and 261 
staff officers; 1,381 sergeants; 774 drummers and fifers; and 17,232 
rank and file. Three artillery regiments added 140 officers and 1,097 
men; cavalry somewhat more than 500 of all ranks. Militia on duty in
2. Monthly Return, Main Army, Jan 1780; Record Group 93, National Archives.
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New York and Rhode Island amounted to 181 officers and 3,192 men.
Shortages remained acute, particularly among ensigns, artillery second 
lieutenants, and enlisted men. The infantry lacked 372 officers, 384 
sergeants, 340 drummers and fifers, and 12,718 rank and file; the artil­
lery regiments 77 officers and 652 men. Equally important, over 200 
infantry officers detailed to perform staff duties did not serve with 
their regiments.
Washington's ability to compensate for transfers through recruiting 
came in part from close cooperation with a Congressional committee. It 
journeyed to headquarters in late spring to investigate logistical prob­
lems but had a secondary mission to recommend ways to cut expenses by unit 
reductions and reorganizations. The committee members, Philip Schuyler, 
John Mathews, and Nathaniel Peabody, interpreted their mandate broadly 
and gradually came to view themselves as a permanent executive agency 
working in harmony with the Army. A majority of delegates disagreed with 
the committee's outspoken statements and recalled it on 11 August. On
the other hand its recommendations formed the basis for a series of fall
4
reorganizations of the various staff departments.
In 1780 the Continental Army received a series of major blows: the
fall of Charlestoa, the debacle at Camden, and the terrible shock of 
Benedict Arnold's treason. In August Washington pushed Congress to act
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quickly since the three-year enlistments of 1777 would expire during the
coming winter. He recommended total centralization of military affairs
under Congress' control and Institution of a three-year draft to offset
decreasing enlistments. Washington argued that a strong Army cost less
than constant militia calls and reminded the delegates that
No Militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist 
a regular force. Even those nearest the seat of War are 
only valuable as light Troops to be scattered in the woods 
and plague rather than do serious Injury to the Enemy. The 
firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is 
only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and 
service.
On 28 August Congress responded by appointing a committee to prepare 
a reorganization plan. In addition to Samuel Adams, who often disagreed 
with Washington on policies, it contained Joseph Jones of Virginia, Thomas 
McKean of Delaware, John M. Scott of New York, and Ezekiel Cornell of 
Rhode Island. Those four were close associated and predisposed to follow 
the Commander-in-Chief's recommendations. The committee consulted Steuben 
and then recommended that Congress require each state to have a full com­
plement of men in the field by 1 December each year. They knew a draft 
posed insurmountable political problems. As an alternative to it they 
convinced Congress to require each state to enlist its full quota for the 
duration of the war. Until it reached that goal a state had to provide 
men for not less than one year's service. The importance of this new ap­
proach lay in the stipulation that the men remain until replacements came.^
5. Washington to Congress, 15 Sep 1780; Ibid., 20: 50. Also see 19: 
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Congress gave preliminary approval to a comprehensive reorganiza­
tion plan on 3 October 1780 which attempted to balance financial limits 
and Washington's military desires. As James Duane told Washington, the 
plan was "submitted, as it is, to your Opinion. It is only to be con­
sidered as an Essay open to such Alterations as you may suggest."^ On 
21 October, true to its word, Congress adopted verbatim the changes
g
Washington requested. The plan reduced "the regular army of the United 
States" on 1 January 1781 to 49 infantry regiments, Moses Hazen's special 
Canadian Infantry regiment, 4 artillery regiments, 4 legionary corps, 2 
partisan corps, and a regiment of artificers. Washington confirmed that 
the engineers, Sappers and Miners, Marechaass£e, and Invalids remained 
unchanged. All other units had to disband and transfer their enlisted 
men to the line regiments. Every unit except Hazen's and the partisans 
found Itself allotted to a single state to simplify subsistence and re­
placement problems.^ At Washington's request Congress let the Army ra­
ther than the state governments decide which officers to retain.
Infantry reorganization formed the heart of the change. Congress 
apportioned the forty-nine regiments on the basis of a realistic estimate 
of the states' ability to raise men rather than on total population. 
Hazen's unallotted regiment, now designated as the Canadian Regiment, 
continued under its four-battalion configuration because of the unique
7. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 5s 414-5.
8. Ibid., 5: 404, 407, 417-8, 422-3, 428. Ford, Journals of Congress. 
18: 893-7, 959-62. Steuben to Washington, 23 Oct 1780; Steuben Papers, 
New-York Historical Society. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 20: 
157-67, 263-4, 277-81, 3H-2, 400.
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agreement Hazen had with Congress. It absorbed the remaining Canadians 
from Livingston's old 1st Canadian Regiment and other miscellaneous 
men.10 Washington persuaded Congress to make some changes in the struc­
ture of a regiment because he doubted that every regiment actually would 
reach full strength. The Commander-in-Chlef complained that if the three 
regiments allotted to South Carolina and Georgia were excluded, a reason­
able assumption since those states had been overrun by the British, the 
plan provided only 18,000 Infantry. Washington needed 22,000: 18,000
for mobile field forces, 2,500 to garrison the Hudson Highlands, and 
1,500 on the frontiers.
The original Congressional plan continued the basic regimental 
alignment of one light and eight line companies, all equal in size. It 
added three enlisted men to each and left the officers unchanged. At 
Washington's request Congress made major c h a n g e s . E a c h  regiment's 
three field officers, either a colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major, 
or a lieutenant colonel commandant and two majors, no longer served as 
company commanders. This change enlarged the Army's pool of field offi­
cers and increased the number of captains in each regiment, increasing 
flexibility. Every company now expected to have three officers present 
in combat. Two sergeants, one officially designated for the first time 
as the first sergeant, and another corporal joined each company. The 
number of privates rose substantially from 53 to 64. Four extra lieuten­
ants joined the regimental staff as permanent paymaster, adjutant, quar­
termaster, and regimental recruiter. The latter remained in his home
10. Ford, Journals of Congress. 19: 427-8; 20: 711-2. Board of War re< 
port, 28 Jun 1781; Record Group 360, National Archives.
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state with a drummer and a fifer and devoted full time to securing re­
placements. Surplus lieutenants created by the reduction in the number 
of regiments filled these positions and vacant enslgncies.
Washington liked the new specifications for an infantry regiment.
Even without the recruiting party and the light company, which would be 
detached under normal circumstances, it had considerably more power than 
the 1778 regiment. Each company's rank and file strength, the true mea­
sure of force, increased by slightly more than 20 percent from 56 to 68. 
More officers and sergeants promised better control. A regiment engaging 
in combat at full strength would deploy 544 rank and file under 40 ser­
geants, 24 company officers, and 3 field officers. The 1781 regiment 
still remained weaker than the 1776 version, but it corrected most of the 
deficiencies of the 1778 plan and employed better organization than a 
British unit.
The new artillery regiment proposed by Congress added eleven matros- 
ses to each company but reduced the number of companies in a regiment.
Staff and company officers and noncommissioned officers remained unchanged.
Congress initially planned on nine companies per regiment, but Washington
12
convinced the delegates to simplify administration by authorizing ten. 
Otherwise he accepted Congress' plan. Although the number of artillery 
companies in the Army dropped to 40, the number of matrosses rose sharply 
on paper from 1,344 to 1,560. Allotment of the regiments to Virginia, New 
York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania was based on their primary recruiting 
areas. The 1st and 3d regiments converted through attrition. Lamb's 2d, 
a very strong regiment, and Proctor's 4th, which had only eight companies,
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presented more of a problem due to a long-standing argument between Lamb
and Pennsylvania. Washington consolidated the two companies of the 2d
from Pennsylvania with Gibbs Jones' separate company and Isaac Coren's
company of laboratory technicians in the Artillery Artificer Regiment.
The resulting companies transferred to the 4th, bringing both regiments
13
to the ten-company limit.
Congress also Intended only minor changes in the four light dragoon 
regiments, adding five privates to each troop. Washington, conscious of 
forage problems and the success of the 2d and 4th regiments' experiments, 
countered with a very different proposal.1** Under his plan each regi­
ment dismounted two troops, turning the unit into a European-style 
legionary corps. "1 prefer Legionary Corps," he told Congress, "because
the kind of Service _/ reconnaissance duties_/ we have for horse almost
15
constantly requires the aid of Infantry." The Infantry contingent 
gave each regiment the ability to defend its camp when on patrol. Congress 
liked the savings achieved by eliminating over one hundred horses per 
regiment. As in the case of the artillery, allocation reflected original 
recruiting areas.
Similar considerations led Washington to make one further recommen­
dation with respect to mounted units. He stated, "Tho' in general I dis­
like independent Corps, I think a Partisan Corps with an Army useful in
13. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18: 277-9, 311; 20: 344-5; 21: 
45-46, 411; 22: 45-48. Knox to Lamb, 8 Sep, 2 and 21 Nov 1780; Robert 
Walker to Lamb, 31 Oct 1780; Ebenezer Stevens to Lamb, 3 Nov 1780; John 
Lamb Papers, New-York Historical Society.
14. See Figure 13.
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many respects. Its name and destination stimulate to enterprise."^ 
Congress approved retaining one for the Main Army and one for the sou­
thern army, under Henry Lee and Colonel Armand respectively. Although 
similar in most respects to a legionary corps, the troop organization 
had major differences. Each had only fifty privates reflecting the fact 
that the partisans did not disperse as much as the legions. Three dis­
mounted troops provided greater staying power because a partisan corps 
operated at a greater distance from its army than a legionary corps.
Congress reduced the support units to a single regiment containing 
eight sixty-man companies. At the state's request and because Philadel­
phia's urban status promised to be a more fertile recruiting area for 
"mechanics," Congress allotted it to Pennsylvania. The delegates did 
not specify which of the two existing artificer regiments to retain until 
29 March 1781. Then Congress directed Baldwin's Quartermaster Artificer 
Regiment to disband and regroup its men into single companies in the 
Main Army and southern army. The rest of the companies came from Flower's 
Artillery Artificer Regiment. Actually the artificers served in detach­
ments for the remainder of the war and the planned eight companies never 
materialized. The southern army supplemented them in 1782 with a pro­
visional pioneer company.^
The plan for the Army in 1781 called for a total of sixty-one regi­
mental equivalents. States supporting the Southern Department furnished,
16. Washington to Congress, 11 Oct 1780; Ibid.» 20: 163. See Figure 14.
17. Ibid.. 20: 339-40; 21; 402; 23: 202-4; 24: 133. Ford. Journals of 
Congress, 22: 148-9. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 5: 76-79, 462. Juli­
an P. Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton: Princeton
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on paper, a total of 1 artillery and 21 infantry regiments, 2 legionary
corps, and a partisan corps. Washington expected to have the services
of 29 infantry regiments (including Hazen's large unit), 3 artillery
regiments, 2 legionary corps, and 1 partisan corps, plus the Sappers
and Miners, Marechauss£e, Invalids, and his guard. This arrangement,
including the nominal services of the artificer regiment, reflected the
different types of operations faced in each theater. Washington had
more artillery, Infantry, and specialist troops in anticipation of an
attack on the fortified base at New York City. The Southern Department's
smaller infantry and artillery contingents but proportionately larger
cavalry force gave it more mobility. Implementation of the reorganize-
18
tlon officially took place on 1 January 1781.
The Main Army reorganized in winter quarters. The four New England 
lines easily accomplished the transition by consolidating units where 
practical or by disbanding higher numbered ones and transferring person­
nel. New Hampshire chose the latter route, Rhode Island the former, 
ending its experiment in segregation in the process. Massachusetts cut 
from 16 to 10 regiments and Connecticut from 9 to 5 through consolidation. 
Both renumbered their lines to reflect new seniority sequences. Brigades 
now required only three Infantry regiments to sustain the combat power of 
four old ones. These four lines organized six brigades: 3 from Massachu­
setts, 2 from Connecticut, and 1 from New Hampshire. Rhode Island's 
regiment rounded out the 2d Connecticut Brigade, and the 10th Massachusetts 
Regiment served as the third element of the New Hampshire Brigade. This
18. Fitzpatrick. Writings of Washington. 21: 12-13, 38-39, 82-83, 250-1.
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arrangement produced a regional force of three divisions with significant
homogeneity and strength.
New York's reduction from five to two regiments occurred in the
Northern Department where the state's brigade maintained garrisons. Con-
solldation produced the required enlisted strength but left a surplus of
experienced officers. The state used them to lead a new corps of state
troops which assumed responsibility for frontier defense with Congress'
20
financial support. New Jersey simply disbanded its 3d regiment and 
reorganized the remaining two at Pompton. A full company of the 2d im­
mediately marched to occupy the Wyoming Valley and mediate a Connecticut-
21
Pennsylvania territorial dispute. Each state continued to field a 
brigade, although both lacked one regiment.
The reorganization precipitated a major crisis in the Pennsylvania 
line, camped for the winter at Morristown. On the evening of 1 January, 
before actual implementation, the enlisted men mutinied over chronic 
shortages of food, clothing, and pay. Most men believed that the reduc­
tion released them from 1777 enlistments ambiguously recorded as "for 
three years or the duration of the war." Sergeants gained control, mar­
ched the regiments to Princeton, and negotiated with representatives from 
Pennsylvania's government and Congress. The men proved that they only 
wanted a redress of grievances by arresting several British agents. The
19. Ibid.. 20: 410, 491; 21: 40-41, 45, 69-70, 405.
20. Ibid., 20: 295-7, 417-8; 21; 17. Ford, Journals of Congress. 19: 
339; 23: 525. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 5: 148, 157-8, 177-8, 444-5; 
6: 313-5, 322-3, 333-4, 337-8. Jacob Judd, ed., The Revolutionary War 
Memoir and Selected Correspondence of Philip Van Cortlandt (Tarrytown: 
Sleepy Hollow Restorations, 1976), pp. 57-58.
21. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21: 29, 32-33, 37-38.
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settlement of the mutiny established an impartial review panel which 
examined each man's enlistment and released 1,250 infantrymen and 67 
artillerists by the end of January. The remaining 1,150 men clearly 
had enlisted for the duration and received furloughs until 15 March.
The soldiers received promises of back pay, clothing, and freedom from 
reprisals. The reorganization, with an effective date of 17 January, 
consolidated paper cadres for six regiments and ordered them to reas­
semble at specific towns.^
The mutiny not only deprived Washington of the two planned Pennsyl­
vania brigades, it opened the door to future revolts. On 20 January 
the New Jersey regiments attempted to extract similar concessions. 
Washington reacted swiftly this time and asked Congress not to interfere. 
He sent General Robert Howe from the Highlands with a detachment of New 
Englanders and orders to "compel the mutineers to unconditional submis­
sion" and to execute "a few of the most active and Incendiary leaders."
On 27 January Howe suppressed the mutiny and shot two ringleaders,
23checking the spread of unrest.
Active operations complicated the reorganization of the southern 
units. Washington realized that recruitment problems there dwarfed his 
own and favored creating a mobile force to pin the British into coastal
22. Charles J. Stille, Major-General Anthony Wayne and the Pennsylvania 
Line in the Continental Army (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1893), 
pp. 248-63. William Henry Smith, ed., The St. Clair Papers ... (2 vols., 
Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co., 1882), 1; 532-3. Burnett, Letters of 
Congress. 5: 516-33, 540-1. Pennsylvania Archives, 2d Ser., H :  631-74; 
4th Ser., 3: 796-9.
23. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 21: 124-5, 128-30, 135-7, 146-9.
S. H. Shreve, ed., "Personal Narrative of the Services of Lieut. John 
Shreve of the New Jersey Line of the Continental Army," Magazine of Ameri­
can History. 3 (1879), p. 575.
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enclaves rather than attempt to reduce fortified cities. On 14 October 
1780 he selected Nathanael Greene to replace Gates as department comman­
der. To assist in rebuilding the department's forces he assigned 
Steuben to Greene. Greene left Steuben in Virginia to establish lines 
of communications and oversee the rehabilitation of Virginia's forces
and arrived himself at Charlotte, North Carolina, on 2 December. The
24next day he formally relieved Gates.
The heart of the southern army remained the infantry regiments from 
Maryland and Delaware. After Camden the Delaware men served in Peter 
Jacquette's line company with the Maryland troops and Robert Kirkwood's 
light infantry company. Surplus officers returned to Delaware to fill
25
the rest of the regiment but only organized two companies by mid-1781. 
Maryland assembled recruits and men from disbanded units for Greene.
The veterans and first replacements reestablished the 1st and 2d Mary­
land Regiments. The 6th and 7th disbanded, and the 3d, 4th, and 5th 
reorganized at cadre strength in Maryland. The 5th refilled first and 
reached Greene by mid-February; the 3d and 4th did not set out until 28 
August and 4 September, respectively.
24. Ford, Journals of Congress, 18: 906, 994-6. Southern Department Gener­
al Orders, 3 and 4 Dec 1780; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society. 
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 20: 50, 181-2, 238-9, 321.
25. William Seymour, A Journal of the Southern Expedition, 1780-1783 (Wil­
mington: Historical Society of Delaware, 1896), pp. 7-11. Joseph Brown
Turner, ed., The Journal and Order Book of Captain Robert Kirkwood ... 
(Wilmington: Historical Society of Delaware, 1910), pp. 11-13. Charles W. 
Dickens, ed., "Orderly Book of Caleb Prew Bennett at the Battle of Yorktown, 
1781." Delaware History. 4 (1955), pp. 108-9, 113, 121, 139, 146.
26. Joslah Hall to Gates, 12 Oct 1780; Gist to Gates, 26 Oct 1780; Gates 
Papers, New-York Historical Society. Greene to Gist (copy), 10 Nov 1780; 
Gist to Steuben, 14 Feb 1781; to Governor Thomas Lee, 8 Feb 1781; Steuben 
Papers, New-York Historical Society. Arthur J. Alexander, "How Maryland 
Tried to Raise Her Continental Quota," Maryland Historical Magazine, 42 
(1942), pp. 191-2. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21: 82-83.
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Greene knew he had no hope of organizing Continentals from Georgia 
or the Carolines and told Steuben to concentrate on rebuilding Virginia's 
regiments. Civilian officials handled recruiting, freeing Continental 
officers to organize the provisional units required to face a series of 
crises. The use of provisional formations undermined Washington's plan 
to refill the regiments lost at Charleston. The return of escaped prison­
ers of war who claimed that their captivity had released them from their 
enlistments, frequent reshuffling of the provisional units, and diversion 
of officers to command militia detachments all complicated Steuben's task. 
The Virginia line's reorganization amounted to a paper arrangement of of­
ficers except in the case of the regiment at Fort Pitt, the only unit not
lost at Charleston. It was reorganized with only two companies and re-
27
designated from the 9th to the 7th Virginia Regiment.
Without the Virginia infantry regiments Greene remained dangerously 
weak. Washington and Congress sent him Henry Lee's 2d Partisan Corps in 
December and in February 1781 decided to shift the Pennsylvania line once 
it recovered from the mutiny. Majmr General Arthur St. Clair found reas­
sembling his regiments in that state unexpectedly difficult. To expedite 
matters he formed three provisional regiments, each containing eight 40-man 
companies. A detachment of the 4th Continental Artillery Regiment with 
four guns and one troop of the 4th Legionary Corps (containing all the men
27. Ibid., 19: 381-2; 20: 465; 21: 82. Boyd, Jefferson Papers, 4: 17-18, 
349-50, 603-4; 5: 111-6, 162-3; 6: 30-32. William P. Palmer, ed.. Calen­
dar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts (ll vols., Richmond: 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 1875-93), 1: 594-6. Muhlenberg to Gates, 12 Oct 
1780; Abraham Buford to Gates, 21 Oct and 1 Nov 1780; Return of the Sou­
thern Army, 5 Nov 1780; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society. W. A. 
Irvine, ed., "Affairs at Fort Pitt in 1782," Historical Magazine, 1st Ser., 
7 (1863), pp. 306-9.
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who had horses) complemented them. After overcoming major financial
and logistical problems and crushing a minor mutiny, Anthony Wayne
finally departed from York in late May. St. Clair remained behind
28
to continue recruiting.
The October 1780 plan for sixty-one regimental equivalents divided 
into two major commands did not materialize. Washington's Main Army 
and subsidiary commands in the north lost the services of the 2d Parti­
san Corps and Pennsylvania's legionary corps, its artillery regiment, 
and the six Infantry regiments. The Southern Department fared worse.
It completely lacked the 7 Infantry regiments projected for the Carolines 
and Georgia and had only 3 of the 14 authorized Virginia, Maryland, and 
Delaware infantry regiments. None of the Pennsylvanians reached the area 
during the first part of 1781. Greene's single artillery regiment amoun­
ted to the crews for a handful of fleldpieces, his two legionary corps 
actually operated as a small cavalry regiment, and only one of the two 
partisan corps remained fit for combat. On the other hand the regiments 
serving in the Continental Array in 1781 contained very experienced cadres. 
The reorganization left only the most competent officers and placed them 
in command of efficiently organized units. During 1781 those troops 
engaged in the war's decisive campaigns.
28. Ford, Journals of Congress. 19: 177-9, 275. Boyd, Jefferson Papers. 
4: 322-4. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21: 272-3, 294, 473-4;
22: 191-2. Smith, St. Clair Papers, 1; 544-5, 548-9. Stille, Wayne, 
pp. 264-7. Historical Magazine. 1st Ser., 6 (1862), pp. 337-8. L/“aw- _ 
rence_/ Keene to Board of War, 10 Apr 1781; St. Clair _/ to Board of War_/, 
5 Apr 1781; Record Group 360, National Archives.
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Triumph at Yorktown.
The 1781 campaign conclusively demonstrated the maturity of the 
Continental Army as a small but effective military force. Washington 
and Greene wrested the strategic initiative from the British, took ad­
vantage of their troops' strengths, and adjusted plans to meet changing 
circumstances. Their joint actions combined with French military, naval, 
and financial support to create and exploit a defect in British dispo­
sitions. In October they Inflicted a major defeat on Great Britain at 
Yorktown, Virginia, an engagement which proved to be decisive.
The year's operations began in the Carolines. General Charles 
Cornwallis suffered a major setback at Cowpens on 17 January when Banas- 
tre Tarleton engaged the Southern Department's light troops under Briga­
dier General Daniel Morgan. Morgan had several contingents of southern 
irregulars, special militia units which contained a large proportion of 
Continental veterans, and Greene's best troops. He developed tactics 
which blended the talents of these diverse groups. Morgan deployed the 
irregulars in a double line of skirmishers, forcing Tarleton to commit 
his reserve before the British reached the main American line. A sharp 
counterattack by the Continentals shattered the disorganized British and
destroyed Tarleton's force. Losses in this battle and an earlier defeat
29at King's Mountain eliminated most of Cornwallis' light troops.
29. Robert E. Lee, ed., Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of 
the United States. By Henry Lee (New York: University Publishing Co.,
1869), pp. 230-1. / “Banastre_7 Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns of 
1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces of North America (London: T.
Cadell, 1787), pp. 214-22. Morgan to Will/~iam Clajon_7, 26 Jan 1781; 
Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
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Although Cornwallis chased Greene across the Dan River into Vir­
ginia, the pursuit so debilitated his regiments that they had to with­
draw to Wilmington, North Carolina, to refit. That allowed Greene time 
to regroup his troops, establish a supply system, and dispatch Henry 
Lee's 2d Partisan Corps into South Carolina to assist Irregulars in 
harassing British outposts and lines of communications. By concentrating 
on quality and mobility, Greene turned the small size of his regular 
force into a logistical advantage. He only called out large militia 
contingents shortly before a battle. The rest of the time he left these 
part-time soldiers to restrict British reconnaissance and freedom of
movement with occasional assistance from Lee and William Washington's
30
composite detachment of Continental cavalry.
Greene reentered North Carolina and on 15 March fought Cornwallis 
at Guilford Court House. As at Cowpens, militia and Irregulars in skir­
mish lines forced the British to deploy prematurely and Inflicted heavy 
casualties. The Continentals then punished Cornwallis with accurate 
artillery and small arms fire. The Marylanders even drove back the elite 
Guards Brigade in a bayonet charge before Greene broke off the action. 
Cornwallis' losses of nearly 50 percent crippled his regiments as fighting 
units and ruined their m o r a l e . G r e e n e  next moved against the depot at 
Camden. He gambled that operations in South Carolina would restore 
civilian morale and deprive the British of vital logistical support.
30. Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke, eds., The Papers of Alexander 
Hamilton (26 vols., New York: Columbia University Press, 1961-79), 2:
529-31. Boyd, Jefferson Papers. 4: 288-9; 5: 360-2. Fitzpatrick, Wri­
tings of Washington. 20: 321.
31. Tarleton, Campaigns, pp. 271-9. George C. Rogers, Jr., ed., "Let­
ters of Charles O'Hara to the Duke of Grafton," South Carolina Historical 
Magazine. 65 (1964), pp. 159-66, 173-9.
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Cornwallis chose not to follow. He hoped that he could disrupt Greene's 
Virginia base before his own subordinates met defeat.
In a series of maneuvers and engagements Greene gradually drove
Francis Rawdon and Alexander Stewart back to the coast. On 8 September
he attacked Stewart's camp at Eutaw Springs. Militia and Irregulars led
the attack, with the Continentals in reserve. The high number of recruits
in his regiments forced Greene to deploy into line sooner than planned,
robbing his attack of some of its momentum. When his advance slowed,
Greene committed his reserve in "a brisk charge with trailed Arms, through
32a heavy cannonade, and a shower of Musket Balls." This maneuver routed 
the main British body. On the American side, broken terrain and casual­
ties among key officers disrupted most units, allowing Stewart to rally 
some of his men in dense thickets and a large brick house. Rather than 
risk defeat, Greene withdrew. Eutaw Springs left the British incapable 
of further offensive action in the south. Cornwallis' gamble that his 
subordinates could hold the Carolines and Georgia had failed.
As Greene planned his spring offensive Washington assembled the Main 
Army's light infantry companies, each raised to a level of at least 5 
sergeants and 50 rank and file. On 19 February 1781 Washington formed 
them into three battalions. Lieutenant Colonel Elijah Vose's contained 
the companies of the 1st through 8th Massachusetts Regiments. Another, 
under Jean-Joseph Glmat, included the remaining 2 Massachusetts companies, 
the 5 from Connecticut, and Rhode Island's. Francis Barber's battalion 
began with the 2 New Hampshire light companies and the single light
32. Greene to Congress, 11 Sep 1781; Record Group 360, National Archives.
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company of Hazen's Canadian Regiment; on 22 February it gained the 2 
light plus 3 line companies from New Jersey. Lafayette took command 
of the light corps on 20 February.
Benedict Arnold in his new role as a British brigadier began opera­
ting along Virginia's James River in January. Washington sent Lafayette's 
light infantrymen south to trap Arnold in conjunction with French war­
ships from Newport. Shallow waters frustrated the first naval expedition 
while a superior British squadron drove off a second. Lafayette's Con­
tinentals remained in Virginia, however, as reinforcements from New York 
City and Cornwallis' column from North Carolina joined Arnold. Although 
Lafayette could not defeat the British, Cornwallis lacked the mobility 
to catch him or to prevent the arrival in Virginia of Wayne's Pennsyl­
vanians. Wayne reorganized his provisional units into two stronger regi­
ments on 14 July, sending excess officers back to Pennsylvania to assist 
in recruiting.^ Cornwallis ended the summer by selecting Yorktown as 
the site for a permanent naval base.
While Greene and Lafayette gradually pressed the British troops in 
the south into a few coastal enclaves, Washington planned a Franco-Ameri­
can offensive to recapture New York City. By June, when he called on 
Rochambeau to march his expeditionary coTps from Rhode Island, the Main
33. John W. Wright, "The Corps of Light Infantry in the Continental 
Army." American Historical Review, 31 (1926), pp. 459-61. Fitzpatrick, 
Writings of Washington. 21: 169-<X), 232-5, 253, 274.
34. Ibid., 21: 254-6, 273-4, 421-4. Joseph A. Waddell, "Diary of Capt. 
John Davis, of the Pennsylvania Line," Virginia Magazine of History and 
Biography, 1 (1893), pp. 5-7. Joseph M. Beatty, ed., "Letters from Con­
tinental Officers to Doctor Reading Beatty, 1781-1788," Pennsylvania 
Magazine of History and Biography, 54 (1930), pp. 159-61.
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Army and Its outposts contained 8 brigades, Hazen's regiment, 2 artil-
35
lery regiments, 1 legionary corps, and various special units. Inclu­
ding the light corps with Lafayette (about 1,300 men), the Infantry por­
tion of Washington's force amounted to 61 field, 623 company, and 118 
staff officers, 810 sergeants, 461 drummers and flfers, and 7,854 rank 
and file. The regiments remained 120 officers, 295 sergeants, 166 drum­
mers and flfers, and 6,510 rank and file below authorized levels, a dis­
couraging fact. The artillery accounted for another 91 officers and 711 
men, short 45 officers and 597 men; Sheldon's legion had 23 of 32 officers 
and 303 of 423 men. Rochambeau added over 5,000 experienced, professional 
troops in 4 2-battalion Infantry regiments, a legion, 6 artillery compa­
nies, 2 companies of miners, and a company of bombardiers. They had re­
cently participated in the French war games that tested the latest develop­
ments in military theory. Washington also expected Admiral the Comte de 
Grasse to move up from the West Indies with additional troops and a large 
naval squadron.^
Washington and Rochambeau joined forces at Dobbs Ferry, New York, on 
6 July. Morale climbed still more with the news that the frigate Resolue 
had reached Philadelphia from France with arms, clothing, medicines, and 
two million livres in cash. When he learned that de Grasse Intended to 
sail to the Chesapeake rather than come directly to New York, Washington 
agreed with Rochambeau and decided to attack Cornwallis. Washington took
35. General Return, Main Army, Jun 1781; Record Group 93, National Archives.
36. Robert S. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare; The Theory 
of Military Tactics In Eighteenth Century France (New YoTk: Columbia Uni­
versity Press, 1957), p. 233. Evelyn M. Acorob, ed., The Revolutionary 
Journal of Baron Ludwig Von Closen 1780-1783 (Chapel Hill; University of 
North Carolina Press, 1958), pp. 4-5, 92, 132. Fitzpatrick, Writings of 
Washington. 22: 86-87, 102-7, 109-U, 116-22, 156-8, 207-9.
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about half of the Main Army and all of the French troops south. General 
Heath, assisted by Generals McDougall, Stirling, and Stark, remained 
behind to secure West Point and the northern frontier. They relied on 
militia and state troops plus the New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Con­
necticut infantry regiments, the Invalids, the 3d Continental Artillery 
Regiment, and the 2d Legionary Corps. Extraordinary efforts by Superin­
tendent of Finance Robert Morris and allied logistical staffs, drawing 
heavily on French cash, handled the largest and most complex troop move­
ment of the war with skill and dispatch. Washington's shrewd use of de­
ception obscured the change in plans from the British until they were
37powerless to Intervene.
De Grasse's squadron defeated a British fleet off the mouth of the 
Chesapeake Bay on 5 September, completing the isolation of Cornwallis. 
Washington opened his headquarters at Williamsburg ten days later and 
began organizing the allied troops for siege operations. Major General 
Benjamin Lincoln, the senior American commander, took charge of the al­
lied Right Wing. The six Continental brigades formed divisions under 
Lincoln, Lafayette, and Steuben and acted as the first line of the Ameri­
can wing. Virginia militia formed the second line. The Continental 
force amounted to 41 field, 355 company, and 66 staff officers, 547 ser­
geants, 272 drummers and fifers, and 6,412 rank and file. Militia con­
tributed another 188 officers and 3,426 men. Rochambeau commanded the
37. Ibid.. 22: 236-7, 395-7, 401-2, 450-1, 501-2; 23: 11-12, 19-23, 25n, 
33-34, 50-58, 68-72, 75-77, 104-7. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 6 : 208- 
11. Heath to CongresB, 5 Sep 1781; Record Group 360, National Archives. 
Victor L. Johnson, "Robert Morris and the Provisioning of the American 
Army During the Campaign of 1781," Pennsylvania History, 5 (1938), pp. 
7-20.
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Left Wing which consisted of his own corps and some 3,000 troops from
op
the West Indies under the Marquis de St. Simon.
Washington advanced on the evening of 28 September, urging the troops
to place their principle ]_ sic_/ relyance on the Bayonet, 
that they may prove the Vanity of the Boast which the 
British make of their particular prowess in deciding 
Battles with that Weapon.3^
Surprisingly, Cornwallis abandoned an outer line of defenses and enabled 
Washington to complete investment with only minor casualties. The siege 
itself followed formal European practices. Engineers started trenches 
during the night of 6-7 October at a range of 600 yards. Batteries 
opened fire on the ninth and quickly silenced defensive guns. A Becond 
or inner ring of trenches followed on the evening of 11-12 October. Be­
cause two detached redoubts threatened to outflank this new line Washing­
ton stormed them on 14 October. The French attacked one and Lafayette's 
light infantry assaulted the other. Preceded by a detachment of Sappers 
and Miners to cut a patch through obstacles, one of Lafayette's columns 
charged directly into the little fort while the other cut off retreat. 
American pride soared when they secured their objective more quickly 
than the elite French chasseurs and grenadiers. New batteries opened 
fire on the sixteenth, convincing Cornwallis that further resistance was 
hopeless. On 19 October his troops laid down their arras
38. Weekly Return, Main Army, 13 Oct 1781; Record Group 93, National 
Archives. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 23: 134-5, 146-7.
39. General Orders, 27 Sep 1781; Ibid., 23: 147.
40. Ibid., 23: 178-85. Joseph Plumb Martin. Private Yankee Doodle .... 
ed. by George F. Scheer (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1962), pp. 230-7. 
John W. Wright, "Notes on the Siege of Yorktown in 1781 with Special Re­
ference to the Conduct of a Siege in the Eighteenth Century," William and 
Mary Quarterly. 2d Ser., 12 (1932), pp. 229-49.
Plans to continue the offensive against other British garrisons in 
the south ended when de Grasse announced that his fleet had to return to 
the West Indies. Rochambeau decided to winter in Virginia, allowing the 
Continentals to split up. Major General St. Clair took some to rein­
force Greene, arriving at Round 0, South Carolina, on 4 January 1782.
He had two Delaware companies, the 3d and 4th Maryland Regiments, a pro­
visional Virginia regiment, Wayne's two Pennsylvania regiments and a 
third which arrived at Yorktown after the siege, plus all available 
mounted troopers from the 1st, 3d, and 4th Legionary Corps. Greene 
quickly regrouped the Pennsylvanians into two strong regiments, disbanded 
his 5th Maryland Regiment to fill the other four from that state, and 
transferred his Delaware men to the new companies. Armand's 1st Partisan 
Corps had to remain in Virginia because it required a more extensive re­
organization, beginning with the transfer of fifty men from the light 
41
Infantry corps.
Most of the rest of the Continentals marched from Yorktown under 
Lincoln and joined Heath in the Highlands. On arrival the light corps 
broke up and the individual companies returned to their regiments for 
the winter. Hazen's regiment escorted prisoners to Lancaster, and then
41. Greene to Congress, 23 Jan 1782; Record Group 360, National Archives. 
"Abstract of Musters for the Southern Army," 1 Apr-19 Sep 1782; Steuben 
Papers, New-York Historical Society. W. A. Irvine, ed., "Extracts from 
the Papers of General William Irvine," Pennsylvania Magazine of History 
and Biography, 5 (1881), pp. 268, 274-5. Archives of Maryland, 18: 429- 
75. Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 2: 127, 241, 582-5. 
Kirkwood, Order Book, pp. 27-30. Tuffin Charles Armand, Marquis de la 
Rouerie, "Letters of Col. Armand," New-York Historical Society Collections 
for 1878, pp. 323-30. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 23: 193-5,
198, 200, 216-7, 248-50, 258, 266-7, 270, 292-9, 309-13, 317-8.
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assumed responsibility for guarding the depot there. Lamb's regiment,
initially assisted by the Sappers and Miners, transported the siege train
and over 200 captured British pieces to Elkton, Maryland. The captured
guns went on to Philadelphia to be overhauled by an artificer company;
the field pieces accompanied the brigades to West Point; and Lamb's
regiment camped for the winter at Burlington, New Jersey, with the siege
A3
train. It did not resume its march to West Point until August.
Washington spent the winter at Philadelphia to discuss the future 
with Congress. The Continental Army had met the challenge during 1781. 
Greene's army, Lafayette's contingent, and Washington's Franco-American 
forces completely altered the course of the war. Yorktown ended British 
hopes of overrunning the south and reduced the enemy to a few footholds. 
French financial, naval, and military aid played a major role in achiev­
ing victory at Yorktown, but the Continentals' own battlefield prowess 
and superior mobility set the stage for the denouement. Washington had 
every reason to be proud of the year's combat, but he still had to face 
recurring economic problems and the failure of the states to furnish 
their full quotas of men.
A2. Ibid.. 23: 290-1, 293-A, 323-A, 37A; 25: 110-1. James Thacher, 
Military Journal of the American Revolution ... (Hartford: Hurlbut, Wil­
liams & Co., 1862), pp. 302-3.
A3. Knox to Lamb, 2 Nov 1781 and 31 Jul 1782; Knox to Washington (copy), 
30 Jul 1782; Lamb Papers, New York Historical Society. Fitzpatrick, 
Writings of Washington. 25: 58-59. The convoy for the move in 1782 from 
Burlington to West Point required H A  horses and 200 oxen to move the 
park's 39 wagons, A traveling forges, 18 assorted howitzers, 16 field- 
pieces, and A 12-pounders. While at Burlington the regiment conducted 
extensive scientific tests to evaluate different types of howitzers 
for Knox.
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The Road to Newburgh.
During the last two years of the Revolution the Continental Army 
did not engage in any major battles. Lack of French naval support pre­
vented assaults on the remaining British strongholds, and changed politi­
cal conditions in England made it clear that peace would be negotiated. 
Congress and the American people, weary of a long war, Increased the 
pressure on the military establishment to reduce costs. Washington's 
role In gradually dismantling the Army became one of his most important 
contributions to the new nation because he guided it through a severe 
political crisis.
Washington's winter conferences with Congress quickly established 
that the delegates wanted to trim expenses. They limited the number of
generals on active duty for the first time and reviewed staff organisa­
tions for ways to reduce costs. A committee recommended cutting the 
number of infantry regiments and the proportion of officers since:
the Class of Men who are willing to become Soldiers is 
much diminished by the War and therefore the Difficulties 
of raising an Army equal to former Establishments have
increased and will continue to increase.
Washington countered with arguments that the Army had eliminated regi­
ments faster since 1777 than the British, that captured documents indi­
cated that the British had more Loyalists on their rolls than he had Con­
tinentals, and that combat experience showed that the ratio of officers 
to men was already too low. He won his case for the time being, but on 
23 April 1782 Congress overturned one of the Important features of the 
1781 regiment in the interest of economy. The delegates eliminated three
44. Morris and Peters to Washington, 13 Aug 1781; Burnett, Letters of 
Congress. 6: 177-9.
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lieutenants from each regiment and ordered that company officers per-
45form the functions of adjutant, quartermaster, and recruiter.
Congress' 1782 economy drive concentrated on the Army's support 
structure. It used the new permanent executive "ministers" as the pri­
mary vehicle for making changes. Robert Morris, who became Superintendent 
of Finance on 20 February 1781, played a major role. Even more important 
was the Secretary of War, the office filled on 30 October 1781 by Ben­
jamin Lincoln. Lincoln's official functions were quite similar to the 
Board of War's and his English counterpart's. In practice he acted as 
Washington'8 liaison with Congress and Morris. Under Lincoln the War 
Office relied on an assistant, a secretary, and two clerks, and on the 
part-time use of line officers to eliminate most staff officials. Con­
gress did insist on reducing many of the individuals concerned with the 
direct support of the field armies, particularly those concerned with
transportation, although Washington protested that the change impaired
46
the Army's mobility.
Washington reached Newburgh on 31 March 1782 and formally resumed 
command in the north four days later. A private's letter written at 
that time reflects the conditions he found: "Times are very dubros ]_ sic
at present for there is no news of Peace as yeit. But the armies are all
45. Ibid., 6: 270-80. Ford, Journals of Congtess. 21: 791, 1127, 1163-5, 
1179-83; 22: 211-2, 381-2. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 23: 29-32, 
452-6, 498-9; 24: 391-2. The list of officers forced to retire by this 
'reform', dated 27 Apr 1784, is in Record Group 360, National Archives.
46. Ford, Journals of Congress. 19: 126-8, 180; 20: 662-7; 21; 1030, 1087, 
1173, H86-7; 22: 30-33, 36-37, 40-41, 129-31, 177-9, 216, 235, 244-5, 381, 
408-15, 425-7; 23: 683-6. Burnett. Letters of Congress, 6 : 11-12, 190-1, 
230-1. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 23: 410-2, 452-6; 24: 98-99; 
25: 72-73; 26: 84.
well diciplined _/ sic_/ and in wonderful good spirits and draw very 
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good provisions." By the Continental Army's standards conditions 
were good. The Highlands area contained long-established depots and 
housing. Training programs existed. Yorktown had raised morale. The 
army also Included a high proportion of hardened veterans able to make 
the most of their circumstances.
In June Washington and Steuben began monthly comprehensive brigade 
inspections designed to evaluate appearance, unit paperwork, maneuvers, 
and marksmanship. Washington liked the overall performance and compe­
titive spirit of the exercises, but warned the men to Temember that "It 
is the effect of the shot not the report of the Gun that can discomfort 
the Enemy and if a bad habit is acquired at exercise it will prevail in 
real action."*8 This rigorous training program culminated on 3I August. 
Washington moved the Main Army's camp from Newburgh to Verplanck's Point 
to simplify subsistence. In the process he tested the feasibility of an 
amphibious attack on New York. Five brigades, including fieldpieces, 
embarked in batteaux followed by other boats with baggage. Boat assign­
ments kept units intact and careful alignment Insured cohesion and rapid 
deployment as the craft reached the landing zone. This experiment was a 
striking success and Indicated that if de Grasse's warships had been
available for a real assault, Washington's veterans probably would have
40been able to capture Manhattan.
47. Sylvia J. Sherman, ad., Dubros Times: Selected Depositions of Maine
Revolutionary War Veterans (Augusta: Maine State Archives, 1975), p. 9.
Also see Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 24: loi.
48. Ibid., 24: 322.
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Washington also established a system of rewards in 1782 to enhance 
morale. He authorized an honorary badge, a chevron worn on the left 
sleeve of the uniform coat, for all enlisted men who "served more than 
three years with bravery, fidelity and good conduct." Two chevrons 
represented six years of such service. The Badge of Military Merit, a 
heart of purple silk edged with narrow lace and worn over the left lapel, 
became a special decoration. Washington proudly proclaimed that "The
50road to glory in a patriot army and a free country is thus open to all."
He only granted three of these awards, all in 1783.***
In August 1782, when Washington practiced the Verplanck's Point 
landing, his forces in the northern half of the nation Included eight 
brigades, Hazen's regiment, two artillery regiments, a legionary corps, 
and the smaller specialist units. The Infantry contributed 67 field,
475 company, and 119 staff officers, 813 sergeants, 448 drummers and 
flfers, and 9,210 rank and file. That amounted to roughly two-thirds 
of authorized strength. The two artillery regiments contained 100 offi­
cers and 907 men, the Invalids 27 officers and 337 men, and the Sappers 
and Miners 5 officers and 77 men. Sheldon's 2d Legionary Corps and the 
Marechauss^e contributed 30 officers and 355 men, raising the basic 
strength at Washington's disposal to about 800 officers and 12,000 men. 
Because of the shortage of recruits, Washington bowed to Congress' de­
sire to reduce the Army still further. On 7 August Congress ordered
50. Ibid.. 24: 488.
51. Ibid., 24: 487-8; 25: 7, 142; 26: 363-4, 481. Recipients of the 
Badge of Military Merit were Sergeants William Brown (formerly of the 5th 
Connecticut Regiment) and Elijah Churchill of the 2d Legionary Corps, and 
a Sergeant Blssel of the 2d Connecticut Regiment. Qualification for the 
Badge was based on a combination of gallantry in action and overall 
meritorious service.
280
all state lines to reform on the first of the year into complete regi­
ments containing no fewer than 500 rank and file. It did restore, on 
19 November, the regimental adjutant and quartermaster positions to full
staff status. At Washington's suggestion junior regiments disbanded to
52
provide the personnel to fill the remaining units.
On 1 January 1783 New York retained its two full regiments. Con­
necticut reduced its line to 3 regiments and Massachusetts to 8 , each 
of which amounted to at least 500 rank and file. Because New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, and New Jersey all came close to this minimum strength, 
Washington obtained special permission from Congress to delay their re­
organization until 1 March. Those states complained that this policy 
amounted to a disproportionate quota and failed to furnish the necessary 
recruits. On 1 March the 2d New Hampshire and 2d New Jersey Regiments 
were reduced to battalion strength. Each had 4 companies, 2 field 
officers, an adjutant, a quartermaster, a paymaster, and either a sur­
geon or a mate. The Rhode Island Regiment formed a similar battalion
53
with six companies.
Greene faced greater problems during 1782 although the British 
evacuated Savannah on 11 July and Charleston on 14 December. The sou­
thern army only engaged in skirmishing during this period, but its less 
stable provisional regiments suffered greater neglect than Washington's
52. Monthly Return, Main Army, Aug 1782; Record Group 93, National Ar­
chives. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 6: 431-2, 537-8. Ford, Journals 
of Congress. 22: 451-3; 23: 710-1, 736-9. Fitzpatrick, Writings of 
Washington. 24: 352-4.
53. Ibid.. 25: 286-7, 312-3, 376, 425-6, 439-40, 456, 460-1; 26: 3-4, 
22, 140-2, 172. Ford, Journals of Congress, 23: 837. Burnett, Letters 
of Congress. 7: 1-2, H-13.
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units. Washington directed Greene to rebuild the lines from Georgia 
and the Carolines so that the other regiments gradually could shift 
back to the Main Army. As a preliminary step he halted the movement 
of recruits from Pennsylvania and Maryland to the south.
Greene's Pennsylvanians reorganized as a single provisional regi­
ment under Lieutenant Colonel Josiah Harmar on 4 November 1782. On 1 
January Congress reduced the Pennsylvania line on paper from six to 
three regiments which remained depot cadres in contrast to Harmar*8 
crack combat unit. Greene handled the permanent Maryland regiments 
differently. The 3d and 4th disbanded and transferred personnel to the 
1st and 2d. A detachment of new Maryland recruits served with the Main 
Army in 1782 under Major Thomas Lansdale as a first step towards even­
tual movement of the line back to the north. The last two companies of 
the Delaware Regiment went home. The men received extended furloughs 
when they reached Christiana Bridge on 17 January 1783.^
Greene simply released the short-term Virginia troops as their en­
listments expired. The state's permanent regiments reorganized on 1 
January. All but two disbanded. The arrangement retained officers in 
proportion to the number of enlisted men remaining from the old regiments. 
The 1st Virginia Regiment formed at the Winchester replacement depot.
54. Ibid., 6: 446-7, 469-70, 480-1. Wayne to Greene, 12 Jul 1782; 
Greene to Congress, 13 Aug 1782; Record Group 360, National Archives. 
Ford, Journals of Congress. 23: 549, 560. Fitzpatrick, Writings of 
Washington. 24: 409-10; 25: 100, 162-3, 193-4.
55. Ibid., 25: 110-1, 283-4, 328; 26: 238. Archives of Maryland, 18: 
476-82. Seymour, Journal, pp. 40-42. Returns, Southern Army, 9 Jan 
and 2 Apr 1783; Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society. Greene's 
General Orders for 14 Sep and 2, 3, and 4 Nov 1782; Southern Department 
Orderly Book, New-York Historical Society. Ford, Journals of Congress, 
23: 560, 837.
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The 2d, only partially filled, contained the VlTginiana on duty at Fort
Pitt. Virginia*8 portion of the 1st Continental Artillery Regiment
became a single overstrength company under Captain William Pierce; the
Maryland portion remained a single company with Greene. The 1st and 3d
56
Legionary Corps formally consolidated as a five-troop unit.
Stabilized conditions in 1782 promised hope for reestablishing the 
Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina lines. Only North Carolina 
had real success, following efforts to raise 1,500 men for a period of 
eighteen months' service. Greene temporarily formed them into two regi­
ments and on 2 November permanently organized them as a regiment and a 
battalion. The South Carolina legislature decided to reorganize two 
regiments, but even after the evacuation of Charleston made no progress. 
Georgia planned to form its regiment and on 29 July 1782 even decided 
to mount two companies. Major John Habersham recruited some pardoned 
Loyalists, but the unit never reached strength. Congress did not ap­
prove the projected variation in its composition.^
The winter menths of 1782-1783, when the Army adjusted to the new 
quotas, became a critical period in national politics. Various groups
56. Ibid., 24: 275-6. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 26: 98, 101, 
206. J. D. Eggleston, "Officers of the Virginia Line at Winchester, 
1783," William and Mary Quarterly. 2d Ser., 7 (1927), p. 61. Katherine 
Glass Greene, Winchester. Virginia and Its Beginnings 1743-1814 (Stras- 
burg: Shenandoah Publishing House, 1926), pp. 241-4. Archives of Mary­
land, 18: 477, 580, 596-7. Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers,
2: 335. Greene's General Orders for 2 and 3 Nov 1782; Southern Depart­
ment Orderly Book, New-York Historical Society.
57. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 6 : 537-8. Allen D. Candler, ed.,
The Revolutionary Records of the State of Georgia (3 vols., Atlanta: 
Franklin-Turner Co., 1908), 3: 57, 79-80, 157, 161-3. Wayne to Greene,
12 Jul 1782; Greene to Congress, 13 Aug 1782; Record Group 360, National 
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realized that the war would end shortly and that they had to act quickly 
to obtain special goals. One group of politicians wanted to Increase 
the powers of the central government and hoped to use the military to 
pressure Congress into adopting a taxation program devised by Robert 
Morris. Officers and enlisted men sought to relieve their own finan­
cial problems by collecting back pay and securing promised benefits be­
fore the Army disbanded. Discontent began to mount in the Main Army's 
winter quarters at Newburgh. Washington sympathized with both groups 
but had real fears that the troops might get out of hand. He warned 
Congress that he would spend the winter in camp and "try like a careful 
physician to prevent if possible the disorders getting to an incurable 
height."58
Hints that Congress might renounce the promise of half pay made in 
1778 precipitated action. General McDougall, accompanied by Colonels 
John Brooks and Matthias Ogden, carried a petition to Philadelphia in 
January. Unlike earlier protests, the officers this time spoke for the 
entire Army. Washington, who personally favored stronger central govern­
ment, wrote private letters to several delegates from the nationalist 
faction. He reminded them that the petitioners deserved the first claim 
on Congress' resources. A committee reported favorably on the petition, 
but Congress defeated a resolution offering to commute the pensions with
58. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25: 269-70. Basic to the fol­
lowing discussion are: H. James Henderson, Party Politics in the Con­
tinental Congress (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974), pp. 318, 332-
5; Richard H. Kohn, "The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: A-
merica and the Coup d'Etat," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., 27 
(1970), pp. 187-220; and Max M. Mlntz, Gouveneur Morris and the American 
Revolution (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), pp. 156-61.
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a sum equal to five years' pay. Attention turned immediately to the
Main Army to see how the Continentals would react. A generation that
matured listening to rhetoric about the dangers of a "standing army"
59fully expected trouble.
Alexander Hamilton, now a delegate from New York, urged Washington,
with moderation, to use the Army's demands to push Congress towards
strengthening the national government. Joseph Jones, a more cautious
nationalist delegate from Virginia, gave the Commander-in-Chief a clearer
picture of Congress' financial problems. He also warned Washington that
The ambition of some, and the pressure of distress in others; 
may produce dangerous combinations .... If there are men in 
the army who harbour wicked designs, and are determined to 
blow the coals of discord, they will greatly endeavour to 
hurt the reputation of those adverse to their projects.^
Washington's views came closer to Jones' than Hamilton's. Although he
decided not to become openly involved in a political matter, he prepared
to neutralize a small group within the Army who might act.**1
Those malcontents centered around Horatio Gates, who had rejoined
62
the Main Army on 5 October 1782. In March Major John Armstrong,
59. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25: 430-1. Charles Thomson,
"The Papers of Charles Thomson, Secretary to the Continental Congress," 
New-York Historical Society Collections for 1878, pp. 70-80. Burnett, 
Letters of Congress. 6 : 405-9, 514, 528, 553; 7: 13-15, 29-31, 72-74.
Ford, Journals of Congress. 22: 424-5; 24: 93-95, 145-51, 154-6, 178-9. 
Syrett, Hamilton Papers. 3: 290-3.
60. Worthington C. Ford, ed., Letters of Joseph Jones of Virginia 
(Washington: Department of State, 1889), pp. 97-103. Syrett, Hamilton
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62. George Mesam to John Armstrong (copy), 14 Sep 1780; William Clajon, 
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Gates' aide, prepared an anonymous address to the Army which Gates saw 
and approved. This document called upon the officers to plan a course 
of action to pressure Congress. Armstrong later explained that the pur­
pose of the address was
to prepare their minds for some manly, vigorous Association 
with the other public Creditors - but the timid wretch 
_/ probably either John Brooks or_Walter Stewart_/ discovered 
it to the only man ]_ Washington_/ from whom he had expressly 
engaged to make it known - to be more explicit he betrayed 
it to the Commander in Chief - who, agreeably the original 
plan, was not to have been consulted till some later period.^3
The First Newburgh Address appeared publicly on 10 March, followed 
two days later by a second. Washington reacted swiftly by calling for 
a general assembly of officers, warning Congress in the meantime that, 
although the delay would allow time for hotheads to cool, Congress 
would have to alleviate the underlying problems. With fine dramatic 
flair Washington dominated the officers' meeting on 15 March. He fum­
bled through the first paragraph of a prepared speech, then put on a 
pair of glasses, murmuring that he had not only grown grey in the service 
of his country, but he was also going blind. The speech condemned the 
addresses as a call to mutiny and suggested that the author was a
British agent. The officers, some of whom broke down and cried, quietly
64adopted a very moderate petition to Congress.
Delegates, regardless of their political views, overwhelmingly 
approved of Washington's brilliant handling of the crisis. On 22 March, 
the same day that Washington's report arrived, the Connecticut delega­
tion reversed itself and Congress approved commutation. The officers
63. Armstrong to Gates, 22 and 29 Apr 1783; Gates Papers, New-York 
Historical Society.
64. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26: 211-8, 222-7, 229-34, 323-5.
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accepted that offer, ending any threat of a coup as well as the ideologi­
cal problem that the half-pay pensions had p o s e d . T h i s  settlement 
and the news on 12 March of the preliminary peace treaty cleared the 
way for Congress to dismantle the Army. It ordered an end to hostili­
ties on 11 April and gave approval to the text of the preliminary treaty 
four days later. Washington implemented the armistice at noon on 19 
April -- eight years to the day after the first shots at Lexington.^ 
Washington and Lincoln promptly worked out the mechanics of dis­
banding the Army, and Congress adopted a general resolution on the sub­
ject on 23 April. The policy represented a compromise between those 
who hesitated to act until the British evacuated their last posts and 
others who wished a swift disbandment to stop expenses. Congress decided 
that duration enlistments expired only with the ratification of a de­
finitive treaty but allowed the Commander-in-Chief to furlough the troops 
at his discretion. That device enabled the Army to reassemble if nego­
tiations collapsed. Other instructions on 26 May specified that all 
detachments march home under the control of officers and allowed the 
men to keep their arms as a bonus. ^
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Washington announced the furlough policy on 2 June. General Heath 
supervised the arrangement of the remaining men into units. Heath com­
pleted his task on 15 June and six days later the Main Army moved into 
garrison at West Point. The force consisted of 4 infantry regiments 
from Massachusetts, 1 from Connecticut, 5 companies from New Hampshire, 
2 from Hazen's regiment, and 6 artillery companies: 2 from the 2d Con­
tinental Artillery Regiment and 4 from the 3d. A provisional light
corps under Lieutenant Colonel William Hull marched into Westchester
68County to help restore civil government to that strife-torn region.
The rest of the Army, including the troops from the Southern and Wes­
tern Departments, went home on furlough.
On 17 August 1783 Washington turned command of West Point over to
Knox and set out for Congress.^ The previous year and a half had pre­
sented difficult challenges which he had successfully met. In 1782 he
sustained morale in the absence of action and honed the Main Army to 
its peak of training and efficiency. At Newburgh he crushed the first 
hint of army action which went against the ideals of the Revolution. 
During June he supervised the reduction of a wartime Continental Army 
to a small force suited to peacetime missions. Washington now turned 
his attention to the composition of that "peace establishment."
68. Ibid., 24: 403. Regimental Orders, 10 and H  Jun 1783; 2d Contin­
ental Artillery Orderly Books, New-York Historical Society. Regimental 
Orders, 8 , 9, and 11 Jun 1783; 3d Continental Artillery Orderly Books, 
New-York Historical Society. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26: 
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Peace*
The important transformation to a peacetime force still faced 
Washington and Congress in the fall of 1783. Objections to a Contin­
ental Army enlisted for the duration of the war ended in late 1776 when 
Congress realized that single-year regiments modeled on the Provincials 
of the colonial period did not fit the realities of a long war. Those 
same ideological arguments resurfaced, however, during the debate over 
the legality of any permanent army in peacetime. The framework of dis­
cussion established in 1783 and 1784 colored the development of the 
United States Army for the remainder of the century.^
Planning actually began in April 1783 at the request of Alexander 
Hamilton's Congressional committee appointed to investigate the subject. 
The Commander-in-Chief discussed options with key officers before sub­
mitting the Army's official views to Hamilton on 2 May. Significantly, 
the generals agreed on the basic needs of a peace establishment. Wa­
shington recommended four components; a small regular army, a uniformly 
trained and organized militia, a system of arsenals, and a military 
academy. He wanted four infantry regiments, each assigned to a specific 
sector of the frontier, plus an artillery regiment. The regimental 
organizations he proposed followed Continental Army patterns in general 
but provided for expanded strength in wartime. Washington expected the 
militia to serve as a reserve for the regulars and the military academy 
to train artillery and engineering officers. Steuben and Duportail
70. The best discussion of military policy from the establishment of the 
peacetime force through the start of the Jefferson administration is 
Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of
the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (New York; Free Press, 
1975).
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submitted separate proposals which largely echoed Washington's for
71
Congress' consideration.
Congress tabled the report of Hamilton's committee on 12 May, but 
realized that some troops had to remain on duty until the British evacu­
ated New York City and several frontier posts. The delegates told Wa­
shington to release the men enlisted for the duration on furloughs and 
retain those enlisted for fixed periods as temporary garrisons. A de­
tachment of the latter from West Point reoccupied New York City without 
incident on 25 November. Unfortunately, Steuben's July effort to ne­
gotiate a transfer of the frontier forts with General Frederick Haldi- 
mand collapsed and the British retained control of them into the l790's. 
The failure of that plan and the realization that most remaining enlist­
ments expired before June 1784 led Washington to order Knox, his choice 
as the commander of the peacetime army, to release all but 500 Infantry 
and 100 artillerymen. The former regrouped as Jackson's Continental 
Regiment under Colonel Henry Jackson of Massachusetts. The single 
artillery company, John Doughty's New Yorkers, came from the remnants 
of the 2d Continental Artillery Regiment.^
71. Syrett, Hamilton Papers, 3: 317-22. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 
7: 150. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26; 315-6, 355, 374-98, 
479, 483-96. "Armand Papers," p. 359. Elizabeth S. Kite, Brigadier- 
General Louis Lebegue Duportail. Commondant of Engineers in the Contin­
ental Army (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press for_the Institut Francais
de Washington, 1933), pp. 263-70. Memorandum /_dated 1783_/, Steuben 
Papers, New-York Historical Society. Other officers submitting opinions 
to Washington included Hand, Pickering, Knox, Gouvion, Rufus Putnam, 
Heath, Ebenezer Huntington, Armand, and Governor George Clinton.
72. Ford, Journals of Congress, 24; 337. Magazine of American History, 
9 (1883), pp. 254-5. Sebastian Bauman to George Clinton, 22 Aug 1783; 
Bauman Papers, New-York Historical Society. Fitzpatrick, Writings of 
Washington. 26: 368-9, 399-400, 480; 27: 16-18, 61-63, 120-1, 221,
255-9, 278-9.
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Congress' proclamation on 18 October 1783 which thanked the troops 
for faithful service also approved Washington's reductions. The Com­
mander- in- Chief released his own Farewell Order to the Philadelphia 
newspapers for nationwide distribution to the furloughed men. In the 
message he expressed his gratitude to the officers and men for their 
assistance and reminded them that
The singular interpositions of Providence in our feeble 
condition were such, as could scarcely escape the atten­
tion of the most unobserving; while ^he unparalleled 
perseverence of the Armies of the U/ nited_/ States, 
through almost every possible suffering and discourage­
ment for the space of eight long years, was little 
short of a standing m i r a c l e . ^3
Washington believed that blending persons from every colony into "one
patriotic band of Brothers" represented a major accomplishment, and he
74
called on the veterans to continue this devotion in civilian life.
Washington said a personal farewell to the Main Army's remaining 
officers on 4 December at Fraunces' Tavern in New York City. On 23 
December he appeared in Congress, then sitting at Annapolis, and re­
turned his commission as Commander-in-Chief
Having now finished the work assigned me, 1 retire from the 
great theatre of Action; and bidding an Affectionate fare­
well to this August body under whose orders 1 have so long 
acted, I here offer my Commission, and take my leave of all 
the employments of public life.^
Congress ended the War of American Independence on 14 January 1784 by
73. Ibid.. 27; 223.
74. Ibid.. 27: 167-9, 197-8, 205-8, 213, 222-30. Ford. Journals of 
Congress, 25: 702-5.
75. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 27: 285.
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ratifying the definitive peace treaty that had been signed in Paris on 
76
3 September 1783.
Congress rejected Washington's large peacetime force in June and 
October 1783. Nationalists could not secure enough support for that 
plan. Moderate delegates offered an alternative in April 1784 which 
scaled the army down to 900 men in one artillery and three infantry 
battalions. Congress rejected the idea in part because New York ob­
jected to retaining a predominantly Massachusetts force which might 
side with its home state in a territorial dispute. Another plan calling 
for retaining 350 of the existing men and recruiting 700 new soldiers 
also failed to win support. On 2 June 1784 Congress ordered the dis­
charge of all remaining men except for 25 caretakers at Fort Pitt and 
55 at West Point. The next day it created the peace establishment.^
The plan required four states to raise 700 men for a single year's 
service. Congress instructed the Secretary at War to form them into 
eight infantry and two artillery companies. Pennsylvania's quota of 
260 men allowed it to nominate the lieutenant colonel, the senior of­
ficer. New York and Connecticut each had to raise 165 men and nominate 
a major; the remaining 110 men came from New Jersey. Economy dominated 
this proposal for each major served as a company commander and line
76. Ibid.. 27: 16-18, 277-80, 284-5. Ford. Journals of Congress, 25: 
836-9; 26: 23-31. Washington hoped that Rufus Putnam and other officers 
would colonize the frontier with veterans. He expected them to act as a 
buffer between the Indians and other frontiersmen.
77. Ibid., 24: 337, 492-4, 50ln; 25: 548-9, 722-45; 26: 54-55, 201-7; 
27: 432-7, 486-8, 499-502, 512-24, 530-1. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 
7: 166-9, 189-91, 540-3, 546-7, 550-3, 572-3, 587-8, 604-5. Syrett, 
Hamilton Papers. 3: 211, 378-97. "Thomson papers," pp. 177-9. Fitz­
patrick, Writings of Washington. 24: 140-4, 202-4.
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officers performed all staff duties except chaplain, surgeon, and sur­
geon's mate. Under Joslah Harmar the First American Regiment slowly 
organized and achieved permanent status as an Infantry regiment of the 
Regular Army.
This small peacetime Regular Army gradually expanded over the next 
decade, led by Continental veterans. It inherited the rules, regula­
tions, and traditions of the Continental Army. Steuben's Blue Book 
remained the official manual for the regulars, as well as the militia 
of most states, until Winfield Scott adapted the 1791 French Army Regu­
lations for American use. At Fallen Timbers in 1794 Anthony Wayne 
applied the techniques of wilderness operations perfected by Sullivan's 
1779 expedition against the Iroquois. The integration of ex-Continen­
tals into the militia, coupled with the passage of a national militia
bill in 1792, improved the military responsiveness of that institution
78
until the veterans began to age.
America's victory in the War of American Independence surprised 
many European observers. Frenchmen tended to attribute it to a fron­
tier mystique: "it may be asserted that North-America is entirely
military, and inured to war, and that new levies may continually be made
78. Lyle 0. Brundage, "The Organization, Administration, and Training 
of the United States Ordinary and Volunteer Militia, 1792-1861" (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1958), pp. 340-93. Jeffrey Kim­
ball, "The Battle of Chippewa: Infantry Tactics in the War of 1812,"
Military Affairs. 31 (1967), pp. 169-86. Harrison M. Ethridge, "Gover­
nor Patrick Henry and the Reorganization of the Virginia Militia, 1784- 




without making new soldiers." Loyalists and some British observers
suggested instead that the British did more to lose the war than the
80
Americans did to win it. Many modern historians feel that the British 
faced insurmountable logistical obstacles and suffered from bad leader­
ship, particularly on the political level. Others see the militia, 
either as guerrillas or as the enforcement arm of Revolutionary govern­
ment, as the most important military institution. It limited British 
authority to those areas physically occupied by troops. As the war
became a global struggle, Great Britain's manpower reserves could not
81sustain the strain.
The militia did play a very important role in the War of American 
Independence. Particularly in the first several years of the war its 
political functions probably were indispensable. As a military insti­
tution the militia, supported by state troops, continued the traditional 
colonial responsibility for local defense and remained a general reserve 
of men in arms. It could not operate effectively as a main battle force 
at any distance from home or for an extended period of time. Congress 
recognized that fact from the beginning of the war and turned to full-time
79. Marquis de Chastellux, Travels in North-America, in the years 1780, 
1781, and 1782 ... (2 vols., London: G. G. J. Robinson, 1787), 1; 19.
Also see Orville Theodore Murphy, Jr., "French Contemporary Opinion of 
the American Revolutionary Army" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
Minnesota, 1957). __ _
80. For example: C _/ harles_/ Stedman, The History of the Origin, Pro­
gress and Termination of the American War (2 vols., Dublin: Privately
printed, 1794), 2: 499.
81. Summaries of recent scholarship are Stanley J. Underdahl, ed.c 
Military History of the American Revolution: The Proceedings of the 6th
Military History Symposium United States Air Force Academy 10-11 October 
1974 (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1976) and Don Higgin­
botham, ed., Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War: Selected Essays
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978).
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regular troops, the Continentals. As long as a field array of Contin­
entals remained in the vicinity, a British commander had to concentrate 
on it, not on the militia.
Britain's defeat cannot be explained solely by the problems of a 
3,000-mile line of communications. The mother country sustained a war 
effort for eight years, five of them after North America became a secon­
dary theater in a global conflict. Logistics and the Atlantic acted as 
a handicap, particularly by increasing the interval between the time a 
casualty occurred and the arrival of a replacement, yet the British 
consistently placed more regulars and military supplies in their com­
manders' hands than Congress did. British seapower, unchallenged by 
America, could have been extremely valuable along the coast. Washington's 
forces offset it in the field with better organization of land transport. 
American commanders used their mobility to outmaneuver their opponents. 
When forced to flee, as in the Tetreat through New Jersey or Greene's 
race to the Dan, they could always escape to secure areas and reorganize. 
That ability to outdistance pursuit also robbed British battlefield vic­
tories of decisive impact.
Continental infantry regiments generally had superior organization 
after 1775. The official structure approved by Congress, usually re­
flecting Washington's desires, made American units more efficient on 
paper than British or German. Greater line combat strength, higher 
ratios of officers and noncommissioned officers, and a developed regi­
mental staff produced a powerful and responsive regiment. In practice 
units of both combatants operated below ideal strength. Continental 
regiments, however, normally sustained company officer and noncommissioned
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officer levels better than their opponents', preserving the leadership 
essential for a prompt response to changing tactical situations. The 
British never matched the permanent brigade instituted by the Continen­
tals in 1777. These factors allowed the Americans greater control 
even in semi-dispersed formations and suited the Continental Army's 
belief in infantry marksmanship. The two-rank battle formation enhanced 
this advantage. Honed by a doctrine of aimed fire and the use of train­
ing which included target practice, the Continentals often inflicted
82
heavier casualties on the British in a battle and dominated skirmishes.
Knox's artillerymen used better organization and doctrine. They 
employed the newer concept of concentrating fire on infantry targets; 
the British used counterbattery fire. Particularly at Monmouth tactical 
use of regimental headquarters as an intervening echelon of command en­
abled Knox to mass guns for a specific transitory mission. More impor­
tant, assigning a company of artillery to each permanent brigade devel­
oped close teamwork between the arms. Rotating companies between gar­
rison, general support, and direct support assignments maintained train­
ing and insured that every company could perform any mission in an emer­
gency. Once Americans overcame early procurement problems Knox could 
tailor the armament of each company to its specific task.
82. Bernard A. Uhlendorf, ed., Revolution in America; Confidential 
Letters 1776-1784 of Adjutant General Major Baurmeister of the Hessian 
Forces (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957), pp. 348-56.
Charlotte S. J. Epplng, ed., Journal of Du Rol the Elder Lieutenant and 
Adjutant in the Service of the Duke of Brunswick, 1776-1778 (New York: 
D. Appleton and Co., 1911), pp. 107-8. John Graves Slmcoe, Simcoe's 
Military Journal ... (New York: Bartlett & Welford, 1844), pp. 21-22,
98-99. William Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution ... (2 
vols., New York: David Longworth, 1802), 2: 270.
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The mounted arm of the Continental Army never had the opportunity 
to develop into a battlefield force, although William Washington's 
troopers gave a fine account of themselves in the later phases of sou­
thern operations. The dragoons did perform well in the original mis­
sion of reconnaissance. Theoretical development and practical necessity 
combined to produce the 1781 legion, an excellent configuration for 
r.arrying out this role in the prevailing conditions. The partisan 
corps, a European concept, developed into an excellent long-range inde­
pendent force that could stiffen local irregulars.
A well-rounded group of support troops backed the combat units. 
Unlike the British Army, Washington had specialized units to perform 
ordnance, maintenance, quartermaster, and military police functions. 
Highly trained engineers, both officers and units, functioned well in 
offensive or defensive assignments after 1777. All units, presided 
over by a competent general staff, functioned by 1782 as a team equal 
or superior in quality to any European army of the day.
The officers of the Continental Army in the beginning owed their 
selection to political rather than military credentials. Yet in crises 
over the years, including the Newburgh incident, they justified their 
reputation for reliability. Experience nurtured latent talents and 
produced an effective team of commanders, although few individual mem­
bers could be called "great captains." Once his trusted subordinates 
(Greene, Heath, Sullivan, Stirling, Lincoln, and McDougall particularly) 
became commanders of territorial departments, Washington assumed a more 
active role in general policy. His practice of consulting with his 
subordinates, usually In a Council of War, has frequently been wrongly
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Interpreted to mean that a committee ruled the Army. This conclusion 
misjudges his desire to allow each officer to state his opinions and 
feel that he was participating in the war effort. Washington, however, 
was the Commander-in-Chief in every respect. He alone carried the 
burden, and to him is due the credit. Even his opponents understood
Q O
that basic fact.
Although tradition in the United States depicts the Continental 
Army as a hardy group of yeomen farmers and middle-class tradesmen under 
amateur officers defeating one of the best European armies in the world, 
an army of lower class troops commanded by aristocrats, after 1776 the 
Continental Army did not fit that image. The long-term Continentals 
also tended to come from the poorer, rootless elements of American socie­
ty to whom the Army, despite its problems, seemed to offer greater oppor­
tunity than civilian life. Enlisted men were young (over half were under 
twenty-two when they enlisted), mostly common laborers, and so poor as 
to be virtually tax-exempt. A sizeable minority were either hired sub­
stitutes or not native to the place where they enlisted.^
83. George Athan Billias, ed., George Washington's Generals (New York: 
Morrow, 1964), p. xvi. George Washington, "Washington's Opinion of His 
General Officers," Magazine of American History, 3 (1879), pp. 81-88. 
Stedman, American War, 2: 448.
84. The best studies of the social composition of the Army are: Mark
Edward Lender, "The Enlisted Line: The Continental Soldiers of New Jer­
sey" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Rutgers University, 1975); Edward C. Papenfuse 
and Gregory A. Stiverson, "General Smallwood's Recruits: The Peacetime
Career of the Revolutionary Private," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., 
30 (1973), pp. 117-32; John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections
on the Military Struggle for American Independence (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1976), pp. 171-3; John B. B. Trussell, Jr., The Penn­
sylvania Line: Regimental Organization and Operations, 1775-1783 (Har­
risburg: Pennsylvania Historical & Museum Commission, 1977), pp. 243-56;
and John P. Sellers, "The Common Soldier in the American Revolution,"
in Underdal, Military History of the American Revolution, pp. 152-8.
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The officer corps, on the other hand, came from the upper social 
strata. In the deferential society of eighteenth-century America mem­
bers of the leading families naturally assumed leadership in the regu­
lar forces just as they did in the militia, politics, law, the church, 
and business. Although it was possible for an enlisted man to become 
an officer, particularly during the reorganizations of 1776 and 1777, 
Washington18 desire to maintain the distance between officers and men 
as a disciplinary tool kept them from rising far. In small colonies a
basic family unit, reinforced by cousins, in-laws, political allies,
85
and business associates dominated entire regiments.
In a force of this nature discipline posed a problem. Desertion 
rates ran high, although few men actively joined the British. Basic 
morale factors explained this phenomenon during the Revolution. Washing­
ton coped by developing, in conjunction with his Judge Advocates, a 
system that adapted British military justice to the conditions of Ameri­
can society in the l770's. His approach was mild by contemporary Euro­
pean standards, but extremely sophisticated. He executed a few indivi­
duals for particularly serious crimes. The rest of the time Washington 
preferred to issue last-second reprieves that extracted a maximum psy­
chological advantage from a situation that resembled a morality play.
Washington led the Continental Army to victory in the longest war 
in American history before Vietnam. Together he and his men overcame 
physical and spiritual obstacles which at times appeared insurmountable.
85. Lender, "Enlisted Line," pp. 127-33. Sidney Kaplan, "Rank and 
Status Among Massachusetts Continental Officers," American Historical 
Review, 56 (1951), pp. 318-26.
Washington's ability to hold the Army together stands as a tribute to 
his Inspirational leadership and great judgement. That he also moulded 
it into a crack professional fighting force and then disbanded it with­
out incident when economic considerations forced him to do so won him 
great praise from his contemporaries, for it conformed to the highest 
standards expected by men schooled in the Whlgglsh tradition.
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4 Apr 1776-20 Mar 1777 
20 Mar 1777-7 Nov 1778 
7 Nov 17 78-Nov 1779
25 Jun 1775-19 Aug 1777
19 Aug 1777-17 Apr 1778
17 Apr 1778-19 Oct 1778
19 Oct 1778-20 Nov 1778
20 Nov 1778-25 Jun 1781
25 Jun 1781-15 Oct 1781
15 Oct 1781-21 Nov 1781
21 Nov 1781-29 Aug 1782
29 Aug 1782-15 Jan 1783
12 Nov 1776-21 Dec 1776
21 Dec 1776-12 May 1777
12 May 1777-16 Mar 1778
16 Mar 1778-20 May 1778
20 May 1778-24 Nov 1778
24 Nov 1778-27 Nov 1779
27 Nov 1779-21 Feb 1780
21 Feb 1780-21 Jun 1780
21 Jun 1780-3 Aug 1780
3 Aug 1780-25 Sep 1780
25 - 28 Sep 1780
28 Sep 1780-5 Oct 1780
5 - 17 Oct 1780
17 Oct 1780-11 May 1781
11 May 1781-24 Jun 1781
24 Jun 1781- 18 Jan 1782
18 Jan 1782-24 Aug 1782
24 Aug 1782-end of war
1 Mar 1776-9 Sep 1776
9 Sep 1776-25 Sep 1778
25 Sep 1778-13 Jun 1780
13 Jun 1780-31 Oct 1780
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b. Appointed but never served in that capacity.
c. Appointed but troops withdrawn from department before assumed command.
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GLOSSARY
AGENT. In the British Army a civilian appointed by the colonel of a 
regiment to handle all the financial accounts of the unit.
ADJUTANT. The regimental staff officer responsible for the unit's ad­
ministrative paperwork and for the supervision of daily details.
AIDE-MAJOR. Archaic term for ADJUTANT.
BATMEN. Hired servants who cared for the baggage and personal effects 
of an officer. Also used to describe privates detailed to perform 
these functions.
BATTALION. The basic tactical unit of eighteenth century warfare composed 
of a group of COMPANIES or PLATOONS and usually commanded in combat 
by a LIEUTENANT COLONEL. In both the British and Continental Armies 
most REGIMENTS had only a single battalion, and the terms were vir­
tually synonymous.
BOMBARDIER. An artillery specialist. Rank given to privates who prepared 
ammunition and fired mortars. The bombardier merited supplemental 
pay for his more hazardous duty.
BRIGADIER. In the British Army a rank held only in wartime. Given to 
the officer commanding a brigade, it fell between the ranks of 
LIEUTENANT COLONEL and COLONEL and was not a general officer.
CAMP-COLOUR-MEN. A duty detail consisting of approximately one man per 
company to assist the regimental QUARTERMASTER in preparing a new 
camp site. The camp colors were small pennants used to mark the 
outlines of the regimental area.
CAPTAIN. The commanding officer of a company or troop.
CAPTAIN-LIEUTENANT. In infantry or cavalry units where field officers 
also served as captains of specific companies, the lieutenant who 
exercised actual command of the colonel's company. He ranked as 
the senior LIEUTENANT in the regiment. In artillery companies the 
second ranking officer.
COLONEL. The commanding officer of a regiment. In the British Army this 
was a titular rank and the colonel was concerned only with financial 
matters, in the Continental Army the colonel actually commanded and 
had responsibility for tactical leadership as well as administration.
COMMISSARY. A civil official performing various logistical duties.
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COMMISSIONED OFFICER. An officer who exercised authority by virtue of 
a commission issued by the King or Continental Congress. Commis­
sions ranged from ensign to general. In the British Array they 
were a form of property and could be bought or sold under govern­
mental supervision.
COMPANY. The smallest administrative unit of infantry or artillery. In 
both the British and Continental Armies companies could be either 
separate entities or components of a REGIMENT. In both armies it 
was virtually synonymous with the tactical PLATOON.
COMPANY-GRADE OFFICER. The officers serving in company-sized units: 
CAPTAIN, CAPTAIN-LIEUTENANT, LIEUTENANT, ENSIGN, and CORNET.
CONDUCTOR. A member of the civil staff responsible for the supervision 
of depots, magazines, or groups of wagons.
CONTINENTAL ARMY. Those units of regular soldiers enlisted for full-time 
service, generally for extended periods of time, and for whom the 
ultimate authority for their organization, maintenance, administra­
tion, and discipline remained the Continental Congress.
CORNET. The most junior officer in a troop of cavalry. Equivalent to 
an ENSIGN in an infantry company.
CORPORAL. A noncommissioned officer who normally was responsible for 
supervising a squad. In combat corporals served in the line of 
battle with the privates.
ENSIGN. The lowest-ranking commissioned officer in an infantry company. 
In the Continental Army a regiment's ensigns carried the regimental 
colors on a rotating basis and were particularly responsible for 
the dress and cleanliness of the company.
FIELD OFFICER. Officers concerned with the operations of a regiment as 
a whole. COLONELS, LIEUTENANT COLONELS, and MAJORS were field 
officers.
FIREWORKER. The rank of the youngest lieutenants in the artillery.
They were particularly responsible for preparing ammunition.
GENERAL. The category of officer responsible for the command of large 
units. In the British Army there were three ranks of general of­
ficer: major general, lieutenant general, and general (a still 
higher rank, field marshal, was not employed in North America).
The Continental Army had two ranks: brigadier general (normally
commanding a brigade) and major general (division). Washington's 
rank as "General and Commander-in-Chief" was unique.
GUNNER. An artillery private with special status derived from respon­
sibility for aiming and loading an artillery piece. He received 
higher pay than a MATROSS.
304
LANCE CORPORAL. An acting CORPORAL. In eighteenth century European 
armies the rank given to future officers receiving on the job 
training. Both the British and Continental Armies preferred to 
call such individuals "cadets" or "volunteers" and not give them 
pay or official standing in the army until they were commissioned.
LIEUTENANT. The middle rank of COMPANY-GRADE OFFICER. When organiza­
tions contained more than one lieutenant per company, the distinc­
tion was drawn between first, second, and third lieutenants.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL. The second in command of a regiment. In the
British Army this individual actually commanded the regiment in 
the field. In the Continental Army when a lieutenant colonel 
was the senior officer of the regiment he was usually called a 
lieutenant colonel commandant.
LINE. The component of the Continental Army under the auspices of a
specific state. Also used to refer to the aggregate of the light 
dragoon regiments or of the artillery regiments. The term applied 
only to combat units, and was used for administrative purposes, 
particularly to determine seniority for promotions. In battlefield 
dispositions the segment of the army deployed in linear formation.
MAJOR. The lowest ranking FIELD OFFICER in a regiment, particularly 
responsible for administration. Infantry majors were the only 
regimental officers who went into battle mounted, and had the 
responsibility to rally the regiment if its line became broken.
MATROSS. The term applied to artillery privates. Matrosses performed 
the semi-skilled tasks in firing a cannon.
MILITIA. The basic military force of each state or colony, nominally 
composed of the total male population capable of bearing arms and 
organized into geographical units. State governments always 
exercised final authority over the militia even when it served 
under operational control of the Continental Army. Because it was 
essentially a local defense organization, provisional units performed 
most of the extended service required of the militia.
MINER. A special engineer soldier who constructed tunnels during siege 
operations.
M1NUTEMAN. A member of the MILITIA responsible for immediate response 
to an emergency. Minutemen received extra training and partial 
monetary compensation. This organization was used only in 1775-1776.
NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER. SERGEANTS, CORPORALS, and drum and fife majors 
appointed by the regimental commander to exercise immediate supervi­
sion over privates, drummers, and fifers. Only the regimental com­
mander or a court martial could remove them from their rank.
PAYMASTER. The officer formally charged with the care of a regiment's 
funds and the payment of the troops.
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PIONEER. Troops responsible for the repair of roads, and occasionally 
with the preparation of fortifications.
PLATOON. The tactical unit of the smallest size in the eighteenth cen­
tury. Normally a BATTALION would deploy in eight platoons. In 
European armies platoons were frequently temporary formations exis­
ting only for a specific battle; in the British and Continental 
Armies COMPANIES and platoons were virtually synonymous.
QUARTERMASTER. An officer responsible for logistical functions relating 
to housing, feeding, equipping, and moving troops.
RANK AND FILE. The privates and corporals of a unit. A classification 
used to reflect the actual combat strength of a unit deployed for 
linear combat. Also referred to as the "bayonet strength" of the 
unit.
REGIMENT. The basic administrative unit of eighteenth century armies.
In both the British and Continental Armies regiments normally had 
only a single BATTALION, so the terms were used synonymously.
SAPPER. Special engineering troops used to dig entrenchments ("saps") 
during sieges.
SERGEANT. The noncommissioned officer aTmed with a halberd and used to 
supervise discipline and act as a file closer in battle.
STATE TROOPS. Regular forces, frequently for full-time service, raised 
on the authority of a state or colony government. Unlike Contin­
entals, the state governments remained the ultimate authority for 
state troops. They sometimes operated with the Continental Army 
for extended periods.
SUBALTERN. Company-grade officer below the rank of captain: LIEUTENANT,
ENSIGN, or CORNET.
WARRANT OFFICER. An officer exercising authority through a warrant 
rather than a commission, and usually assigned to staff duty. 
Warrants were issued by lesser authorities than a commission.
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at every level from company to army, and to cross-reference the records 
of the other major participants in the war.
My research indicated that scholars have not always exploited this 
richness of primary accounts. The recent revolution in technology 
which makes microfilming and reproduction possible on an affordable 
scale should go far to opening up hitherto neglected materials. I 
found that certain materials were especially valuable in my approach to 
the structure of the Continental Army. Unit records, particularly the 
various type8 of Tolls and roBters maintained by different headquarters, 
provide a base of data which an be tapped for empirical verification of 
organizational concepts. Doctrine expressed in the several regulations 
and drill manuals is explained and highlighted by official and private 
accounts of engagements and reorganizations, particularly by officers
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of field grade. Official transcripts of courts martial and courts of 
inquiry, in which all the concerned parties were military men, are 
another important source of information. Similarly, the accounts of 
the war transmitted by the German professional soldiers in the service 
of Great Britain to their comrades back in Europe represent a techni­
cally-oriented, surprisingly impartial set of documents.
This bibliography follows a somewhat unusual arrangement. I have 
grouped the most useful printed sources and doctoral dissertations ac­
cording to subject matter, A discussion of manuscript collections and 
a list of major American Imprints of military manuals published during 
or prior to the Revolution precedes the topical arrangements. General 
and reference works are followed by sections dealing with aspects of the 
military, political, and diplomatic background of the war. The next 
sections deal with the Continental Army's general officers, various 
headquarters functions, and specialized areas of service. Items which 
relate to specific states are grouped next, proceeding in geographical 
order from New Hampshire to Georgia, and culminating with a section on 
miscellaneous Continental Army units. The remaining sections deal with 
the other major military forces and the operations of the war. The 
bibliography ends with a brief list of the most important works on the 
immediate post-war American military developments. 1 believe that this 
arrangement will make it possible for a reader to immediately decide if 
my comments on a particular topic are based on sound scholarship.
Manuscripts relating to the War of American Independence are not 
concentrated in Federal hands, but remain widely scattered, primarily in 
state archives and in state and local historical societies. The National 
Archives and Records Service does have custody over two groups of
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records which were of particular value in research for this dissertation. 
The Papers of the Continental Congress (Record Group 360) include more 
than the official journals of the Congress and the papers of its various 
committees. They also Include Important bodies of material on the Board 
of War, and a file of all correspondence received from senior military 
commanders. The War Department Collection of Revolutionary War Records 
(Record Group 93) largely related to logistical matters and muster rolls. 
Most of the latter were laboriously rebuilt following a series of fires 
early in the nineteenth century and the result is by no means complete. 
The other Important Federal repository, the Library of Congress, has a 
wider range of materials. Key items there include the George Washington 
Papers and the Peter Force Transcripts. The Library also has microfilm 
copies of numerous collections located in Europe and elsewhere in America.
1 selected the New-York Historical Society in New York City as the 
central archival collection outside the Washington area on which to 
concentrate. One important consideration was accessibility. Even more 
significant, however, was the fact that it contains the papers of those 
individuals that 1 considered to be most important for my work. The 
Baron von Steuben Papers provided me with most of the Important insights 
into the emergence of a tactical doctrine found outside the Washington 
Papers. Its collection of Orderly Books and the Erskine-DeWltt Map 
Collection served to illuminate other important points. Among the major 
Continental Army generals whose papers have not been published, the 
Society houses those of Horatio Gates, Alexander McDougall, and William 
Alexander (Lord Stirling). Each of those collections proved to be of 
enormous value. Lesser figures' papers were also useful, especially 
those of James Clinton, Marlnus Willett, Walter Stewart, Edward Hand,
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Allen McLane, and Lachlan McIntosh. The Society represents a concen­
trated source of information on the Continental Army's artillery in the 
form of Important regimental orderly books plus the papers of John 
Lamb, Ebenezer Stevens, Sebastian Bauman, and Thomas Machin.
While I did not attempt to exhaustively mine all the various 
repositories of manuscripts relating to the British Army, I did use 
one collection to provide balance to my work on the Continentals. The 
Colonial Williamsburg Foundation's set of photostats, The Headquarters 
Papers of the British Army in America, represents the official papers 
of Sir Guy Carleton, the final British Commander-in-Chief in North 
America. As such, it Includes file copies of the important correspon­
dence of his predecessors and that of various subordinates in semi-au­
tonomous commands. The original documents, calendared by the Historical 
Manuscripts Commission as the American Manuscripts in the Royal Institu­
tion. were returned to Great Britain in 1957 and are currently Class 
30/55 in the Public Record Office.
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